Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[winny]

That as of May 18 1940, select Fighter and Bomber stations were supplied with 100 octane.
Despite numerous request, you have refused to show what has happened after May 1940, when Pips showed that the conversion stopped.
That in early August 1940 100 octane use was authorized for all aircraft.
That this wasn't even started to be implemented until late September 1940.

Why are you so "this is a lie" ? Surley you mean it's incorrect. Your bias shines through when you start accusing people of lying.

Combat reports mentioning 12lb and home station (therefore 100 octane must be present at station)

74 Squadron 24th May 1940 - Hornchurch & Manston - 100 octane
54 Squadron 25th May 1940 - Hornchurch - 100 octane
19 Squadron 26th May 1940 - Duxford - 100 octane
611 Squadron 2nd June 1940 - ? (Catterick?) or Duxford
610 Squadron 12th June 1940 - Biggin Hill - 100 octane
41 Squadron 19th June 1940 - Hornchurch - 100 octane

Looks like 4 stations must have had 100 octane in May/June (Keep in mind that these are just the combat reports I've found, need more)

No new squadrons appear till August when first new references to 12lb start to appear..
for 64, 603, 602 and 234 squadrons
In September more appear
152, 66, 72, 609, 222.

I haven't checked the stations for August / September, yet

Anyone know of any good BoB combat report sites?

[Kurfürst]

Why are you so "this is a lie" ? Surley you mean it's incorrect.

I do not mean his position. He has an opinion, which is may be inccorect, but he has the right to be believe it.

However if someone pretends he hadn't seen the posts in this (and other) threads and pretend they do not exist, and keep posting that has not seen anything, it is something different. He knows they exists, he is aware of the points taken in them.

To say that nothing was put forward when it was done is a lie intend to mislead those who did not read the thread, pure and simple. There's no reason to call this incorrect. To say for example that nothing proves that Pips was right about the late September 1940 conversion, when I have shown David the fuel deliveries at least three times now, showing exactly what Pips notes, and he quickly jumps over it and fails to comment, I will not say he is incorrect when he again starts saying the same thing again a few pages later like if nothing happened.

It would be a different matter if he would say he does not agree with my conclusions, but he keeps making these foggy references to "hundreds books" etc. David is in pure denial and now he is becoming desperate and starting to use underhand tactics instead of putting forward a good arguement, and good sources.

To put it blunt, all he does in the 20 or so pages is to threaten to developers that they will be considered donkeys if they do not follow his opinion, and post the same two papers in which he reads something that goes to directly against the meaning of the words on the paper. Apparantly that just about nobody agrees with his interpretation of the May 18 and previous papers, which clearly say select squadrons, this does not stop him from keeping saying he has seen nothing, and keep telling everyone nobody has managed to prove him wrong, imply to everyone that the Australian paper is a lie. At the same time he simply does not asnwer the questions put to him. That's desperate.


Combat reports mentioning 12lb and home station (therefore 100 octane must be present at station)

74 Squadron 24th May 1940 - Hornchurch & Manston - 100 octane
54 Squadron 25th May 1940 - Hornchurch - 100 octane
19 Squadron 26th May 1940 - Duxford - 100 octane
611 Squadron 2nd June 1940 - ? (Catterick?) or Duxford
610 Squadron 12th June 1940 - Biggin Hill - 100 octane
41 Squadron 19th June 1940 - Hornchurch - 100 octane

Looks like 4 stations must have had 100 octane in May/June (Keep in mind that these are just the combat reports I've found, need more)

No new squadrons appear till August when first new references to 12lb start to appear..
for 64, 603, 602 and 234 squadrons
In September more appear
152, 66, 72, 609, 222.

I haven't checked the stations for August / September, yet

Anyone know of any good BoB combat report sites?

Now this is GOOD analytical work! Check out the Grunch's post earlier, I think he did the same. Actually if you manage to finish this work, would you be as kind as sharing this collection in the same format? Ie. Sqn - date - base. I can look up the base if you give me the two other particulars.

I think this approach is the most useful, as this gives the best idea to identify 100 octane Stations. Ie. 74, 54 and 41 Sqns all reported 100 octane use, and all of them were at the time based in Hornchurch.

[Al Schlageter]

Mike (this time using the handle lane) already knows that for years, in fact he has seen the papers showing the early rating of +9 for All out level, but hey, he was never afraid of posting manipulating BS in order to push an agenda under various new logins.. ;)

Now this is really hilarious by someone who is well known for doing such.

A prime example of Barbi's manipulating BS is the graph he posted on the issuing of fuel. First off, he doesn't give a source for the data points he plotted on his graph. Secondly, the fuel issuing was for the whole RAF, not for FC.

To see the double standard of proof used by Barbi one only has to look at his 1.98ata boost for the K-4. He even goes on and suggests that other units besides the 4 Gruppen converted to 1.98ata. :rolleyes:

There should be no question that 100 octane fuel was in widespread use by RAF FC during the BoB if one uses Barbi's logic for the widespread use of 1.98ata boost by the 109s.

[Kurfürst]

Who says 1,98ata was in widespread use? It seems it was in use in four or five Gruppen. Possibly more, but nobody is getting a heart attack over the question, just a few RAF zealots that bite into a citrus over 100 octane.. but these same guys even question that MW-50 was in use, so why would anyone concern himself with such people? :D

[winny]

My reservations about 'certain stations' are that it's very vague, and unless it can be quantified it's pretty mute. 3, 4 or 5, or 10, 11 or 12..?

I'm going to have a look at what other squadrons were operating out of Hornchurch, Biggin Hill and Duxford at the time too.

It's harder to find BoB combat reports than I thought, initially (with VERY limited data) it would appear that some 3 or 4 stations were first issued 100 oct in May/June, then more were added in July (found ref to 2)
August is where it seems to get busy..

Which slightly counters Kurfursts claim that the roll-out of 100 octane didn't happen till September.. Some were obviously converted by the end of August

However September/October do seem to have way more 12lb combat reports (20+ squadrons) than all the other months.

[Glider]

Indeed. There are a number of papers, book, both technical and historical that mention that the Spitfire I was equipped with only four machine guns. I think we should 'correct' the current error in the sim that it has eight..
Name one
.
That is a lie. Excerpts from Spitfire the History, by far the most reliable Spitfire source was posted and it says that there were supply problems due to tanker sinkings by U boots..
It was a concern of course it was losses were serious but more got through than were sunk and in the May to August period stocks still rose.

.
Again, lies.

The paper is not riddled with errors.
It is supported by your own documentation
- 18 May 1940 paper showing only select units using 100 octane,
- fuel consumption papers showing large scale conversion did not start until late September,
- early operating Limits of Merlin III XII (+9 except for take off)
Pips seen it and gave reference to it.
The archieves recognise the paper, they have told you loud and clear that you have not asked for the paper with proper description.

