Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[TomcatViP]

To KF, VIP et al:

Could you please explain in concise detail how the RAF selected the 16 squadrons, and how the RAF made sure that only 16 squadrons at a time used 100 Octane fuel, and could you provide documented evidence of the processes and logistics used by the RAF to ensure that only 16 squadrons at a time were allowed to use the fuel during the B of B?

Could you please provide some documented evidence that there was a shortage of 100 octane fuel during July, August, such that FC had to stop using the fuel?

Could you please provide documentary evidence of FC pilots (apart from Gladiators, NF Blenheims and Whirlwinds) using 87 octane fuel in combat between July and September 1940?

Pleeease???
For what I said reading the Australian archive is that there was 100oct but the use was not in line with what is put frwd by you and your afficionados. It simple as tht.
I did say tht there is the logical hypothesis that 100 octane was used as a meaning to make available the stock of old fuel (74?) due to the probably huge quantity stocked and the very high price of tht fuel.

It's seems very easy to check to see if I am right or wrong as I said : as we hve the qty of old fuel and 100oct per month and the formula for the blending, just making the math shld give an accurate awnser.

However
I don't take orders from anyone NZTyph and certainly don't think that there is any time left for discussion after being insulted.

You better take tht into account.

This debate is over for me as... there is no debate.

[Al Schlageter]

For what I said reading the Australian archive is that there was 100oct but the use was not in line with what is put frwd by you and your afficionados. It simple as tht.
I did say tht there is the logical hypothesis that 100 octane was used as a meaning to make available the stock of old fuel (74?) due to the probably huge quantity stocked and the very high price of tht fuel.

It's seems very easy to check to see if I am right or wrong as I said : as we hve the qty of old fuel and 100oct per month and the formula for the blending, just making the math shld give an accurate awnser.

However
I don't take orders from anyone NZTyph and certainly don't think that there is any time left for discussion after being insulted.

You better take tht into account.

This debate is over for me as... there is no debate.

What insult?

[lane]

Robert Schlaifer, Development of Aircraft Engines, (Harvard University, Boston, 1950). pp 222 - 223
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Development_of_Aircraft_Engines_Page_222.jpg

[fruitbat]

What insult?

probably showing evidence that he's wrong.

reading this thread, and a few peoples opinion reminds me of this,

http://i755.photobucket.com/albums/xx191/mattman0313/Three-Wise-Monkeys--C117656571.jpg

[41Sqn_Banks]

For what I said reading the Australian archive is that there was 100oct but the use was not in line with what is put frwd by you and your afficionados. It simple as tht.


In 1941 RAAF didn't intend to use 100 octane fuel at that time because they didn't have a engine that required the use of 100 octane. They only had one engine type that required 90 octane fuel. The RAF instead had already engines that required the use of 100 octane fuel (e.g. Merlin XX) and engines that allowed higher operation limits when 100 octane fuel was used (e.g. Merlin III).


I did say tht there is the logical hypothesis that 100 octane was used as a meaning to make available the stock of old fuel (74?) due to the probably huge quantity stocked and the very high price of tht fuel.

It's seems very easy to check to see if I am right or wrong as I said : as we hve the qty of old fuel and 100oct per month and the formula for the blending, just making the math shld give an accurate awnser.


You obviously have missed some statements in the documents. The standard aviation fuel used by the RAAF at this time was 87 octane fuel. This 87 octane fuel aviation fuel was blended by adding additives to 73 octane base fuel. This was the standard process.

As they required 90 octane fuel the they could either blend the 87 octane fuel even more to get 90 octane fuel or they could mix 97 octane fuel with 100 octane fuel. They've chosen to use the later method. Reason: Blending 87 to 90 octane would violate the specification for 90 octane because to much additives have to be added. Therefore this was only a emergency solution.
There was no need for this as they didn't have problems to obtain 100 octane fuel.

[NZtyphoon]

So, lets have a look at the evidence presented in 50 pages that large numbers (up to 2/3rds) of frontline units of Fighter Command were using 87 octane fuel right through until at least September 1940...

A summary of a document, apparently found in the AWM (which cannot find the document) and which was part of a thread from 2004, in another forum; this can only be read by members of that forum. The document itself has not yet been seen by the one who pins 100% faith on its authenticity. Glider already tried this line. The Forum and the thread is easily accessible, for registered AND approved members.

Pre-war documents which planned to have 16 FC and two Blenheim squadrons using 100 Octane by September 1940. There is lots of attention focused on the words "certain" and "concerned", but hardly any on the fact that these are pre-war planning documents.

Quote from Morgan and Shacklady.

Otherwise nada, zip. Lots of bluster and smokescreens and diversions, but no documentary evidence showing that 100 Octane use was restricted to "selected", "concerned" or "certain" frontline Fighter Command units during the Battle of Britain.

When directly asked to build a case, using documentary evidence, for the widespread use of 87 octane fuel by frontline units of Fighter Command during the B of B, the protagonists either go silent, or feel "insulted".

The people who should feel insulted are those who have gone to a huge amount of effort to find and present documents supporting a case for the full scale use of 100 0ctane fuel by frontline FC units, only to be confronted by the same old nonsense, which has also been thrown about on other forums, and in Wikipedia, particularly as I have...only a very passing interest (in) the RAF...

That's it, that's what 50 pages of wrangling boils down to.

[Al Schlageter]

Know what is so said NZt is that these same nay sayers will back at it again in the future with the same lame reasons as history has shown.

[lane]

In the interests of clarity, the following chart taken from Flight - December 2nd, 1943 (http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1943/1943%20-%202839.html) is useful for comparing Schlaifer's manifold pressures, given in inches of mercury in his Development of Aircraft Engines (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Development_of_Aircraft_Engines_Page_222.jpg) depicted above, with the equivalent boost pressures in lbs/sq.in. as used by the British. Schlaifer wrote "Before the middle of 1940, a manifold pressure of 54.3 in. was authorized, giving a combat rating of 1,310 hp at 9,000 feet...". 54.3 in. Hg is the equivalent to +12 lbs/sq.in.. 1,310 hp at 9,000 feet operating at 54.3 in Hg. (+12 lbs /sq.in) is in agreement with the combat rating for the Merlin III given in Alec Harvey-Bailey's The Merlin in Perspective, pg 155 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/merlin3-rating.jpg).

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/boost-inches-hg.jpg

[ACE-OF-ACES]

I think any reasonable person would agree that 100 octane Spits and Hurries were active during BoB..

And based on this thread it is clear that no amount of proof will change the minds of the nay-sayers for what ever reason

The good news is they don't mater!

The only people that mater are the people at 1C.

With that said, I think we should stop wasting time on the nay-sayers and focus on 1C.

To do that we need to pull all this info into one document with one stated objective.

That being adding 100 octane Spits and Hurries to CoD

I think you guys should start a group PM and consider making use of some of the goggle global tools and create a document that includes all this proof in it and submit it to Luither for consideration. Also if needed I would be more than willing to post your results on my web site so when the nay-sayers bring this up again in six months we can simply point them to the link instead of wasting time going around in circles with then again.

[ATAG_Snapper]

Thanks, Lane, that's a handy chart to have on file!

[lane]

Thanks, Lane, that's a handy chart to have on file!

Your welcome ATAG Snapper, I'm glad you too found that chart handy.

Looking at A. R. Ogston's excerpt from History of Aircraft Lubricants (Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. Warrendale, PA USA), p. 12.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/aircraft-lubricants-pg12.jpg

Of particular interest to us is the passage: "The Royal Air Force had used 87 octane fuel until March 1940 when Fighter Command converted all its Spitfire and Hurricane Rolls-Royce Merlin powered fighters to 100 octane (i.e., Grade 100/130). This permitted the maximum manifold pressure of the Merlin II and III engines of the Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant fighters to be raised from 42 ins. Hg to 54 ins. Hg which gave a 30% power increase, that is from 1,000 to 1,310 h.p.

We can see in the table Equivalent Boost Pressures in Different Units (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/boost-inches-hg.jpg) above that 42 ins Hg is equivalent to +6 lbs/sq.in boost and 54 ins. Hg is equivalent to +12 lbs./sq.in. Therefore we can see of course that Ogston is in agreement with Schlaifer's Development of Aircraft Engines (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Development_of_Aircraft_Engines_Page_222.jpg) and Harvey-Bailey's, The Merlin in Perspective (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/merlin3-rating.jpg) posted earlier.

[NZtyphoon]

Thanks, Lane, that's a handy chart to have on file!
Ditto, the article itself is interesting as well, and has been used to update a couple of wikipedia articles http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supermarine_Spitfire_variants:_specifications,_per formance_and_armament#Boost_pressure_measurements

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_P-51_variants#Power_ratings

[CaptainDoggles]

A summary of a document, apparently found in the AWM (which cannot find the document) and which was part of a thread from 2004, in another forum; this can only be read by members of that forum. The document itself has not yet been seen by the one who pins 100% faith on its authenticity.

Here are what I consider to be the relevant posts from that thread, reproduced here for people without an account.


I thought this may be of some help.

http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/100+grade+fuel.jpg

Neil.




Would be more interesting to see a comparison table of 87 Octane in the same format.




Would be more interesting to see a comparison table of 87 Octane in the same format.
Why?




Why?

Because 100 Octane only became available in the UK in mid 1939 with small quantities imported from the US. Even in 1940 large scale imports didn't start until late August. Here's brief history of it's introduction.

"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

Given that large quantities were not available until late August, the volume of usage/week of 87 Octane must be far higher than that quoted for 100 Octane. So to put things into perspective that why I asked for a comparison. :)




http://prodocs.netfirms.com/

Various documents about 100 octane fuel, 1937-39

http://www.lanpartyworld.com/smallwoy/100o1.JPG

http://www.lanpartyworld.com/smallwoy/100o2.JPG

http://www.lanpartyworld.com/smallwoy/100o3.JPG




Why?

Because 100 Octane only became available in the UK in mid 1939 with small quantities imported from the US. Even in 1940 large scale imports didn't start until late August. Here's brief history of it's introduction.

"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

Given that large quantities were not available until late August, the volume of usage/week of 87 Octane must be far higher than that quoted for 100 Octane. So to put things into perspective that why I asked for a comparison. :)
Thats interesting, where does this come from and does it quote refererences?

Two thousand five hundred tons per week = 130,000 tons per year and given that it would have been April by the time the RAF started using 100 grade that total would have been spread out over 9 months, approximately 14,400 tons per month.
This works out at 52,705 Spitfire sorties per month, half that for supply and storage and we still get 26,552 Spitfire sorties.

Edited to include this,
UK 1940 consumption of aviation spirit was 404,000 tons and 100 grade made up 130,000 tons of it, and as far as I know only Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants used this fuel at the time.

The question of +9lbs boost seems strange as everything I have seen states +12lbs.

http://www.fourthfightergroup.com/eagles/spit1-12lbs.jpg

http://www.fourthfightergroup.com/eagles/dowding1.jpg

http://www.fourthfightergroup.com/eagles/dowding2.jpg

+9lbs may have been for those aircraft not so modified

http://www.fourthfightergroup.com/eagles/ap1590b.jpg

Nine pounds boost did not require this modification

http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/twelve.jpg

Maybe unmodified aircraft used +9lbs.

I will visit the NA soon and I will look further into this.


Neil.




Thanks Neil. Great thread BTW, keep it on.

Pips, what is the source from this qoute is taken from? It really gives a new insight to these matters, and a rather different one as the 4thFG website presents it.
This was just sent,by a friend.

>In article <bXadnem5cpH-keujXTWcqA@gbronline.com>, Lawrence Dillard
><lawrenced@gbronline.com> writes
>>Done. Now, with respect, I suggest that you read "I Kept No Diary" by RAF
>>Air Commodore FR (Rod) Banks, 1978.

I have actually read this book, and Banks is wrong when he states that
- "...100 octane became available to Fighter Command ready for the
Battle of Britain through Roosevelt's "cash and carry" compromise."

In fact Britain had been importing 100-octane from three seperate
sources, Shell, Standard Oil and Trinidad Leaseholds, and only
Standard Oil importation was affected by the embargoes involved in
pre-war Neutrality Acts as the others were not US companies and did
not export 100-octane spitit from US terrirtory. 100-octane supply
began in 1937 to selected airfields for trials and was then withdrawn
to build up a large (400,000 ton) reserve stock. I'm read the
official records and even the damn Air Ministry purchase contracts,
something I suspect nobody else commenting on this issue has.

When it comes to the BoB, the British imported as much as Fighter
Command used in July - October 1940 from BP in Abadan alone. Banks
worked for the British Eythyl Corp, a subsidiary of ICI and Eythyl
Export importing tetra-eythyl lead for the Air Ministry, and was
clearly not a party to 100-octane supply policy as a whole. He
confuses Standard Oil's 100-octane supply to the Air Ministry with the
totality of supply, and is unaware of pre-1939 importation despite the
fact that 100-octane had been delivered in barrels by rail to selected
RAF bases as early as May 1937.

>The question is more of where the fuel came from. I haven't got an
>accurate breakdown but I understand 100 octane fuel from several
>sources:
>
>1) British refineries
>2) Dutch Shell refineries (in the US) handed over to British control
>3) US refineries
>4) Refineries in the Caribbean (not sure about this?)
>
>Obviously a lot of it came across the Atlantic (possibly in US tankers),
>but that doesn't necessarily make it supplied by the US.

Here is an extract from a presentation I made on the subject at the
Transatlantic Studies Conference, Dundee in July 2002.

"It has often been asserted that the supply of high-octane aviation
fuel was an operationally-significant factor attributable to American
supply in the Battle of Britain [22]. This rests on two largely
unsubstantiated foundations - firstly, the operational impact of
100-octane fuel to fighter operations, and secondly the paramount
importance of American supply of this fuel.

100-octane fuel allowed aircraft engines to exceed their normal
supercharging limits at lower altitudes. This provided higher power
output with a consequent improvement in performance, without the
premature detonation that would result from doing this with lower
octane value fuel. However, the constraints involved in this facility
are never fully articulated. In fact, exceeding normal supercharger
boost was only permitted for a maximum of five minutes, and the engine
power settings involved in most operational sorties were identical to
those obtained on lower-octane fuel. The level of benefit gained from
increasing supercharger pressures decreased with height, declining to
no additional benefit at or above the full-throttle height of the
engine [23]. Nevertheless, the use of this fuel did confer a real, if
often overstated, operational advantage in terms of speed and rate of
climb at lower altitudes.

A larger problem comes with the assertion that high-octane fuel was
exclusively attributable to American supply. 100-octane fuel was
developed in the mid-30's in the U.S., firstly by Shell and then
Standard Oil, in response to a USAAC requirement [24]. However
British purchasing of this fuel began in March 1937, from three
sources, while the Hartley committee was formed to steer the
development of production expansion for the RAF. 100-octane fuel was
also produced within Britain [25].

100-octane fuel was made by blending additives (iso-octanes) with
lower-octane feedstock and tetra-ethyl lead. Iso-octanes were
originally manufactured by a process of hydrogenation, pioneered by
Shell and copied by Standard Oil in the United States. Almost all of
the British supply of 100-octane fuel in the period up to 1940 was
dependent upon this process, but the massive expansion of high-octane
fuel production which followed was contingent upon the development of
iso-octane production by another process (alkylation). This was
discovered by British Petroleum in Britain in 1937. BP production of
100-octane fuel using this process began at Abadan in Iraq in 1940,
and in that year sufficient 100-octane fuel was delivered from this
source alone to replace that issued to Fighter Command during the
critical period of the Battle of Britain [26].

The procurement of 100-octane fuel for RAF use involved the use of
several sources of supply, and was not contingent upon supply from the
United States in isolation, as Table 2 indicates.

Table2. 100 Octane fuel production: current production estimates
exclusive of American domestic production, November 1940. From PRO
AIR 19/254 - 23A

Plant Production (tons per annum)
Heysham, UK 150,000
Billingham, UK 15,000
Stanlow, UK 55,000
Abadan 50,000
Trinidad 80,000
Palembang, Dutch East Indies 50,000
Pladejoe, Dutch East Indies 50,000
Aruba, Dutch West Indies 50,000

After early 1941, to economise on tanker shipping tonnage and take
advantage of lend-lease supply, a deliberate policy decision was made
to favour "short-haul" supply across the Atlantic instead of the
longer routes associated with sources of supply in the Dutch East
Indies and Persia. Nevertheless, this indicates a more complex
historical picture regarding the supply of 100-octane fuel than is
admitted in most accounts. The availability of 100-octane fuel for
the RAF in the Battle of Britain was contingent upon a variety of
sources of supply, and the procurement process involved originated in
pre-war rearmament policy, not in the emergency measures of 1940[27]."

Footnotes:

22 "..a contribution of profound significance to the operational
success [of British fighters]", Richard P. Hallion, "The American
Perspective", in Paul Addison and Jeremy A. Crang (eds), The Burning
Blue. A New History of the Battle of Britain (Pimlico, London 2000),
p. 84. Hallion's appreciation is derived from Richard Hough and
Denis Richards, The Battle of Britain (Hodder & Stoughton, London
1989) Appendix XII, p.387. Deighton emphasises similarly the
performance benefits, Blood Tears and Folly, p.352.

23 Approximately 18,000 feet for the Merlin III engined used in
the Spitfire I and Hurricane I in use in the Battle of Britain.

24 For the evolution of 100-octane fuel for the USAAC, Lowell
Thomas & Edward Jablonski, Bomber Commander. The Life of James H.
Doolittle (Sidgwick & Jackson, London 1977), p.136-142 and Kendall
Beaton, Enterprise in Oil. A History of Shell in the United States,
(New York, 1957), p.535 and p.561-569. For the evolution of BP
production, J. H. Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum
Company, Vol.2. The Anglo-Iranian Years, 1928-1954 (Cambridge
University Press, 1994), p.199-218, and for Shell, George P. Kerr,
Time's Forelock. A Record of Shell's Contribution to Aviation in the
Second World War (Shell, London 1948), p.36-59. An overview is in D.
J. Payton-Smith, Oil - A Study of War-time Policy and Administration
(HMSO, 1971), p.55 and p.260-279.

25 Air Ministry importation of 100 octane was established in 1937
at 17,000 tons per year from Trinidad Leaseholds, 32,000 tons from
Shell and 25,000 tons from Standard Oil (New Jersey). Payton-Smith,
Oil, p.55. These quantities were doubled after Munich. Domestic
production was in progress at Billingham and Stanlow, with a further
plant planned at Heysham.

26 By 11th July 1940 the RAF had 343,000 tons of 100 octane in
store, and the rate of importation was such that stocks rose to
424,000 tons by 10th October, 1940 after 22,000 tons had been issued
during the Battle. Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin.
The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power 1930-1940 (Hutchinson,
London 1967. First published 1961), p.101-102. Importation from BP
at Abadan alone was sufficient to meet this consumption. Bamberg, The
History of the British Petroleum Company, p.244

27 100 octane was delivered to selected airfields and used in
trials from 1937, with priority going to those where Spitfires and
Hurricanes were to be based. PRO AIR 2/3424. A date was set by the
Air Ministry in April 1939 for introduction into RAF service in
September 1940 after a sufficient stockpile had been accumulated. In
the event this was accelerated due to events in 1940. PRO AIR 2/3531
- 3A.


Neil.




Pips, what is the source from this qoute is taken from? It really gives a new insight to these matters, and a rather different one as the 4thFG website presents it.

I came across it when I was in fact researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives.

It's from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance.

It was quite an interesting paper actually, even though i found it to be a very dry subject. :)




Pips, what is the source from this qoute is taken from? It really gives a new insight to these matters, and a rather different one as the 4thFG website presents it.

I came across it when I was in fact researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives.

It's from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance.

It was quite an interesting paper actually, even though i found it to be a very dry subject. :)
Pips, does the quote come from "Higher Faster and Farther: Fuelling the Aeronautical Revolution 1919-1945", by Stephen McFarland?

Neil.




It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF.

I believe that McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.




It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF.

I believe that McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.
Thank you, do you have a copy? It would be useful as Rolls Royce seem to have been unaware of certain facts, or were the British deceiving to the Australians?
Then again maybe not, however your help in obtaining a copy of the original would be very much appreciated.

Neil.




or were the British deceiving to the Australians?

I wouldn't be surprised. The British did quite a bit of that during both World Wars.

Next time I'm down at the AWM I'll chase it up for you Neil.




Latest info including that already posted.

1./ High Octane Fuel Decisions at the 96th meeting on 12th October 1937.

The Air Council note that 97,000 tons a year of 100 octane fuel is now in sight, the department being definitely committed to 72,000 tons a year.

17,000 tons from Trinidad Leaseholds Ltd.
30,000 tons from the Shell group.
25,000 tons from Anglo American Oil.
This total was reckoned not to be reached until 1939.

2./ Notes of a meeting held in AMPDS room on the 16 March 1939, to consider the question of when 100 octane fuel should be brought into use in the RAF and of the number and type of squadrons to be supplied with the fuel.

16 fighter squadrons and 2 twin engine bomber squadrons by September 1940, annual consumption 10,000 tons. Brought forward to early 1940 by subsequent events.

3./ 15/7/39. The position in regard to sources of supply of 100 octane fuel is therefore at present.

(a) under guaranteed off take contracts.

Aruba Already producing 25,000 tons per annum. Max58,000 tons
Stanlow Already producing 32,000 tons per annum. Max 42,000 tons.
Trinidad Already producing 17,000 tons per annum Max 20,000 tons
ICI Billingham 1/4/40 16,000 tons per annum Max 20,000 tons
Palembang 1/7/40 20,000 tons per annum Max 35,000 tons

(B) from A.M hydrogenation plants commencing circa 1/4/41 Max 480,000 tons
how did ^ get there?

4./ 11/7/40 RAF had 343,000 tons of 100 octane in store.

5./ 10/10/40 RAF had 424,000 tons of 100 octane in store. After 22,000 tons issued during the B of B.

6./ Quantity of fuel available ( production estimates) from non US sources as of November 1940

Heysham 150,000 tons
Trinidad 80,000 tons
Billingham 15,000 tons
Stanlow 55,000 tons
Abadan 50,000 tons
Aruba 50,000 tons
Palembang 50,000 tons
Pladjoe 50,000 tons

7./ Air Ministry reserves as of November 1940, 500,000 tons. This = 80 weeks consumption.

8./ At one time 800,000 tons was the target.

AIR 2/2151, AIR 2/3531, AIR 19/254.



Neil.



After this series of posts, Pips does not enter the thread again. The thread quickly derails once a known troll under the alias 'Kutscha' appears, and the thread spirals downward in a most aggravating fit of trolling and counter-trolling.

No more useful information relating to the topic at hand is produced, and sadly you can see that the links are broken after 7 years (a long time on the internet, be sure).

[Al Schlageter]

The only trolls in that thread are the same two trolls that are in this thread.

parsifal summed up the ww11 discussion and this discussion wonderfully:

It has a lot to do with revisionist history. The "pro-allied" camp in this debate are saying that 100 Octane was in widespread use in the RAF from an early stage, and that this made a huge difference to the performance arcs of the spits and hurricanes that used it. It is pretty well known that the Luftwaffe only used higher rated fuels on a very limited scale, and that this only chnged relatively slowly as the wasr progressed. The allies on the other hand embraced the widespread use of high octane fuel from an early stage. Whilst german fuels were comparable in their octane ratings, they were never fully adopted on a widespread scale, or at least on not a wide a scale as the allies did.

By arguing that 100 octane rated fuel was not widespread, the pro-german revisionists can argue with even greater conviction the superiority of german technology over the allied tech development, and that the allies only won because of brute strength. A variation to the "we were stabbed in the back" argument that gained so much favour in weimar germany after wwi, and assisted the Nazis in their rise to power.

[TomcatViP]

You can keep the insults coming but it won't make yourself grown.

Calling me Troll when most of you hide them selfs behind multiple accounts (server/forum) ? Wew!

That's so funny. As much as the ridicule FM some of you use that is rivaled only by your Spartan's use of the "PrintScreen" key when I've got you in my visor.

As I hve said on the other troll post, I can't help you in your catatonic way of posting in a gentlemen discussion.

I know teenager here that I've a more mature attitude trying to raise the debate with improved tactical behavior, true situational awareness (not your map wide sound radar) and E management. That's in what we are all interested.

I guarantee that with a bit of efforts you'll succeed easily without having to commit you in such hair raising interpretation of history betraying the "few" heritage - eg your own despicable personal way of thinking that to win beyond all odds they might hve had some secret aces cards.


Frankly none of us here won't let you turn CoD/BoM in the same manner RoF had turns itself influenced by a certain point of view of history and very relaxed interpretation of physics (30% more grade = 30% more HP. Damn you are true magicians !!!)

Unlike some of the cheat mode the gaming world is sadly accustomed with, they simply didn't hve secret cards. Most of the vics were hardly gained flying hurries. A non negligible proportion of them still having a 2 speed prop what the devs did take rightfully into account.

Baahh enough of reasonable arguments lost in death hears. I'll better go continuing to spank your 6 on the server as usual :mrgreen:

[ACE-OF-ACES]

The only trolls in that thread are the same two trolls that are in this thread.

parsifal summed up the ww11 discussion and this discussion wonderfully:

It has a lot to do with revisionist history. The "pro-allied" camp in this debate are saying that 100 Octane was in widespread use in the RAF from an early stage, and that this made a huge difference to the performance arcs of the spits and hurricanes that used it. It is pretty well known that the Luftwaffe only used higher rated fuels on a very limited scale, and that this only chnged relatively slowly as the wasr progressed. The allies on the other hand embraced the widespread use of high octane fuel from an early stage. Whilst german fuels were comparable in their octane ratings, they were never fully adopted on a widespread scale, or at least on not a wide a scale as the allies did.

By arguing that 100 octane rated fuel was not widespread, the pro-german revisionists can argue with even greater conviction the superiority of german technology over the allied tech development, and that the allies only won because of brute strength. A variation to the "we were stabbed in the back" argument that gained so much favour in weimar germany after wwi, and assisted the Nazis in their rise to power.
I think parsifal summary is spot on

[von Brühl]

All this fuel debate is fine and dandy, now who can produce papers showing the installation of sonar systems on RAF fighters?

[fruitbat]

All this fuel debate is fine and dandy, now who can produce papers showing the installation of sonar systems on RAF fighters?

or Axis.......:-P

[NZtyphoon]

All this fuel debate is fine and dandy, now who can produce papers showing the installation of sonar systems on RAF fighters?
Now that you come to mention it...

[Glider]

Most of the vics were hardly gained flying hurries. A non negligible proportion of them still having a 2 speed prop what the devs did take rightfully into account.

Baahh enough of reasonable arguments lost in death hears. I'll better go continuing to spank your 6 on the server as usual :mrgreen:

2 Speed prop in the BOB is there any evidence to support this statement?

[NZtyphoon]

As I recall from earlier postings...

Now, anyone who searches back in this thread will find the actual figures for British / Allied tanker losses in the period, they were quite serious indeed, iirc several hundred thousends of GRT worth. Mines, torpedo planes and bombers, uboots all took their toll. I don't bother to post them again.


Not that actual figures were posted, just vague references, but do go on.

Well let's see now the reality.
Tanker losses to all causes, I have gathered a total of 78(!!) tankers were sunk by mine, U-boot (typically), aircraft and raiders, between September 1939 and November 1940. About 90% of them were British, though there are a couple of Swedish, Dutch, French etc. tankers

I have them by name, date, cause of loss, route, cargo, tonnage and so on.

Alltogether 558,260 GRT of tankers went to Davy Jones locker, by the end of November 1940, along with 385,957 tons of oil product. Half of that, ca. 243 000 GRT worth of tankers were sunk by the end May 1940.

Fuel oil was the greatest loss, 116 000 tons of it went down with tankers (luckily, no green peace back then). Avgas seems quite untypical as a load, but in the end it didn't really matter, because if a tanker sunk with diesel oil, or even empty, the next one had to haul about its cargo again.

Tanker losses were serious, unfortunately.


My scanner has gone awol so I'll have to do this the hard way.

