Quote:
Originally Posted by 28_Condor
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Not my research -
thank Glider and lane in particular, who have spent hours delving into archives - note that it can cost about £3.50 to copy each of the files (?), so it adds up - and who have presented these, and many other papers, time and again in this thread, only to have them sneered at, dismissed as being "scraps of paper used out of context", or a "misuse of information" or "propaganda" by the likes of Barbi and Crumpp, who have not presented a shred of real evidence showing that the majority of frontline RAF fighters were still using 87 Octane fuel during the battle.
As for misusing and misrepresenting material? Not so long ago Crumpp,
in post #921 for example, quoting A.P.1590B of March 1940 (attachment), tried to make out that the modifications needed on Merlin IIs and IIIs to use 100 Octane fuel were so extensive that very few of them could be modified in time for the battle...
What he conveniently left out is that the necessary modifications had already been introduced on the production lines, and the document was discussing modifying
older engines to the required standards.
Starting way back in
post #376 Crumpp, quoting from a pre-war paper said:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Crumpp
That is the RAF built up a strategic reserve and it was not until September 1940 that 16 squadrons from Fighter Command converted to 100 octane.
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Crumpp has been asked time and again to present documentary evidence that only 16 squadrons of RAF fighters used 100 Octane fuel, and that the RAF went ahead with its pre-war plans, regardless of the fact that a full scale air assault was underway, but of course he has not come up with anything.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Crumpp
Sure, some of consumed fuel was used in aircraft and all of it issued to the fields operating those aircraft. It appears that we have 16 squadrons on 31 July 1940 and we still have 16 squadrons by September.
The next thing you seem to refuse to deal with is 87 grade remains the predominate fuel in the RAF until September 1940. Only then do we see 100 grade beginning to equal 87 grade. That corresponding rise in consumption very much agrees with Morgan and Shacklady.
Until then, it appears the RAF is simply building up the logistical base required to support the eventual change to 100 grade.
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He has not explained how the RAF managed to
issue 61,000 tons or 19,245,500 imperial gallons of 100 Octane fuel July - October 1940,
consumed 52,000 tons (16,406,000 gal), while needing only 15,184 tons (4,790,552 gal) to fly
all defensive sorties, day and night, flown between 10 July - 6 October 1940
post #784. And all the while the reserves of 100 Octane fuel continued to increase.
He has not explained how only 16 squadrons of single-engined fighters managed to consume all that fuel. Instead we get blather about "strategic reserves".
Nor has Crumpp explained, and it has not yet registered with him, that heavy bombers, flying boats etc were all still using 87 Octane fuel, which might explain why it was "predominate".
Crumpp has had all of this explained very carefully, time and time again, but has continued to insist, and will continue to insist that he alone is right. If nothing else it's entertaining.