So stop lying. Its showing desperation and dishonesty..
-The paper 18th may is in direct responce to an unabigious request from the Chief of the Air Staff for fighters and Blenheim units. I believe that the reference to certain is the stations to be stocked with 100 octane in the first instance. If you believe otherwise provide some documentation, its a simple request and one that you would insist on.
- The Fuel consuption figures do show an increase in 100 octane in September. This is due to the Other commands starting to transfer from 87 Octane to 100 Octane after permission was given in August for which documentation evidence was provided. If you believe otherwise provide your evidence.
-The Archives did not recognise the paper when I asked for it, they did not recognise the paper when the Wiki editors asked for it and last I heard from you, you have NEVER asked for it. All you need to do therefore is ask for it and post it when you find it. You know I can provide evidence for all these requests so once again, provide some evidence to support your statement.
- If Pips has seen it then please provide some evience as no one else has seen it.
You said it rightly - it is your belief.
Correct it is and my belief is supported by documentation. All we are asking is for you to provide your documentation to support your belief


a, It actually say 18 + 2 Squadrons, until September 1940. Also that 800 000 tons of reserves need to be accumulated. In spring 1940 there were but 220 000 tons accumulated. Target was not met, period.
b, The document you speak of is a simply assessement of requirement. It mentions 21 Stations (out of ca. 60 operational in BoB).
Can you explain how these 21 Stations of December 1939 magically got 60 by July 1940? You have absolutely no evidence to that, in fact, you haven't find anything to prove your thesis.
c, It doesn't mention anywhere 'without limitation'. This is simply made up by you.
d, Given the lenght of discussion attached to it, you simply lie that the word certain only appeared in early 1940. It was present in all documents dealing with the subject. I've dealt with this in my earlier post, you've seen it, so stop lying.
e, You've got that right. Question arises though - if FC command did not even get the basics yet in spring of 1940, how would they plan for complete changeover - of which there's no sign yet in the papers..
f, All that was done by May is noting that select units were cleared for 100 octane used. You have admitted that nothing changed afterwards, it remained in use with select units.
g, Fuel consumption papers show the actual conversion process did not start until late September 1940.
a It does say 18 plus 2 but this is a pre war plan which also asy that the number of squadrons can be amended depending on the fuel available. War changes priorities and the Target of 800,000 tons was never met at any time during the war but it didn't stop us using this and other fuels.
b The document is more than an assesment. It is a clear statemnt that the oerational stations were to be treated as a first tranch and a second set of non operational stations were to be treated as a second tranch. Hence my belief that in the paper when the magic certain word was used it refered to the first tranch.
What we don't know is how many other stations were equipped in the roll out, was it the 21 or was it all the operational stations. What we do know is that in May squadrons in France who do not appear on the list were equiped with 100 Octane and in Norway so its my belief that the fuel was issued as a normal supply item. If not can you explain why these units were equipped?
c The Request from the Chief of the Air Staff was for fighters and Blenheim units to be equipped with 100 Octane. It didn't say some, or certain, or by station, squadron or Group. It was a blanket request without limitation.
d My posting 177 and 178 deal with this question
e I agree that the confusion was unexpected but the paper trail shows that the issue was adressed and the roll out didn't slow down while the discussion was underway
f I admit that the supply was to all the units in the first tranch. As I said in (B) we know that additional units were issued with 100 Octane such as those in France and Norway. Its my belief that all operation stations had the 100 Octane and its mprobable that by the time July August arrived those in Tranch 2 the non operational units would have been stocked but cannot prove that to be the case.
g Fuel Consupmtion paper prove that in September the use of 100 Octane fuel increased as the other operational commands started to use 100 Octane. They also prove that for June to August approx 10,000 tons a month were being used up. Have you tried to work out how many flights those 125 aircraft mentioned by Pips would have to do to get through 10,000 tons a month?
Have you anything to support the 125 aircraft figure


You have misquoted several papers as shown above and left out conviniently parts that did not fit your thesis.
Name them, simple request and I will post them. Also supply information that supports your theory another simple request




There is a case for select units being equipped in May 1940 with 100 octane fuel. There is no evidence for anything more.

YOU CANNOT DANCE AROUND THAT FACT, I am sorry.
I haven't tried to. The select being the 21 stations to be equipped in the first instance plus the ones that we know were equipped such as France and Norway.
Its my belief that the other operational stations would also have been equipped but recognise that I don't have any paper to support that. Just the indication that if the Operational stations in France were equipped in May I find it hard to believe that the other operational units in UK wouldn't have been.



You keep asking that question, you keep answer, then you keep asking again. Who are you trying to bull here? Do you think if you ask the same question, all the uneasy evidence that were posted will just go away? Do you think that if you resort to Goebbels like tactics, repeating the same falsehood again and again, people will believe what you say? Is that the idea, David?

Can we say the complete file of these meetings, David? Why are you holding them back so fiercely? I think this is the best question in thread.

You have what I have and nothing is being held back, nothing. The only question I have asked you is to supply anything that supports your comments which is reasionable as you demand a lot from others.

With luck I aim to get to the NA next week. Tell me which meeing you want and I will copy everything for that meeting. The notes for the meeting, the meeting notes, actions arising and any additional papers. The same goes for the War Committee meeting. Name which meeting you want and I will copy everything, I am not going to copy all the notes for all the meetings.
I cannot be fairer than that.

In return you get a copy of the Pips papers how does that sound?

Let me summarize what you have posted so far.

That as of May 18 1940, select Fighter and Bomber stations were supplied with 100 octane.
Despite numerous request, you have refused to show what has happened after May 1940, when Pips showed that the conversion stopped.
That in early August 1940 100 octane use was authorized for all aircraft.
That this wasn't even started to be implemented until late September 1940.

Some obvious points on this.
Select fighter stations are as a minimum the first tranch 21 stations plus those we know were equipped France and Norway
Select Bomber equals all Blenheim units in No 2 Group posting 122 and 134 cover this
Pips hasn't showed anything. Its an unsubstantiated posting and the reason for his statment doesn't hold water
Its all operational aircraft in all commands not the rest of fighter command

[Glider]

Irrelevant.
I don't think so, its an error
What you think is irrelevant again. The RAF considered 800 000 tons of reserves necessary, they had about 220-294 000 by the spring of 1940, and supply was uncertain.
Pre war the RAF considered the reserve to be 800,000 tons of fuel which they never achieved at all at any time but it didn't stop us using this.


At 10 000 tons per month consumption the storage would be enough for 20 months, but this is with about 25% of the fighters and some bombers running 100 octane.
Nope, its 100 % of the fighters and all No 2 Blenheims


Complete conversion would have meant the reserves would not be enough for more than about 5-6 months, running out by October.
As already said this is not the case the conversion was made
Morgan and Shacklady in Spitfire the History also notes the concerns about supply, and the U boot thread. In fact up to that time about 300 000 tons of oil shipments were sunk by uboots and mines.
It was a concern, but more go arrived than was sunk and stocks rose.


David, can we see the post-May 18 decisions by the Oil Committee in their completeness?
I don't have them but will copy them next week as per my last posting, can you get a copy of the Pips paper?


So in end of April there were 294 000 tons, and some three months later in July there were some 40 000 tons more? What was the total monthly consumption again - 40-50 000 tons?

So in three months the equivalent of one months of supply arrived. Do we need to make even more clear why the British were concerned about a complete conversion to 100 octane?

Stock increase
27th February 1940 220,000 tons
31st May 1940 294,000 tons
11th July 1940 343,000 tons
31st August 1940 404,000 tons

Stocks went up in about 6 weeks by approx 50,000 tons (May - July)
and again in about 6 weeks by another 60,000 ish tons (July - August)

Over this time the consumption was about 30,000 tons (Ave figure June - August)

So imports over the period June to August must have been in the order of 140,000 tons (consumption plus increase in stocks).

Consumption therefore was approx 17.5% of imports which is an ample margin for safety and more than enought reason to allow the use of 100 Octane to be given to all operational aircraft in all commands. It also questions Pips statement and view that the stocks were under severe strain.
We need to know how he arrived at that assumption. If you want to accuse me of misrepresenting the figures and papers that I have put forward explain how you arrived at your figures and calculations.