From the NA:
cab68/6/11 "War Cabinet Oil Position: Thirty-third Weekly Report: 23 April 1940" (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/war-cabinet-1939-1945.htm Scroll down to 4.Cabinet Papers or Memoranda, click on cab68; enter reference no. "cab68/6/11" in this format in top l/h corner of new page, click on "Go to reference"; click on "View digital image" then "+Add to shopping"; it is free and downloadable)

"The process of bringing Norwegian tankers under Allied control has advanced during the week, and of a total fleet of 212 Norwegian tankers 119 are now under Allied control, while 18 are proceeding to Allied ports; 93 are in neutral ports or reported to be proceeding to neutral ports..."

Meaning in April 1940 Britain had already gained the use of 119 Norwegian tankers, 41 more than were sunk between Sept 1939 and November 1940, and more were expected.

cab68/7/31 "War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly Report: November 1940" (issued 20 December) (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/war-cabinet-1939-1945.htm)

Table I: "Imports Into the United Kingdom (Services and Civil)"

Shows the total number of tankers arriving in UK ports in the year between September 1939 and August 1940 = 947: (Total shown in table = 1,079 minus 132, June to August 1939.)

March to May 1940 = 109 tankers; 1,112,300 tons imported;
June to August = 100 tankers; 1,058,900 tons

total tonnage of oil products imported = 9,986,900. (11,126,900 minus 1,140,000 tons, imported June to August 1939.): an average of 10,546 tons per tanker.

September and October 1940: 124 tankers (62 per month) arrived and in November 80: September = 640,500 tons of imports; October = 651,600; November = 890,300 tons

Grand Total of Tankers arriving in UK Sept 1939 to November 1940 = 1,151
Grand Total of Oil Products Imported = 12,169,300 tons: 10,573 tons of oil product per tanker

Total number sunk Sept 1939 - Nov 1940 = 78(!!); 385,957 tons of oil product = roughly 6.8% tankers; roughly 3.2% of tons imported to Britain. The amount of oil product per tanker destroyed was 4,948 tons, meaning on average the tankers sunk were carrying less than half the weight of cargo each tanker that arrived in port was discharging; the tankers being sunk were either smaller than average, or, more likely, at least half of them were sunk in ballast.

Losses were serious - particularly for the crews - but hardly crippling, and how many were carrying 100 Octane avgas?

Explains why fuel stocks continued to rise right throughout the B of B, and shows that Morgan and Shacklady were right in that tankers were sunk; problem is that the numbers were paltry compared with the numbers arriving in Britain and unloading their cargo. Nor is there any cross referencing used by M & S providing sources for their claim that large numbers of tankers carrying 100 octane were sunk.

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e133/Kurfurst/BoB%20Stuff/shacklady100octane_2.jpg

[Al Schlageter]

Good stuff NZt. Nothing like the facts over sensationalism. :)

[TomcatViP]

calm down little jedi

[Al Schlageter]

calm down little jedi
I could say something and then you would have a real reason to feel insulted. :)

[TomcatViP]

Well it seems like you had a decomplexed way to speak about other untill now. Don't tell me you'd feel embarrassed today :shock:

[TomcatViP]

2 Speed prop in the BOB is there any evidence to support this statement?

yes but you'd need to read something longer than an extracted sheet of paper quoted on a certain website... a book

May I suggest reading Badder story or an old cheap book right on the subject (I might hve got it at somthing like 9£ in the 90's at London Foyle's) : Hurricane versus Bf109

the Osprey series is also not tht bad. But I am sry : books they are!

[NZtyphoon]

yes but you'd need to read something longer than an extracted sheet of paper quoted on a certain website... a book

May I suggest reading Badder story or an old cheap book right on the subject (I might hve got it at somthing like 9£ in the 90's at London Foyle's) : Hurricane versus Bf109

the Osprey series is also not tht bad. But I am sry : books they are!

Not that there was much point in responding to this inanity, but read http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1943/1943%20-%202888.html and

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1943/1943%20-%202891.html

"De Havillands then had 400 Hurricane conversion sets in hand and expected to convert a total of 700, after which constant speed airscrews would be embodied in the new aircraft. The worst of the rush was over, six days before the Luftwaffe's mass attacks began, and a chance diary entry records that the company was already busy on another urgent job, of fitting airscrews to 24 Hurricanes to be sent at once to the Middle East!"

Or Morgan and Shacklady, which says almost exactly the same thing.

[Glider]

yes but you'd need to read something longer than an extracted sheet of paper quoted on a certain website... a book

May I suggest reading Badder story or an old cheap book right on the subject (I might hve got it at somthing like 9£ in the 90's at London Foyle's) : Hurricane versus Bf109

the Osprey series is also not tht bad. But I am sry : books they are!

Books will do fine and I will look them up. At a guess and its only a guess, the fighting mentioned happpened before the conversion took place in late June as the Luftwaffe obviously didn't stop and wait for the RAF to make the conversion

In general offical records are better. I am sure if I look I will find a book that says the earth is flat and Rome was built in a day.

PS all the sheets extracted from a certain website as you put it, I checked in the NA for context and completeness before quoting them. Where possible I try to check everything I quote or at least find two sources. However I do agree with you, it would be nice if others did the same.

[TomcatViP]

Books will do fine and I will look them up. At a guess and its only a guess, the fighting mentioned happpened before the conversion took place in late June as the Luftwaffe obviously didn't stop and wait for the RAF to make the conversion

In general offical records are better. I am sure if I look I will find a book that says the earth is flat and Rome was built in a day.

PS all the sheets extracted from a certain website as you put it, I checked in the NA for context and completeness before quoting them. Where possible I try to check everything I quote or at least find two sources. However I do agree with you, it would be nice if others did the same.

Ok. Sry for overplaying my irony ;)

[Al Schlageter]

Pips might have surfaced. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewforum.php?f=69

This Pips is from Ozland

[Glider]

Ok. Sry for overplaying my irony ;)

Don't worry I was tempted to write

I am sure if I look I will find a book that says the earth is flat and Rome was built in a day, or even one that showed a shortage of 100 Octane

Damn, now look what I have done

[Seadog]

I'm still waiting for someone to post data showing that RAF FC flew even a single Hurricane or Spitfire combat sortie during the BofB using 87 octane fuel. Again, if the RAF FC was flying large numbers of sorties during the BofB using 87 octane fuel, it should be easy to find historical accounts by RAF pilots or in combat reports stating that they flew into combat with 87 octane fuel during the BofB. Yet no such reports or accounts have ever come to light...

So far no takers on my challenge.

It's time for the RAF FC BofB 87 octane myth to die; it has been thoroughly busted.

[Bounder!]

I'm still waiting for someone to post data showing that RAF FC flew even a single Hurricane or Spitfire combat sortie during the BofB using 87 octane fuel. Again, if the RAF FC was flying large numbers of sorties during the BofB using 87 octane fuel, it should be easy to find historical accounts by RAF pilots or in combat reports stating that they flew into combat with 87 octane fuel during the BofB. Yet no such reports or accounts have ever come to light...

So far no takers on my challenge.

It's time for the RAF FC BofB 87 octane myth to die; it has been thoroughly busted.

+1

[TomcatViP]

You shld write comics. You will hve an huge success.

It has been alrdy explained and can be found in many documents.

I myself illustrated this meaning right her ein this thread by linking to a 1954 FLIGHT articles detailing the evolution of teh Merlin eng during the war with details of wich octane was used. :rolleyes:

There is also a second article of FLIGHT that I linked about a respective study of a He111 engine and the Merlin where teh author explained that the Brits eng discovered that the remaining trace of fuel found inside the studied German engine showed that the LW probably was using a fuel with better octane grade than what RAF was using at the time.The article clearly says that it was 92 octane in the German bomber.

More over I hve a thousand times explained and showed that there is no sense to believe that 100 octane will provide a tremendous augmentation of pow in an eng that was not specifically built for that fuel.

Here is a modern example with Turbo Tech (no eng power needed to drive the compression process) : http://wn.com/octane_rating?orderby=relevance&upload_time=all_time

[EDIT] : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQghB4asSnI&feature=player_embedded

As I hve alrdy says I don't know what to write more. What 's for sure is that I am loosing my time at a ... 100% rate !

[41Sqn_Banks]

I think no one believes your interpretation because your conclusions are wrong.

I myself illustrated this meaning right her ein this thread by linking to a 1954 FLIGHT articles detailing the evolution of teh Merlin eng during the war with details of wich octane was used. :rolleyes:

The article is in no way complete (for example Merlin V engine is not mentioned) and only mentions take-off power and not emergency power.

More over I hve a thousand times explained and showed that there is no sense to believe that 100 octane will provide a tremendous augmentation of pow in an eng that was not specifically built for that fuel.

Every supercharged engine produces more boost below FTH than the engine can handle, that's why it is called FULL THROTTLE HEIGHT, it is the lowest altitude where the throttle can be fully open without damaging the engine. The engine can't handle that high boosts because of detonation. 100 octane fuel allows to run the engine with a higher boost without detonation. Higher boost means higher power.
This means every supercharged engine benefits from the use of 100 octane fuel as long a the engine control (e.g. Automatic Boost Control) allows the pilot to apply the higher boost. The Merlin engine has a Boost Control Cut-Out device to override the limit of the Boost Control, i.e. it allows the pilot to apply a higher boost than the regular +6 1/2.
Of course the higher power may cause a higher stress on other parts, however it is documented which modifications must be applied to a Merlin II/III to allow the use of higher boost.
The use and benefit of 100 octane in Merlin II/III is very well documented, it is also very well documented from which time on selected aircraft used it. What is so far not documented is when it was introduced for ALL operational aircraft.

[klem]

.......................

More over I hve a thousand times explained and showed that there is no sense to believe that 100 octane will provide a tremendous augmentation of pow in an eng that was not specifically built for that fuel. ...............

<sigh>

Again.... :rolleyes:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1vrs109e.html
Search for "Engine Power"

More... if you aren't completely averse to Wikipedia...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supermarine_Spitfire_variants:_specifications,_per formance_and_armament
The evolution of high octane aviation fuels and improved supercharger designs enabled Rolls-Royce to extract increasing amounts of power from the same basic designs. For example, the Merlin II and III which powered the Spitfire I produced a maximum of 1,030 hp (770 kW) using the 87 octane aviation fuel which was generally available from 1938 through to 1941; from early 1940 increasing supplies of 100 octane fuel allowed the maximum power to be increased to 1,310 hp (977 kW) with an increased supercharger boost pressure, albeit for a maximum time limit of 5 minutes.

I'd like a 30% increase in power in my car if only for five minutes.

[TomcatViP]

...from early 1940 increasing supplies of 100 octane fuel allowed the maximum power to be increased to 1,310 hp (977 kW) with an increased supercharger boost pressure, albeit for a maximum time limit of 5 minutes.

I'd like a 30% increase in power in my car if only for five minutes.


Again this makes your assertion ridiculous.

In the above article tht I mentioned, the 100 oct dedicated Merlin engine for the 1940/41 era is stated in an article dedicated to RR anniversary in a British renown publication (and not an obscure extract) to be the mkVIII at 1045hp (not sure exactly - look previous pages).

This is only an example.

To be kind I hve suggested earlier that you made the confusion of SHP and BHP. You might be making the same error here (I say it obviously overplaying my naive side )
.

[NZtyphoon]

You shld write comics. You will hve an huge success.

It has been alrdy explained and can be found in many documents.

I myself illustrated this meaning right her ein this thread by linking to a 1954 FLIGHT articles detailing the evolution of teh Merlin eng during the war with details of wich octane was used. :rolleyes:

There is also a second article of FLIGHT that I linked about a respective study of a He111 engine and the Merlin where teh author explained that the Brits eng discovered that the remaining trace of fuel found inside the studied German engine showed that the LW probably was using a fuel withe better octane grade than what RAF used at the time.The article clearly says that it was 92 octane in the German bomber.

More over I hve a thousand times explained and showed that there is no sense to believe that 100 octane will provide a tremendous augmentation of pow in an eng that was not specifically built for that fuel.

Here is a modern example with Turbo Tech (no power eng needed to drive the compression process) : http://wn.com/octane_rating?orderby=relevance&upload_time=all_time

As I hve alrdy says I don't know what to write more. What 's for sure is that I am loosing my time at a ... 100% rate !

Yes Mr Tomcat, I'm sure you're convinced in your own mind that you're right, so there's no point in discussing the matter any further with you is there? Meantime, your Flat Earth Society friends are waiting for you to make your maiden speech to the Venerable Coven of Witches and I believe your pet ostrich has buried its head in sand - again.

[Al Schlageter]

<sigh>

Again.... :rolleyes:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1vrs109e.html
Search for "Engine Power"

More... if you aren't completely averse to Wikipedia...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supermarine_Spitfire_variants:_specifications,_per formance_and_armament
The evolution of high octane aviation fuels and improved supercharger designs enabled Rolls-Royce to extract increasing amounts of power from the same basic designs. For example, the Merlin II and III which powered the Spitfire I produced a maximum of 1,030 hp (770 kW) using the 87 octane aviation fuel which was generally available from 1938 through to 1941; from early 1940 increasing supplies of 100 octane fuel allowed the maximum power to be increased to 1,310 hp (977 kW) with an increased supercharger boost pressure, albeit for a maximum time limit of 5 minutes.

I'd like a 30% increase in power in my car if only for five minutes.

In Graham White's book 'Allied Piston Engines of WW2', he says 1440hp @ 3000rpm @ 5000ft for the Merlin II and III.

[TomcatViP]

Yes Mr Tomcat, I'm sure you're convinced in your own mind that you're right, so there's no point in discussing the matter any further with you is there? Meantime, your Flat Earth Society friends are waiting for you to make your maiden speech to the Venerable Coven of Witches and I believe your pet ostrich has buried its head in sand - again.

Get some fresh air NZT.

Did someone at least watch the Impreza example ?

[41Sqn_Banks]

Get some fresh air NZT.

Did someone at least watch the Impreza example ?

Can you provide the exact link, your previous link just showed a search result and pointed to a video called "Octane Rating - Explained", didn't find something on the Impreza.

[TomcatViP]

updated (see above)

[Al Schlageter]

More over I hve a thousand times explained and showed that there is no sense to believe that 100 octane will provide a tremendous augmentation of pow in an eng that was not specifically built for that fuel.

So why do the instructions for the mods to the engine for the use of 100 octane fuel not mention anything about beefing up the engine? Just maybe it is because beefing up the engine wasn't required as it was already strong enough.

Even you gospel, FLIGHT, says the early Merlin was ran at 22lb boost.

[TomcatViP]

So why do the instructions for the mods to the engine for the use of 100 octane fuel not mention anything about beefing up the engine? Just maybe it is because beefing up the engine wasn't required as it was already strong enough.

Even you gospel, FLIGHT, says the early Merlin was ran at 22lb boost.

It's not my "gospel". I am just reading some of the source you guys hve provided and extract contradictory arguments.


If they didn't mention that beefing up the eng was necessary, isn't it more logical to think that it's due to the fact that no 100 oct was actually used as a prime source of fuel ? ;)

[NZtyphoon]

Alec Harvey-Bailey, The Merlin in Perspective, (Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 1983)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/rolls-royce-100oct.jpg


W.G. Dudek and D. R. Winans, excerpt from AIAA Paper No. 69-779, Milestones in Aviation Fuels, (Esso Research and Engineering Company, New York 1969.)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Page_16_from_AIAA-42363-319.jpg

A. R. Ogston, excerpt from History of Aircraft Lubricants (Society of Automotive Enginees, Inc. Warrendale, PA USA), p. 12.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/aircraft-lubricants-pg12.jpg

1)The authors of these articles are respected engineers and fuel technicians who are properly qualified to know how much power the Merlin III could generate on 100 octane fuel.

2)Rolls-Royce were already building Merlins that could run on 100 octane fuel in 1938.

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1938/1938%20-%203453.html RM 2M "The normal output at 7,870ft. is 1,265 h.p. and the maximum at
9,500ft., 1,285 h.p. with 1,320 h.p. available for take-off....The maximum potential output of the Merlin II is 1,800 h.p..."

3) Not forgetting either that on August 7 1937 Rolls Royce had a "more-or-less standard Merlin II, running at 18 pounds boost on a special mixture of straight-run gasoline, benzol and methanol with a dash of tetraethyl lead, achieved an output of 1,536 hp at 2,850 rpm over a four minute run." (this was used for the Speed Spitfire). Price The Spitfire Story 2010 p. 107. Ergo the engine was already strong enough to take the extra power.

[Al Schlageter]

It's not my "gospel". I am just reading some of the source you guys hve provided and extract contradictory arguments.


If they didn't mention that beefing up the eng was necessary, isn't it more logical to think that it's due to the fact that no 100 oct was actually used as a prime source of fuel ? ;)

And you write off others as propaganda.

Except their is much proof that 100 octane was used.:)

[Osprey]

Mr Tomcat. Don't you think it a bit unfair that others need to provide 100% conclusive proof that their arguments are to be believed, yet all you need to provide is a 13 years after the event magazine article to be believed yourself?

It's not only unreasonable and arrogant, but also frustrating and insulting to those that spend their time on here trying to explain their findings to you. If you are not prepared to listen anyway, because to be honest that is the way it looks to the observer, then just say so now and save everybody the effort. You are being impolite, one would think somebody in the teaching profession would realise that.

[Bounder!]

You shld write comics. You will hve an huge success.

It has been alrdy explained and can be found in many documents.

I myself illustrated this meaning right her ein this thread by linking to a 1954 FLIGHT articles detailing the evolution of teh Merlin eng during the war with details of wich octane was used. :rolleyes:



As I pointed out also previously in this thread, that article only comments on normal pre-war octane use (1937) not octane use during the war

[TomcatViP]

As I pointed out also previously in this thread, that article only comments on pre-war octane use (1937) not octane use during the war

false

You'd need to really read it actually

@Osp : for a bunch of guys tht are drawing disgusting parallel lines btw arguing abt the real use of that fuel with neo-nazi activism I think you shld drop out that virgin attitude. Does not fit.

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=395603&postcount=483

I am only interested by the truth. The only think I believed in is that RAF proved actually itself superior to the LW strategically and by employing better tactics.

I am not harri potter, I don't believe in charms and incantatory self convincing sentences.

[winny]

I'm amazed at the resistance to 100 octane usage from some members on here.

The circumstancial evidence is overwhelming.

I have loads of pilots memoirs from the BoB era and at lots of them mention putting 100 octane fuel in their cars, before, during and after the BoB.
It doesn't sound like they were very carefull about saving 100 octane because it was in short supply.

All RAF pilots who mention 100 octane say it was introduced just before the main battle, without exception. They have no reason to lie about this. They don't need to rewrite history, everyone knows what happened. There would be plenty of references to 'if we had 100 octane fuel we could have...' (much like all the references to cannons.. ie 'If we had cannons we would have..'). I have never seen a single reference made by an RAF pilot about the lack of 100 octane during the BoB. (I have at least 250 seperate accounts from the period.).

Or how about a dated photograph? Whilst the conversion was taking place, as someone here has already mentioned, the ground crew painted '100' onto the cowling of the converted aircraft. Find me a photograph from June 1940 onwards where this marking is visable. I can't find one. The reason? Because the conversion process had finished and there was no need to differentiate between the 2 types of fuel.

So like the others on here, I'd like to see a single account from somebody who was there that mentions a shortage/restriction re 100 oct during the battle.

[klem]

I think afer 55 pages this thread has run its course. Time to lock it down so we don't waste any more time on it.

[Bounder!]

You'd need to really read it actually



I have read the article, maybe I’m being especially thick (and that may very well be the case :grin: ), I cannot see the statement that 87 octane fuel was the fuel normally used by the Spitfire or Hurricane during combat in the Battle of Britain.

There is a quote in that paper, which you used before, that states that "the petrol normally used at that time was 87 Octane" however the time it is referring to is 1937.

[TomcatViP]

....

2)Rolls-Royce were already building Merlins that could run on 100 octane fuel in 1938.

It's an exposition for the Paris airshow. RR put on show the must advanced items they had with war in perspective - e.g look at my bad looking Merlin that will eat your sausage's 109.

The mot ridiculous at this game were arguabily the french with their twin engined single cranckshaft 2000hp marvel that history has shown how irealistic this formula was (the very 1st french act of sabotage of the German war machine ?)



http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1938/1938%20-%203453.html RM 2M "The normal output at 7,870ft. is 1,265 h.p. and the maximum at
9,500ft., 1,285 h.p. with 1,320 h.p. available for take-off....The maximum potential output of the Merlin II is 1,800 h.p..."

they also explain the line just bellow that Maximum means maximum theoritical power !!!



3) Not forgetting either that on August 7 1937 Rolls Royce had a "more-or-less standard Merlin II, running at 18 pounds boost on a special mixture of straight-run gasoline, benzol and methanol with a dash of tetraethyl lead, achieved an output of 1,536 hp at 2,850 rpm over a four minute run." (this was used for the Speed Spitfire). Price The Spitfire Story 2010 p. 107. Ergo the engine was already strong enough to take the extra power.

It's a record breaker plane ! No reception flight, training, long formation flight etc... You can't draw a comparaison... C'mon tell me you are jocking !

You are also citing the 1300+HP nbr when the line bellow teh journalist explicitely said that "a fully supercharged" merlins does 1030hp. This in line with what I hve alrdy pointed out (from RR doc sources) that your hve repeateadly mixed SHP (power on the shaft without supercharger plugged) and BHP.

I don't know really on what base we can discuss anymore you and me.

@Bounder :

I made an abstract of the article last week. Pls (re)read it there : http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=395323&postcount=457

[klem]

It's an exposition for the Paris airshow. RR put on show the must advanced items they had with war in perspective - e.g look at my bad looking Merlin that will eat your saucage's 109.

The mot ridiculous at this game were arguabily the french with their twin engined single cranckshaft 2000hp marvel that history has shown how irealistic this formula was (the very 1st french act of sabotage of the German war machine ?)

they also explain the line after that Maximum means maximum theoritical power !!!



It's a record breaker plane ! No reception flight, training, long formation flight etc... You can't draw a comparaison... C'mon tell me you are jocking !

This is just another example of TC trying to side track answers to his own question because he can't win. It doesn't matter what the purpose of the engine/aircraft demonstrations were, we were answering TCs statement:-
"More over I hve a thousand times explained and showed that there is no sense to believe that 100 octane will provide a tremendous augmentation of pow in an eng that was not specifically built for that fuel."

The posts that followed show that tremendous increase in power was possible - read the posts and references - and NZt's posts and references show that the engine was demonstrated to be strong enough to deliver the increased power.

We have arrived at Trolling and I've had enough of this thread.

[TomcatViP]

This is just another example of TC trying to side track answers to his own question because he can't win. It doesn't matter what the purpose of the engine/aircraft demonstrations were, we were answering TCs statement:-
"More over I hve a thousand times explained and showed that there is no sense to believe that 100 octane will provide a tremendous augmentation of pow in an eng that was not specifically built for that fuel."

The posts that followed show that tremendous increase in power was possible - read the posts and references - and NZt's posts and references show that the engine was demonstrated to be strong enough to deliver the increased power.

We have arrived at Trolling and I've had enough of this thread.

Insulting contents once again.

The major problem with you is that you are seeing others here with the narrow pencil of your "open minded" attitude.

It's not a matter of wining or loosing. I am not here arguing with you to be part of history. I am not an historian. I just don't trust your hair raising theory and I am still waiting to be convinced out from what I hve read so far. Simple like that.

[41Sqn_Banks]

I just don't trust your hair raising theory and I am still waiting to be convinced out from what I hve read so far. Simple like that.


So what do we need to provide to convince you?
- A combat report from a pilot that use +12 boost on a Merlin II/III?
- A flight test?
- A quote from a manual?

[Osprey]

If only we were insulting Tomcat, but we're not. Perhaps we should.

[TomcatViP]

Better on an internet forum than face to face ... obviously. Did I get it right ? :roll:

[Seadog]

I'm still waiting for someone to post data showing that RAF FC flew even a single Hurricane or Spitfire combat sortie during the BofB using 87 octane fuel. Again, if the RAF FC was flying large numbers of sorties during the BofB using 87 octane fuel, it should be easy to find historical accounts by RAF pilots or in combat reports stating that they flew into combat with 87 octane fuel during the BofB. Yet no such reports or accounts have ever come to light...

So far no takers on my challenge.

It's time for the RAF FC BofB 87 octane myth to die; it has been thoroughly busted.

I'm still waiting for someone to post something proving that at least one Spitfire/Hurricane BofB combat sortie was flown with 87 octane fuel...

[NZtyphoon]

So what do we need to provide to convince you?
- A combat report from a pilot that use +12 boost on a Merlin II/III?
- A flight test?
- A quote from a manual?

We don't need to provide any evidence to Mr Tomcat because Mr Tomcat has no interest in being convinced - Klem is right, this is just trolling and arguing for the sake of it, otherwise why post inane comments like:

calm down little jedi

If not to inflame a response?

He claims to know better than A C Lovesey, chief engineer of Rolls-Royce, or W.G. Dudek and D. R. Winans (excerpt from AIAA Paper No. 69-779, Milestones in Aviation Fuels, Esso Research and Engineering Company, New York 1969.) who are respected authorities on the properties of aviation and other types of fuel, or simply ridicules any information he finds uncomfortable, and pushes the same circular arguments, posting very little evidence to back them up. I have better things to do than waste time trying to convince Mr Tomcat - this "ignore" setting is a handy device which I will now use...ahhh, bliss! :cool:

[lane]

Dr. Alfred Price, Spitfire Mark I/II Aces 1939-41, (Osprey Publishing, 1996), p. 19.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Price_100_Octane_Petrol.jpg

[Glider]

I'm still waiting for someone to post something proving that at least one Spitfire/Hurricane BofB combat sortie was flown with 87 octane fuel...

Interestingly and probably the person most unlikely to give evidence I can. In July three spitfires shot down a He111 using 87 octane fuel. However before the doubters get excited, they were three aircraft attached to an OCU unit who formed an emergency flight in case of an opportunity.

All RAF aircraft were armed in case this happened including OCU units but OCU units didn't have 100 Octane fuel, so there was one combat using 87 octane.

[Seadog]

Interestingly and probably the person most unlikely to give evidence I can. In July three spitfires shot down a He111 using 87 octane fuel. However before the doubters get excited, they were three aircraft attached to an OCU unit who formed an emergency flight in case of an opportunity.

All RAF aircraft were armed in case this happened including OCU units but OCU units didn't have 100 Octane fuel, so there was one combat using 87 octane.

Thanks! ;)

[Al Schlageter]

It is possible that 245 (Northern Rhodesia) Squadron sent to Northern Ireland in July 1940 might have been still using 87 fuel as this was a backwater base well away from any combat.

I concur that Tomcat is most certainly trolling.

[NZtyphoon]

Interestingly and probably the person most unlikely to give evidence I can. In July three spitfires shot down a He111 using 87 octane fuel. However before the doubters get excited, they were three aircraft attached to an OCU unit who formed an emergency flight in case of an opportunity.

All RAF aircraft were armed in case this happened including OCU units but OCU units didn't have 100 Octane fuel, so there was one combat using 87 octane.
I'm pretty sure you're thinking of an Operational Training Unit OTU, rather than an OCU, which was postwar?

5 OTU, Ashton Down and 6 OTU, Sutton Bridge both had Hurricanes while 7 OTU, Hawarden, seemed to have them for a short time http://www.rafweb.org/OTU_1.htm

On 14 August there was another He 111, this one from 8./KG27, shot down by a combination of 213 Sqn Hurricanes and 7 OTU Spitfires (The Blitz Then and Now Vol 1, p. 194).

[Glider]

Your right, it was OTU my mistake, looks like there were two combats with 87 octane.

[Al Schlageter]

Pips on the AHF has confirmed that he is the Pips from AAW.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=69&t=187113

[NZtyphoon]

In the series of " What archives tells us" here is the FLIGHT archives that I cited two days ago :

- There was no 100 octane fuel usage during BoB in the FC. Here I am putting my money on British pride that would hve pushed forward any of its usage (ok Brits are not French but never the less ;) )

Sources : (http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%201286.html)

1. "International power of the Merlin I and II was 950/990 h.p. at
2,600 r.p.m. at 12,250ft, and the maximum take-off output was
890 h.p. at 2,850 r.p.m."