Can I ask where you got your figures for stocks and consumption as they do not match the documents shown. Where on earth did 50,000 tons a month come from for consumption?


There's nothing wrong with it. Pips says the RAF emberked again to 100 octane conversion in late September 1940. Fuel consumption shows exactly that. Of course they made decision earlier, in August, but things seem to have take some time in the RAF. Just consider they made decision about supplying 18 squadrons with 100 octane in March 1939 - and when this was realized..? In May 1940...
As said before the RAF decided to use 100 Octane for all operational aircraft in all commands in August. This is what the consumption figures show. As we know the 18 squadrons was replaced whenwar broke out and plans were well in place by December 1939.


Noteworthy that the consumption remains pretty much the same between May (when select Fighter Squadrons converted) and late September 1940.
When all fighter command were converted


I should point out that all you comments are supported by misrepresentation of original documentation.
I supply the documents and let people decide for themselves

[winny]

Name one
.
It was a concern of course it was losses were serious but more got through than were sunk and in the May to August period stocks still rose.

.
-The paper 18th may is in direct responce to an unabigious request from the Chief of the Air Staff for fighters and Blenheim units. I believe that the reference to certain is the stations to be stocked with 100 octane in the first instance. If you believe otherwise provide some documentation, its a simple request and one that you would insist on.
- The Fuel consuption figures do show an increase in 100 octane in September. This is due to the Other commands starting to transfer from 87 Octane to 100 Octane after permission was given in August for which documentation evidence was provided. If you believe otherwise provide your evidence.
-The Archives did not recoginse the paper when I asked for it, they did not recognise the paper when the Wiki editors asked for it and last I heard from you, you have NEVER asked for it. All you need to do therefore is ask for it and post it when you find it. You know I can provide evidence for all these requests so once again, provide some evidence to support your statement.
- If Pips has seen it then please provide some evience as no one else has seen it.
Correct it is and my belief is supported by documentation. All we are asking is for you to provide your documentation to support your belief

a It does say 18 plus 2 but this is a pre war plan which also asy that the number of squadrons can be amended depending on the fuel available. War changes priorities and the Target of 800,000 tons was never met at any time during the war but it didn't stop us using this and other fuels.
b The document is more than an assesment. It is a clear statemnt that the oerational stations were to be treated as a first tranch and a second set of non operational stations were to be treated as a second tranch. Hence my belief that in the paper when the magic certain word was used it refered to the first tranch.
What we don't know is how many other stations were equipped in the roll out, was it the 21 or was it all the operational stations. What we do know is that in May squadrons in France who do not appear on the list were equiped with 100 Octane and in Norway so its my belief that the fuel was issued as a normal supply item. If not can you explain why these units were equipped?
c The Request from the Chief of the Air Staff was for fighters and Blenheim units to be equipped with 100 Octane. It didn't say some, or certain, or by station, squadron or Group. It was a blanket request without limitation.
d My posting 177 and 178 deal with this question
e I agree that the confusion was unexpected but the paper trail shows that the issue was adressed and the roll out didn't slow down while the discussion was underway
f I admit that the supply was to all the units in the first tranch. As I said in (B) we know that additional units were issued with 100 Octane such as those in France and Norway. Its my belief that all operation stations had the 100 Octane and its mprobable that by the time July August arrived those in Tranch 2 the non operational units would have been stocked but cannot prove that to be the case.
g Fuel Consupmtion paper prove that in September the use of 100 Octane fuel increased as the other operational commands started to use 100 Octane. They also prove that for June to August approx 10,000 tons a month were being used up. Have you tried to work out how many flights those 125 aircraft mentioned by Pips would have to do to get through 10,000 tons a month?
Have you anything to support the 125 aircraft figure


Name them, simple request and I will post them. Also supply information that supports your theory another simple request




I haven't tried to. The select being the 21 stations to be equipped in the first instance plus the ones that we know were equipped such as France and Norway.
Its my belief that the other operational stations would also have been equipped but recognise that I don't have any paper to support that. Just the indication that if the Operational stations in France were equipped in May I find it hard to believe that the other operational units in UK wouldn't have been.




You have what I have and nothing is being held back, nothing. The only question I have asked you is to supply anything that supports your comments which is reasionable as you demand a lot from others.

With luck I aim to get to the NA next week. Tell me which meeing you want and I will copy everything for that meeting. The notes for the meeting, the meeting notes, actions arising and any additional papers. The same goes for the War Committee meeting. Name which meeting you want and I will copy everything, I am not going to copy all the notes for all the meetings.
I cannot be fairer than that.

In return you get a copy of the Pips papers how does that sound?

Some obvious points on this.
Select fighter stations are as a minimum the first tranch 21 stations plus those we know were equipped France and Norway
Select Bomber equals all Blenheim units in No 2 Group posting 122 and 134 cover this
Pips hasn't showed anything. Its an unsubstantiated posting and the reason for his statment doesn't hold water
Its all operational aircraft in all commands not the rest of fighter command

Interesting, that 21 stations figure. That would mean the majority of squadrons were converted as a lot of squadrons had a home base and a forward base

Does the NA at Kew have squadron maintenence records? Campaign diaries?
I've enquired about combat reports from May '40 to September '40 but there are hundreds of them..

I've mentioned it before but does anyone know if the Merlin conversion was one way? ie. once converted it would not work on 87oct. The reluctance to convert until stocks were high enough would suggest that it was a one way conversion. Otherwise it wouldn't have mattered.

[Glider]

My reservations about 'certain stations' are that it's very vague, and unless it can be quantified it's pretty mute. 3, 4 or 5, or 10, 11 or 12..?

I'm going to have a look at what other squadrons were operating out of Hornchurch, Biggin Hill and Duxford at the time too.

It's harder to find BoB combat reports than I thought, initially (with VERY limited data) it would appear that some 3 or 4 stations were first issued 100 oct in May/June, then more were added in July (found ref to 2)
August is where it seems to get busy..

Which slightly counters Kurfursts claim that the roll-out of 100 octane didn't happen till September.. Some were obviously converted by the end of August

However September/October do seem to have way more 12lb combat reports (20+ squadrons) than all the other months.
Try these

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1vrs109e.html
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/hurricane-I.html

[Glider]

Does the NA at Kew have squadron maintenence records? Campaign diaries?
I've enquired about combat reports from May '40 to September '40 but there are hundreds of them..
.

It should do and as mentioned in the posting I am going to see what I can find. The one area that I have not been able to identify is a level below the Oil Committee. There should be someone somewhere who was responsible for implementing the change, they were too senior.

The Holy Grail is some form of status report that mght say stations A have ben equipped, stations B are being equipped and stations C will be done by such and such a date.

That would finish it off once and for all

[winny]

It should do and as mentioned in the posting I am going to see what I can find. The one area that I have not been able to identify is a level below the Oil Committee. There should be someone somewhere who was responsible for implementing the change, they were too senior.

The Holy Grail is some form of status report that mght say stations A have ben equipped, stations B are being equipped and stations C will be done by such and such a date.

That would finish it off once and for all

Good luck!
I'm interested to see what you can find.

[lane]

I'm going to have a look at what other squadrons were operating out of Hornchurch, Biggin Hill and Duxford at the time too.

It's harder to find BoB combat reports than I thought, initially (with VERY limited data) it would appear that some 3 or 4 stations were first issued 100 oct in May/June, then more were added in July (found ref to 2)


Hi Winny – One should be careful to not draw the conclusion that a note in a combat report demonstrating 100 octane usage on a given date is an indication of when those stations "were first issued 100 oct".

For example:

Combat report of 151 Squadron from 18 May 1940 follows the squadron’s conversion to 100 octane fuel in February 1940:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/bushell-151sqdn-18may40.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/151-orb-16feb40.jpg

Combat report of 611 Squadron from 2 June 1940 follows the squadron’s conversion to 100 octane fuel in March 1940:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/611-brown-2june40.jpg

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no611-100oct.jpg

Combat report of 74 Squadron from 24 May 1940 follows the conversion to 100 octane fuel in March 1940:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/freeborn-24-5-40.jpg

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no74-100oct.jpg

There are several combat reports available from units stationed at Hornchurch during the Dunkirk battle that mention +12 boost, demonstrating that the station and the units flying from there were supplied with 100 octane fuel. During the Dunkirk action in May/early June 1940 Nos. 19, 41, 54, 65, 74, 222, and 616 Squadrons in Spitfires were stationed at Hornchuch.

For example:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/deere-26-5-40.jpg

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/lane-26-5-40.jpg

It follows that 19, 41, 54, 74, 222 and 616 squadrons were all supplied with 100 octane.

Similar analysis can be applied to other stations such as North Weald (56, 111 & 151):

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/56sqdn-9may40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/111-15feb40-100-octane.jpg

...Biggin Hill (32, 79, 213, 229, 242, 610); Tangmere (601, 145), Hawkinge (245 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/245-mcglashan-28may40.jpg)) Kenley, Northholt, etc, etc…

[winny]

Hi Winny – One should be careful to not draw the conclusion that a note in a combat report demonstrating 100 octane usage on a given date is an indication of when those stations "were first issued 100 oct".



You're right, I believe that more stations had 100 oct but can't find any hard evidence.. (except for a handfull of Operations records books)
I should have said the 'first recorded use in combat' of 100 oct. It gives us at least a provable date by which the relevant station must have had 100 oct on site..

I can now add to the list of stations with 100 oct before August 40.

I've got Hornchurch, Manston, Duxford, North Weald, Digby, Catterick, Biggin Hill, Croyden, Debden, Digby, Wick.

I'm trying to avoid making the assumption that if a certain station had 100 oct that all squadrons using that base would also be converted (even if it is a logical step). I think that was the case, but without evidence the argument gets stuck.

As we all know Kurfurst has very high, and hard to meet standards when it comes to what constitutes evidence.

If I was in charge of FC at the time I would have made sure that 11 and 12 group converted asap. I think that's probably what happened.

[Kongo-Otto]

As we all know Kurfurst has very high, and hard to meet standards when it comes to what constitutes evidence.


Oh realy, do we?

[winny]

Oh realy, do we?

Yes really. He's pretty hard to please.

It was tounge in cheek.


I think kurfurst will take it in the spirit it was meant, we've been straight with each other in the past. Even if we disagree.

[Al Schlageter]

As we all know Kurfurst has very high, and hard to meet standards when it comes to what constitutes evidence.

Only when it concerns the British. When it concerns the Germans, even the slightest hint is good enough for it to be an absolute true fact.

[winny]

Only when it concerns the British. When it concerns the Germans, even the slightest hint is good enough for it to be an absolute true fact.

I do feel that the burden is always on us to prove him wrong instead of the other way round, which is unfair. There is more than one way to skin a cat though.

The thing is, if I found a doc tomorrow that proved that Kurfurst was right I'd post it. I'm not so sure if it happened the other way around that that would happen.

I just want to know that when I'm flying towards a 109 in a Spit that I've got exactly what the guys in 1940 had. I want the 109 guys to have exactly what the LW pilots had too.

In a combat simulator realistic FM's are paramount, otherwise its bollocks. Forget AA, textures, sound, terrain, clouds, lighting, balistics, dials and switches. If it dosn't fly right then it's not doing what a simulator should be doing.

I don't want it clouded by opinion, I want fact.



Regardless of emotional attachment to either the 109 or Spitfire.

[Glider]

I do feel that the burden is always on us to prove him wrong instead of the other way round, which is unfair. There is more than one way to skin a cat though.

The thing is, if I found a doc tomorrow that proved that Kurfurst was right I'd post it. I'm not so sure if it happened the other way around that that would happen.

I just want to know that when I'm flying towards a 109 in a Spit that I've got exactly what the guys in 1940 had. I want the 109 guys to have exactly what the LW pilots had too.

In a combat simulator realistic FM's are paramount, otherwise its bollocks. Forget AA, textures, sound, terrain, clouds, lighting, balistics, dials and switches. If it dosn't fly right then it's not doing what a simulator should be doing.

I don't want it clouded by opinion, I want fact.



Regardless of emotional attachment to either the 109 or Spitfire.

This is the core of the issue and reason for my posting, people have the right to expect that what they had in 1940 is what they have in the FS.

I firmly believe that the RAF had the 100 Octane and that the evidenc shows it. However in the various threads in the WW2 website where aircraft are discussed my choice for the BOB period is the Me109 not the Spitfire

[Kongo-Otto]

The thing is, if I found a doc tomorrow that proved that Kurfurst was right I'd post it. I'm not so sure if it happened the other way around that that would happen.
That will never happen, not when the document proofs him wrong or let the Luftwaffe be seen in a not so glorious light like he does.


I just want to know that when I'm flying towards a 109 in a Spit that I've got exactly what the guys in 1940 had. I want the 109 guys to have exactly what the LW pilots had too.

me too.


In a combat simulator realistic FM's are paramount, otherwise its bollocks. Forget AA, textures, sound, terrain, clouds, lighting, balistics, dials and switches. If it dosn't fly right then it's not doing what a simulator should be doing.

+100


I don't want it clouded by opinion, I want fact.

Kurfürst and facts against the Luftwaffe?
No way! This is a contradiction in terms!

[Glider]

Yes really. He's pretty hard to please.

It was tounge in cheek.


I think kurfurst will take it in the spirit it was meant, we've been straight with each other in the past. Even if we disagree.

All he has been asked to do is supply the one paper which isn't a huge request. After all it does form the basis of his position.

As for the straight bit, he stays polite until backed into a corner then the insults come think and fast. I think I was accused three times of being a lliar, one of holding information back and two of misrepreseting the facts when all I did was supply original documentation

[Kurfürst]

All he has been asked to do is supply the one paper which isn't a huge request. After all it does form the basis of his position.

David, I think I told you about 8 times by know where did I learn about these papers, I gave you the refernce, the link to thread. The papers were found by Pips, in Australia. I know I really have to repeat this to you to sink in, but I am not Pips, nor do I live in Australia. So either ask Pips - who you can easily connect, I gave you his contact, for some reason you choose not to.. hmmm - or travel to Australia yourself.

So, may I ask why are you pretending to all these fine people there that you do not know all of the above?

Personally, I have no reason not to believe that Pips summary of the documents are honest and accurate.

As for the straight bit, he stays polite until backed into a corner then the insults come think and fast.

Oh, I am certain you'd like to push me into a corner, but Dave, you have to grow up to the task first. You have put forward a thesis, which so far you could not support with anything.
And I do not mean how you interpret them, because it takes quite a bit of imaginatory power to fill in the gaps, and these gaps can be filled both ways.

For example, you claim the December 1939 mentioning of Stations is a definiete order of these stations to be supplied, even though nobody seem to have approved the request (it may have been, but it is pure guesswork to say so).

You also claim that "certain" was either a typo (which is clearly against the trail of papers, I already pointed tihs out, actually only one paper does not use the limiting word, but it does on the previous page which you do not post..)