2. Merlin III : "The power output of the standard engine,"
writes Harold Nockolds, "was 1,030 b.h.p. at 3,000 r.p.m. at
10,250ft with plus 6i lb boost. "

3. "the petrol normally used at that time was 87
octane"


What Mr Tomcat conveniently left out:
1. "International power of the Merlin I and II was 950/990 h.p. at 2,600 r.p.m. at 12,250ft, and the maximum take-off output was 890 h.p. at 2,850 r.p.m."

The 1938 Flight article http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1938/1938%20-%203453.html states that "Figures are being quoted on the Rolls-Royce stand for the Merlin R.M. 2M rated on 100 octane fuel....Merlin II, III and IV gave 1,015 h.p for take off on the same (100 octane) fuel". This was before the modifications made allowing the boost to be raised to +12.

2. (NB:This paragraph refers to June 1937) "The power output of the standard engine," writes Harold Nockolds, "was 1,030 b.h.p. at 3,000 r.p.m. at 10,250ft with plus 6 1/4 lb boost. (The following was left out) Solely by opening the throttle, raising the supercharger pressure, and using fuel of higher octane," he goes on [the petrol normally used at the time was 87 octane] "the engine was made to develop no less than 2,160 b.h.p at 3,200 r.p.m with the supercharger giving 27 lb/sq in boost (albeit this was over a short period of about four minutes - my added comment)....But Elliot and Hives were perhaps even more satisfied with a 15-hr endurance run at 1,800 b.h.p., 3,200 r.p.m. and 22 lb boost..."

[41Sqn_Banks]

Pips on the AHF has confirmed that he is the Pips from AAW.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=69&t=187113

Maybe the Pips here in this forum http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/member.php?u=3927 is also the same person.

[NZtyphoon]

Maybe the Pips here in this forum http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/member.php?u=3927 is also the same person.

Canberra, Australia - most certainly this is the same Pips. Perhaps he can post at the very least an archival reference number for the papers he discovered back in '04?

[Glider]

Canberra, Australia - most certainly this is the same Pips. Perhaps he can post at the very least an archival reference number for the papers he discovered back in '04?

Maybe Kurfurst would like to ask him, as he has never seen the paper and has put so much importance to it?

[NZtyphoon]

KF's entire "case" is a busted flush and there's absolutely no point in pursuing it any further. People like Glider, and Lane and others have been chasing their tails for years over this chimera, and his wishful thinking. There is nothing wrong with a free flow of information and discussion, and people are entitled to their opinions, no matter how flawed. But something is wrong when so much time and energy is expended having to counter an extremely weak case, because the person putting that case has a genius for using smoke and mirrors, and constant bluster, to camouflage the fact that he has no real evidence to back up his claims. Over 50 pages on this thread alone? I didn't come here for this - but I guess I let myself in for it. :wink: In future I'm not going to bother with KF; he can think and say what he likes - he isn't worth wasting so much time over.

[NZtyphoon]

Found in a book on the Dewoitine D.520 (Docavia)...On the 21st April (1940), D.520 No. 2, using 100 octane rated fuel, and with a CEMA pilot at the controls...p.303.

Table of Characteristics of Hispano-Suiza 12Y series engines
12Y-45
Series production D.520 No.s 1-350
Rated for 92 or 100 Octane fuel

12Y-49
Late series D.520 No.s 351- also rated for 92 or 100 Octane fuel p.245.

Also Mushroom Yellow series No 6113 p.38

[Crumpp]

having to counter an extremely weak case,

There is no weak case.

There is quite a bit of raw speculation that attempts to bedazzle folks into thinking a specific way.

For example, you speculate all over the map about FC, BC, Invasion of France, and everything else under the sun like it is a fact in the post below:

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=395518&postcount=476


It is not, it is YOUR interpretation.

Morgan and Shacklady say something completely different which also fits the information in the document you posted on weekly issues.

That is the RAF built up a strategic reserve and it was not until September 1940 that 16 squadrons from Fighter Command converted to 100 octane.

Not only do I think Morgan and Shacklady's research was more through and grounded than yours, it is a fact that every military required such a reserve.

Heck, BMW built over two thousand BMW801S series motors before the first one was put on a production aircraft. Why??? They used a three to one strategic reserve for engines. Three engines were in the inventory for every one being used operationally. That way losses could be replaced and the operational aircraft maintained.

With the simple logic in this thread some revisionist would be screaming the Germans were sending thousands of BMW801S engines into battle starting in 1943!!

:rolleyes:

[41Sqn_Banks]

That is the RAF built up a strategic reserve and it was not until September 1940 that 16 squadrons from Fighter Command converted to 100 octane.


I absolutely agree with you that the case is in no way clear. However IIRC there is proof by combat reports and official squadron diaries (ORBs) that more than 16 squadrons used 100 octane before September 1940. Of course this doesn't mean that all squadrons used it. And this could also be caused by rotating the squadrons between the different groups.

[NZtyphoon]

There is no weak case.

There is quite a bit of raw speculation that attempts to bedazzle folks into thinking a specific way...

Morgan and Shacklady say something completely different which also fits the information in the document you posted on weekly issues.

That is the RAF built up a strategic reserve and it was not until September 1940 that 16 squadrons from Fighter Command converted to 100 octane.

Not only do I think Morgan and Shacklady's research was more through and grounded than yours, it is a fact that every military required such a reserve.

:rolleyes:

The only one suffering from wishful thinking, raw speculation and presenting no case at all, let alone a weak one, is someone who places so much faith in the "well grounded" research of M & S...someone like Crumpp, who has not provided a single scrap of evidence to prove anything throughout this entire thread, apart from parroting what others have said.

From the NA:
cab68/6/11 "War Cabinet Oil Position: Thirty-third Weekly Report: 23 April 1940" (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/war-cabinet-1939-1945.htm Scroll down to 4.Cabinet Papers or Memoranda, click on cab68; enter reference no. "cab68/6/11" in this format in top l/h corner of new page, click on "Go to reference"; click on "View digital image" then "+Add to shopping"; it is free and downloadable)

"The process of bringing Norwegian tankers under Allied control has advanced during the week, and of a total fleet of 212 Norwegian tankers 119 are now under Allied control, while 18 are proceeding to Allied ports; 93 are in neutral ports or reported to be proceeding to neutral ports..."

Meaning in April 1940 Britain had already gained the use of 119 Norwegian tankers, 41 more than were sunk between Sept 1939 and November 1940, and more were expected.

cab68/7/31 "War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly Report: November 1940" (issued 20 December) (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/war-cabinet-1939-1945.htm)

Table I: "Imports Into the United Kingdom (Services and Civil)"

Shows the total number of tankers arriving in UK ports in the year between September 1939 and August 1940 = 947: (Total shown in table = 1,079 minus 132, June to August 1939.)

March to May 1940 = 109 tankers; 1,112,300 tons imported;
June to August = 100 tankers; 1,058,900 tons

total tonnage of oil products imported = 9,986,900. (11,126,900 minus 1,140,000 tons, imported June to August 1939.): an average of 10,546 tons per tanker.

September and October 1940: 124 tankers (62 per month) arrived and in November 80: September = 640,500 tons of imports; October = 651,600; November = 890,300 tons

Grand Total of Tankers arriving in UK Sept 1939 to November 1940 = 1,151
Grand Total of Oil Products Imported = 12,169,300 tons: 10,573 tons of oil product per tanker

Total number sunk Sept 1939 - Nov 1940 = 78(!!); 385,957 tons of oil product = roughly 6.8% tankers; roughly 3.2% of tons imported to Britain. The amount of oil product per tanker destroyed was 4,948 tons, meaning on average the tankers sunk were carrying less than half the weight of cargo each tanker that arrived in port was discharging; the tankers being sunk were either smaller than average, or, more likely, at least half of them were sunk in ballast.

Explains why fuel stocks continued to rise right throughout the B of B, and shows that Morgan and Shacklady were right in that tankers were sunk; problem is that the numbers were paltry compared with the numbers arriving in Britain and unloading their cargo. Nor is there any cross referencing used by M & S providing sources for their claim that large numbers of tankers carrying 100 octane were sunk.

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e133/Kurfurst/BoB%20Stuff/shacklady100octane_2.jpg

Cabinet papers, which can be downloaded and examined for free as opposed to unreferenced speculation by Morgan et al.

No Crumpp, you provide some documentary evidence that frontline fighter units of FC were using 87 octane fuel during combat operations during the B of B

Crumpp; You provide some documentary evidence that the RAF stuck to its pre-war plans to have 800,000 tons of 100 octane fuel before releasing it to FC.

Crumpp; You provide documentary evidence that the RAF considered that stocks of 100 octane fuel were too low to supply more than the 16 front line fighter squadrons of FC and two Blenheim units that you and others allege.

Crumpp; You provide documentary evidence that so many tankers carrying 100 octane fuel were sunk that somehow there was never enough to go round.


There is nothing intelligent to discuss about it until a fuel specification order or something saying all units are to use it is found. All that can be said as a fact is the RAF transitioned from 87 Octane to 100 Octane by early 1941.

Oh, do you mean the attached document dated 7 August stating that All operational aircraft have been authorised to use 100 Octane, and that instructions have been issued to Commands?


I am out of this debate at this point.
And yet here you are, re-entering with nothing fresh or useful to say. :rolleyes:

[Al Schlageter]

Banks and NZt, I see selective reading by the nay sayers. They stop reading when they come across something that supports their nay saying.

Heck, BMW built over two thousand BMW801S series motors before the first one was put on a production aircraft. Why??? They used a three to one strategic reserve for engines. Three engines were in the inventory for every one being used operationally. That way losses could be replaced and the operational aircraft maintained.

That was not the case with the DB601N.

"6.10.1940: Until the end of October, 1100 - 1200 DB601N engines were delivered. They are installed in the four existing Me 110 groups and the single existing Me 109 group, some reconnaissance aircraft of the Aufklärungsgruppe Ob. d. L., plus 130 reserve engine pool. The rest of the engines went into Me 109F and Me 110 production. The production of DB601N-engined Me 110s is to be channelled into night fighters, for which a constant strength of 120 is demanded."

[Kurfürst]

I absolutely agree with you that the case is in no way clear. However IIRC there is proof by combat reports and official squadron diaries (ORBs) that more than 16 squadrons used 100 octane before September 1940. Of course this doesn't mean that all squadrons used it. And this could also be caused by rotating the squadrons between the different groups.

Perfect and logically well founded summary, dear Banks. As far as it stands, the trail of evidence seems to last until May 1940, when these memos and summaries we have seen state that select fighter and bomber stations were supplied with 100 octane. At its core, this is clearly the continuation of same policy as laid down in March 1939 (16 + 2 Sqns, ie. basically select Sqns but not all being effected).

How many Squadrons were effected is somewhat uncertain, but as you have noted the combat reports, orbs. etc. do give some insight. We do have accounts for some 30 Sqns (out of ca. 60..) or so using 100 octane at one time or another, though as you noted Sqn rotation between stations makes it quite difficult to find out how many Sqns (stations) were using it simultaneously. There's of course this paper of 7 August that supposed to 'authorize' all Commands for using 100 octane, but the 100 octane consumption figures quite clearly refute that this happened or even started in August. There's clearly no increase in consumption of 100 octane or fall in consumption of 87 octane until the end of September 1940.

As Crumpp said, the above are the ascertainable facts from which a learned man would draw factual and logical conclusions.

Some good research would clear up the situation, but none is forthcoming, and the thread can be pretty much summarized as the speculation and wishful thinking of three fanatics against the weight of documentary evidence; the arguments are hollow or even absurd (lately it appears that its becoming focused on Russel's teapot analouge, i.e. since they could offer no evidence to their thesis, its up to everyone else to disprove a yet unproven thesis), ad hominem and straw man arguments, or limited to spamming the thread over and over with unrelated papers of no value evidence. These three people do not even play the simulation and are alien to this community and its spirit, having been 'imported' from other discussion boards, with their credibility well worn and resulting in the use of multiple accounts, and apparently interested in nothing else but to push an old agenda and/or vent off their frustration at the developer (see lane's posts in the update threads) or posters.

As noted, the whole story ever increasingly reminds old participants of the 150 grade-fiasco of lane and co. The agenda of 'all the RAF fighter Command was using 150 grade' was pressed with the same fortitude, documents were manipulated and doctored for support the same, until documentary evidence become clear and it turned out that 'all +25 lbs Mark IXs using 150 grade' were in fact but two Sqns on operational trials, the '+25 lbs Mk XIVs' lane was pushing for never existed due to technical troubles, those '+25 RAF Mustang IIIs of the RAF in 1944' were again just two Sqns who have seen the enemy about twice, once over France and once over the North Sea, were and proposed use of 150 grade in the 2nd TAF's IX units was recalled after a month of operation in 1945 - a fact that lane still omits from his website articles. ;)

The 100 octane story/agenda is the same, with the same old origins, methods and smokescreen - though I am sure its can be presented as better case than what turned out to be the truth about 150 grade (giggles). Its curious though that the reaction was the same when it become clear that the 150 grade agenda was lost - back then lane and co. was casting doubts about the use of MW 50 by the German side. Now they cast 'doubts' about the use of German 100 octane 'C-3' in 1940, even going as far as claiming that all the 100 octane fuel the Germans were using was in fact from captured British stocks! :D

[Kurfürst]

3) Not forgetting either that on August 7 1937 Rolls Royce had a "more-or-less standard Merlin II, running at 18 pounds boost on a special mixture of straight-run gasoline, benzol and methanol with a dash of tetraethyl lead, achieved an output of 1,536 hp at 2,850 rpm over a four minute run." (this was used for the Speed Spitfire). Price The Spitfire Story 2010 p. 107. Ergo the engine was already strong enough to take the extra power.

Its lovely to see how NZTyphoon constantly conflicts himself, posting the following, which noted that the Merlin failed its type test even a year later, on 4 April 1938.

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e133/Kurfurst/BoB%20Stuff/shacklady100octane_2.jpg

In fact Merlins still failed type tests at much lower ratings in around November 1939:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg

and continued to have an increased failure rate even in August 1940:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/dowding.pdf

Bottomline, NZTyphoon seems to like to boast about the development of Merlin outputs on single engines and on limited runs on tests stands, ie. 'more or less standard' :D Merlins.

In connection to the 1536 HP achieved on the Merlin in August 1937 with a curious mix of gasoline, benzol and methanol, perhaps equivalent DB developments should be noted to cool of any undue excitement.

11 November 1937. Messerschmitt Bf 109 V13 sets world record with [b]DB 601 Re/III - 1660 PS
8. Juni 1938
8 Juni 1938. Junkers Ju 89 V 2 sets altitude record with 4 × DB 601 Re/IV - 2060 PS each
30 March 1939. Heinkel He 100 V8 sets world speed record with DB 601 Re/V - 2770 PS.

The above also explains why the 'Speed Spitfire' was never attempted. There was no 2700-HP Merlin...

[TomcatViP]

The much modified SpeedFire did run operational reconnaissance missions on a couple of occasion. She was used for high speed low deck run on the French coast fitted with cameras (620/50 kph if I do remind well)

The consumption of her engine prevent her to be flown much deeper.

The pilot (a test pilot if I do remind correctly) had to care about the level of water left in the specific rads (vapor blown away) with great attention (well planned missions). Despite some concerns at the beginning he did not have any serious problem during his attempts.

Le Fana de l'aviation published the story in France some years ago. It might hve been a translated article extracted from US/UK sources.

Regarding the HP of the Merlin as of NZT sources it : He is confusing SHP and BHP. It was a standard use in RR to give the power of an engine without the charger fitted as the methods used to calculate the true corresponding power at alt from a bench test ran on the ground were not reliable (source RR - already mentioned by myself somewhere in the thread).

[NZtyphoon]

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg
The Merlin tested in the Hurricane ran for 8 1/2 hours on 100 Octane fuel at 12 pounds boost, but the test was terminated after 49.5 hours by a glycol leak into one cylinder. The document goes on to note that this problem was rectified by modifying the cylinder head joints, a modification which was retrofitted to earlier Merlins and would have been incorporated into later Merlins. ( paras 4 & 6)

"It will be noted from the Service reports that an approximate increase in speed, due to the use of emergency 12 lbs. boost, of 28/34 m.p.h. is obtained depending on the altitude flown up to 10,000 feet." (para 8.)

This most likely applys to both the Hurricane and Spitfire. Gleed, below, 19 May 1940, notes an increase of 30 mph for his Hurricane.

"The modifications to the boost control cut out to limit the maximum boost to 12 lbs. sq. in are simple and in hand (otherwise full throttle would give about 17 lbs. sq. in.)" para 9.

[Osprey]

I thought Kurfurst had "only a passing interest" in the RAF?

[Al Schlageter]

Regarding the HP of the Merlin as of NZT sources it : He is confusing SHP and BHP. It was a standard use in RR to give the power of an engine without the charger fitted as the methods used to calculate the true corresponding power at alt from a bench test ran on the ground were not reliable (source RR - already mentioned by myself somewhere in the thread).

How ever was the engine ever run to obtain the hp number as the supercharger was between the carb and the cylinders?

As Barbi and Eugene are so positive that 87 octane fuel was still in widespread use by RAF FC, they should have no trouble listing the squadrons, and the bases they flew from, that were still using 87 octane fuel late in the BoB.

As for Barbi's comment of fuel consumption, he is no doubt referring to the useless garbage graph (no source for the data points ever given) he posted earlier in this thread. Useless garbage because the consumption of 87 octane fuel includes that other RAF Commands (Coastal, Bomber, Training et al).

There's of course this paper of 7 August that supposed to 'authorize' all Commands for using 100 octane

Now this statement shows what a double standard Barbi has as he uses a German document, and [v]ONLY[/b] this document, giving authorization for 1.98ata use to 4 Gruppen with the Bf109K-4 and even goes on and speculates that other K-4 and G-10 units also used 1.98ata boost. This contradicts Eugene's emphatic statement that German units never ever did modifications without official authorization.

It is not known if and how many units had converted to 1,98 ata manifold before that order came, but it should be noted these units, in particular III./JG 27, III./JG 53 and IV./JG 53 were the major users of the Bf 109 K-4 in the Lufwaffe. The other units effected are not known at present, but given the abundance of photograph depicting G-10 and K-4 fighters belonging to other units, marked for C-3 fuel use - a likely sign of the DC engine at 1,98 ata - the boost increase was likely not limited to JG 27 and JG 53 alone.

[Al Schlageter]

I thought Kurfurst had "only a passing interest" in the RAF?

He does until the mediocre aircraft of the RAF put the boot to his uber Luftwaffe. I don't understand his objection to 100 octane fueled Spitfires and Hurricanes during the BoB as this give him a good excuse for the failure/defeat of the Luftwaffe in achieving air superiority over southern England. As it now stands, it was inferior fighters which did the job.

[Ernst]

He does until the mediocre aircraft of the RAF put the boot to his uber Luftwaffe. I don't understand his objection to 100 octane fueled Spitfires and Hurricanes during the BoB as this give him a good excuse for the failure/defeat of the Luftwaffe in achieving air superiority over southern England. As it now stands, it was inferior fighters which did the job.

However its an error admit that the Luftwaffe failure was due to the superiority of the Spitifire. I already commented but i ll do it again. How many 109s in percentage of the ones lost were lost simply by lack of fuel instead being shot down?

I am most sure than this number is far from insignificant. I ll be not surprise if a large number of German fighter simply did not come home because fuel and not because they were shot down.

The spitfire were not so succesfull against the 109s in other theaters. At mediterranean and Afrika the allied resources are bigger. And the RAF suffered heavy loses in Afrika and Malta. The failure of the Luftwaffe in this scenarios was mainly because they were outnumbered and low of fuel. And they performed very well. And the spitfire was there.

[Al Schlageter]

The failure of the Luftwaffe in this scenarios was mainly because they were outnumbered and low of fuel. And they performed very well. And the spitfire was there.

Eugene will argue til the cows come home and the moon turns blue that the Luftwaffe was not outnumbered.


How many 109s in percentage of the ones lost were lost simply by lack of fuel instead being shot down?

Luftwaffe Losses in the Battle of Britain
(July-October 1940)

Data from “The Narrow Margin”, cleaned up by Robert Herrick
http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/Seelowe/BOB_LW_Losses.htm

[Ernst]

What is considered inside "operational" and "non-operational" loses?

[Al Schlageter]

What is considered inside "operational" and "non-operational" loses?

Non-operational would be a test flight, a training flight or a transfer flight.

[NZtyphoon]

It was a standard use in RR to give the power of an engine without the charger fitted as the methods used to calculate the true corresponding power at alt from a bench test ran on the ground were not reliable (source RR - already mentioned by myself somewhere in the thread).

Evidence please?

[TomcatViP]

Browse back the thread. I hve alrdy discussed this point and listed the source (RR history book).

[NZtyphoon]

Browse back the thread. I hve alrdy discussed this point and listed the source (RR history book).

These are your posts in this thread: #157:Frankly I don't understand what are those ppl hijacking a game forum #205; Wrong. See my post above and data pasted bellow. You need to take into account the s/c ! #206: A Spit from Toyota's Burnaston plant ?
#245:I don't understand the spit lover that are arguing for 100oct when the Spit FM makes her Zip Zapping the air like a cartoon rubber ball #294: Some of the last comments tells a lot abt what are the seriousness of some on this discussion. I don't want to be personal but I nearly spit of my coffee reading that some are seriously thinking that the Spit was like a X-wing fighters in BoB skies. #296: I am not sure it can works like that. For example I hve bought RoF with enthusiasm as soon as it was released and can't play it anymore.... There is no default FM left anywhere on any server ! #301:Wouldn't it be more relevant to ask in a less biased manner how many conversion were done before August 40 ? :confused::!:
#303:Hopefully Holmes had more a Cartesian thinking ! ???!!! #315: really ?
20000 post of the same "piece of evidence" does not makes it a demonstrated fact. We are still waiting for some cross references.
#322: A 100° British lager ?:rolleyes:
#365:Guys the 100 oct justified itself whenn it comes to hve low alt extra power (short time) or increased fuel efficiency at low revs. That's why you see that kind of usage on the Blenheim.
#381:
A fairly good read :rolleyes: : http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1954/1954%20-%201286.html
#383:A document outsourced from nowhere with a very specific account of history and so contradictory with - for example - the doc I linked from Flight Journal an internationaly respected publication : humm and what next, the Brit first detonated a nuke INSIDE a Merlin engine when the US were still craking nuts in the French Ardennes ? :-| #387: Where all this cleverness and fine written irony are gone Schlag? #392:Wew... are you turning rogue ? #408: Oh Yeah it's a great document. And thx for that. But what is buzzing me as hell is why are you so one sided in your citation #411:Ok fair enough for the fighters. But with so many RAAF personnel flying Hurries and SPits in ENgland, any 100 oct probable requirement would hve been listed.

#412; #427; #434, #437,#457,#461, #467, #484, #496, #501, #515, #523, #525, #526, #529, #534, #537, #540, #542, #544, #549, #553, #555, #558, #580


It was a standard use in RR to give the power of an engine without the charger fitted as the methods used to calculate the true corresponding power at alt from a bench test ran on the ground were not reliable (source RR - already mentioned by myself somewhere in the thread).

Nowhere, until this last one, is there any mention by you in this thread, or any other I can find, that R-R tested engines without superchargers, nor have you presented any evidence:

So, where is your evidence that R-R routinely tested engines without superchargers?

[Glider]

The Meteor Tank engine was basically a Merlin without a supercharger. It worked well and was used for many years post war on the Centurion and shows how robust the basic Merlin was.

However that clearly came after the aero engine merlin.

[TomcatViP]

post #205 give you a tip ;)

Vip2000 also did use teh same book (in fact bought it after reading his post)

Impressive work btw but now I guess that you are some kind of antic cyclopes to get a so selective sense of reading.
:rolleyes

@Glider : I am not talking abt a production engine. For what I understand those were for test and performances check only.

end of post #593

[Glider]

)

@Glider : I am not talking abt a production engine. For what I understand those were for test and performances check only.

end of post #593

I know, but I also know that you didn't provide any documentation, papers, test reports, anything in fact, to support your statement.
I looked for what I could find and supplied it, all we ask is that you do the same or is that not fair?.

[Glider]

However its an error admit that the Luftwaffe failure was due to the superiority of the Spitifire. I already commented but i ll do it again. How many 109s in percentage of the ones lost were lost simply by lack of fuel instead being shot down?
A fair point I admit. However when discussing the losses the RAF had in 1941 its an equal point how many were lost due to running out of fuel? I do know that a whole squadron of the early Mk IX's were lost due to lack of fuel , no doubt others were as well.
There is a difference here. I am not trying to put the blame on the lack of fuel.



The spitfire were not so succesfull against the 109s in other theaters. At mediterranean and Afrika the allied resources are bigger. And the RAF suffered heavy loses in Afrika and Malta. The failure of the Luftwaffe in this scenarios was mainly because they were outnumbered and low of fuel. And they performed very well. And the spitfire was there.
There is no doubt that the 109 performed well over Africa but, when the Spits arrived even in small numbers the change in the air war was palbable. To pretend that the 109 was outnumbered by Spitfires over Malta is pushing it more than a little.

Taking todays date in 1942.
Combat 1 3 x Ju88 approached with fighter escort, 4 x Spits and 7 x Hurricane intercepted. No details of the numbers in the escort but 12 x Me109 mentioned in one combat report
Combat 2 3 x Ju88 and 7 x Me109 intercepted by 4 Spits
Combat 3 3 x Ju88 with 6 x Me109 and a cover of 19 x Me109, 6 x Spit and 8 x Hurricane intercepted

[NZtyphoon]

Fair enough I missed #205; here's #205
Wrong. See my post above and data pasted bellow. You need to take into account the s/c !

MerlinXX !

ALT(ft) SHP BHP (diff correspond to the power used to drive the supercharger)
15K 1267 1048
20K 1298 1073
20K+ 1362 1126
25K 1162 960
30K 945 778
35K 700 568


More over the subsequent Merlin (the XX) developed to give more power to the Hurri (what the RaF felt was more a need) was limited to 9lb at 20Kft but 12lb in T.O/Emergency


I think that you are confounding higher grade and NOS and don't forget all the cooling prob with the Merlin in the RAFFC's fighters

Quitely again as I hve said it does not fit any logics.

~S!

This is a post about the Merlin XX, which is a completely different engine from the III, using a two-speed supercharger which drew more power than the single-stage single speed unit of the III:
otherwise there is No evidence provided that R-R routinely tested its engines without superchargers, No documentation, No mention of a History of Rolls-Royce.

[Glider]

There is no weak case.

There is quite a bit of raw speculation that attempts to bedazzle folks into thinking a specific way.

For example, you speculate all over the map about FC, BC, Invasion of France, and everything else under the sun like it is a fact in the post below:

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=395518&postcount=476


It is not, it is YOUR interpretation.

Morgan and Shacklady say something completely different which also fits the information in the document you posted on weekly issues.

That is the RAF built up a strategic reserve and it was not until September 1940 that 16 squadrons from Fighter Command converted to 100 octane.
If you believe that the RAF only used 16 squadrons of fighters with 100 Octane until Sept 1940, then you need to explain why we have over 30 squadrons mentioning it in combat reports.
If you believe that this was achieved by only 16 squadrons using it at any one time then you need to prove it.
If you beleive that a pre war plan stayed in force for 12 months without any change then ask yourself this question. Can you find any pre war plan, on any topic, in relation to any combat arm, of any nation that continued without alteration once the fighting started. Find one, this isn't it because we know that Blenhiem units were equipped with 100 octane in France alone and that was more than 2 squadrons.


Not only do I think Morgan and Shacklady's research was more through and grounded than yours, it is a fact that every military required such a reserve.
I cetainly agree that a reserve is needed and the RAF had a three and a half year reserve of 100 Octane. There was no shortage of fuel at any time in the BOB. If you think there was a shortage, prove it. The only shortage I found was in May 1944 before the invasion.
Its also worth remembering that if there had been a shortage the UK had the ability to produce its own and decided not to because of cost and that it wasn't needed.