You also claim that two previous claims would be true, the 21 or so Stationed mentioned were equipped with 100 octane, and in your understanding, that what the 18 May 1940 paper say. But you still owe us an explanation how did this 20-odd station become 60-odd stations between May and July 1940. You do not even give guesswork how. You simply say it happened. When, how, you do not care. It must have happened.

I am afraid it is you who is cornered, not me. You see, everyone is asking you, not me, to put some substance in your claims. I guess everyone is a bit tired of of guy who registered on this board with an agenda and an axe to grind, and ever since does not doing anything but running in circles, and posting the same papers, even after just about everybody told him his interpretation of the papers is more than a bit wishful. After all, it is you who wave about a paper that says certain Squadrons are to convert, and say that means they all converted.

You have promised to do so, so we are eager to see your papers if you manage it to NA, and I hope we all learn from it. All I am asking is to support to papers.

If your papers prove your thesis, I do not doubt that anyone, including me, would express any doubts. But I have some experience with these type of discussions, every time someone fanatically wanted something extreme about such stuff to be true, ie. every single fighter suddenly getting a huge boost of power due to some unique exotic fuel overnight, which was only available to that side etc. etc. usually hit the brick wall and bounced back painfully. Just ask "lane" about how "all of Fighter command" converted to 150 grade fuel in 1944, +25 lbs XIVs he is chasing for twelve years, oh and BTW, why is the Monty Berger quote is missing from the end of his 150 grade article. :D

I think I was accused three times of being a lliar, one of holding information back and two of misrepreseting the facts when all I did was supply original documentation

No, you were told doing that because you were doing exactly that. You came here with an axe to grind, and insults to shot at me, and I think I was patient with you long enough. If I was thinking that you were holding back papers, I am sorry for that, but you were pretending long enough that you did went into the archieves and took shots of those papers yourself. It appears this is not the case, I guess "lane" throw a couple of papers/bones out of the whole to you. Knowing "lane" a bit, I guess you are up to a surprise or two when you look at the file in its completeness. :)

I do not think I wish to waste much time on this until you live up to your word and support the papers which establish the basis of your thesis. I await with an open mind.

In any case, thanks for your efforts and time in advance, also in the name of this community if I may, I guess many will like to read the decisions in these meetings between December 1939 and October 1940 in their completeness.

[Kurfürst]

Yes really. He's pretty hard to please.

Comes with my trade I guess... ;)

I think kurfurst will take it in the spirit it was meant, we've been straight with each other in the past. Even if we disagree.

Oh, have no worries about that, I know you're an honest chap.

[Al Schlageter]

David, I think I told you about 8 times by know where did I learn about these papers, I gave you the refernce, the link to thread. The papers were found by Pips, in Australia. I know I really have to repeat this to you to sink in, but I am not Pips, nor do I live in Australia. So either ask Pips - who you can easily connect, I gave you his contact, for some reason you choose not to.. hmmm - or travel to Australia yourself.

So, may I ask why are you pretending to all these fine people there that you do not know all of the above?

Personally, I have no reason to believe that Pips summary of the documents are honest and accurate.

People have contacted the Australian Archives about the Pips papers and the AA have had no success in producing these papers for viewing.

So, if you have no reason to believe that Pips summary of these Australian papers are honest and accurate, then why do you continue to use them?

Winny, Barbi is only hard to please when the subject of discussion is the British and the Spitfire. Unfortunately, when it comes to Nazi Germany and the 109, any thing will do to become an absolute factual truth.

And I do not mean how you interpret them, because it takes quite a bit of imaginatory power to fill in the gaps, and these gaps can be filled both ways.

That is hilarious Barbi. You definitely have quite a bit of imaginary power when it comes to the K-4 and 1.98ata boost. You should give up being a lawyer and become a comedian.

[Kurfürst]

What is your purpose in life?

Because if this is it, I guess its a most severe form of punishment in itself, and I don't have to lift a finger, just leave you be as you are. :D

[Seadog]

We're still waiting for proof that even one RAFFC Merlin engined fighter squadron used 87 octane operationally during the BofB.

[winny]

Don't get me wrong, I get annoyed by Kurfurst, sometimes very annoyed.

Deflection is an art form, Kurfurst's a master.

There are forums all over the place with threads about this subject and Kurfurst is present in all of them.

The subject gets bogged down in the supply issue, it's a red herring.

The whole argument seems to hinge on the 'select or certain stations'
There is no definite definition of certain stations so again it's a red herring.

If the question is 'Were the RAF using 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain' the answer is a definite yes. It's just how many.

To go back to the 1938 doccument, written at a time when Britain were in the process of rearmament, not war, is another deflection.

To say that that doccument is relevant to a battle that took place 2 years later, under a different government is wrong. Unless a doccument is post the invasion of Poland then its frankly irrelevant.

Nobody expected the war to start in 39. Most were gearing up for 42.

I can prove to anyone that up to 30 squadrons used 100 octane during The battle.
At the very least 4 at dunkirk
At the very least another 6 in June. That's 30% of the total number of FC sqns at the time (around 330 operational Hurricanes and Spitfires).

Kurfurst has never quantified his argument. No numbers for squadrons.

[Seadog]

I can prove to anyone that up to 30 squadrons used 100 octane during The battle.
At the very least 4 at dunkirk
At the very least another 6 in June. That's 30% of the total number of FC sqns at the time (around 330 operational Hurricanes and Spitfires).

Kurfurst has never quantified his argument. No numbers for squadrons.

RAFFC had 34 operational Hurricane/Spitfire squadrons on July 08 with 6 Blenheim and 2 Defiant squadrons, and 61 operational Hurricane/Spitfire squadrons on Nov 03, with 6 Blenheim and 3 Defiant squadrons. So 30 (I assume you mean Hurricane/Spitfire) represents from ~90 to ~50% of all operational Hurricane/Spitfire squadrons.

[Glider]

The subject gets bogged down in the supply issue, it's a red herring.

.

Its interesting as I see the supply as being the key issue. If the RAF had a shortage of supply then there is logic in limiting the roll out and concentrating the supplies where you need them most say 11 and 12 group. However if there isn't a shortage, then there is no logic in limiting the numbers.

The changes to the engine were small and could easily been doe on the stations, yet the performance gain was very significant. So it isn't a technical or manufacture issue, its down to supply.

Without a shortage of fuel there is no logic to holding the supplies back. Indeed this is probably the one thing that I agree with re Pips posting, its centred on supply. I just disagree with his assumption that there was a shortage.

[winny]

RAFFC had 34 operational Hurricane/Spitfire squadrons on July 08 with 6 Blenheim and 2 Defiant squadrons, and 61 operational Hurricane/Spitfire squadrons on Nov 03, with 6 Blenheim and 3 Defiant squadrons. So 30 (I assume you mean Hurricane/Spitfire) represents from ~90 to ~50% of all operational Hurricane/Spitfire squadrons.

I did mean Hurri/Spit and I was using the 4 + 6 = 10 Squadrons by June.
Or a third of the Hurri/Spit squadrons at the time.

I'm starting with a low number. It's a definite which is more than I've seen for the other side of the argument.

I've found combat reports that back this up, and as Pilots had to record use of 12lb I think there must be more.

[Glider]

I did mean Hurri/Spit and I was using the 4 + 6 = 10 Squadrons by June.
Or a third of the Hurri/Spit squadrons at the time.

I'm starting with a low number. It's a definite which is more than I've seen for the other side of the argument.