I repeat that all the facts that I have posted on this have come from the official records in the National Archives. If that isn't good enough for you then tell me what is.

All I am asking is for you or someone else to supply any evidence to support your theory, just one on any point, not every point, just one of your choosing.

[NZtyphoon]

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg
But Kf has supplied evidence that RAF plans changed; note the comment on reserves of 100 octane fuel being adequate.

[Glider]

I know that and thats the beauty of the situation. To prove his case he will have to disprove the one piece of evidence that he supplied

[TomcatViP]

Fair enough I missed #205 because it was so tedious reading all of your nonsense over again; here's #205


This is a post about the Merlin XX, which is a completely different engine from the III, using a two-speed supercharger which drew more power than the single-stage single speed unit of the III:
otherwise there is No evidence provided that R-R routinely tested its engines without superchargers, No documentation, No mention of a History of Rolls-Royce.

I quoted the exact title of the book elsewhere (sry not with me as for now). It's one of the RR heritage trust. It's a study extracted from RR sources and internal documentation.

As I said, this small book written in 1941 explain why RR had to create new methods to predict the perf of a S/C Engine at alt due to the divergences of predicted perf and the real ones achieved during flight test. The authors were the very same guys conducting the work at the time.

It is also explained how the US was slightly in advance in that way. But also why RR conducted that work as improvement were still on demands.

The base engine to conduct this work was the NEW MerlinXX flight tested in a Hurricane II.

There is a lot of interesting curves that I hve re-used in my post (but no scan). Most notably no perf test was seen using the 12lb boost when top performance was the very base of that work ;)

The book itself is cheap (10 to 20$ ?) and can be ordered simply via amazon if I do remind well. I had to wait 1 or 2 month to get a new print out of the roll. You may read (or ask ?) Viper2000 posts with whom I heard first abt that book.

~S

[Gabelschwanz Teufel]

It it patently obvious that many squadrons used 100 octane fuel. How many? Were they confined to 11 group or were they throughout fighter command? We haven't been able to determine that exactly, yet. But to deny it was used at all is to deny documented historical fact :rolleyes:

Quote:
"The spitfire were not so succesfull against the 109s in other theaters. At mediterranean and Afrika the allied resources are bigger. And the RAF suffered heavy loses in Afrika and Malta. The failure of the Luftwaffe in this scenarios was mainly because they were outnumbered and low of fuel. And they performed very well. And the spitfire was there."

As an aside, Spitfires (and Hurricanes) initially used in the middle east suffered a considerable performance penalty due to the enormous "Volkes" filter that was attached to keep sand out of the intakes. The "Aboukir" filter that was developed later caused less of a performance issue.

[lane]

There is a DVD including "The Daily Inspection of the Spitfire", and 3 other IWM Spitfire films: http://www.iwmshop.org.uk/product/15406/Spitfire_Frontline_Fighter

Thanks for the tip NZtyphoon! I purchased the DVD from the Imperial War Museum and found it quite interesting. The images are rather better than what I had too.

The first two screen captures are from Re-arming filmed around June 1940. 609 Squadron Spitfire I's are shown being re-fueled and re-armed. One of the aircraft still has a black & white underside paint scheme, whereas the others have all duck egg blue undersides. Note the 100 stenciled in black paint on the fuselage at the location of the fuel tanks. This is in contrast to the 100 stenciled in white paint at the fuel tanks location of the Spitfire I shown in the instructional film The Daily Inspection of a Spitfire. The location of the 100 octane fuel stencil also varies slightly from aircraft to aircraft.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/609-spitfire-I-100oct-g.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/609-spitfire-I-100oct-i.jpg

From The Daily Inspection of a Spitfire June 1940.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/609-spitfire-I-100oct-h.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/609-spitfire-I-100oct-1b.jpg

[Crumpp]

NZTyphoon says:
If you believe that the RAF only used 16 squadrons of fighters with 100 Octane until Sept 1940, then you need to explain why we have over 30 squadrons mentioning it in combat reports.

You are invested in your point of view. There is no real reason to discuss anything.

FYI, a very good explanation was offered shortly after my last post.

41Sqn_Banks says:
I absolutely agree with you that the case is in no way clear. However IIRC there is proof by combat reports and official squadron diaries (ORBs) that more than 16 squadrons used 100 octane before September 1940. Of course this doesn't mean that all squadrons used it. And this could also be caused by rotating the squadrons between the different groups.
__________________

Re-arming filmed around June 1940.

The RAF certainly did not suddenly convert 16 squadrons in September without first conducting an operational trial of at least one or possibly several squadrons to ensure the fuel was viable in service. If an unforeseen issue suddenly reared its head, that would mean 1/3 of the FC would be out of the action.

Look up the O2 system on the F22 raptor........ALL of the USAF F22 were grounded.
It does happen and there is a reason the process to adopt new technology on aircraft is so laborious. The United States is just lucky it did not occur in the middle of a major conflict between first world nations.

What if the RAF adopted 100 grade en-mass and it caused the aircraft to be grounded, unavailable to defend the country in time of war???

[NZtyphoon]

You are invested in your point of view. There is no real reason to discuss anything.

The RAF certainly did not suddenly convert 16 squadrons in September without first conducting an operational trial of at least one or possibly several squadrons to ensure the fuel was viable in service. If an unforeseen issue suddenly reared its head, that would mean 1/3 of the FC would be out of the action.

Look up the O2 system on the F22 raptor........ALL of the USAF F22 were grounded.
It does happen and there is a reason the process to adopt new technology on aircraft is so laborious. The United States is just lucky it did not occur in the middle of a major conflict between first world nations.

What if the RAF adopted 100 grade en-mass and it caused the aircraft to be grounded, unavailable to defend the country in time of war???

100 Octane fuel was being used by the fighter squadrons of the BEF during the Battle of France, as well as home based fighter squadrons and several Blenheim bomber units, more than enough to prove the use of the fuel operationally; as for the rest of your posting:

I don't remember anyone saying 16 Squadrons were "suddenly converted" to 100 octane fuel in September 1940 - just another example of pure speculation on your part.

You still have not provided any documentary, or secondary evidence for the rest of your wishful thinking.

The rest is nothing but pure hypothesis; what happens to F-22s in 21st Century peacetime conditions has nothing whatsoever to do with what happened in Britain in 1940.

[Al Schlageter]

You are invested in your point of view. There is no real reason to discuss anything.

In other wards you have nothing to back up your words. Typical.


The RAF certainly did not suddenly convert 16 squadrons in September without first conducting an operational trial of at least one or possibly several squadrons to ensure the fuel was viable in service. If an unforeseen issue suddenly reared its head, that would mean 1/3 of the FC would be out of the action.

What if the RAF adopted 100 grade en-mass and it caused the aircraft to be grounded, unavailable to defend the country in time of war???

They had, at the minimum, converted over 20 squadrons before July:

No. 32 Squadron pre BoB H
No. 92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 111 Squadron pre BoB H
No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940 H
No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 609 (West Riding) Squadron pre BoB S

No. 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 3 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 17 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 19 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 54 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 74 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 73 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 85 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 229 Squadron May 1940 H

No. 43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 H
No. 41 Squadron June 1940 S
No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 S
No. 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 S

One third of FC would not be out of action as 87 fuel could still be used.

[Al Schlageter]

100 Octane fuel was being used by the fighter squadrons of the BEF during the Battle of France, as well as home based fighter squadrons and several Blenheim bomber units, more than enough to prove the use of the fuel operationally; as for the rest of your posting:

I don't remember anyone saying 16 Squadrons were "suddenly converted" to 100 octane fuel in September 1940 - just another example of pure speculation on your part.

No it is a lack of reading comprehension.


You still have not provided any documentary, or secondary evidence for the rest of your wishful thinking.

Never will.


The rest is nothing but pure hypothesis; what happens to F-22s in 21st Century peacetime conditions has nothing whatsoever to do with what happened in Britain in 1940.

More like useless gum flapping.

[Glider]

FYI, a very good explanation was offered shortly after my last post.

41Sqn_Banks says:
I absolutely agree with you that the case is in no way clear. However IIRC there is proof by combat reports and official squadron diaries (ORBs) that more than 16 squadrons used 100 octane before September 1940. Of course this doesn't mean that all squadrons used it. And this could also be caused by rotating the squadrons between the different groups.


Clearly you do believe that this is a good explanation, so what exactly is your evidence? Without it this is just a fantasy.

My previous questions are still waiting a reply.

1) If you believe that the RAF only used 16 squadrons of fighters with 100 Octane until Sept 1940, then you need to explain why we have over 30 squadrons mentioning it in combat reports.
2) If you believe that this was achieved by only 16 squadrons using it at any one time then you need to prove it.
3) If you beleive that a pre war plan stayed in force for 12 months without any change then ask yourself this question. Can you find any pre war plan, on any topic, in relation to any combat arm, of any nation that continued without alteration once the fighting started. Find one, this isn't it because we know that Blenhiem units were equipped with 100 octane in France and that alone was more than 2 squadrons.
4) There was no shortage of fuel at any time in the BOB. If you think there was a shortage, prove it. The only shortage I found was in May 1944 before the invasion.
5) All the facts that I have posted on this have come from the official records in the National Archives. If that isn't good enough for you then tell me what is?

[41Sqn_Banks]

To check the "only-16-squadrons-at-one-time-by-rotating" theory I did count the squadrons that were at one time in No. 11 Group.

July 10th 1940
Hurricane 13
Spitfire 5
Blenheim 3
Defiant 1
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-22.html

August 8th 1940
Hurricane 14.5 (No. 85 Squadron is listed twice as the two Flights were at different stations, No. 1 RCAF is operational on August 17th when No. 41 Squadron was already transferred back to No. 13 Group)
Spitfire 5.5 (No. 41 Squadron returned to No. 13 Group on August 9th)
Blenheim 2
Defiant 0
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-28.html

September 7th 1940
Hurricane 14
Spitfire 7
Blenheim 2
Defiant 0
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-44.html


If we assume that 16 squadrons operated on 100 octane at one time, by summing up the Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant* squadrons in No. 11 Group we get:
July 10th: 19 Squadrons (84% on 100 octane)
August 8th: 20 Squadrons (80% on 100 octane)
September 7th: 21 Squadrons (76% on 100 octane)

*Blenheim only used 100 octane fuel for better take-off performance when heavy loaded, which was not required in Fighter Command as they didn't carry bombs.

[NZtyphoon]

The first two screen captures are from Re-arming filmed around June 1940. 609 Squadron Spitfire I's are shown being re-fueled and re-armed. One of the aircraft still has a black & white underside paint scheme, whereas the others have all duck egg blue undersides. Note the 100 stenciled in black paint on the fuselage at the location of the fuel tanks. This is in contrast to the 100 stenciled in white paint at the fuel tanks location of the Spitfire I shown in the instructional film The Daily Inspection of a Spitfire. The location of the 100 octane fuel stencil also varies slightly from aircraft to aircraft.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/609-spitfire-I-100oct-g.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/609-spitfire-I-100oct-i.jpg

From The Daily Inspection of a Spitfire June 1940.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/609-spitfire-I-100oct-h.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/609-spitfire-I-100oct-1b.jpg

According to Ted Hooton Spitfire Camouflage 1938-1940 Scale Aircraft Modelling Vol 5 No. 2, November 1982, the transition from Black/White under-surfaces to what was meant to be Sky (Type S) - there were some unit applied colours that were non standard - took place between 6 -17 June 1940 (p. 56).

R6692 - the Spitfire in the hanger, and the subject of the maintenance film, first flew June 3 was delivered to 6MU 5 June, then 609 Sqn. 7 June http://www.spitfires.ukf.net/p009.htm : in the film the aircraft code letter had yet to be applied, so the film was shot early-mid June, while it was still working into 609 Sqn. service. The 2nd photo of 609 Sqn Spitfires shows two of them still had black wheels, meaning they originally were painted black under the port wing, yet the undersurfaces of the wing were painted Sky, meaning the unit was in the middle of repainting its operational aircraft - again early - mid June 1940.

[Kurfürst]

5) All the facts that I have posted on this have come from the official records in the National Archives. If that isn't good enough for you then tell me what is?

And all the facts from the National Archives say

- that the RAF decided in March 1939 to equip 16 fighter + 2 bomber Squadrons with 100 octane

- that in May 1940 they acknowledged that the fuel was delivered to select fighter and bomber squadrons

- that in August 1940 they decided that other Commands may use 100 fuel as well (which does not mean they did, they were authorized to do so)

- 100 octane vs 87 octane issues figures for 1940 all show that 87 octane was the primary fuel issued during the Battle, and 100 octane issues did not increase or took prominence until the day battle was pretty much over

Everything else is merely your speculation and wishful thinking about 'all' and 'every' unit using 100 octane, supported by no evidence as many has already told you. You can only offer mere rhetoric and nothing more.

Nobody else need to offer counter-evidence to your speculation, as you were not able to offer evidence to start with. The burden is proof is on you. You can't - I see you'd like to - escape from that fact I am afraid.

[NZtyphoon]

Nobody else need to offer counter-evidence to your speculation, as you were not able to offer evidence to start with. The burden is proof is on you. You can't - I see you'd like to - escape from that fact I am afraid.

In other words what ever pitiful evidence Barbi thought he had, and has spent hours arguing over, even though he confessed to having only a very passing interest in the RAF

....Because I have only a very passing interest the RAF... Some times questions like this just solve themselves in time.

has been totally busted.

No Pips memo, which he has never seen in the first place;

Morgan and Shacklady busted; (pity I still like the book but some of their research lacks depth)

and his mere conjecture and wishful thinking over the words "certain" or "selected", written in memos that are 70 years old.

Not forgetting that Kf very recently did provide a document stating that the RAF actually considered it had adequate reserves of 100 octane fuel in November 1939.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg

All he can do is squeak "the burden of proof is on you" - and nobody but Kf has set that 'rule'. If that was really true everything Kf has posted, all of his bluster, all of his attempts to justify his position, has been, in the words of the bard "a tale. Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing" (MacBeth)

[Gabelschwanz Teufel]

If you are engaged in a battle for survival, do you not think you would utilize every possible advantage you have whether or not there are "adequate" reserves on hand or not?

[Glider]

And all the facts from the National Archives say

- that the RAF decided in March 1939 to equip 16 fighter + 2 bomber Squadrons with 100 octane

- that in May 1940 they acknowledged that the fuel was delivered to select fighter and bomber squadrons

- that in August 1940 they decided that other Commands may use 100 fuel as well (which does not mean they did, they were authorized to do so)

- 100 octane vs 87 octane issues figures for 1940 all show that 87 octane was the primary fuel issued during the Battle, and 100 octane issues did not increase or took prominence until the day battle was pretty much over

Everything else is merely your speculation and wishful thinking about 'all' and 'every' unit using 100 octane, supported by no evidence as many has already told you. You can only offer mere rhetoric and nothing more.

Nobody else need to offer counter-evidence to your speculation, as you were not able to offer evidence to start with. The burden is proof is on you. You can't - I see you'd like to - escape from that fact I am afraid.

If you believe that the RAF only used 16 squadrons of fighters with 100 Octane until Sept 1940, then you need to explain why we have over 30 squadrons mentioning it in combat reports. I think that counts as counter evidence

[Korn]

Sorry to intervene in the middle of your sword fighting, but if the 100 Octane fuel use was generalized, why is it even mentioned in the combat reports? I really doubt the use of your regular-every-day-normal fuel warrants mentioning.

Just asking. Was any air force during the WW2 in the habbit of specifying what fuel they flew with unless it was something, i don't know, unusual?

[NZtyphoon]

Sorry to intervene in the middle of your sword fighting, but if the 100 Octane fuel use was generalized, why is it even mentioned in the combat reports? I really doubt the use of your regular-every-day-normal fuel warrants mentioning.

Just asking. Was any air force during the WW2 in the habbit of specifying what fuel they flew with unless it was something, i don't know, unusual?

The reason 100 octane fuel is mentioned in combat reports in 1940 is because pilots using the +12 boost generally had to describe the circumstances under which it was used - the fuel did not have to be mentioned specifically, but there was often an expression like "squeezed the tit" used, meaning the pilot had pushed the throttle lever forward through a wire placed across the gate, engaging the overboost which could only be used with 100 octane fuel. The pilot also had to report use of the boost to the squadron's mechanics who entered it into the engine log of the aircraft. Later versions of the Merlin were able to routinely use +12 boost without the five minute time limit set on its use with the Merlin II/III series.

[41Sqn_Banks]

Sorry to intervene in the middle of your sword fighting, but if the 100 Octane fuel use was generalized, why is it even mentioned in the combat reports? I really doubt the use of your regular-every-day-normal fuel warrants mentioning.

Just asking. Was any air force during the WW2 in the habbit of specifying what fuel they flew with unless it was something, i don't know, unusual?

The pilots didn't mention the use of 100 octane fuel, they only mentioned the use of "emergency power" (+12 boost) which was only allowed if the aircraft was fueled up with 100 octane fuel. They did mention the use of "emergency power" because they had to report any use of it; so the ground crew knew that the engine should be inspected with special care.

However I don't think they were strictly required to mention the use in "Intelligence Form F" (Combat Report) as the ground crew wouldn't read them. However it was a useful information for the intelligence officer, for example if the pilot was able to catch up with a Bf 109 using +12 boost.

[Korn]

Ok that i understand, thanks for explaining it to me. It really made no sense before ;).

[Kurfürst]

If you believe that the RAF only used 16 squadrons of fighters with 100 Octane until Sept 1940, then you need to explain why we have over 30 squadrons mentioning it in combat reports. I think that counts as counter evidence

I suggest you cease putting words into my mouth; nowhere I had suggested that the use of 100 octane was limited to 16 Squadrons, this may or may not have been revised, but given that there is an absolute lack of evidence that happening, any such thesis remains in the realm of wishful thinking. However the trail of evidence is clear, in 1939 the RAF clearly intended to issue the fuel to select Squadrons. In May 1940 the archive papers have noted that this policy of limited use was followed, as the papers still note that only select units/stations are supplied.

You have not produced anything that would suggest this policy was revised. Fuel issue/consumption records show that the 87 octane remained the main type issued and consumed.

So instead of dancing on the words and expecting others to disprove the unsupported thesis you are speculating about, how about producing a single paper saying that all Squadrons are/are to be supplied, hmm? So far your record with that is dismay failure.

Moreover, as you said you have combat reports from pilots from about 30 Squadrons (rotating between Stations that selected to be supplied with 100 octane as others have also correctly pointed out, so alone it gives very little idea of how many units were using the fuel at one time) so one just wonders on really what basis you are claiming that not 30 but 60+ Squadrons were all using 100 octane fuel, when you have only evidence for half of them. After years of rather barren research.

[41Sqn_Banks]

I found this document http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/12dec39-100octane-issue.pdf rather interesting.

[Kurfürst]

I found this document http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/12dec39-100octane-issue.pdf rather interesting.

Indeed that fits into the story nicely.

"serving the fighter stations concerned"

"certain units of Bomber Command"

".. 100 octane fuel will come into use in all the approved stations"

"bulk storage could be made available at the relevant stations"

Quite clear isn't it. Just don't make the mistake that Glider is not aware of all that, he is, for a long time, he just ignores the evidence.

[NZtyphoon]

Fuel issue/consumption records show that the 87 octane remained the main type issued and consumed.

Yep, because Bomber Command, Coastal Command OTUs etc etc were all still using 87 octane fuel. Barbi forgot to mention all those medium/heavy bombers flying boats et al which consumed rather a lot of 87 octane fuel. Fact is the RAF were confident enough in their reserves of 100 octane that orders were issued in early August that all commands could convert to using 100 octane - it took about a month but use of 100 octane began to increase in September, while 87 octane declined.

[41Sqn_Banks]

Indeed that fits into the story nicely.

"serving the fighter stations concerned"

"certain units of Bomber Command"

".. 100 octane fuel will come into use in all the approved stations"

"bulk storage could be made available at the relevant stations"

Quite clear isn't it. Just don't make the mistake that Glider is not aware of all that, he is, for a long time, he just ignores the evidence.

I read it a bit different. "Issue of this fuel to certain units in the Bomber Command will, however, take precedence over the units equipped with the above mentioned types of aeroplanes." There is a clear constraint on "certain" units in Bomber Command but no constraint on units with Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant. ;)

... it is not possible to state a day on which 100 octane fuel will come into use in all the approved stations."

Pretty much sums it up. We won't find a exact date, the change was made a soon as possible.

The "approved stations" are given in the referenced letter No. F.C. 15447/76/E.Q.2:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/7dec39-100oct-issue.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/9dec39-100oct-issue.jpg

It was also shown here:
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=298446&postcount=121
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=298459&postcount=125
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=298729&postcount=133
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=298744&postcount=135

that the "certain units" of Bomber Command had received 100 octane fuel until May 1940. And then the Fighter stations started to receive 100 octane fuel, which pretty much agrees with the reported use of 100 octane fuel in several fighter squadrons starting from May 1940.

[NZtyphoon]

"These are, or will be operational Stations although they have no Hurricanes or Spitfires at the moment. In the near future these stations will have Merlin engine aircraft that will require 100 octane fuel." 9 December 1939

Not might require, not maybe require but will require 100 octane fuel. Clear recognition that as early as December 1939 Merlin engine aircraft such as the Hurricane and Spitfire required 100 octane fuel, and that bases operating Merlin powered aircraft needed stocks of the fuel.

[Kurfürst]

I read it a bit different. "Issue of this fuel to certain units in the Bomber Command will, however, take precedence over the units equipped with the above mentioned types of aeroplanes." There is a clear constraint on "certain" units in Bomber Command but no constraint on units with Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant. ;)

Only if you simply forget about the preceeding sentence - ""serving the fighter stations concerned". Its a quite clear constraint, repeated again in the April - May docs, posted previously.

[QUOTE=41Sqn_Banks;399463]
The "approved stations" are given in the referenced letter No. F.C. 15447/76/E.Q.2:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/7dec39-100oct-issue.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/9dec39-100oct-issue.jpg

The paper reads to me as a request, not an approval.

It was also shown here:
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=298446&postcount=121
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=298459&postcount=125
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=298729&postcount=133
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=298744&postcount=135


that the "certain units" of Bomber Command had received 100 octane fuel until May 1940. And then the Fighter stations started to receive 100 octane fuel, which pretty much agrees with the reported use of 100 octane fuel in several fighter squadrons starting from May 1940.

The 'certain' restristion was not limited to Bomber Command. Subsequent papers keep speaking of 'certain' concerned etc. fighter stations the same as 'certain' concerned bomber stations.

[Kurfürst]

Yep, because Bomber Command, Coastal Command OTUs etc etc were all still using 87 octane fuel. Barbi forgot to mention all those medium/heavy bombers flying boats et al which consumed rather a lot of 87 octane fuel. Fact is the RAF were confident enough in their reserves of 100 octane that orders were issued in early August that all commands could convert to using 100 octane - it took about a month but use of 100 octane began to increase in September, while 87 octane declined.

I did not forgot, I just do not care to give any weight to your childish speculations and outright nonsense, Minnie. :D

[Kurfürst]

Moreover:

16 Fighter and 2 Bomber Squadrons by September 1940

"The change-over would start towards the end of the present year and ACAS would select the particular squadrons which would operate on the new fuel."

[41Sqn_Banks]

Only if you simply forget about the preceeding sentence - ""serving the fighter stations concerned". Its a quite clear constraint, repeated again in the April - May docs, posted previously.

"fighter stations concerned" could also mean all fighter stations with Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant. But I agree with you that this is not clear and one can be read in both ways.

[lane]

100 Octane fuel was being used by the fighter squadrons of the BEF during the Battle of France, as well as home based fighter squadrons and several Blenheim bomber units, more than enough to prove the use of the fuel operationally;...

Yes, that's right, however, its interesting to note that stations were supplied with 100 octane fuel and squadrons were consuming 100 octane back in 1937 and 1938. The following document lists six stations and three squadrons that received 100 octane fuel during 1937 - 1938. 90 Squadron flying Blenheims, 98 Squadron flying Hawker Hinds, and 201 squadron flying Saro Londons were using 100 octane fuel during trials in 1937 and 1938. Also worthy of note is the listing of Hucknall, which is where Rolls-Royce had their Experimental Flight Test Establishment.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/100oct-37-38.jpg

We also know that the following units were supplied with 100 octane during 1938.

Duxford: No. 19 in Spitfire I, No. 66 in Gloster Gauntlet II
Debden: No. 85 & No. 87 in Hawker Hurricane
Northholt: No. 111 in Hawker Hurricane
Digby: No. 46 in Gaunlet II & No. 73 in Hurricane

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/100oct-6dec38.jpg


It bears repeating that the use of 100 octane fuel for Hurricanes and Spitfires was approved by 24 September 1938.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/24sept38-spitfire-100oct-approval.jpg

[Kurfürst]

"fighter stations concerned" could also mean all fighter stations with Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant. But I agree with you that this is not clear and one can be read in both ways.

Theoretically it could, but then again, since all fighter stations had either Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant anyway - what purpose would that serve..?

Secondly, about the two letters from December 1939. If we assume that the 24 Stations (if I counted right) listed there are indeed the ones that were said to be selected by ACAS in the March 1939 paper by the end of the year, that leaves a bit of problem, because there were about 60-odd fighter stations operated by Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain...

Which leaves if these were the ones effected, or 'concerned' it leaves about half of fighter command operating on 100 octane. A curious coincidence is that there are only combat reports indicating 100 octane supply for about half the Squadrons that participated in the Battle.

That leaves with a very well supportable case that half of Fighter Command was operating on 100 octane, and the other half on 87 octane.

Its not an easy case and I am thankful that as opposed to Fighter Command's case of 100 octane use, the Jagdwaffe's use of 100 octane fuel (naturally denied by lane, glider and minnie :D ) is so much more clearly documented and we know the very exact units, and the number of planes effected. Makes so much less room for arguements. ;)

[Crumpp]

If we assume that 16 squadrons operated on 100 octane at one time, by summing up the Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant* squadrons in No. 11 Group we get:

Good work. My original post also noted that in September, 16 squadrons was a significant portion of Fighter Commands combat power.

The points to think about:

It was not until sometime in September the RAF had 16 fighter squadrons using 100 Octane. That could be the 1st of September or the 30th of September that 16 squadrons were operational. We don't know the exact date. I point this out because during the 100/150 grade debacle, knowing the exact dates revealed the fuel was used for several weeks before being withdrawn in the 2nd TAF. During that time, many squadrons converted back to 100/130 grade on their own because of the unreliability of the engine when using 100/150 grade. As a pilot myself, I have an aversion to flying with anything that will stop that propeller from turning, too. I like it when it works and don't like dying.

Second point is the logistical planning of the RAF in many ways was much better than the Luftwaffe. I would be willing to bet the RAF did not wait and suddenly stand up those 16 squadrons at once. Instead, at the completion of operational trials, the units were stood up on 100 octane as soon as the field built up the required reserve, the aircraft converted, and the logistical support in place to maintain combat operations.

This would make for a gradient curve and by sometime in September a full 16 squadrons were using the fuel. A word of caution, this is just my opinion and stated to participate or add fuel to any "make my gameshape better" butchering of history.

Unfortunately, we don't have the facts to fill in the gaps in our knowledge on that part so the very presence and actual slope is just more guesswork.

Given time, the facts will be revealed. Five years ago, I know very little about the development details or extent of operational use of either GM-1 or Alkohol-Einspritzung on the FW-190. We just knew we wanted our aircraft to be as authentic a restoration as possible. After several years of ploughing archives the gaps in our knowledge have narrowed considerably and the picture is much clearer.

The same will happen with the introduction of 100 Octane. I highly doubt it will be solved here and now. The answer is probably collecting dust in the files of an archive somewhere.

[lane]

According to Ted Hooton Spitfire Camouflage 1938-1940 Scale Aircraft Modelling Vol 5 No. 2, November 1982, the transition from Black/White under-surfaces to what was meant to be Sky (Type S) - there were some unit applied colours that were non standard - took place between 6 -17 June 1940 (p. 56).