I've found combat reports that back this up, and as Pilots had to record use of 12lb I think there must be more.

Its interesting that Pips and Kurfurst believe that the number was 25% of FC and 125 aircraft in May

I have 10 Hurricane squadrons and 3 Spitfire squadrons with combat reports in May alone.

Hurricane 85, 1, 73, 79, 87, 151, 56, 17, 229 and 245 squadrons
Spitfire, 74, 54 and 19 squadrons

Links
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/hurricane-I.html
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1vrs109e.html

[winny]

Its interesting as I see the supply as being the key issue. If the RAF had a shortage of supply then there is logic in limiting the roll out and concentrating the supplies where you need them most say 11 and 12 group. However if there isn't a shortage, then there is no logic in limiting the numbers.

The changes to the engine were small and could easily been doe on the stations, yet the performance gain was very significant. So it isn't a technical or manufacture issue, its down to supply.

Without a shortage of fuel there is no logic to holding the supplies back. Indeed this is probably the one thing that I agree with re Pips posting, its centred on supply. I just disagree with his assumption that there was a shortage.

I agree that it was a crucial point at the time.
I just think it's being used to hide behind. The records are vague and it's the point Kur keeps coming back to.

All the other forums threads seem to get stuck at the supply issue.

So, let's by-pass it and go to evidence of 100 octane use in battle. Easier to prove.

Unless someone finds the 'holy grail' doccument regarding supply/conversion this supply debate is just going to keep looping around.


It's interesting to note that all of the early doccuments say that the conversion would not happen till they had enough supplies.
There is no doubt the conversion started before The BoB, so logically someone must have decided that there was enough 100 octane or they wouldn't have done it.

I still think Squadron operations log books and combat reports are the key to this one.

We don't need to prove that the conversion happened, because it did.
We don't need to prove that the stocks of 100 octane were adequate, because someone made the decision at the time that there was enough, or the conversion wouldn't have happened.

We just need to prove widespread use in combat. That's what it's all about.

[winny]

Its interesting that Pips and Kurfurst believe that the number was 25% of FC and 125 aircraft in May

I have 10 Hurricane squadrons and 3 Spitfire squadrons with combat reports in May alone.

Hurricane 85, 1, 73, 79, 87, 151, 56, 17, 229 and 245 squadrons
Spitfire, 74, 54 and 19 squadrons

Links
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/hurricane-I.html
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1vrs109e.html

It's getting better :)
10 squadrons in May is equal to a third of the operational FC fighter (Hurri/Spit) squadrons at the time. I'll have a look and see what stations they were all flying out of.

I made some brief enquiries at the national archive, they have over 1600 combat reports from the BoB. The answer to this must be in them, given that RAF pilots HAD to report any 12lb boost usage it would be pretty easy to see when and where the conversions happened.

I'm seriosly considering hiring a researcher at the archive to dig them out...

EDIT: I've also decided to get in touch with Rolls Royce at Derby to see if they have anything on wether or not a converted 100oct Merlin would run on 87 oct. The reason is that a lot of Squadrons used 2 stations. One where they stayed overnight and a forward base. If the conversion meant that a merlin wouldn't run on 87 then that would mean both stations would have to have had 100 oct, meaning more stations, more fuel, etc..

[ZaltysZ]

As talks begin to wander towards personals things, I want to point out one thing. This thread was created for discussions about inaccuracies between FM and RL data, however later it took the course of debating if planes present in game are suitable for BoB period.

Although Kurfurst doesn't agree that all Spitfires MK.I were on 100 octane, I think he won't disagree that Spitfire MK.I on 100 octane were not such rare and exotic breed (ala I-185, Mig-3U and so on), which would not be worth to be modeled. I think both sides would agree that we need 2 additional Spitfire MK.I models: CSP and CSP+100 octane. This is what is required from devs now. Everything else (debates about how much 100 octane were available) would be more helpful for mission designers and not to devs (somehow I don't think they would invest much time correcting campaigns).

[winny]

As talks begin to wander towards personals things, I want to point out one thing. This thread was created for discussions about inaccuracies between FM and RL data, however later it took the course of debating if planes present in game are suitable for BoB period.

Although Kurfurst doesn't agree that all Spitfires MK.I were on 100 octane, I think he won't disagree that Spitfire MK.I on 100 octane were not such rare and exotic breed (ala I-185, Mig-3U and so on), which would not be worth to be modeled. I think both sides would agree that we need 2 additional Spitfire MK.I models: CSP and CSP+100 octane. This is what is required from devs now. Everything else (debates about how much 100 octane were available) would be more helpful for mission designers and not to devs (somehow I don't think they would invest much time correcting campaigns).

You're right, and personally I think that the Devs won't include the 100 octane Spit untill they've included the 109-F, simply for balance.
There would be too much flak.

I doubt if this discussion will sway them, they have their own ideas I'm sure.

This is really about ending the whole 'it shouldn't be there because...' argument. I think it's relevant and I aslo find it interesting (that's because I've nothing better to do :) )

[Glider]

You're right, and personally I think that the Devs won't include the 100 octane Spit untill they've included the 109-F, simply for balance.
There would be too much flak.

I doubt if this discussion will sway them, they have their own ideas I'm sure.

This is really about ending the whole 'it shouldn't be there because...' argument. I think it's relevant and I aslo find it interesting (that's because I've nothing better to do :) )

I might regret this but why on earth would they include the 109F? I believe that around a half dozen were sent to the front as a trial. You might as well say can we have Spit II with 20mm

[winny]

I might regret this but why on earth would they include the 109F? I believe that around a half dozen were sent to the front as a trial. You might as well say can we have Spit II with 20mm

Because it's going to start to move forwards, I seem to recall the Devs saying that a 109-F was in the pipeline.

I'm looking from the MP side of things here, not the BoB. There will be more flyables, but it's a game, and developers balance games.

Maybe the 100 oct Mk I is so much better than a 109-E that they had to leave it out. :rolleyes:, people have already complained that the Spit is too good, imagine what it would be like if the 100 oct was in there.. Mutiny :)

[VO101_Tom]

You're right, and personally I think that the Devs won't include the 100 octane Spit untill they've included the 109-F, simply for balance.
There would be too much flak.

I doubt if this discussion will sway them, they have their own ideas I'm sure.

This is really about ending the whole 'it shouldn't be there because...' argument. I think it's relevant and I aslo find it interesting (that's because I've nothing better to do :) )

I think, if the balance would be the purpose, would be before E-4/N, E-7/N (these fit this period historically, no need new 3d modell), than F. Who flies on a German side, it does not understand it, why they are not those developments, with what the German aircrafts were equipped already under the BOB? Is this Balance too?

[Sven]

I thought the ingame variant was already 100 octane performance wise, but only the dial indicates a too low value of boost. Or did I miss something again? :grin:

[Al Schlageter]

As Barbi puts much much stock in what Oliver Lefebvre says, this is what he said on the DB601N engines:

Wastel are you sure about the E-7/N for 41 ? AFAIR my delivery data show a much lower amount of E-7 with the DB601N. While the E-7 was planned for use with the DB601N, the installation of this engien was quite troublesome on the Emil and few were actually fitted with it.

I'll try to come up with my numbers if the documents have not already been packed away...

http://www.allaboutwarfare.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=515&hl=db601n

[csThor]

With the Bf 109 E you can't really take delivery numbers for the DB 601N engined crates. Most of them were re-engined after some time (even some E-1s).

[robtek]

One has to take in account also that more than half of the DB601N production went to the 110's, which used them in the BoB.

[winny]

I thought the ingame variant was already 100 octane performance wise, but only the dial indicates a too low value of boost. Or did I miss something again? :grin:

I have no idea, I was just speculating, wildly...

It could just boil down to faulty instruments.

(But where's the fun in that?!)

[Al Schlageter]

One has to take in account also that more than half of the DB601N production went to the 110's, which used them in the BoB.

And if the DB601N was having troubles in the 109 then there must have been trouble with the 110 as well.

[TomcatViP]

Some of the last comments tells a lot abt what are the seriousness of some on this discussion. I don't want to be personal but I nearly spit of my coffee reading that some are seriously thinking that the Spit was like a X-wing fighters in BoB skies. The I-185 ? the Mig 3 U ???!!! Hey boy do you know how many were built and sent to the front ? Pls stop turning those brave young men that fought in harsh conditions stupid as they might hve knew nothing abt facebuk and Showme !


Pls dev paint a SPit half in Pink, add a methane pulse detonation engine at the rear end and load our guns with some talk powder that we can cleanup this discussion right now
:rolleyes:

[Blackdog_kt]

And if the DB601N was having troubles in the 109 then there must have been trouble with the 110 as well.

Your original quote mentioned problems with the installation, not the engine itself. The way i read this is that there was probably some redesign needed under the cowling and shuffling around the engine accesories, not that the engine was faulty per se.

If that's true, then it actually means it would be easier to install in a 110 as it's a bigger airframe with more available space.


As talks begin to wander towards personals things, I want to point out one thing. This thread was created for discussions about inaccuracies between FM and RL data, however later it took the course of debating if planes present in game are suitable for BoB period.

Although Kurfurst doesn't agree that all Spitfires MK.I were on 100 octane, I think he won't disagree that Spitfire MK.I on 100 octane were not such rare and exotic breed (ala I-185, Mig-3U and so on), which would not be worth to be modeled. I think both sides would agree that we need 2 additional Spitfire MK.I models: CSP and CSP+100 octane. This is what is required from devs now. Everything else (debates about how much 100 octane were available) would be more helpful for mission designers and not to devs (somehow I don't think they would invest much time correcting campaigns).


Exactly, best post in the entire number of threads concerned with the octane issue. Give us all the Spit Mk.I variants that were relevant in the timeframe of BoB and BoF, then it's the mission designer's/server admin's job to decide what to do with them. If people don't like it they fly another offline campaign, modify it to include their preferred ride or fly on a different server, problem solved.

[TomcatViP]

I am not sure it can works like that. For example I hve bought RoF with enthusiasm as soon as it was released and can't play it anymore.... There is no default FM left anywhere on any server !

[Al Schlageter]

The following Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons are known to have used 100 octane fuel before or during the BoB:
1, 17, 19, 41, 43, 54, 56, 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 74, 79, 85, 87, 92, 141, 145, 151, 152, 222, 229, 234, 245, 249, 264, 303, 602, 603, 605, 609, 610, 611, 616

These squadrons were stationed at the following airfields (bold text) at sometime during the BoB.


11 Group

RAF Biggin Hill

- RAF West Malling

RAF Debden

- RAF Martlesham Heath

RAF Hornchurch

- RAF Hawkinge
- RAF Gravesend
- RAF Manston, night fighter base
- RAF Rochford

RAF Kenley

- RAF Croydon

RAF Northolt

RAF North Weald

- RAF Martlesham
- RAF Stapleford

RAF Tangmere

- RAF West Malling
- RAF Ford
- RAF Lee on Solent, RN airfield
- RAF Gosport, RN airfield
- RAF Thorney Island
- RAF Westhampnett


Not sure which Sector airfield these were assigned to but as all the sector airfields had 100 octane fuel, these to would need a stock of 100 octane fuel.

RAF Detling

RAF Eastchurch

RAF Hendon

RAF Lympne


In 10 Group, 5 of the 6 airfields had stocks of 100 octane fuel.

In 12 Group, 7 of the 8 airfields had stocks of 100 octane fuel.

In 13 Group, 7 of the 10 airfields had stocks of 100 octane fuel. Of the 3 that possible didn't have stocks of 100 octane fuel, one was based in the Shetland Is. and the other in the Orkney Is.

[winny]

The following Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons are known to have used 100 octane fuel before or during the BoB:...


74 squadron were based at Hornchurch but flew (I think) to a forward Station (Manston) every day. You should maybe add that.

Good list :)

[Danelov]

74 squadron were based at Hornchurch but flew (I think) to a forward Station (Manston) every day. You should maybe add that.

Yes, same for the 54, Hornchurch was the normal base but the Squadron expended much of July using Rochford as base.

Yes, a good list. Not more mistery about this theme.

[Viper2000]

EDIT: I've also decided to get in touch with Rolls Royce at Derby to see if they have anything on wether or not a converted 100oct Merlin would run on 87 oct. The reason is that a lot of Squadrons used 2 stations. One where they stayed overnight and a forward base. If the conversion meant that a merlin wouldn't run on 87 then that would mean both stations would have to have had 100 oct, meaning more stations, more fuel, etc..

They would probably thank you to include their hyphen.

AFAIK there would be no problem associated with running a Merlin on 87 octane post conversion provided that the appropriate boost limits were respected.

However, just filling up with 100 octane afterwards doesn't then cut the mustard as you'd have to clean the fuel system out. Otherwise you'd be running on a mixture which might be say 95 octane, potentially causing trouble at +12.

Therefore, I don't think people would make a habit of switching from one grade to another.

[TomcatViP]

Wouldn't it be more relevant to ask in a less biased manner how many conversion were done before August 40 ? :confused::!:

[winny]

Wouldn't it be more relevant to ask in a less biased manner how many conversion were done before August 40 ? :confused::!:

You ask them. I'll ask what I want to know. Thanks.

[TomcatViP]

You ask them. I'll ask what I want to know. Thanks.

Hopefully Holmes had more a Cartesian thinking ! ???!!!

[winny]

Hopefully Holmes had more a Cartesian thinking ! ???!!!

I'm no Sherlock, that much is elementary my dear TCVIP.

Anyway, I've only made a brief enquiry at RR, just to see if they hold Service records for Merlins.

I didn't wanna start the whole thing with..'There's this argument on the internet... etc'

[Glider]

Just a brief message to say that I did try the NA this week. I didn't get what I wanted, the airfield records differ considerably, some go into some detail as to what was going on on the base, some stuck rigidly to the base and concerned themselves with transfers, promotions and visitors. Finally some had pages missing, Duxfords for instance had the pages for January to April missing. I was only able to look at six reports and gave up after that.

All I found were some more details re the import of fuel for the period June to August when approx 250 tankers arrived or were expected to arrive in the UK carrying petroleum products. It didn't split these into MT, 87 or 100 Octane totals.

I also found a memo dated dated Nov and its clear that the reserves were more than healthy. The Phrase 'We are very well ahead in our fuel reserve and shall not make an appreciable increase in the pesent stocks' is used. (note their English not mine).

I will have another go next week.

However the War Cabinet records are on line at the NA website if someone wants to support the view held by Pips that they discussed the lack of fuel in May and made the decisions he states, they are free to try. I did look a second time at the originals, but again didn't find anything apart from some weekly reports (from May monthly) but again they support the steady increase in stocks.

So much fuel arrived in June 1940 that storage capacity for MT fuel was brimmed out (their phrase).