R6692 - the Spitfire in the hanger, and the subject of the maintenance film, first flew June 3 was delivered to 6MU 5 June, then 609 Sqn. 7 June http://www.spitfires.ukf.net/p009.htm : in the film the aircraft code letter had yet to be applied, so the film was shot early-mid June, while it was still working into 609 Sqn. service. The 2nd photo of 609 Sqn Spitfires shows two of them still had black wheels, meaning they originally were painted black under the port wing, yet the undersurfaces of the wing were painted Sky, meaning the unit was in the middle of repainting its operational aircraft - again early - mid June 1940.

Thanks for the info NZtyphoon.

Here's a 602 Squadron Spitfire at Drem. Note the black & white undersides and the 100 octane label stenciled in white. This photo was taken during a press day, probably late February or March 1940. See also the Flight article from 28 March 1940 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Flight_March28_1940_Fighter_Station.pdf) which describes 602 Squadron's operations using 100 octane fuel, probably the same event. (Ironically, for those that like to "get in the weeds" with this stuff, the author of the flight article was none other than H. F. King ;) ) 602 Squadron converted to 100 octane at Drem during February 1940.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/602sqdn-spitfire1-100octane.jpg

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/602-16feb40-100octane.jpg

[41Sqn_Banks]

As the Stations did have there own ORB, did anyone check them for entries concerning 100 octane fuel?

[Glider]

As the Stations did have there own ORB, did anyone check them for entries concerning 100 octane fuel?

I tried. The detail for each station varied, some did what you would expect as per the above, some only did entries for the station and ignored anything to do with the squadrons, and some were missing. Duxfords was missing two months of entries.

I also started to review the squadron records and what was interesting was that any squadron that formed after May 1940 had no mention of 100 octane at all and I checked these through to May 1941 by which time they certainly would have been using 100 octane. The inference I drew was that they didn't mention it as by then it was standard issue and therefore wouldn't be mentioned. This would support the view that the paper in May which referred to the stations concerned was talking about the Operational stations that had not been converted by April 1940.

I think its worth mentioning that Drem is in the North of Scotland. Not the first place I would issue 100 Octane too, if supply and distribution was to be limited.

[41Sqn_Banks]

It's interesting that so far ORB was found that mentions the switch to 100 octane fuel after May 1940. Of course some ORBs don't mention the switch at all. However if at least one squadron could be found it would clearly proof that it was not in use by all squadrons.

BTW: Anyone know what Merlin Modification 102 and 123 was? It was applied to the Spitfire of 41 Squadron in November 1939: http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/424/4240052.gif

Also I remembered that there are two different Pilot's Notes for the Spitfire II are circulating, one that mentions the use of 100 octane only and another that mentions 100 octane (operational) and 87 octane (non-operational). Wouldn't it be logical that the first issue only contains 100 octane use as the new Spitfire II was only used operational at first, and only later when non-operational units used it the handling of 87 octane is mentioned.

[Crumpp]

I think its worth mentioning that Drem is in the North of Scotland. Not the first place I would issue 100 Octane too, if supply and distribution was to be limited.

And the perfect place to conduct operational trials of a new fuel.

One of the things that greatly hampered the Luftwaffe was the inability to conduct operational testing outside of combat operations.

There was no place like Drem outside of the maelstrom of combat to collect operational data.

[Kurfürst]

Also I remembered that there are two different Pilot's Notes for the Spitfire II are circulating, one that mentions the use of 100 octane only and another that mentions 100 octane (operational) and 87 octane (non-operational). Wouldn't it be logical that the first issue only contains 100 octane use as the new Spitfire II was only used operational at first, and only later when non-operational units used it the handling of 87 octane is mentioned.

Both are from June 1940 IIRC so any later amendments can be ruled out. In addition, Spitfire I pilot notes note 87 octane limits as well. I am haven't seen but its probably true for Hurricanes as well.

[Kurfürst]

Here's a 602 Squadron Spitfire at Drem. Note the black & white undersides and the 100 octane label stenciled in white. This photo was taken during a press day, probably late February or March 1940.

Quite an unlikely date given that it seems the aircraft on the picture has armored glass and no Spitfires had any armor fitted until about June 1940.

[Robo.]

Quite an unlikely date given that it seems the aircraft on the picture has armored glass and no Spitfires had any armor fitted until about June 1940.

Improved windshields were fitted regardles of the rest of the armor before June 1940.

[lane]

<...> BTW: Anyone know what Merlin Modification 102 and 123 was? <...>

Hi 41Sqn_Banks,

Merlin/102: To make provision for increased ratio starter gearing the slipping torque of the starter clutch has been increased by extra spring pressure.

Merlin/123: Introduction of epicyclic type of starter motor gears having a 94.6 to 1 turning ratio.

A bit off topic but flip back one page in your 41 Sqdn ORB and check out Spitfire Alteration 1/36 - Armour Plating ;)

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/41sqdn-23nov39-armour.jpg

[TomcatViP]

The Spit II was introduced in august in OTU.

Regarding the armoured windshield I hd the same remark as KF looking at the picture... weird.

Spit II was introduced a bit latter during BoB. Link Alrdy posted on ATAG

http://plane-crazy.purplecloud.net/Aircraft/WW2-Planes/Spitfire/Examples/spitfire%20mk%202.htm

[Glider]

Both are from June 1940 IIRC so any later amendments can be ruled out. In addition, Spitfire I pilot notes note 87 octane limits as well. I am haven't seen but its probably true for Hurricanes as well.

The Pilots notes that Kurfurst quotes from isn't from the BOB. Unless he agrees that Spit II in the BOB had 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG which we know didn't happen

[NZtyphoon]

Quite an unlikely date given that it seems the aircraft on the picture has armored glass and no Spitfires had any armor fitted until about June 1940.

Completely wrong; armoured glass was fitted starting September 1939, as was the extra sheet of alloy over the fuel tank, both of which are clear in the photo.

[Seadog]

That leaves with a very well supportable case that half of Fighter Command was operating on 100 octane, and the other half on 87 octane.



Show us evidence of a single operational sortie using 87 octane fuel flown by a front line RAF FC Spitfire or Hurricane squadron during the BofB.

[lane]

The "approved stations" are given in the referenced letter No. F.C. 15447/76/E.Q.2:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/7dec39-100oct-issue.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/9dec39-100oct-issue.jpg

Hi 41Sqn_Banks,

Those 7th December 1939 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/7dec39-100oct-issue.jpg) and 9th December 1939 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/9dec39-100oct-issue.jpg) directives list the stations requiring 100 octane fuel since they had or were expected to have in the near future Merlin engined aircraft. Non operational stations in Fighter command were also required to hold certain quantities of 100 octane.

The squadrons equipped with Hurricanes during December 1939 are as follows: 3, 17, 32, 43, 46, 56, 79, 111, 151, 213, 501, 504, 605.

During December 1939 these Hurricane Squadrons were stationed as follows.
3 – Croydon,
17 – Debden
32 – Biggin Hill
43 – Acklington
46 – Digby
56 – Martlesham Heath
79 – Manston
111 – Drem
151 – North Weald
213 – Wittering
501 – Tangmere
504 – Debden
605 – Tangmere

All these operational stations were listed on the 7th December 1939 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/7dec39-100oct-issue.jpg) or 9th December 1939 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/9dec39-100oct-issue.jpg) as requiring 100 octane fuel, therefore it was Fighter Command's clear intention that these Hurricane squadrons would convert to 100 octane fuel.

The Squadrons equipped with Spitfires in December 1939 are as follows: 19, 41, 54, 65, 66, 72, 74, 152, 602, 603, 609, 610, 611, 616.

During December 1939 these Spitfire Squadrons were stationed as follows:
19 - Duxford
41 - Catterick
54 - Hornchurch
65 - Northholt
66 - Duxford
72 - Drem
74 - Rochford
152 - Acklington
602 - Grangemouth
603 - Turnhouse
609 - Drem
610 - Wittering
611 - Digby
616 – Leconfield

Rochford is the only base not listed on the 7th December 1939 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/7dec39-100oct-issue.jpg) or 9th December 1939 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/9dec39-100oct-issue.jpg) directives, however, 74 Operations Record Book (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no74-100oct.jpg) indicates that they had 100 octane while at Rochford in March 1940.

Other units participating in the Battle of Britain that converted to Hurricane, Spitfire or Defiant after December 1939 and the station where they converted are as follows:

64 – Church Fenton
92 – Croyden
145 – Croyden
222 – Duxford
229 – Digby
232 – Sumburgh
234 – Leconfield
242 – Church Fenton
245 – Leconfield
253 – Manston
257 – Hendon
263 – Drem
266 – Sutton Bridge
302 – Leconfield
310 – Duxford
312 – Duxford
601 – Tangmere

Sumburgh is the only base not listed in the 7th December 1939 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/7dec39-100oct-issue.jpg) and 9th December 1939 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/9dec39-100oct-issue.jpg) 100 octane Fuel - Issue of directives to receive 100 octane fuel. 232 formed there in July 1940.

Therefore it can be readily seen that the operational stations at which the 100 octane fuel was required were all those stations that held operational Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant squadrons.

Those units based in France during December 1939 were 1, 73, 85, 87 & 607 in Hurricane and 615 in Gladiator. We know from Post 372 (http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthread.php?p=394251#post394251) that all these France based Hurricane squadrons were using 100 octane by May 1940.

This listing accounts for the 50 merlin engined Spitfire, Hurricane & Defiant squadrons that fought in the Battle of Britain.

[NZtyphoon]

Secondly, about the two letters from December 1939. If we assume that the 24 Stations (if I counted right) listed there are indeed the ones that were said to be selected by ACAS in the March 1939 paper by the end of the year, that leaves a bit of problem, because there were about 60-odd fighter stations operated by Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain...

Wrong again: as of September 1940 there were 19 Sector stations and 23 Satellite aerodromes = 42 bases: * = requiring 100 octane as of December 1939; # = bases not operational in December 1939: NB: 10 Group was not formed until 1 June 1940 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._10_Group_RAF

Sector Stations:
10 Group: Filton* (listed as operational 9th December 1939 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/9dec39-100oct-issue.jpg)), Middle Wallop#

11 Group: Tangmere*, Biggin Hill*, Hornchurch*,
North Weald*, Debden*, Northolt*,
Kenley* listed as non-operational, requiring 100 Octane 7th December 1939 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/7dec39-100oct-issue.jpg)#

12 Group: Duxford/ Fowlmere*, Wittering*, Digby*,
Kirton-In-Lindsey, Church Fenton*

13 Group: Usworth, Acklington*, Turnhouse*, Wick and Dyce

Satellite aerodromes

10 Group: Boscombe Down, Colerne, Pembry, Warmwell#,Exeter#

11 Group: Westhampnett*, Croydon*, Gravesend,
Rochford*, Manston*, Hawkinge, Martlesham
Heath*, Hendon*, West Malling#, Stapleford
Tawney#.

12 Group: Coltishall, Turnhill, Leconfield*

13 Group: Catterick*, Drem*, Grangemouth*, Kirkwall, Sumburgh*

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Fighter_Command_Order_of_Battle_1940

attachment: Combat Report Boyd 602 Sqn showing Westhampnett as using 100 octane. August 1940

From the Battle of Britain Then and Now Vol V:

Westhampnett was "...an emergency landing ground for the fighter squadrons based at Tangmere...during the month of July 1940 it gradually assumed the status of a satellite landing ground..." (p. 42.).

Kenley was under a programme of reconstruction and expansion from May - December 1939. (p. 46.)

The following bases had not been established in December 1939:

*West Malling was a private aerodrome and did not become an official RAF station until June 1940. (p.70.)

*Stapleford Tawney did not receive its first operational fighter squadrons until March 1940, when 56 and 151 Sqns used it as a stopover. (p. 184.)

*Duxford and Fowlmere have to be considered together "as the latter had no separate identity..."(p.198.)

*"RAF Station Exeter was officially inaugurated in the presence of Nos. 213 and 87 Squadrons on July 6 1940."(p. 213.)

*Middle Wallop was a training aerodrome until becoming an operational fighter base on 12 July 1940. (p.218.)

*Warmwell was also a training aerodrome and did not become an operational fighter base until July 4 1940. (p. 231.) 609 Sqn was based firstly at Northolt then moved to Middle Wallop on July 4 and used Warmwell as a daytime base.(p.231.) The Spitfire maintenance film was made at Northolt in mid June 1940.

*Filton was later a 10 Group Sector station but only ever hosted one or two squadrons at a time, only one of which - 501 Sqn. - required 100 Octane fuel.

"Squadrons stationed at RAF Filton from the beginning of WW2 included 501 (County of Gloucester) Sqdn (Auxiliary Air Force), now flying Hawker Hurricane I fighters, until 10 May 1940 when that Squadron moved to France; and 263 Squadron (reformed on 20 October 1939 at Filton) taking over some of the Gloster Gladiator I biplane fighters previously with 605 Squadron and still wearing that squadron's code letter (HE). The Squadron went on to Norway in April 1940 operating from a frozen lake.

Between May and July 1940, No. 236 Squadron were based at Filton with Bristol Blenheim twin-engined fighters, flying defensive sweeps over the Channel." (source http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Filton)

In December 1939 there were 36 operational bases, because Fowlmere was an integral part of Duxford.

All of the 6 operational and 1 non-operational 11 Group sector stations were to be provided with 100 octane fuel;

12 Group: 4 out of 5

13 Group: 2 out of 5

10 Group: 1 out of 2

6 out of 8 "satellite' airfields in 11 Group were to be provided with 100 octane fuel;

12 Group: 1 out of 3

13 Group: 4 out of 5

10 Group: 0 out of three

25 out of 36 operational bases were to be provided with 100 Octane fuel starting in December 1939, a ratio of better than 2 to 1.

Far more realistic than 24 out of "60 odd" stations.

[Blakduk]

The evidence keeps mounting up that 100 octane was used throughout fighter command by May 1940.
The case has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt: any jury would have come to that conclusion over 60 pages ago in this thread and any number of other threads in this forum and others.
I joined this debate many months ago with an open mind and have been convinced by the evidence presented and have not seen anything that makes me doubt that conclusion. Until such time as fresh evidence is put forward that any fighter command aircraft were using 87 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain I suggest this thread is closed lest newcomers to the debate stumble upon it and heed the opinion of the tiny minority and believe the matter is being seriously questioned.
When future questions are raised regarding this matter referral can be made back to this thread where all the evidence resides- especially for the developers who seem to have acceded to the minority view that 100 octane was not used routinely in fighter command until late in the BoB.

The only reason this poor excuse for a debate continues is due to a small number of posters who are determined to have the last word and their intransigence in the face of all the evidence. As the old saying goes 'There are none so blind as those that refuse to see'.

[Kurfürst]

The Pilots notes that Kurfurst quotes from isn't from the BOB. Unless he agrees that Spit II in the BOB had 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG which we know didn't happen

... and now you are making things up again.

[Kurfürst]

24 out of 36 operational bases were provided with 100 Octane fuel in December 1939, a ratio of 2 to 1.

So its now not even May 1940, not even February 1940, its December 1939 already! :D That is at least as funny as Glider's dreaming up that there were no two-speed propeller units in BoB!

But of course, you can dream up almost anything and nobody will care. ;)

Far more realistic than 24 out of "60 odd" stations.

No. Its a pipedream as usual, by the same person who stole Morgan and Shacklady's work and published it under his own name on his site, but here tried to discredit them, and now quotes a wiki article as 'proof', the same one he was editing himself. His only source for his pipedreams is his own editing of wikipedia :D

How much lower can one get I wonder...?

[Kurfürst]

Improved windshields were fitted regardles of the rest of the armor before June 1940.

Hmm - possisble. I would need to check but the May 1940 papers I have (reporting armoring on Hurricane's, but mentioning that no Spitfire have been fitted with armor yet) do seem be in conflict. Perhaps 'improved windshields' were not considered as 'armor' only steel plates?

Out of curiousity, what is your source for armored windshields?

[NZtyphoon]

Regarding the armoured windshield I hd the same remark as KF looking at the picture... weird.

The attached photo http://spitfiresite.com/2007/10/early-spitfires-of-no-611-squadron-rauxaf.html is of a Spitfire I of 611 Sqn taken at Digby http://www.611squadronrauxaf.co.uk/history/Brief.html during a press day in February 1940. (Alfred Price, Spitfire MkI/II Aces 1939-41, 1996 p. 11.) The armoured windscreen, fuel tank cover and bulged canopy is obvious, as is the straight aerial mast and early markings without finflash and serial number, the latter a feature of K and L series Spitfire Is built pre-war. (Ted Hooton, Spitfire Camouflage 1938-1940, Scale Aircraft Modeling Vol 5 No. 7 November 1982.)

[TomcatViP]

I quoted the exact title of the book elsewhere (sry not with me as for now). It's one of the RR heritage trust. It's a study extracted from RR sources and internal documentation.

As I said, this small book written in 1941 explain why RR had to create new methods to predict the perf of a S/C Engine at alt due to the divergences of predicted perf and the real ones achieved during flight test. The authors were the very same guys conducting the work at the time.

It is also explained how the US was slightly in advance in that way. But also why RR conducted that work as improvement were still on demands.

The base engine to conduct this work was the NEW MerlinXX flight tested in a Hurricane II.

There is a lot of interesting curves that I hve re-used in my post (but no scan). Most notably no perf test was seen using the 12lb boost when top performance was the very base of that work ;)

The book itself is cheap (10 to 20$ ?) and can be ordered simply via amazon if I do remind well. I had to wait 1 or 2 month to get a new print out of the roll. You may read (or ask ?) Viper2000 posts with whom I heard first abt that book.

~S

The book ref. :

Performance of a Supercharged Aero Engine
Hooker, Stanley 1872922112
Rolls Royce Heritage Trust

http://www.amazon.com/Performance-Supercharged-Aero-Engine-Technical/dp/1872922112/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1332002116&sr=8-2-fkmr0

(seems the price has increased - the bill I dug out of my archives says 6.53€ !)

Regarding the Spit II, I didn't heard any of your commentaries regarding the roll out date (august) and service intro (sept late) ;)

[41Sqn_Banks]

Regarding the Spit II, I didn't heard any of your commentaries regarding the roll out date (august) and service intro (sept late) ;)

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no611-orb.jpg

16/8/1940 "A" Flight used the new Spitfires for the first time in operations.

Can you provide a source for the introduction of Spitfire II in OTU, e.g. which OTU received Spitfire II?

[Al Schlageter]

Can you provide a source for the introduction of Spitfire II in OTU, e.g. which OTU received Spitfire II?

P7280 IIa Morris MXII First Spitfire by Nuffield AMDP AAEE 27-6-40 diving trials with 7lb inertia wt on elev control syst. hand trials AST 25-10-40 DTD AAEE 29-10-40 403S 17-7-41 457S 4-10-41 61OTU 5-1-42 FACB 29-4-42 61OTU 2-7-43 trials with blister hood 10-43 comparison trials with N3171 (MkI) Spun into ground out of cloud Crickheath Farm nr Oswestry CE 15-9-44

P7281 IIa Morris MXII 6MU 17-6-40 612S 27-8-40 611S 27-8-40 41S 24-10-40 54S 22-2-41 616S 10-7-41 417S 26-1-42 15OTU 15-2-42 57OTU 30-7-42 CB 22-4-43 SOC 23-1-44

P7282 IIa Morris MXII 6MU 26-6-40 611S 22-8-40 41S 24-10-40 shot down by Bf109 P/O Draper injured C3 30-10-40 SOC 14-11-40

P7283 IIa Morris MXII 8MU 1-7-40 611S 26-8-40 41S 24-10-40 C2 ops 17-11-40 54S 12-2-41 234S 3-7-41 152S 28-10-41 8FTS 13-6-43 10AGS 17-4-45 FTR ops 17-5-45 SOC 18-6-45

P7284 IIa Morris MXII 8MU 7-7-40 611S 26-8-40 41S 24-10-40 C2 ops 26-10-40 54S 22-2-41 308S 14-7-41 610S 11-9-41 3ADF Spun into ground in circuit Valley CE 2-11-41 SOC 5-12-41

P7285 IIa Morris MXII 8MU 1-7-40 266S 5-9-40 603S 7-10-40 Shot down by Bf109s 16m E of Dover 8-10-40 F/O Kirkwood missing

P7286 IIa Morris MXII 9MU 13-7-40 152S 17-7-40 603S 17-10-40 shot down by Bf109 P/O Maxwell 27-10-40 AST AAEE 16-1-41 trials with Rotol constant-speed prop Morris rad and inertia weight 234S 12-5-41 VA 3-7-41 66S 31-7-41 152S 3-9-41 Overshot landing into fence Swanton Morley CAC 16-9-41 ASTE SOC 10-11-41

more @ http://www.spitfires.ukf.net/p003.htm

[Glider]

... and now you are making things up again.

We have been throught this before on another Forum and again on this forum

The Zeno pilots notes you quote are here
http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Images/spit/Spit2Manual.pdf

Please note item 35 gun controls where it has a) and b) and B has 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG. Section 2 has the bit you keep quoting 100 Octane and 87 Octane.

The posting where you identified these as being the ones you quote is here
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-pt-2-a-20108-8.html

The Pilots Note I refer to are here
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/other-mechanical-systems-tech/spitfire-manuals-9050.html

Please note item 44 Gun Controls where only the 8 mgs are mentioned, and item 55 where it clearly states only 100 Octane

The question I ask is this:-
When you know with an absolute certainty, that the quote you are making is wrong and misleading, why do you keep mentioning it as part of your evidence?
Unless of course you believe it to be true and that the RAF had Mk II spits in July 1940 with 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG which is what your pilots notes say

People are free to look at these links, and if you do not reply with an explanation may well make their own mind up as to why.

[41Sqn_Banks]

more @ http://www.spitfires.ukf.net/p003.htm

Thanks, I checked several pages, the earliest date I found was December 1941 were a couple of Spitfire II were assigned to 61OTU. The majority was 1942 or later. I didn't find a single aircraft that was assigned directly from Maintenance Unit (MU) to OTU, all were transferred to operational squadrons first.

[TomcatViP]

The Spit II was introduced in august in OTU.

Regarding the armoured windshield I hd the same remark as KF looking at the picture... weird.

Spit II was introduced a bit latter during BoB. Link Alrdy posted on ATAG

http://plane-crazy.purplecloud.net/Aircraft/WW2-Planes/Spitfire/Examples/spitfire%20mk%202.htm

seems you didn't take the time to check the link I just posted yesterday (see above) !

This Spit is on display in UK. You might hve the oportunity to check it by your own eyes :evil:

[41Sqn_Banks]

seems you didn't take the time to check the link I just posted yesterday (see above) !

This Spit is on display in UK. You might hve the oportunity to check it by your own eyes :evil:

I did check your link yesterday. But it only provides the history of a single aircraft (Spitfire II, Serial No. P7350) which was, according to your link, first delivered to No. 6 Maintenance Unit* in August 1940 and to No. 266 Squadron in September 1940. It was assigned to No. 57 Operational Training Unit in March 1942.

*every aircraft of was first assigned to a Maintenance Unit and than transferred to a Squadron.

I don't understand how you conclude from this link that the Spitfire II was first introduced in August 1940 in OTUs and wasn't used operational before September 1940.

[TomcatViP]

I don't understand how you conclude from this link that the Spitfire II was first introduced in August 1940 in OTUs and wasn't used operational before September 1940.

I don't !

Did I ?

just mixed MU and OTU. :rolleyes:

September ! september ! september !

[41Sqn_Banks]

Ok, mixing abbreviations can happen.


Not September, but August.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no611-orb.jpg

16/8/1940 "A" Flight used the new Spitfires for the first time in operations.

[TomcatViP]

Banks, "my" Spit II is the 14th ever produced (Castel Brwnich) and made it in OP the 6th september.

It's hard to imagine any significant use of the II during august ;)

A short abstract of the MkII history :
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_spitfire_mkII.html

[41Sqn_Banks]

Even your own link says says that the first squadron (No. 611) received them in August 1940. Then there are excerpts from the Operational Record Book of No. 611 Squadron which confirm the first operational use in August 1940. http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no611-orb.jpg

But obviously your claim switched from "service introduction" to "significant use". There was significant use in one squadron. Significant use in whole Fighter Command is of course a different story.

[Kurfürst]

It's hard to imagine any significant use of the II during august ;)


It happened in Laneworld. ;) You know, the place where Spitfires were flying with armor, CSPs and 100 octane since before the war. :D

[Kurfürst]

The question I ask is this:-
When you know with an absolute certainty, that the quote you are making is wrong and misleading, why do you keep mentioning it as part of your evidence?

What I know with an absolute certainty is that there is a Spitfire I manual and a Spitfire II manual, both from June-July 1940 and both specify both 87 octane and 100 octane limits.

I also know for certainty that you have an idiotic thesis why to dismiss yet another source which is clearly dated June 1940 and notes what limits apply 'when 100 octane fuel is used' and not 87.

Guess what, I just do not give credit to neither this idiotic thesis of yours, neither the other which says that when British papers say select fighter squadrons, it's 'a typo', nor the one which says its not a typo but it was reveresed later, nor the one which says the only 100 octane fuel the Germans had was from captured British stock, nor the one which says that no Spitfire or Hurricane had two pitch propeller in the Battle of Britain and so on.

Guess what, you simply have no credibility left in my eye.

Unless of course you believe it to be true and that the RAF had Mk II spits in July 1940 with 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG which is what your pilots notes say.

Of course they had. Look up Spitfire the history, on page 60 in my edition :

"P9504... still had four of the original Browning MG mountings in the wings. It was used to test a trial installation of two Hispano cannon and four Browning guns... within days a second Spitfire, X4257 had a wing built from scratch, with the new armament and service trials begun on 20 August. Five days later R6761, 6770,6889,6904 and 6919 were withdrawn from No.19 and modified to the same standards. etc.."

P9504 was a Mark I, the first produced a/c with 4 x 7.7 + 2 x 20mm, first flight 30 April 1940.

People are free to look at these links, and if you do not reply with an explanation may well make their own mind up as to why.

Boooh, more childish threats reminding me of dire consequences. Had it crossed your mind that I usually do not reply to your posts because I find them a waste of time, being illogical, wishful and of no consequence, clinging fanatically to an idea you cannot prove at all?

How about just taking Crumpp's advice which seem to be the majority view here anyway - admitting that we (you) simply do not know the exact details (yet) and have really no solid idea how many Squadrons were employing 100 octane fuel?

[NZtyphoon]

The only unit using the Mk II in combat from August - September was 611 Sqn based at Digby; the first significant action I can find in The Battle of Britain Then and Now Vol V was on 21st August when P7290, P7304, P7303, P7292 (P7305 damaged hitting a chock while landing) were damaged during combat against Do 17s of KG2: one Do 17 was shot down while two collided and crashed (pp.373, 591).

The next entry is for September 9 when P7320 force landed, out of fuel, then September 11 when P7298 was set light during combat and crashed, while P3721 was heavily damaged by an He 111 and crashed on landing category C2 (pp 441, 446). Other units to start equipping in September included 74, 266 and 603 Sqns, although there seemed to be some swapping around, and 421 Flight (later 91 Sqn).

[41Sqn_Banks]

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachment.php?attachmentid=8833&d=1332019557


Amended in Vol. I by A.L.31
and in P.N. by A.L./L


As we can see at the top of the page it has been amended. The version of the Pilot's Notes that don't mention 87 octane fuel is not amended, i.e. it contains the initial content from June/July 1940.

[NZtyphoon]

The book ref. :

Performance of a Supercharged Aero Engine
Hooker, Stanley 1872922112
Rolls Royce Heritage Trust

http://www.amazon.com/Performance-Supercharged-Aero-Engine-Technical/dp/1872922112/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1332002116&sr=8-2-fkmr0

(seems the price has increased - the bill I dug out of my archives says 6.53€ !)



Thanks for that, I'll do some amazoning.

[NZtyphoon]

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachment.php?attachmentid=8833&d=1332019557

Amended in Vol. I by A.L 31
and in P/N by A.L./L.
As we can see at the top of the page it has been amended.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg

And the testing for this was done in 1939; "...it being observed that the Merlin XII has been type tested and approved for 12½ lbs. boost take off conditions." (para 5)

[Al Schlageter]

GliderUnless of course you believe it to be true and that the RAF had Mk II spits in July 1940 with 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG which is what your pilots notes say.

Barbi"P9504... still had four of the original Browning MG mountings in the wings. It was used to test a trial installation of two Hispano cannon and four Browning guns... within days a second Spitfire, X4257 had a wing built from scratch, with the new armament and service trials begun on 20 August. Five days later R6761, 6770,6889,6904 and 6919 were withdrawn from No.19 and modified to the same standards. etc.."

Seems Barbi doesn't know the difference between July and August.:rolleyes:

X4257 Ib 1037 EA MIII FF 16-8-40 6MU 20-8-40 first Spit with 'B' wing Type 340 AMDP EA 30-8-40 RAE 3-9-40 AAEE 20-10-40 1CRU new eng 8MU 15-11-40 AFDU Duxford 11-1-41 R-RH 10-2-41 M45 fitt redesignate FVB 92S 16-2-41 service trials engine failed crashed Maidstone 19-3-41 AST 411S 8-11-41 AAEE 1-42 R/T function trials at high alt with R7120 (FVI) 242S 25-9-42 VASM 5-4-43 fuel syst mods wing stiff 118S 2-7-43 64S 25-9-43 power loss force-landed hit obst nr Lodiswell S Devon CE SOC 3-7-44 F/O W Smart killed

[Glider]

He obviously will not mind the RAF using the IIB in July 1940. Can I have one please.

Being serious for a moment, do you know when the first IIB was built, the ones quoted are Spit IB's

Another small point is that anyone who has seen the RAF Pilots Notes will see that the format of the one that Kurfurst quotes, isn't an original document. The format didn't change until well after the war. My notes for the Hunter are still in the WW2 standard layout.

[fruitbat]

Don't know when they were built, but i believe 92 squadron were the first to use them operationally in jan 41.

[NZtyphoon]

He obviously will not mind the RAF using the IIB in July 1940. Can I have one please.

Being serious for a moment, do you know when the first IIB was built, the ones quoted are Spit IB's


http://www.spitfires.ukf.net/p006.htm
P8134 IIb CBAF MXII DGRD AAEE 12-3-41 9MU 14-5-41 58OTU 14-8-42 53OTU 21-6-43 1CRU ros 24-3-44 SOC 14-12-45 seems to be the most likely candidate to be the first IIB (March 1941).

Tested by A&AEE and didn't reach an operational unit so P8135 on 66 Sqn was the first one in squadron service.

[Kurfürst]

Another small point is that anyone who has seen the RAF Pilots Notes will see that the format of the one that Kurfurst quotes, isn't an original document. The format didn't change until well after the war. My notes for the Hunter are still in the WW2 standard layout.

LOL. The first excuse of Glider when he wanted to dismiss yet another primary document was that the pilot's notes was from 1941, when Glider believes (=made up) 'all Mark IIs were relegated to training duties'. In reality of course, it was in 1941 when Mark II production increased to meaningful amounts and begun to replace other aircraft in first line duties; it just begun to appear in front line units, instead of being withdrawn.

Now in desperation he has switched to a new excuse, making up that 'it isn't an original document' because it 'looks like post-war'. :D

As I said, he makes it all up on the go. ;)

[Seadog]

Show us evidence of a single operational sortie using 87 octane fuel flown by a front line RAF FC Spitfire or Hurricane squadron during the BofB.

Kurfurst, I'm still waiting...

[Glider]

Had it crossed your mind that I usually do not reply to your posts because I find them a waste of time, being illogical, wishful and of no consequence, clinging fanatically to an idea you cannot prove at all?


I admit to thinking that as all I normally ask you to do, is supply some evidence to support your case, that your lack of reply is because you don't have any evidence to give.

Re the layout of the pilots notes, people are free to look at a selection and make their own mind as to which has the correct format.

They may also wonder how you have pilots notes for the Spit IIb with 20mm (including photos of the cockpit) in July 1940, for an aircraft that wasn't built until 1941 and believe that to be solid proof.

[NZtyphoon]

All the specifics they managed to dig up that the RAF decided in March 1939 to equip 16 Fighter Squadrons for 100 octane by September 1940, and that the 'certain' Squadrons 'concerned' were equipped so by mid-May 1940. Oh wait - we knew that already from books, just see the Spitfire the History scan...


And all the facts from the National Archives say

- that the RAF decided in March 1939 to equip 16 fighter + 2 bomber Squadrons with 100 octane

- that in May 1940 they acknowledged that the fuel was delivered to select fighter and bomber squadrons

- 100 octane vs 87 octane issues figures for 1940 all show that 87 octane was the primary fuel issued during the Battle, and 100 octane issues did not increase or took prominence until the day battle was pretty much over.

Moreover:

16 Fighter and 2 Bomber Squadrons by September 1940

"The change-over would start towards the end of the present year and ACAS would select the particular squadrons which would operate on the new fuel."
What hasn't been mentioned is that this was provisional: para 8 says:

"A.M.D.P asked that D.D.C(3) should keep him informed of the rate of output of 100 octane fuel in order that the rate of change-over of squadrons to this fuel could be kept under review in the light of any diminution or acceleration in supplies." (attachment 1)

The 16 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons by September 1940 was hypothetical, based on March 1939 conditions of fuel supply, and was flexible, not fixed in stone.

Supplies of 100 octane fuel continued to increase from 202,000 tons in December 1939, which was the time specified for the change over.

In November 1940 it was considered that there were "adequate reserves" of 100 octane fuel to go ahead with the modification of all Hurricane and Spitfire Merlin engines to use 12 lb boost.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg

Problem: squadrons did not, and could not hold their own fuel supplies, to require them to do so would be an operational and logistical nightmare: it was airbases that were supplied with fuel, not individual squadrons. In the 6 May 1940 paper (Item 9 7th Meeting Summary...) "Units concerned" cannot be talking about individual squadrons, it is referring to bases which, depending on their importance, (eg; Sector Station) hosted up to three squadrons. 18 squadrons = 8-10 airbases.

The December 7 1939 letter, which sets out a process for supplying 100 Octane fuel starts:

"I have the honour to refer to my letter...dated 27 October 1939, regarding the issue of 100 Octane Fuel for use in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft in this Command." (attachment 2)

25 Fighter Stations were listed as requiring 100 octane fuel "in the first instance", including non-operational Kenley, Usworth and Hendon, with a further 17 non-operational bases which required supplies for visiting aircraft, but "which have no Hurricane or Spitfire aircraft at the moment."

Squadrons that were to use 100 octane fuel were not selected by Squadron number but by the type of aircraft used. Bases that hosted these aircraft types were accordingly supplied with 100 octane fuel. Same for the Bomber squadrons, namely Blenheims. The only Blenheim capable of using 100 octane fuel was the Mk IV the first of which emerged in March 1939. The Defiant was not listed in December because it was not yet operational.

All of the 11 Group Sector stations were listed, plus Filton which, in June 1940, became part of the new 10 Group; 4 out of 5 12 Group sector stations, 2 out of 5 13 Group sector stations, and 11 other airfields, including 6 of 11 Group were listed.

In May 1940 stocks of 100 Octane fuel were 294,000 tons, while stocks of "other grades" were 298,000 tons (attachment 3).

Far from there being a crisis in the supply, of 100 Octane preventing a continued change over of units (according to the famous Pips document) for the next two months, 100 Octane fuel was becoming the dominant fuel type being stocked; by August 404,000 tons was being held, cf 230,000 tons of other grades.

[Al Schlageter]

Kurfurst, I'm still waiting...

It shouldn't be that hard for Barbi, or Eugene, to do so as there was only 16 squadrons out of 50 plus that used 100 fuel, according to them.

[41Sqn_Banks]

Re the layout of the pilots notes, people are free to look at a selection and make their own mind as to which has the correct format.

I did check "AP 1565B Vol. I" ("Vol. I" is the full manual; the "Pilot's Notes" are only Section 1 and 2 of this manual).

Section 2 starts with Para 1 "Handling and Flying Notes for Pilots" on page "F.S/3". This is the one posted by Kurfürst, that contains engine limits for 100 and 87 octane fuel. This page is amended by Amendment List 31, I don't have a date for this list but A.L. 30 was issued December, 1943.

At the end in Para 55 of Section 2 there is the unamended page "F.S./16" that contains only limits for 100 octane fuel.

The "List of Contents" (dated June, 1940) confirms that Para 55 contains the "Notes concerning the Merlin XII engine", however Para 1 should actually contain an "Introduction" and not "Handling and Flying Notes for Pilots", which obviously was added later. The unamended Para 1 can be seen in this copy here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/4598146/Pilots-Notes-Supermarine-Spitfire-Mk-IIA-IIB-Merlin-XII-Engine

[41Sqn_Banks]

Section 4 "Instructions and Notes for Ground Personnel" mentions in Para 4

The fuel ... to be used with the Merlin XII engine are as follows:-
Fuel .............. 100 Octane


Section 8 "Engine Installation" was issued August, 1940 with A.L. No. 3 in Para 14 "Fuel System"

The fuel system ... uses 100 octane fuel ...


The use of 87 Octane fuel is not mentioned in these sections.

It's obvious that the guidelines for the use of 87 Octane fuel were not contained in the initial issue of June 1940 and were added later.

[lane]

Interestingly, at the time of the March 1939 planning memo calling for 100 octane to be brought into use by 16 squadrons, 15 squadrons were operational with Spitfires or Hurricanes, with 3 others in the process of forming or converting. The units are as follows:

Mar-39
Sqdn Base Aircraft
1 Tangmere Hurricane
19 Duxford Spitfire
32 Biggin Hill Hurricane
41 Catterick Spitfire
43 Tangmere Hurricane
46 Digby Hurricane Converting from Gauntlets March 39
54 Hornchurch Spitfire Converting from Gladiator March 39
56 North Weald Hurricane
66 Duxford Spitfire
73 Digby Hurricane
74 Hornchurch Spitfire
79 Biggin Hill Hurricane
85 Debden Hurricane
87 Debden Hurricane
111 Northolt Hurricane
151 North Weald Hurricane
213 Wittering Hurricane
501 Filton Hurricane Forming with Hurricanes in March 39

The status of other squadrons that had not converted to Hurricane or Spitfire by March 1939 but had converted by December 1939, when the stations at which they were based in December 1939 were required to be supplied with 100 octane, were as follows:

3 Kenley Gladiator
17 Kenley Gauntlet
65 Church Fenton Blenheim
72 Church Fenton Gladiator
152 not formed none
504 Hucknall Gauntlet
602 Abbotsinch Gauntlet
603 Turnhouse Gladiator
607 Usworth Gladiator
609 Yeadon Gladiator
610 Wittering Hind
611 Speke Hind
615 Kenley Gauntlet
616 Kenley Gauntlet

The 100 octane approval memo from 24 September 1938 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/24sept38-spitfire-100oct-approval.jpg) suggests that the impetus for converting to 100 octane pre-war was for improved take-off performance, given the propellers that the aircraft were equipped with at that time.

[Kurfürst]

I did check "AP 1565B Vol. I" ("Vol. I" is the full manual; the "Pilot's Notes" are only Section 1 and 2 of this manual).

Section 2 starts with Para 1 "Handling and Flying Notes for Pilots" on page "F.S/3". This is the one posted by Kurfürst, that contains engine limits for 100 and 87 octane fuel. This page is amended by Amendment List 31, I don't have a date for this list but A.L. 30 was issued December, 1943.

Interesting. Do you what was changed with A.L. 31?

At the end in Para 55 of Section 2 there is the unamended page "F.S./16" that contains only limits for 100 octane fuel.

Another interesting point that it appears that +12 lbs was banned at that time for combat use ("5 min all out level"), the maximum allowed was +9, with +12 was only cleared for take off purposes up to 1000 feet. It appears that +12 was not cleared for combat use during the Battle of Britain, and was added only later.

If that's correct, our Spitfire II is running well above (having +12 performance) the established limits applicable (+9 lbs boost) and having a performance not representative for the Battle of Britain period.

With it's historical +9 lbs limitation the Spitfire II was capable of about 290 mph at SL. Ours do well over 300 mph. If Bank's findings are correct, this should be corrected to historical levels.

One does wonder though about what was the point about the Spitfire II, given that at it's historical limit of +9 lbs and 100 octane it was only equal in speed to the Spitfire Mk I on 87 octane fuel and inferior to the Bf 109E on 87 octane fuel (not to mention 96 octane C-3 fuelled variants).

The "List of Contents" (dated June, 1940) confirms that Para 55 contains the "Notes concerning the Merlin XII engine", however Para 1 should actually contain an "Introduction" and not "Handling and Flying Notes for Pilots", which obviously was added later. The unamended Para 1 can be seen in this copy here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/4598146/Pilots-Notes-Supermarine-Spitfire-Mk-IIA-IIB-Merlin-XII-Engine

This seem to confirm that the unamended Pilot's notes from June 1940 was already referring the Spitfire IIA and IIB types, so Glider's assumption that the mention of cannon armament refers to a later date manual is clearly wrong.

[Glider]

All
I believe that a lot of frustration is being expressed and think it would be a good time to stand back, look at the overall picture and let people decide the strength of the two sides of the argument. This is best done by showing all the relevant papers in the time line so everyone can see how they fit together.

Before I start I will confirm my view that all of Fighter Command was effectively supplied with 100 Octane Fuel for the BOB, that the case is a strong one, but not, a perfect one. However all the following are supported by original documentation from the NA or from published works

16th March 1939 Meeting
Held to consider the question when 100 Octane Fuel should be brought into use in the RAF and the number and type of squadrons involved.

There are three main parts to this.
i) It is true that at this meeting authorisation was given for 16 fighter squadrons and two twin engined bomber squadrons be converted to be use 100 Octane fuel by September 1940. The change over to start at the end of 1939 and the ACAS would select the squadrons.
ii) It was anticipated that these units would use 10,000 tons of fuel over a twelve month period and this would slow down the aim of achieving an 800,000 ton reserve.
iii) The AMPD asked that he should be kept informed as to the progress of the production of the 100 Octane fuel in order that the change over of squadrons could be kept under review in the light of any acceleration or diminution in Supplies.

General Points
- Clearly this is a peace time plan, the war hadn’t started, 18 squadrons would use a lot more than 10,000 tons over twelve months when at war. It is certain that when war started there would be changes.
- It covers both fighters and bombers
- They were not defined as being Blenheim just twin engined bombers of which the RAF had a number of types.
- The 18 squadrons wasn’t a fixed number, it was open to change.

14th November 1939 letter Supplied by Kurfurst
The tests of 100 Octane in the Hurricane and Merlin
In this letter it mentions:-
i) That the tests were successful
ii) It is understood that sufficient stocks of 100 Octane are available
iii) That approval for use in Hurricanes and Spitfires should be given forthwith

7th December 1939 Letter from FC Admin to HQ
This letter starts going into the nuts and bolts of how the change from 87 to 100 Octane would need to be handled. It’s the sort of information any change of this magnitude will need.
The most interesting part is that it lists the 21 operational stations at which the fuel will be required in the first instance. At the time these were all the stations that were equipped or planned to be equipped, with Hurricanes and Spitfires. Also that training units would not be supplied with 100 Octane.

12th December 1939 Letter from Director Of Equipment re Issue of 100 Octane Fuel
Letter confirms that 100 Octane Fuel is approved for use in Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant aircraft. Issue to be made as soon as the fuel is available at the distribution depots servicing the fighter stations concerned. Some bomber units may be given priority.
The date of use is dependent on when the fuel can be put down in bulk at the distribution sites and the relevant stations. Re the latter as a station empties a tank of 87 Octane it will be replaced with 100 Octane.

Observations
Clearly 7th and 12th papers are a change to the March 1939 notes. Certain aircraft are included and other aircraft in Fighter Command are excluded, no Blenheim fighter units are included or are any Gladiator units.
There is no limit set to the number of squadrons or area such as 11 Group, or any reference to specific squadrons. The RAF decided to use the 100 Octane and instead of limiting it to a number of squadrons, have decided to limit it by type of aircraft. All current and planned Spitfire and Hurricane bases are identified as being in the first instance.
Its worth commenting that Fuel was held at different levels, Strategic Reserves where they were imported, Regional level which is self explanatory, District Level which for FC was depots close to the Sector Stations and those at the individual satellite stations that were supplied from the Sector Stations. The method of distributing 100 Octane was to burn off the supplies of 87 Octane and as the tanks emptied to replace them with 100 Octane fuel. It takes time to use the 87 Octane Fuel in place, to make way for the 100 Octane so there isn’t a schedule roll out, the time will vary from station to station.

February 1940
The first combat reports are being recorded using 100 Octane and stations are also reporting the replacement of 87 Octane with 100 Octane fuel. Clearly the roll out is starting to reach the squadrons and one of the stations we have records for is Drem in Scotland and North Weald in the South of England. Drem is the last place I would change over to 100 octane, if there was a shortage of the fuel

24th February 5th Meeting of the Oil Committee
Request from ACAS that squadrons with Spits, Hurricanes and Blenheim should begin to use 100 Octane., no limitations.
Interesting choice of words as it is clear that some squadrons and bases have already converted and are using 100 Octane. However, there is a change in the replacement process they are discussing how to actively remove 3,600 – 4,000 tons of 87 octane fuel from station storage and replace it with 100 Octane, they are no longer waiting for the 87 Octane to be used up. The pace of change has increased.

6th April 6th Meeting of the Oil Committee
Progress Report on the change.
2 Group Bomber Command making good progress and want to have only 100 Octane on their bases. Agreement reached that four stations would only have 100 Octane and the others five sixths of fuel to be 100 Octane and one sixth 87 Octane.
Confusion in Fighter Command over the changes needed to operate 100 Octane. A Mr Tweedle is tasked with clarifying the situation with Fighter Command
There is also confirmation that the approved storage capacity of 800,000 tons is sufficient and that this tankage will hold between 640-700, 000 tons of fuel allowing for Ullage.
Definition of Ullage - the quantity of wine, liquor, or the like, remaining in a container that has lost part of its contents by evaporation, leakage, or use

18th May 1940 7th Meeting of the Oil Co ordination Committee Summary of Conclusions
The key points here are:-
i) The Committee took note that the position of the use of this fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft had been made clear to Fighter Command.
ii) Satisfaction was expressed that the units concerned had been stocked with the 100 Octane Fuel
iii) The Minutes were to reflect the appreciation of the work of the Petroleum Board and that the Air Ministry had been impressed with the manner in which the work had been executed.

May 1940 France
There are a number of papers detailing the roll out of 100 Octane to the RAF units in France. These were not in the original list of stations to be equipped and we have similar records for the RAF units sent to Norway.

Squadron Records Post May 1940
A number of RAF squadrons that took part in the BOB formed after May 1940, namely the commonwealth squadrons. None of the records that I have seen for these units mention any change over to 100 Octane and I checked these records until May 1941 by which time they would certainly be using 100 Octane. It’s my belief that this was because the use of 100 Octane after May 1940 was the norm.

1st August 1940 Memo from Downing re the Handling of the Merlin Engine
This note is advising the pilots that there is an increase in engine failures in the overuse of the emergency 12lb boost.
The interesting thing is that this memo was sent to ALL fighter groups. Had we been talking about the 16 squadrons or less this would not have been the case. It would have been sent to the squadrons involved.

7th August 1940
Note confirming that the Use of 100 Octane had been authorised for all Commands.This speaks for itself.


Reserves Information
The following information are the reserve stocks of 100 Octane fuel during the BOB period
This information has come from the War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly report (a) that is available from the National Archives, as well as Gavin Baileys paper(b) and Wood and Dempster(c).

Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)

Point of interest. From the start of the war until the end of the BOB the reserves never dropped and continued to increase. There was never any danger of the supply of the oil running out, there is no record of any concern over the lack of 100 Octane fuel supplies, in the Air Ministry or the Oil Co ordination Committee, until May 1944.
From September 1939 small quantities of 100 Octane of under 1000 tons were held at Malta and Gibraltar

Consumption Information
The following information are the consumption details of fuel during the BOB period. This information has come from the War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly report that is available from the National Archives.

Consumption of Aviation Spirit
The following figures are for the Air Minstry and are the Average Monthly Consumption

September – November 1939 16,000 tons
Dec 1939 – February 1940 14,000 tons
March 1940 – May 1940 23,000 tons
June 1940 – August 1940 10,000 tons (100 Oct) 26,000 tons (87 Oct)
Sept 1940 – November 1940 15,000 tons (100 Oct) 18,000 tons (87 Oct)

Consumption was running at approx 21% of the Imports

Combat Reports
We have combat reports from over 30 squadrons showing the use of 100 Octane. Its worth mentioning here that the NA have changed access to the combat records. They used to be on microfilm so it was fairly easy to get the combat reports for a squadron and find an example. They are now available on line, but you have to pay to view each record and you cannot view them until you have paid so it becomes a very expensive business with many hundreds of records to look at. A price I cannot afford, but have little doubt that if we were to look at the other squadrons we would find similar records.

Important Note
All the above is supported by original documentation with the exception of my observation on the Squadron Records of Post May, I did look at a number but not all of those squadrons that is a fact but the interpretation is mine alone

[Glider]

Those who doubt the Previous Posting

Their arguments seem to be based on the following

The Phrase the Units concerned and Certain Units

It’s my belief that these words were used to refer to bases/units which had not yet been converted to 100 Octane. We know that the roll out had already started, as proved by the Station / Combat reports we have from February 1940. This view is supported I believe by:-
• the number of combat records we have from over 30 squadrons
• the report in the May meeting where the appreciation of the work of the Petroleum Board was expressed and that the Air Ministry had been impressed with the manner in which the work had been executed
• The total lack of any conversion records of any FC station or squadron after May 1940 which were checked until May/June 1941

The belief is expressed by some that the use of Certain or concerned proves that the roll out was limited and some have said that this is clearly a continuation of the pre war Feb 1939 plan.
We have the 21 stations identified as being in the first instance, clearly there was going to be a second instance, clearly this is more than 16 Squadrons. We know that units in France were equipped with 100 octane and those in Norway, so the 21 stations was built on, this could easily be defined as a second instance.
There is absolutely no evidence that says that the roll out was limited. As a minimum the Oil Co ordination committee would have been involved as they were responsible for the purchase, storage and distribution of all fuel.
Those who believe this to be the case are invited to provide some evidence. I have stated what I believe to be the definition of Certain and Concerned with what evidence I can find. Its not perfect but I have tried and have shown what I found. I invite the doubters to do the same

The view that it didn’t mean 16 squadrons it meant no more than 16 Squadrons using 100 Octane at the same time
This is totally new and no one has even tried to support it. Those who propose it are encouraged to support this view with some evidence.

Pips Views
This paper has never been seen but more importantly there is no evidence to support any of the statements made in it. The War Cabinet didn’t make the decisions he said it did. There was no shortage of 100 Octane, nothing. Again those who believe this view are encouraged to find some evidence to support any part of it.

Pips Didn’t Mean the War Cabinet
This view that the War Cabinet was actually a much bigger thing with hundreds of component parts is fanciful. The War Cabinet was the War Cabinet, it had a structure, it had members, it had minutes and it was chaired by the Prime Minister. A lot of parties reported to it, including the Air Ministry and the Oil Committee, but the War Cabinet was the War Cabinet and the minutes are available on line.
People who believe this are invited to find out who made these decisions, it wasn’t the Air Ministry and it wasn’t the War Cabinet.

Pilots Notes I and IIB
This has been done in some detail recently. The only thing I can add is that I would expect to find Spit I Pilots notes to have 100 octane and 87 Octane because:-
a) it was in service before 100 Octane was available
b) Spit I’s were in the training Units and they didn’t have 100 Octane

Important Note
I invite anyone to look at the evidence put forward to support each side of the case and make their own minds up

[Kurfürst]

18th May 1940 7th Meeting of the Oil Co ordination Committee Summary of Conclusions
The key points here are:-
i) The Committee took note that the position of the use of this fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft had been made clear to Fighter Command.
ii) Satisfaction was expressed that the units concerned had been stocked with the 100 Octane Fuel
iii) The Minutes were to reflect the appreciation of the work of the Petroleum Board and that the Air Ministry had been impressed with the manner in which the work had been executed.

In short, the RAF recored in May 1940 that the issue of 100 octane was limited to select units.


Combat Reports
We have combat reports from over 30 squadrons showing the use of 100 Octane.

Out of 60+ Squadrons.

In addition, within these over 30 Squadrons there are duplications, when several Squadrons rotate between the same stations.

We can identify about 20-25 Stations supplied with 100 octane fuel at one time or another out of 50+.

[Al Schlageter]

List of officially accredited Battle of Britain squadrons
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_officially_accredited_Battle_of_Britain_sq uadrons

Hurricane (36) and Spitfire (19) squadrons numbered 55

Sector Group Sector Station Satellite Airfield or airfields
A 11 Tangmere RAF Westhampnett
B 11 Kenley RAF Croydon
C 11 Biggin Hill RAF West Malling, RAF Gravesend[7]
D 11 RAF Hornchurch RAF Gravesend, RAF Rochford, RAF Manston, RAF Hawkinge
E 11 RAF North Weald RAF Stapleford Tawney, RAF Martlesham Heath
F 11 RAF Debden RAF Martlesham Heath[8]
G 12 RAF Duxford RAF Fowlmere
K 12 RAF Wittering RAF Coltishall
L 12 RAF Digby RAF Ternhill
M 12 RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey
N 12 RAF Church Fenton RAF Leconfield
O 13 RAF Usworth RAF Catterick
P 13 RAF Acklington
Q 13 RAF Turnhouse RAF Drem, RAF Grangemouth
R 13 Dyce RAF Grangemouth
S 13 RAF Wick RAF Kirkwall, RAF Sumburgh
W 10 RAF Filton RAF Boscombe Down, RAF Colerne, RAF Pembrey
Y 10 RAF Middle Wallop RAF Boscombe Down, RAF Warmwell, RAF Exeter, some control over RNAS Roborough, RAF St Eval
Z 11 RAF Northolt RAF Hendon

[Kurfürst]

Those who doubt the Previous Posting

Their arguments seem to be based on the following

The Phrase the Units concerned and Certain Units

It’s my belief that these words were used to refer to bases/units which had not yet been converted to 100 Octane.

Yes it's your belief and it's supported by nothing and specifically disproven by the documents you supplied yourself. These papers discuss in great lenght and express specifically that 100 octane is not meant for all stations, and specifically dismiss the suggestion to have only 100 octane at those stations which do not require it.


We know that the roll out had already started, as proved by the Station / Combat reports we have from February 1940. This view is supported I believe by:-

• The total lack of any conversion records of any FC station or squadron after May 1940 which were checked until May/June 1941

'Which were checked' seem to be keyword here. You checked but a handful of reports but mislead everyone here that there's no trace. The truth is you haven't checked it in a manner that would justify such claims.

The belief is expressed by some that the use of Certain or concerned proves that the roll out was limited and some have said that this is clearly a continuation of the pre war Feb 1939 plan.

Which it is, all the papers you have supplied follow exactly the schedule laid down by the March 1939 plan. Absolutely no indiciation or evidence have been presented that the plan was overidden at any time.

And certain means what it means.

We have the 21 stations identified as being in the first instance, clearly there was going to be a second instance, clearly this is more than 16 Squadrons.

Nope, these 21 stations you keep mentioning from the December 1939 letters by FC are merely a list of stations where RAF FC would have liked to have 100 octane fuel.

You have supplied no evidence that these 21 stations were approved for 100 octane issues nor that 100 octane was actually issued to them.

There is absolutely no evidence that says that the roll out was limited.

In other words, you have absolutely no information or evidence to the extent of the roll out, or that it was unlimited, and you merely keep ignoring and dismissing every paper that specifically note that it was limited as 'pre-war plans' and 'mis-types'.


As a minimum the Oil Co ordination committee would have been involved as they were responsible for the purchase, storage and distribution of all fuel.
Those who believe this to be the case are invited to provide some evidence. I have stated what I believe to be the definition of Certain and Concerned with what evidence I can find. Its not perfect but I have tried and have shown what I found. I invite the doubters to do the same

Here's the definition of 'certain' for you:

pronoun
(certain of)
some but not all:
certain of his works have been edited

http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/certain?q=certain

Pips Views
This paper has never been seen but more importantly there is no evidence to support any of the statements made in it. The War Cabinet didn’t make the decisions he said it did.

We have discussed this. To put it bluntly, your claims about checking the War Cabinet decisions was a lie.


There was no shortage of 100 Octane, nothing. Again those who believe this view are encouraged to find some evidence to support any part of it.

This is a nice strawman argument. Nobody claimed that the there was a shortage of 100 octane stocks, however there were uncertainities with consistent supplies, partly due to U-boot activity and partly due to dependence on US manufacturers, their capacity and willingness; this is clearly noted by a dozen British historians like Morgan and Shacklady or the official studies. You ignore them all.


Pips Didn’t Mean the War Cabinet
This view that the War Cabinet was actually a much bigger thing with hundreds of component parts is fanciful. The War Cabinet was the War Cabinet, it had a structure, it had members, it had minutes and it was chaired by the Prime Minister. A lot of parties reported to it, including the Air Ministry and the Oil Committee, but the War Cabinet was the War Cabinet and the minutes are available on line.
People who believe this are invited to find out who made these decisions, it wasn’t the Air Ministry and it wasn’t the War Cabinet.

You keep repeating this obvious nonsense. On one hand you claim the War Cabinet was one single body, and then you contradict yourself that 'a lot of parties reported to it'. The nonsense Glider repeats is that the War Cabinet had no Committes, and then he names the Oil Committee of the War Cabinet. :D

Committees are smaller cells of the Cabinet, and Glider hadn't checked these, but claims he has done so. Further information at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/cabinet-office.htm#17741

Pilots Notes I and IIB
This has been done in some detail recently. The only thing I can add is that I would expect to find Spit I Pilots notes to have 100 octane and 87 Octane because:-
a) it was in service before 100 Octane was available
b) Spit I’s were in the training Units and they didn’t have 100 Octane

I am curious of the evidence of the claims made in b). So which 'training units' had Spitfire Is and from where do you take they had no 100 octane fuel? Have you seen a document about it? A paper? A list of which units have 100 octane and which didn't?

Important Note
I invite anyone to look at the evidence put forward to support each side of the case and make their own minds up

Well to cut the long story short, the only definitive evidence you have provided is that 100 octane was used by about 30 Squadrons out of 60, or about 20 Stations out of 50.

And that is just that, about 1/3 to 1/2 the units, so quite simply there's no factual basis, or evidence to, that all the others were using 100 octane. It's merely a wishful assumption.

[Al Schlageter]

So Barbi what RAF FC squadrons used only 87 octane fuel?

[41Sqn_Banks]

This seem to confirm that the unamended Pilot's notes from June 1940 was already referring the Spitfire IIA and IIB types, so Glider's assumption that the mention of cannon armament refers to a later date manual is clearly wrong.

Actually it does not. Only the cover states "IIB", but within the text there is only reference to 8 Browning .303 machine guns.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/4598146/Pilots-Notes-Supermarine-Spitfire-Mk-IIA-IIB-Merlin-XII-Engine

Introduction Para 7
Eight Browning .303 in. machine guns ...

Section 1 Para 44
The eight guns ...

As this scan is from a post-war (?) reproduction (See copyright on last page) probably used a different cover that contains "IIA" and "IIB".

[Osprey]

He doesn't know. But remember, the fact that there is no evidence is countered by the fact that the RAF were the enemy of his favourite aeroplane. When the second fact occurs then no other facts matter.

[Kurfürst]

As this scan is from a post-war (?) reproduction (See copyright on last page) probably used a different cover that contains "IIA" and "IIB".

Yes its seems possible - maybe the repro or the scanning person frankensteined together a couple of manuals.

[NZtyphoon]

We have discussed this. To put it bluntly, your claims about checking the War Cabinet decisions was a lie.

This is a nice strawman argument. Nobody claimed that the there was a shortage of 100 octane stocks, however there were uncertainities with consistent supplies, partly due to U-boot activity and partly due to dependence on US manufacturers, their capacity and willingness; this is clearly noted by a dozen British historians like Morgan and Shacklady or the official studies. You ignore them all.

Well let's see now the reality.

Tanker losses to all causes, I have gathered a total of 78(!!) tankers were sunk by mine, U-boot (typically), aircraft and raiders, between September 1939 and November 1940. About 90% of them were British, though there are a couple of Swedish, Dutch, French etc. tankers
Tanker losses were serious, unfortunately.

From the NA:
cab68/6/11 "War Cabinet Oil Position: Thirty-third Weekly Report: 23 April 1940" (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ Click "Search" then "Browse our guidance A-Z" Click "C" then "Cabinet Government" which will highlight "The Cabinet and its committees" scroll down to 3. "Cabinet Papers online" click on cab68; enter reference no. "cab68/6/11" in this format in top l/h corner of new page, click on "Go to reference"; click on "View digital image" then "+Add to shopping"; it is free and downloadable)

"The process of bringing Norwegian tankers under Allied control has advanced during the week, and of a total fleet of 212 Norwegian tankers 119 are now under Allied control, while 18 are proceeding to Allied ports; 93 are in neutral ports or reported to be proceeding to neutral ports..."

Meaning in April 1940 Britain had already gained the use of 119 Norwegian tankers, 41 more than were sunk between Sept 1939 and November 1940, and more were expected.

cab68/7/31 "War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly Report: November 1940" (issued 20 December) (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/r...-1939-1945.htm)


Table I: "Imports Into the United Kingdom (Services and Civil)"

Shows the total number of tankers arriving in UK ports in the year between September 1939 and August 1940 = 947: (Total shown in table = 1,079 minus 132, June to August 1939.)

March to May 1940 = 109 tankers; 1,112,300 tons imported;
June to August = 100 tankers; 1,058,900 tons

total tonnage of oil products imported = 9,986,900. (11,126,900 minus 1,140,000 tons, imported June to August 1939.): an average of 10,546 tons per tanker.

September and October 1940: 124 tankers (62 per month) arrived and in November 80: September = 640,500 tons of imports; October = 651,600; November = 890,300 tons

Grand Total of Tankers arriving in UK Sept 1939 to November 1940 = 1,151
Grand Total of Oil Products Imported = 12,169,300 tons: 10,573 tons of oil product per tanker

Total number sunk Sept 1939 - Nov 1940 = 78(!!); 385,957 tons of oil product = roughly 6.8% tankers; roughly 3.2% of tons imported to Britain. The amount of oil product per tanker destroyed was 4,948 tons, meaning on average the tankers sunk were carrying less than half the weight of cargo each tanker that arrived in port was discharging; the tankers being sunk were either smaller than average, or, more likely, at least half of them were sunk in ballast.

Quantity of fuel available ( production estimates) from non US sources as of November 1940

Heysham 150,000 tons
Trinidad 80,000 tons
Billingham 15,000 tons
Stanlow 55,000 tons
Abadan 50,000 tons
Aruba 50,000 tons
Palembang 50,000 tons
Pladjoe 50,000 tons

[Kurfürst]

The current level of evidence for 100 octane use with all units of Fighter Command summarized:

http://f00.inventorspot.com/images/1559606_340_1116081430036-spam.jpg

+

http://bluejacket.com/usn/images/sp/oth/w1_destroyer_smoke-screen.jpg

[41Sqn_Banks]

Yes its seems possible - maybe the repro or the scanning person frankensteined together a couple of manuals.

Indeed, from what I've seen it contains at least amendments 6 and 9.

I did check "Vol. I" for references to IIB and found that the "Introduction" page was changed in June, 1941 to contain the difference between IIA and IIB. The changed part in the text is marked by vertical line.

And A.L. No. 19 from December, 1941 (see header of Section 1 Introduction) contains description of the different handling of IIA and IIB (Para 34a and b).

So I think it was June, 1941 when the difference between IIA and IIB was added to the manual.

[Al Schlageter]

It can be put to rest that the stations listed in the Dec 7 1939 document did indeed get 100 octane fuel, except possibly one.

10 Group

Filton
No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940
St Athan - training base

11 Group

Biggin Hill
No. 32 Squadron pre BoB H,
No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940

Manston
600 squadron Blenheims

Marlesham Heath
No. 85 Squadron May 1940 H

Hornchurch
No. 41 Squadron June 1940,
No. 65 (East India) Squadron 12 Aug 1940,
No. 74 Squadron May 1940 S

Northholt
No. 43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940

Croydon
No. 111 Squadron pre BoB

Tangmere
No. 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H

Debden
No. 17 Squadron May 1940

Nowrth Weald
No. 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940,
No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940

12 Group

Duxford
No. 19 Squadron May 1940

Digby
No. 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940

Leconfield
No. 616 (South Yorkshire) Squadron 15 Aug 1940,
No. 249 (Gold Coast) Squadron 6 Sept 1940

Church Fenton
No. 73 Squadron May 1940,
No. 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H,
No. 616 (South Yorkshire) Squadron 15 Aug 1940

Wittering
No. 229 Squadron May 1940 H

13 group

Drem
No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB

Turnhouse
No. 603 (City of Edinburgh) Squadron 31 Aug 1940

Grangemounth
No. 263 (Fellowship of the Bellows) Squadron

Acklington
No. 152 (Hyderabad) Squadron 4 Sept 1940,
No. 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H,

Catterick
No. 41 Squadron June 1940

[Al Schlageter]

The current level of evidence for 100 octane use with all units of Fighter Command summarized:

http://f00.inventorspot.com/images/1559606_340_1116081430036-spam.jpg

+

http://bluejacket.com/usn/images/sp/oth/w1_destroyer_smoke-screen.jpg

When Barbi starts trolling, you know that he is squirming like a worm skewered on a fishing hook.

His 2cd image is of American 4 stack destroyers laying a smokescreen, which he is doing.:)

[Glider]

In short, the RAF recored in May 1940 that the issue of 100 octane was limited to select units.
All we have ever asked is for you to define select, which squadrons and support it so do so

[41Sqn_Banks]

Interesting. Do you what was changed with A.L. 31?

No, I think only that part and a para about air/sea rescue dinghy equipment. It's the last A.L. incorporated in the manual. It must have been between December, 1943 (the date of A.L. 30) and June 1944 (when the amendments were incorporated into the manual).


Another interesting point that it appears that +12 lbs was banned at that time for combat use ("5 min all out level"), the maximum allowed was +9, with +12 was only cleared for take off purposes up to 1000 feet. It appears that +12 was not cleared for combat use during the Battle of Britain, and was added only later.


Indeed interesting. The Merlin XX did have exactly the same limits when introduced, as can be seen here: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/merlin-xx-limits-10june40.jpg and was eventually increased to +12 boost in November, 1940, see:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/merlin-xx-15nov40.jpg
And 3,000 rpm for climb above 20,000ft in December, 1940, see:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/merlin-xx-11dec40.jpg

Also note that even the amended AP 1565 A Pilot's Notes for Spitfire I that comes with the Collector's Edition gives the "All out" limit with 3,000 R.p.m and +6 1/4 lb/sqn.in., and this is dated January 1942. The +12 boost is given under a own paragraph called "combat concessions" on the following page.

Also note that AP 1565 A Vol. I gives the +6 1/4 for "All out", however the description of the "boost cut-out" gives +12 boost. Note that A.L. No.6 is dated July, 1940.

the override control can be used for short periods only, but only when 100 octane fuel is used.

AP 1590B Vol. I Merlin II, III and V Aero-Engines A.L. No. 4 dated November 1940 also gives "maximum level flight (5 minute limit) of +6 1/2 but contains a detailed description of the +12 boost use for emergency.

It seems like there was a difference between "all out" and "emergency/combat" power (5min limit in the amended Spitfire II Pilot's Notes is called "combat" instead of "all out"). However, it would be interesting to find a reference when +12 boost and 3000 rpm for climb was actually cleared for the Merlin XII for combat/emergency. Possibly at the same time as higher limits were introduced for Merlin XX (November 1940 and December 1940).

[Glider]

Yes it's your belief and it's supported by nothing and specifically disproven by the documents you supplied yourself. These papers discuss in great lenght and express specifically that 100 octane is not meant for all stations, and specifically dismiss the suggestion to have only 100 octane at those stations which do not require it.
You need to be careful Kurfurst. The papers go to great length to say that the 100 octane is targeted in the first instance at the 21 stations which were all the stations that had Spitfires and Hurricanes at the time and we know that the RAF units in France and Norway were added to the list. Later your complaint is that is says it was targeted at all these stations but it did not get issued. However, your problem is that to aim for 21 stations is a change in the pre war statement of intent, something you say was carried out without alteration.



'Which were checked' seem to be keyword here. You checked but a handful of reports but mislead everyone here that there's no trace. The truth is you haven't checked it in a manner that would justify such claims.
This is your one comment which is correct. In two places on the posting I made it clear that I hadn't looked at all the squadrons and I didn't here.




Which it is, all the papers you have supplied follow exactly the schedule laid down by the March 1939 plan. Absolutely no indiciation or evidence have been presented that the plan was overidden at any time.
The problem here is that you do not know the details behind the paper. For instance, which squadrons, which bases, when, how does the the fuel get distributed. You cannot reply to these questions so it isn't a plan. A plan has etails that tell you how to get there, no detail no plan..
We do know that this aim was changed if only by the number of bomber units equipped with 100 Octane.


Nope, these 21 stations you keep mentioning from the December 1939 letters by FC are merely a list of stations where RAF FC would have liked to have 100 octane fuel.
This is where you need to make up your mind. If it helps Al matched 20 of the 21 stations to 100 Octane fuel in an earlier posting and as we know, those in France and Norway were issued with it as well.


In other words, you have absolutely no information or evidence to the extent of the roll out, or that it was unlimited, and you merely keep ignoring and dismissing every paper that specifically note that it was limited as 'pre-war plans' and 'mis-types'.
Its a theory but as I have pointed out, the pre war paper says 16 squadrons and we have over 30, its a problem for you.


We have discussed this. To put it bluntly, your claims about checking the War Cabinet decisions was a lie.
You know that I went through the War Cabinet files, I gave you the link, the file numbers concerned and even said I would help you if you had a problem. You have said that you have been through them and I am confident that you didn't find what you wanted, as you would have shouted it from the rooftops.

To now say I lied about going through the papers is a new low even for you.




This is a nice strawman argument. Nobody claimed that the there was a shortage of 100 octane stocks, however there were uncertainities with consistent supplies, partly due to U-boot activity and partly due to dependence on US manufacturers, their capacity and willingness; this is clearly noted by a dozen British historians like Morgan and Shacklady or the official studies. You ignore them all.
A couple of points:-
a) If there wasn't a shortage and we had a three year stockpile, why would the roll out be limited.
b) If there were uncertanties about supply, why did we halt production at the Billingham refinery because it wasn't needed
c) Please list the dozen Historians you refer to, or the official studies




You keep repeating this obvious nonsense. On one hand you claim the War Cabinet was one single body, and then you contradict yourself that 'a lot of parties reported to it'. The nonsense Glider repeats is that the War Cabinet had no Committes, and then he names the Oil Committee of the War Cabinet. :D
What I said is true. You have seen the minutes on the link I gave you,The War Cabinet is chaired by the PM, it has its own members. It isn't a committee, but organisations such as the Oil Committee and Air Ministry do report to it.
You did look at those files I gave you, didn't you?
If anyone would like me to reissue the details so they can check for the decisions Pips says were made by the War Cabinet and make their own mind up, please let me know.



I am curious of the evidence of the claims made in b). So which 'training units' had Spitfire Is and from where do you take they had no 100 octane fuel? Have you seen a document about it? A paper? A list of which units have 100 octane and which didn't?
OTU's had some Spitfires and Hurricanes and as Training units didn't have 100 Octane, so they used 87 Octane and papers have been submitted stating this. You have read the papers submitted haven't you?. The Luftwaffe used early 109's in a similar training role, I am sure.
I admit to not knowing where you are coming from here. Are you saying tht the RAF would give 100 Octane to training units, but not to front line units?



Well to cut the long story short, the only definitive evidence you have provided is that 100 octane was used by about 30 Squadrons out of 60, or about 20 Stations out of 50.

And that is just that, about 1/3 to 1/2 the units, so quite simply there's no factual basis, or evidence to, that all the others were using 100 octane. It's merely a wishful assumption.
I have explained about the change in the storage of the records and it is now very expensive to look at combat records. But 30 is a lot more than 16.

[NZtyphoon]

100 Octane Fuel Consumed

July - Aug 1940 = 20,000 tons consumed
Sept - = 14,000 tons consumed
Oct = 17,000 tons consumed
Total = 51,000 tons of 100 octane fuel consumed
1 imperial gallon of 100 Octane = 7.1 pounds ("Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith the official British war history on the oil and petroleum industry during WW2 page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"):

1 ton of 100 octane = 2,240 lbs therefore 2,240 divided by 7.1 = 315.5 imp gal

Fuel Capacities:

Defiant I = 97 imp gal
Hurricane I = 90 imp gal
Spitfire I & II = 84 imp gal
Blenheim IV = 199 imp gal outer fuel tanks
TOTAL = 470 imp gal divide by 4 = average fighter/bomber fuel load = 117.5 imp gal (Defiant from memory, so feel free to correct me. Defiant II = 104 imp gal)

1 ton = 315.5 imp gal divided by 117.5 imp gal = 2.6 fuel loads (or sorties) per ton of 100 octane fuel.

*This is assuming all aircraft emptied their tanks for each sortie, and assuming all aircraft shot down = 1 fuel load of 90.3 imp gal

NB: Not all aircraft returned with empty tanks and RAF policy was to refill each aircraft as soon as possible after landing, or each evening or early morning, to avoid vapour traps.

Merlin III & XIIs could still use 87 octane fuel, hence training flights and other secondary flight duties, such as delivery, ferry flights, etc could still use 87 octane fuel

July to August: 20,000 tons x 2.6 = 52,000 sorties
September: 14,000 tons x 2.6 = 36,400 sorties
October: 17,000 tons x 3.5 = 44,200 sorties
Total July-October 132,600 fuel loads consumed or 132,600 sorties in which all aircraft landed with empty tanks.


The Battle of Britain by T.C.G. James shows 51,364 sorties, day & night from July 10 through Sept 30; some of the most intensive combat took place between these dates. Of course there were quiet periods when far fewer combat sorties were flown by Fighter Command; eg: August 16 & 17, between two days of intensive combat August 15 & 18.

Hooton’s Eagle in Flames, Table 2, FC flew Sep 23-29: 4,825 defensive sorties Sep 30 – Oct 6: 1,782 defensive sorties.

Total = 57,971 sorties yet

In spite of Blenheims being mixed in there are still 74,629 fuel loads available.

OR


And that is just that, about 1/3 to 1/2 the units

were using 100 octane fuel = 19,323 to 28,985 sorties, either that or the aircraft using 100 octane fuel carried out all the sorties, leaving the rest, who were confined to using 87 Octane, to do other things.


And that is just that, about 1/3 to 1/2 the units, so quite simply there's no factual basis, or evidence to, that all the others were using 100 octane. It's merely a wishful assumption.

132,600 sorties - 19,323 to 28,985 = 113,277 sorties or 103,615 sorties unaccounted for, including Blenheim sorties Where did all that fuel go? :confused:

The only engines cleared to use 100 Octane were the Merlin II III and XII and the Bristol Mercury XV, so it wasn't Bomber Command or Coastal Command who used it all, nor was it Army Co-Operation Command.

[NZtyphoon]

Now, just for interest, this is assuming all Blenheims used 100 octane only (six Blenheim units may have used 100 octane in all tanks)

Blenheim = 479 imp gals
Defiant= 97
Hurricane = 90
Spitfire = 85
Total= 751 imp gals divided by 4 = 187.75

1 ton 100 octane = 315.5 divided by 187.75 = 1.7 fuel loads

20,000 x 1.7 = 34,000 fuel loads
14,000 x 1.7 = 23,800 fuel loads
17,000x1.7 = 28900 fuel loads
Total = 86,700 fuel loads - 57,971 = 28929 fuel loads left over

Even with all Blenheims theoretically using nothing but 100 octane fuel, there was still more than enough 100 octane fuel consumed - not issued - from July through end of October to supply 100% of FC, and some BC, operations. Once again this is also assuming all aircraft landed with empty tanks and had to be completely refueled, rather than being topped up.

But Wait there's More!!

According to Kf (attachment) the only British aircraft to fly during the Battle of Britain were those of Fighter Command and they managed to consume all of the "other grades" of fuel issued, and all of the 100 Octane!? :cool: :mrgreen:

(Kf also says that consumption of "other grades of fuel went down starting mid to late September. Coincidentally that was the time that Operation Sealion was called off, and the collections of invasion barges that Bomber Command was running intensive operations against dispersed.

http://www.military-history.org/articles/the-battle-of-britain-timeline.htm

Except, according to the graph, Bomber Command wasn't operating.)

[41Sqn_Banks]

About +12 combat boost for Merlin XII I found a chart posted by Kurfürst which lists that boost. Unfortunately no date is given. National Archives Reference AIR 16/315.

[Crumpp]

The problem here is that you do not know the details behind the paper.

And nobody else does either.....including you.

As for counting "stations" that are supplied with fuel I would remind everyone in this discussion that aircraft can cover considerable distances in short periods of time.

If you want to test a fuel, you need the logistical base to conduct the test. That means stations must have the fuel on hand in the areas your test aircraft are to fly. Otherwise, your maintenance personnel will be draining a lot of fuel tanks for every off station landing.

Aircraft fuel tanks have what is called "usable fuel". There is always some left in the tanks that the lines cannot reach in level flight. The Spitfire POH refers to this as the "effective capacity". That left over fuel can be a significant amount in a WWII fighter. The amount is specific to the individual aircraft and will be found with that airframes weight and balance sheet. The average is about 5 gallons a tank for a WWII fighter.

Next point is "consumed" does not mean it was put in an airplane and used up. Aircraft fuel has a specific shelf life to it. Once mixed it is distributed and considered consumed. For example, 100LL stock is refined only ONCE per year in the United States. The stock is then distributed to the holding yards. When it is dispensed to the airports, the final mix of that stock occurs and it becomes 100LL fuel. Just because the airport buys 15,000 gallons does not mean it will be sold and go into airplanes by the time the shelf life is over. That is why airport managers keep data on fuel sales!

That does not mean they mixed up a huge batches of 100 grade to be "disposed of" either. In many cases fuel can be converted back to stock and then again to a lower grade. It is still 100 grade that is consumed whether it comes back to the holding yard or not!

This is why the same reasoning that was used to "prove" the 100/150 grade extent of use was so flawed. First the strategic stocks must be maintained and once the fuel is mixed, it is "consumed". Nothing to do with it being blown out the exhaust pipe of an airplane.

[NZtyphoon]

And nobody else does either.....including you.
Aircraft fuel tanks have what is called "usable fuel". There is always some left in the tanks that the lines cannot reach in level flight. The Spitfire POH refers to this as the "effective capacity". That left over fuel can be a significant amount in a WWII fighter. The amount is specific to the individual aircraft and will be found with that airframes weight and balance sheet. The average is about 5 gallons a tank for a WWII fighter.

Next point is "consumed" does not mean it was put in an airplane and used up. Aircraft fuel has a specific shelf life to it. Once mixed it is distributed and considered consumed. For example, 100LL stock is refined only ONCE per year in the United States. The stock is then distributed to the holding yards. When it is dispensed to the airports, the final mix of that stock occurs and it becomes 100LL fuel. Just because the airport buys 15,000 gallons does not mean it will be sold and go into airplanes by the time the shelf life is over. That is why airport managers keep data on fuel sales!

And what does peacetime civil practice have to do with an air force fighting off a concerted air attack over a period of a few months? Absolutely nothing!
:rolleyes:

For one thing it was standard FC practice to top up the tanks of all of its fighters as soon as possible after every sortie, mainly to avoid condensation traps because of the fuel left in the tanks. Nor did every aircraft land with empty fuel tanks. There was no "shelf life" when it came to running intensive, frontline operations.

No - what this entire discussion comes down to is Barbi's belief that Fighter Command, which proved to be technically astute during the Battle of Britain, deliberately deprived up to half of its front -line pilots of a technical and tactical asset.

People can speculate all they like about "selected units" "certain units" etc because, in the end:

1) Was 100 octane fuel available to Fighter Command? Yes

2) Was there enough 100 octane fuel available to cover all sorties flown by Fighter Command during the battle? Yes

3) Was enough 100 Octane fuel distributed and used throughout the battle to allow Fighter Command to fly all 57,971 sorties from July to end of October? Yes, with more than enough left over to allow Blenheims of Bomber Command to operate.

[Glider]

Crump
I must admit I don't understand what your last posting was about.

As for counting "stations" that are supplied with fuel I would remind everyone in this discussion that aircraft can cover considerable distances in short periods of time
I don't see the connection between the distance a plane can travel and the stations issued with the fuel.

I also don't see the emphasis on testing of the fuel. Testing started in 1938 and was completed in 1939 when it was signed off for use as documented in Kurfursts paper. 1940 is about the use of the fuel in combat, not testing it.

If you wish I can show you the consumption figures, i.e. the fuel used and I can show you the issued figure, which is as you would expect is a little different. That might help clear the topic, just let me know.

Re your comment on the line I posted The problem here is that you do not know the details behind the paper and your reply And nobody else does either.....including you
You are absolutely correct, no one does know the details. No one knows which squadrons, which aircraft, which stations, how it was to be distributed and so on were for the pre war paper. The difference is that I do not pretend to know.
However I do know that this idea of 16 + 2 bomber units wsan't mentioned at all in the Oil Committee meetings who would have been instrumental in the distribution of the fuel to the 16 fighter squadrons whatever those squadrons might be, wherever they may be based.

[Osprey]

You chaps have done your bit. The fact that a couple of sad knobheads still argue the toss even though there is overwhelming evidence is neither here nor there. I feel sorry for their own investigation and journey into history really, because with a viewpoint so precise it is not possible to speculate or deduce anything at all. Past their own lifetimes I dare say everything is debatable and by their own logic it is a large, mostly blank, canvas. I wonder if these guys believe anything at all about WW1, or the Roman Empire, or what happened at the Battle of Trafalgar, or anything where there is nothing to absolutely state in triplicate with recorded footage about that something happened in the past. Cpt. Mainwaring has the perfect response to them imo.....

[Al Schlageter]

I see Eugene is confused, still.

As for the testing Eugene thinks was being done at those 21 bases, 100 fuel had already been tested. Duxford, Debden, North Weald and Digby had received 8142gal a year earlier for 'testing'.

[Al Schlageter]

You chaps have done your bit. The fact that a couple of sad knobheads still argue the toss even though there is overwhelming evidence is neither here nor there. I feel sorry for their own investigation and journey into history really, because with a viewpoint so precise it is not possible to speculate or deduce anything at all. Past their own lifetimes I dare say everything is debatable and by their own logic it is a large, mostly blank, canvas. I wonder if these guys believe anything at all about WW1, or the Roman Empire, or what happened at the Battle of Trafalgar, or anything where there is nothing to absolutely state in triplicate with recorded footage about that something happened in the past. Cpt. Mainwaring has the perfect response to them imo.....

Agh but Barbi does just that, speculate, when it comes to 1.98ata boosted K-4s. Even going so far as to speculate that G-10s and K-4 units not covered by a never seen document also converted to 1.98ata boost. This despite that Eugene emphatically states that such would never be done by the Luftwaffe.

[NZtyphoon]

I see Eugene is confused, still.

As for the testing Eugene thinks was being done at those 21 bases, 100 fuel had already been tested. Duxford, Debden, North Weald and Digby had received 8142gal a year earlier for 'testing'.

And it had been "tested" operationally during the Battle of France, both by aircraft of the BEF and home based FC squadrons.

[Crumpp]

Crump
I must admit I don't understand what your last posting was about.


You cannot look at fuel stocks "consumed". I explained that already. It has nothing to do with "peacetime". It has to do with the science of fuels and the shelf life of the mixed stock and how it is accounted for.

You guys keep chewing on the same information. Problem is none of the information is complete or changes what Morgan and Shacklady put out. In fact, it only supports what they wrote but we don't have all the documents that they obviously referenced.

16 squadrons sometime in September 1940 were converted to the fuel. That would require their operating bases as well as their satellite fields to be supplied. In other words, anyplace they might have to land would need a source of fuel.

Did they just suddenly poof into existence 16 squadrons converted? Maybe....maybe not. If they gradually phased in those 16 squadrons as resources became available, then looking at squadron logs is not going to tell you much.

FC maintained a high rate of rotation to keep its fighter pilots as rested as possible. So looking at squadron logs is not going to be much help again.

[ACE-OF-ACES]

You chaps have done your bit. The fact that a couple of sad knobheads still argue the toss even though there is overwhelming evidence is neither here nor there.
Agreed 100%

I highly recomend you do as so many others have learned to do.. Ignore those three.. They are clearly biased.. Everyone can see that they are biased.. So no need to prove it over and over again.

[ATAG_Snapper]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6v4pk-kC-qE&feature=youtube_gdata_playerHmmm. Missing documents? Can't understand why....had my best man on it....

[Crumpp]

Re your comment on the line I posted The problem here is that you do not know the details behind the paper and your reply And nobody else does either.....including you
You are absolutely correct, no one does know the details. No one knows which squadrons, which aircraft, which stations, how it was to be distributed and so on were for the pre war paper. The difference is that I do not pretend to know.
However I do know that this idea of 16 + 2 bomber units wsan't mentioned at all in the Oil Committee meetings who would have been instrumental in the distribution of the fuel to the 16 fighter squadrons whatever those squadrons might be, wherever they may be based.


16 Fighter Squadrons + 2 Bomber units = THE SELECTED UNITS

The Oil Committee used very plain language.

[Al Schlageter]

You cannot look at fuel stocks "consumed". I explained that already. It has nothing to do with "peacetime". It has to do with the science of fuels and the shelf life of the mixed stock and how it is accounted for.

You guys keep chewing on the same information. Problem is none of the information is complete or changes what Morgan and Shacklady put out. In fact, it only supports what they wrote but we don't have all the documents that they obviously referenced.

16 squadrons sometime in September 1940 were converted to the fuel. That would require their operating bases as well as their satellite fields to be supplied. In other words, anyplace they might have to land would need a source of fuel.

Did they just suddenly poof into existence 16 squadrons converted? Maybe....maybe not. If they gradually phased in those 16 squadrons as resources became available, then looking at squadron logs is not going to tell you much.

FC maintained a high rate of rotation to keep its fighter pilots as rested as possible. So looking at squadron logs is not going to be much help again.

Are you really that clueless Eugene?

S:TH pg 55

"A meeting was held in the AMDP's room on 16 March 1939......... The decision taken was initial delivery to 16 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons by September 1940."

AMDP - Air Member for Development & Production

But then the war heated up and Barbi and Eugene expect this 16+2 to be kept. :rolleyes:

As can be seen, the 16+2 went bye-bye.
At the least 22 squadrons converted to 100 fuel by the end of June:

By Month

32 Squadron pre BoB H
92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB S
111 Squadron pre BoB H
151 Squadron Feb 1940 H
602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB S
609 (West Riding) Squadron pre BoB S

1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H
3 Squadron May 1940 H
17 Squadron May 1940 H
19 Squadron May 1940 S
54 Squadron May 1940 S
74 Squadron May 1940 S
56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940 H
73 Squadron May 1940 H
79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H
85 Squadron May 1940 H
87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H
N229 Squadron May 1940 H

N43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 H
N41 Squadron June 1940 S
610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 S
611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 S

[NZtyphoon]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6v4pk-kC-qE&feature=youtube_gdata_playerHmmm. Missing documents? Can't understand why....had my best man on it....

Yep, that really sums up what's happening here. Now...I just hit the trusty "ignore - okay" button...oh look, no Crumpp! 8-)

[Glider]

16 Fighter Squadrons + 2 Bomber units = THE SELECTED UNITS

The Oil Committee used very plain language.

But we have reports from over 30 squadrons

[Gabelschwanz Teufel]

Honestly. You actually believe that wartime fuel stocks sat around long enough to live past it's shelf life? During the BoB?

[Crumpp]

ut we have reports from over 30 squadrons

Glider,

The RAF had a very vigorous rotation schedule. The fight was tough and very dangerous so Dowding very intelligently rotated his units out to rest/refit.

In some cases, the rotation was in as little as 10 days of fighting. So when you count a 30 day chunk of time, that can be up to three rotations!!

[Crumpp]

As I understand it, the rotation was based on combat strength of the unit and not a set schedule or time.

In one month, (08 August 1940 thru 08 September 1940) 16 squadrons from 11 Group were rotated out of the fight and replaced by fresh ones. That would show up over a month period as up to 32 squadrons using 100 Octane fuel.

[fruitbat]

So by that rational, basically your saying that 11 group used 100 octane......

Now which group bore the brunt of the fighting by far.......

;)

[Al Schlageter]

As I understand it, the rotation was based on combat strength of the unit and not a set schedule or time.

In one month, (08 August 1940 thru 08 September 1940) 16 squadrons from 11 Group were rotated out of the fight and replaced by fresh ones. That would show up over a month period as up to 32 squadrons using 100 Octane fuel.

Which 16 squadrons out of 11 Group?

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/biggin.gif
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/croydon.gif
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/debden.gif

more http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0006.html

[Crumpp]

Now which group bore the brunt of the fighting by far.......


Of course 11th Group and if you line things up, 16 squadrons is a very large portion of 11th Groups combat power.

We also don't know when in September or when other squadrons were approved.

It could have been a sloping curve of units being stood up on 100 grade when the strategic reserves were in place and the fuel distributed to the stations concerned.

So if we have 16 units on 01 September, we could have the entire RAF FC by 30 September!! Consequently, if we have 16 squadrons on 30 September, then that picture changes.

Facts are we don't know.

[Osprey]

Which 16 squadrons out of 11 Group?

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/biggin.gif
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/croydon.gif
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/debden.gif

more http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0006.html

This is great, but 501 were in it from France to the end.

[Al Schlageter]

This is great, but 501 were in it from France to the end.

from the link:
The airfields that are displayed below are all those airfields within Fighter Commands' 11 Group including satelite airfields. The time span of each chart is from July 10, 1940 untill September 31, 1940 and all those squadrons that officially based the airfields shown are shown to the left of each chart.

[Osprey]

Didn't see the airfields. Yes, 501 were @ Kenley for a couple of weeks but spent most of the time @ Gravesend giving Jerry a black eye.

[fruitbat]

What about the squadrons at Hornchurch, Northolt and North Weald.....

Also sector airfields in 11 group.

i can see quite a few squadrons missing from those charts.

[Al Schlageter]

What about the squadrons at Hornchurch, Northolt and North Weald.....

Also sector airfields in 11 group.

i can see quite a few squadrons missing from those charts.

Did you go to the link?

[fruitbat]

Did you go to the link?

ahh, just wondered why you copy/pasted those!

By the way Osprey, i love the specs of your computer, if only i had the money:)

[NZtyphoon]

Question: How much fuel was needed to fly all defensive sorties flown by FC during the battle?

The Battle of Britain T.C.G. James: 51,364 sorties, day & night from July 10 through Sept 30: Hooton’s Eagle in Flames, Table 2, FC flew Sep 23-29: 4,825 defensive sorties Sep 30 – Oct 6: 1,782 defensive sorties.

Total = 57,971 sorties

1 imperial gallon of 100 Octane = 7.1 pounds ("Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith the official British war history on the oil and petroleum industry during WW2 page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"):

1 ton of 100 octane = 2,240 lbs divided by 7.1 = 315.5 imp gal

Fuel Capacities:

Defiant I = 97 imp gal
Hurricane I = 90 imp gal
Spitfire I & II = 84 imp gal
Total 271 imp gal

divided by 3 = 90.3 imp gal

315.5 divided by 90.3 = 3.5 fuel loads per ton of fuel

57,971 divided by 3.5
Answer: 16,563 tons of fuel

Crumpp likes to talk about shelf life and fuel being returned to depots etc: total 100 Octane fuel issued between July 11 and October 31 = 62,000 tons:

fuel consumed = 51,000 tons - 16,563 tons = 34,437 tons available for other purposes.

Now why, Eugene, would FC bother using 87 Octane fuel for half its frontline fighters? Hmmm? Can you give us some good, tangible reasoning bolstered by a modicum of evidence that this is the way things were done?
Pleeease?

ahh, just wondered why you copy/pasted those!

By the way Osprey, i love the specs of your computer, if only i had the money:)

Here's mine http://oldcomputers.net/amiga1000.html I can play COD but very slowly.

[Crumpp]

What about the squadrons at Hornchurch, Northolt and North Weald.....

Also sector airfields in 11 group.

i can see quite a few squadrons missing from those charts.

Those charts are not correct. If you need me too I will post the RAF's order of battle showing all the squadrons dispositions at various times. In the span of a few weeks, ALL of the squadrons in 11 Group had rotated out.

It actually was one of Dowdings more unpopular decisions to maintain such a vigorous rotation schedule. Many commanders felt it took experienced guys away from the fight and increased the casualty rate by placing inexperienced pilots in their place.

[Crumpp]

NZTyphoon, Once again.....

In the pursuit of gamers proving 100/150 grade was the standard fuel of the RAF, documents were produced that showed hundreds of thousand of tons of the fuel being moved around various stations and brought into the RAF logistical system in anticipation of the fuel being adopted.

The operational use turned out to be extremely limited and for a very short period of time before it was withdrawn from service.

You cannot look at fuel stocks to determine the extent of operational use. Logistics is there to answer the question, "Do we have enough to use?"

They do not answer the question, "Can we use this fuel?"....that is the operational side of the house!

[NZtyphoon]

NZTyphoon, Once again.....

In the pursuit of gamers proving 100/150 grade was the standard fuel of the RAF, documents were produced that showed hundreds of thousand of tons of the fuel being moved around various stations and brought into the RAF logistical system in anticipation of the fuel being adopted.

The operational use turned out to be extremely limited and for a very short period of time before it was withdrawn from service.

You cannot look at fuel stocks to determine the extent of operational use. Logistics is there to answer the question, "Do we have enough to use?"

They do not answer the question, "Can we use this fuel?"....that is the operational side of the house!

This is just too ridiculous to be true!!! :eek::eek::eek: :grin::grin::grin:

So, genius, explain exactly what happened to 51,000 tons of 100 octane fuel and provide some evidence for your claims. E-v-i-d-e-n-c-e! Is that so hard?

[Al Schlageter]

Those charts are not correct. If you need me too I will post the RAF's order of battle showing all the squadrons dispositions at various times. In the span of a few weeks, ALL of the squadrons in 11 Group had rotated out.

Post the RAF OoB from July 1 to Oct 31.

[lane]

... explain exactly what happened to 51,000 tons of 100 octane fuel and provide some evidence for your claims. E-v-i-d-e-n-c-e! Is that so hard?

<Sarcasm>The pilots fueled their cars with 100 octane petrol and drove into London to hit the pubs. Those that didn't have a car would drive the 100 octane petrol bowsers into town for a drink or to visit their girl friends! I'll leave it to others to do the math as to how many car trips to London the pilots would have to make to "consume" 51,000 tons of 100 octane fuel. </Sarcasm>

David Ross, Stapme, The Biography of Squadron Leader Basi Gerald Stapleton DFC, (Grub Street, London, 2002), pp. 22-23
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Stapleton-p23.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Stapleton-p22.jpg

Tony Bartley DFC, Smoke Trails in the Sky, (Crecy Publishing Limited, Wilmslow, Cheshire, 1997), p. 35.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/bartley-100oct.jpg

Tim Vigors DFC, Life’s Too Short to Cry, (Grub Street, London, 2006), p. 137.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/vigors-100octane.jpg

[41Sqn_Banks]

NZTyphoon, Once again.....

In the pursuit of gamers proving 100/150 grade was the standard fuel of the RAF, documents were produced that showed hundreds of thousand of tons of the fuel being moved around various stations and brought into the RAF logistical system in anticipation of the fuel being adopted.

The operational use turned out to be extremely limited and for a very short period of time before it was withdrawn from service.

You cannot look at fuel stocks to determine the extent of operational use. Logistics is there to answer the question, "Do we have enough to use?"

They do not answer the question, "Can we use this fuel?"....that is the operational side of the house!

I agree with you that "fuel stocks quantity" and "extend of operational use" can be two different things. However, there is evidence that
a) there was more than enough fuel for every operational sortie "in stock", "issued", "consumed" (or however you want to call it that the fuel is circulating)
b) it was in operational use by at least 30 squadrons

And your theory is that only 16+2 squadrons only used it at one time because they didn't want to change a pre-war plan ... and the other squadrons didn't use it because of ... uhh?

I mean these squadrons had been modified to use it (and even if not modified it wouldn't have harmed the engine) and the fuel was been tested in regular squadrons since 1938.

[Crumpp]

And your theory is that only 16+2 squadrons only used it at one time because they didn't want to change a pre-war plan

It is not my theory. I don't know. It comes from what is considered the bible on the Spitfire's development, Morgan and Shacklady.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Spitfire-History-Eric-B-Morgan/dp/0946219486

I just know nothing in this thread is convincing otherwise to make their conclusion invalid.

If you have a copy, look it up. If you don't and are interested in the Spitfire, get one.

[41Sqn_Banks]

It is not my theory. I don't know. It comes from what is considered the bible on the Spitfire's development, Morgan and Shacklady.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Spitfire-History-Eric-B-Morgan/dp/0946219486

I just know nothing in this thread is convincing otherwise to make their conclusion invalid.

If you have a copy, look it up. If you don't and are interested in the Spitfire, get one.

I have a copy of course. I read the section a week ago and my understanding is that the authors didn't make any conclusion, they only cite the pre-war plan. Some doubt that this plan was changed, some believe it has changed ... but really we don't even have evidence that the plan was accomplished, just as we don't have evidence that all units had converted.

What we have is evidence that Fighter Command wanted to change to 100 octane fuel and we have a large amount of squadrons that used 100 octane in May/June 1940 compared to a the few squadrons prior that time which used it on trial. Common sense tells me that it's not very likely that all squadrons changed from 87 octane to 100 octane in 6 weeks. Maybe someone can proof that I'm wrong with that assumption ;)

My believe is that the widespread (meaning not limited to certain squadrons) use started in May/June 1940, however I don't believe that all squadrons used it exclusively from that time on but that the amount of squadrons that used it increased steadily and maybe it took the whole summer for some isolated squadrons.

[41Sqn_Banks]

Those charts are not correct. If you need me too I will post the RAF's order of battle showing all the squadrons dispositions at various times. In the span of a few weeks, ALL of the squadrons in 11 Group had rotated out.

Would be interesting to see those OOBs. There are some circulating in the internet, would be nice to compare them with other sources.

[Glider]

It is not my theory. I don't know. It comes from what is considered the bible on the Spitfire's development, Morgan and Shacklady.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Spitfire-History-Eric-B-Morgan/dp/0946219486

I just know nothing in this thread is convincing otherwise to make their conclusion invalid.

If you have a copy, look it up. If you don't and are interested in the Spitfire, get one.

Can I ask where in the book it says this as I cannot find it.

[Al Schlageter]

Can I ask where in the book it says this as I cannot find it.

Pg 55 under the heading 100 OCTANE FUEL

This is the 1st edition.

[NZtyphoon]

It is not my theory. I don't know. It comes from what is considered the bible on the Spitfire's development, Morgan and Shacklady.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Spitfire-History-Eric-B-Morgan/dp/0946219486

I just know nothing in this thread is convincing otherwise to make their conclusion invalid.

If you have a copy, look it up. If you don't and are interested in the Spitfire, get one.

I have a copy of the book and, in many respects it is an excellent piece of work; the problem is that there are holes in their interpretation - which is relatively brief - of events in 1940.

For example they say that there were large numbers of tankers carrying 100 octane fuel lost in 1940, but there is no evidence cited in the book to back that up - it is a blanket statement.

In fact 78 (KF's figures) tankers were sunk - it is a high number, and terrible for those who died on them, but does not compare with the 1,151 which unloaded in Britain, as shown by a primary source document from the British War Cabinet
(Grand Total of Tankers arriving in UK Sept 1939 to November 1940 = 1,151
Grand Total of Oil Products Imported = 12,169,300 tons: 10,573 tons of oil product per tanker - my wording, not the cabinet paper)

Morgan and Shacklady are great at describing technical details of the Spitfire, which was their primary focus, but their interpretation of historical events not so much, because that is not their area of expertise.

You have critiqued Alfred Price in a similar way in another thread http://forums.ubi.com/showthread.php/478202-Mid-to-late-war-Spitfires-vs-Mid-to-late-war-Bf-109s-Forums - great author, enjoy reading what he says but he's not always accurate in specific details.

You don't know, even with the evidence that's been placed here - that's fine, if you want to place your entire faith in one book, that's up to you - historical research about events that happened in wartime Britain, or any other country cannot come up with 100% answers. That goes for matters concerning the Luftwaffe. The houses of Parliament in London were bombed during the battle and there is the possibility that documents that people like Glider have spent hours patiently searching the archives for were destroyed.

Take an unblinkered look at the "evidence" posted by Kurfürst, who admits that he only has a very passing interest in the RAF, yet has for years has obsessively pursued a theory about the RAF not using 100 octane fuel, later modified to the RAF having some 100 octane fuel in the B of B - it is all based on a memo presented by Pips in another thread in 2004 which Kurfürst has never seen. What else has he actually presented that stacks up? Nada - nothing, lots of abuse and scorn and lawyerly twisting of words and context. Other people have recognised that the sheer weight of evidence for the RAF using 100 Octane fuel extensively throughout the B of B is "overwhelming" - if you can't see it, I cannot help you.

[Crumpp]

Would be interesting to see those OOBs. There are some circulating in the internet, would be nice to compare them with other sources.

The source is the RAF's official History of the Battle of Britain by TCG James. I will scan them and post them when I get the chance.

my understanding is that the authors didn't make any conclusion

No they just state the facts as they know them. That is one of things that makes their book so good and so far, everything in it has been correct. Their research into the technical development of the Spitfire is profound.

I remember when people loved to post the Mach .98 dives of the recon Spitfire that lost a propeller available on that website "Spitfire Performance" as representative of the diving ability of the aircraft. Anybody with some knowledge of aerodynamics who reads Morgan and Shacklady can immediately spot the issue with that. Not only does the A&AEE officially retract those measurements but it is very easy to spot the fact the A&AEE had their static ports in the wrong location to get any kind of accurate speed measurement from their rake in the original report.

Not their fault, we just did not know as much about transonic flight and the difficulty in obtaining accurate airspeed measurements.

I agree the 800,000 ton strategic reserve requirement be built up before any squadrons convert probably comes from a pre-war estimate.

If it is correct, then there is absolutely no chance a single operational squadron flew with the fuel during the Battle of Britain. England simply did not have enough 100 Octane fuel on hand to come close to that reserve requirement.

Again, that is just speculation on my part. Morgan and Shacklady just listed the two facts we know but they were not writing a book on the history of the Oil Committee and strategic reserves.

1. An 800,000 ton Strategic Reserve was required to be on hand before a single aircraft flew operationally.

2. 16 Squadrons converted in September 1940.

They were doing the technical development of the Spitfire. The 16 squadrons is a very important part of that technical development and inline with the subject they were research. One can look at the 87 Octane consumption on the documents in this thread and easily tell that it was not until after September that 100 Octane became the predominate fuel used by the RAF.

[Glider]

Where has Kurfurst gone anyway

[Al Schlageter]

If it is correct, then there is absolutely no chance a single operational squadron flew with the fuel during the Battle of Britain. England simply did not have enough 100 Octane fuel on hand to come close to that reserve requirement.

They were doing the technical development of the Spitfire. The 16 squadrons is a very important part of that technical development and inline with the subject they were research. One can look at the 87 Octane consumption on the documents in this thread and easily tell that it was not until after September that 100 Octane became the predominate fuel used by the RAF.

So tell me Eugene why is there so many fighter squadrons using 12lb boost which can only be done when using 100 fuel?

This is just what I have even before the BoB started:

By Month

No. 32 Squadron pre BoB H
No. 92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 111 Squadron pre BoB H
No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940 H
No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 609 (West Riding) Squadron pre BoB S

No. 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 3 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 17 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 19 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 54 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 74 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 73 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 85 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 229 Squadron May 1940 H

No. 43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 H
No. 41 Squadron June 1940 S
No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 S
No. 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 S

Well quite naturally 87 fuel was predominate as the other RAF Commands (Bomber, Coastal, Training etc) used 87 fuel.

[winny]

If it is correct, then there is absolutely no chance a single operational squadron flew with the fuel during the Battle of Britain.

luckily it's not correct. Just let me understand your argument here.

You're disregarding contemporary combat reports, pilot's memoirs, Morgan and shacklady and more, in favour of a document that was written when nobody in Europe expected the war to start in 1939. Nobody, not even hitler.



Britain was in the process of rearmament. Everything changed in September '39.
They were expecting to have to fight in '41 or '42. As soon as Poland was invaded all the plans changed.

The history of trimpell oil refinery says that according to their records there were over 300 converted spitfires and hurricanes by the end of July. They supplied the fuel, at the time. Surely their account is more reliable.

EDIT: Corrected spelling of Trimpell

[lane]

The history of trimpnell oil refinery says that according to their records there were over 300 converted spitfires and hurricanes by the end of July. They supplied the fuel, at the time. Surely their account is more reliable.

Close but not quite Winny:

"Bulk supply contracts for higher octane fuel were placed by the Air Ministry and it was put into widespread use in the RAF in March 1940 when Spitfires' Rolls Royce Merlin engines were converted to use the 100 octane fuel.

By May 1940, reconnaissance Spitfires had begun flying combat missions using the 100 octane fuel. By 31 July 1940, there were 384 Spitfires serving in 19 squadrons using the 100 octane fuel."

Heysham Heritage Association, The Trimpell Oil Refinery (http://www.heyshamheritage.org.uk/html/trimpell.html)

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Trimpell-1200.jpg

Heysham’s position is not unique, rather it’s very much in keeping with the conventional view:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/1940-0897.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/flight-january6-44.jpg

Alec Harvey-Bailey, The Merlin in Perspective, (Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 1983)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/rolls-royce-100oct.jpg

Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story, (Arms and Armour Press Ltd., London, 1986)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/price-pg74.jpg

David Ross, The Greatest Squadron of Them All, The Definitive History of 603 Squadron, RAauxAF, (Grub Street, London, 2003)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/603-ross-pg125.jpg

W.G. Dudek and D. R. Winans, AIAA Paper No. 69-779, Milestones in Aviation Fuels, (Esso Research and Engineering Company, New York 1969.)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Page_16_from_AIAA-42363-319.jpg

A. R. Ogston, History of Aircraft Lubricants, (Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. Warrendale, PA USA), p. 12.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/aircraft-lubricants-pg12.jpg

[winny]

Close but not quite Winny:


Sorry it was from memory. I underestimated :)

And I'd forgotten about the fact that they were converting 87 into 100 - which means that the import figures do not take into account existing 87 that was converted in the UK.

Nice.

[Glider]

This might help. This is the RAF Order of Battle as reported to FC at 09.00 on the 13th July giving squadrons, bases and the operational status, I only hope you can read them. These are the original reports posted to FC as held in the NA

The no of Spitfire Squadrons is an almost exact match for my OOB plus the Hurricane Squadrons not mentioned in the prior posting

[Kurfürst]

Where has Kurfurst gone anyway

I guess where everybody else who has lost interest in the thread, which is pretty much about three RAF fanatics who doesn't even fly in the sim desperately trying to sell a pet theory that nobody bought.

NZTyphoon has run out of his limited stores of unconvincing ruckus, and he can't seem to be able to decide between copy-pasting his old posts or pathetic personal attacks on other members. You and him should really decide whether I'm 'trolling' the thread or I am absent from it. It is impossible in the same time you know.

Or look at 'lane' (Mike William's umpteenth login handle). He posts the very same papers for about the 20th time every two pages or so, in the belief that spamming the thread with irrelevance has convincing power. Without managing to convince anyone, and especially not the developers. I guess another sore outburst in the next path news thread at the development team is in order.. ;)

Even better, look at your own performance. You can't admit you can't prove anything apart from what we have already known and you cannot admit that you don't know anything about the number of Squadrons, Stations supplied, when this happened. Others do not find it so difficult and we all understand that the evidence is lacking, but at a later time, it may well clear up. Instead, we see fanciful explanations why your own supplied documents have been mistyped or being irrevelant pre-war planning, or the latest that they were 'destroyed in the bombing of London'. You only manage to come up with these childish call-outs, like 'where is Kurfurst'? You know, he's patiently awaiting for you to find something you could not find in all these years. But let me direct a question to you - did having the last word work out so well in the kindergarten that you grow so fond of such approach?

I won't even mention 'Al Schlageter' who is the undisputed champion of having the most handles and at the same time, the most frequently permabanned member of this forum, and the only one who went as far as opening a thread just to call Oleg Maddox an idiot for including the 1,98 ata Bf 109K-4 in Il-2.

So tell me, why should anyone be interested in this sad quartet...? The whole thread is loud with your agony and frustration, and pretty much everyone lost interest in watching any more it. Sure, its amusing for a while, then people move on. You came here with an agenda and an axe to grind, but only managed to convince anyone with grey matter between the ears that the honest answer is 'we do not know', and also that it's a waste of time to listen to you, since you are either repeating the same like a broken record, or frothing in the mouth.

Well, congratulations - I find that I don't even need to enter a debate with you, as you are perfectly capable of behaving in a manner that nobody in their right mind would take seriously what you say anyway.

[winny]

I guess where everybody else who has lost interest in the thread, which is pretty much about three RAF fanatics who doesn't even fly in the sim desperately trying to sell a pet theory that nobody bought.


I notice you've gone from arguing the facts to character assasination.. Pathetic.

And you're talking rubbish, why would an RAF fanatic (as you put it) argue that the RAF had 100?

If they didn't have 100 octane then what they achieved in 1940 is even greater than I thought it was.

Truth is what happened happened, if they did it on 87 octane (they didn't, but I'll humour you) then they are even better than I thought they were.

And you nailed it - I'm not making this argument for a video game - It's about what happened, not what you say happened because you can't handle being killed by Spitfires in a computer game.

Seeing as 'everyone else has lost interest' why are you even posting?

To accuse us of being fanatics when you run and maintain a 109 site is frankly beyond hypocritical. Your opinion is so biased as to be of no value what so ever.

[fruitbat]

Good job K.

They've supplied evidence, and you've personally attacked them.......

How about something of a rebuttal, based on actual evidence, rather than slander.

If you can.

[NZtyphoon]

I agree the 800,000 ton strategic reserve requirement be built up before any squadrons convert probably comes from a pre-war estimate.

If it is correct, then there is absolutely no chance a single operational squadron flew with the fuel during the Battle of Britain. England simply did not have enough 100 Octane fuel on hand to come close to that reserve requirement.

Again, that is just speculation on my part. Morgan and Shacklady just listed the two facts we know but they were not writing a book on the history of the Oil Committee and strategic reserves.

1. An 800,000 ton Strategic Reserve was required to be on hand before a single aircraft flew operationally.


If your argument that the RAF needed to build up a reserve of 800,000 tons of 100 octane before releasing it for use is correct then the RAF never released 100 octane, because their reserves never reached 800,000 tons right throughout the war. The 800,000 ton figure was a conservative pre-war estimate of what reserves should be built up in the event that America refused to supply 100 octane

It would be interesting to find the pre-war estimates for the reserves of other grades of aviation fuel and see how they match up with war-time reserves - has anyone got the pre-war estimates for other grades?