[Kurfürst]

Although Kurfurst doesn't agree that all Spitfires MK.I were on 100 octane, I think he won't disagree that Spitfire MK.I on 100 octane were not such rare and exotic breed (ala I-185, Mig-3U and so on), which would not be worth to be modeled. I think both sides would agree that we need 2 additional Spitfire MK.I models: CSP and CSP+100 octane. This is what is required from devs now. Everything else (debates about how much 100 octane were available) would be more helpful for mission designers and not to devs (somehow I don't think they would invest much time correcting campaigns).

Absolutely agree with the above. There's no doubt a significant number - how many, we do not know - Mark Is and IIs, and Hurricanes were running on 100 octane with the associated boost levels. There's a need for a Spitfire MK.I with CSP and CSP+100 as you say. Mission designers and server admins will then decide which will be used based on the evidence found on whether the home station was historically supplied with the fuel or not.
In contrast Glider's position is that the basic Spitfire MK.I with CSP should be not modelled at all, so that nobody would have choice to make up his mind wheater 100 octane was in universal use or not. Glider himself will have the right to make that decision instead of them and the developers.

I doubt it is about balance; after all, we have the Mark II which is already running on 100 octane and with a performance that is virtually identical to Mark Is with 100 octane. The problem is the FM has simulation-wide issues, and presently the 109E are not runing at historical performance levels. I do not think a 109F is needed for "balance", after all the basic 109E with 601A had very similiar performance as the 100 octane RAF birds, and we do not even have 601N powered Emils or similar 110 Ceasars.

Overall, however, I do not think this thread warrants more discussion on the subject, as the current evidence level is simply lacking. We will see if Glider or others can shed light on the issue based on hard evidence in the archives. Otherwise, its just neverending talk, talk, talk..

[Kurfürst]

However the War Cabinet records are on line at the NA website if someone wants to support the view held by Pips that they discussed the lack of fuel in May and made the decisions he states, they are free to try. I did look a second time at the originals, but again didn't find anything apart from some weekly reports (from May monthly) but again they support the steady increase in stocks.

Can you give a link to these online sources, David?

[winny]

Can you give a link to these online sources, David?

I'm not David, but I think he means here (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/war-cabinet-1939-1945.htm)

[Glider]

Thats correct. I believe the files that you want start CAB 65/7/1 and should be available to download. If you are stuck on anything let me know on the thread or via a PM.
Good Luck

[Kurfürst]

Have you got any luck in the archives, David, you have been a bit silent for a month about the subject.

[Al Schlageter]

Have you got any luck in the archives, David, you have been a bit silent for a month about the subject.

What have you found?

[Glider]

The only interesting thing that I picked up was that there was a serious shortage of 100 Octane Fuel, serious enough to start impacting operations in the period May to August 1944 (not 1940).
Emergency measures were taken such as switching RAF squadrons which had US radial engines to US 90 octane fuel and a temporary dip below the previously set strategic minimum reserve level. Once the invasion was firm and the pressure eased the situation returned to normal.

There was one file I was after which they couldn't find and another that I had high hopes of, that only had one sheet of paper in it. Its unlikely that I will get to visit again until October.

Kurfurst, How did you get on finding evidence of the May 1940 meetings that support Pips posting?

[Glider]

The following Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons are known to have used 100 octane fuel before or during the BoB:
1, 17, 19, 41, 43, 54, 56, 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 74, 79, 85, 87, 92, 141, 145, 151, 152, 222, 229, 234, 245, 249, 264, 303, 602, 603, 605, 609, 610, 611, 616

These squadrons were stationed at the following airfields (bold text) at sometime during the BoB.


11 Group

RAF Biggin Hill

- RAF West Malling

RAF Debden

- RAF Martlesham Heath

RAF Hornchurch

- RAF Hawkinge
- RAF Gravesend
- RAF Manston, night fighter base
- RAF Rochford

RAF Kenley

- RAF Croydon

RAF Northolt

RAF North Weald

- RAF Martlesham
- RAF Stapleford

RAF Tangmere

- RAF West Malling
- RAF Ford
- RAF Lee on Solent, RN airfield
- RAF Gosport, RN airfield
- RAF Thorney Island
- RAF Westhampnett


Not sure which Sector airfield these were assigned to but as all the sector airfields had 100 octane fuel, these to would need a stock of 100 octane fuel.

RAF Detling

RAF Eastchurch

RAF Hendon

RAF Lympne


In 10 Group, 5 of the 6 airfields had stocks of 100 octane fuel.

In 12 Group, 7 of the 8 airfields had stocks of 100 octane fuel.

In 13 Group, 7 of the 10 airfields had stocks of 100 octane fuel. Of the 3 that possible didn't have stocks of 100 octane fuel, one was based in the Shetland Is. and the other in the Orkney Is.

I did go to the NA today for a while to do some family history but did spent some time looking at a few of the squadron operational records. Once again I found that the details vary by squadron but can add two maybe three additional squadrons to the list of 100 Octane users.

No 111 squadron (based at Drem)
On the 15th February 1940 the squadron was released while the tanks were drained and replaced by 100 Octane.

No 32 Squadron (based Gravesend)
29th February 1940, 20 new type aircraft fitted with Metal Wings, new propellers and fuel were delivered during the month. 13 L type machines were flown away

No 213 Squadron
24th February new aircraft were delivered to the squadron.

As you can see, no 111 and 32 squadrons are pretty clear, but I have little doubt that no 213 squadron will be debated by some. My personal view is that if 32 squadron received new aircraft with all the improvements, its unlikely that 213 wouldn't less than a week earlier.

I did go to look up 232 squadron but they only formed in July 1940 when 100 Octane was the normal issue, so it wouldn't have been worth mentioning, i did look but there was no mention. I found it interesting that all the dates are in February.

[NZtyphoon]

Okay, how about some simple calculations?

Now, there is no doubt that 100 Octane fuel was available to Fighter Command before and during the Battle of Britain.

How Much? Woods and Dempster say 22,000 tons - which is too low.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/technical/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-during-bob-16305-2.html

Mike Williams #26 scroll down to Table II Monthly Consumption of fuel & oil:

June - Aug 1940 = 10,000 tons consumed
Sept - = 14,000 tons consumed
Oct = 17,000 tons consumed

1 imperial gallon of 100 Octane = 7.1 pounds ("Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith the official British war history on the oil and petroleum industry during WW2 page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"):

1 ton of 100 octane = 2,240 lbs therefore 2,240 divided by 7.1 = 315.5 imp gal

Fuel Capacities:

Defiant I = 97 imp gal
Hurricane I = 90 imp gal
Spitfire I & II = 84 imp gal
TOTAL = 271 imp gal divide by 3 = average fighter fuel load = 90.3 imp gal (Defiant from memory, so feel free to correct me. Defiant II = 104 imp gal)

1 ton = 315.5 imp gal divided by 90.3 imp gal = 3.5 fuel loads (or sorties) per ton of 100 octane fuel. Assuming all aircraft emptied their tanks for each sortie, and assuming all aircraft shot down = 1 fuel load of 90.3 imp gal

NB: Not all aircraft returned with empty tanks and RAF policy was to refill each aircraft as soon as possible after landing, or each evening or early morning, to avoid vapour traps.

Blenheims were the only other aircraft known to have used 100 Octane fuel, albeit only in their outer wing fuel tanks, making things complicated for the poor pilots. (Warner, The Bristol Blenheim:A Complete History 2nd ed, page 100.)

Merlin III & XIIs could still use 87 octane fuel, hence training flights and other secondary flight duties, such as delivery, ferry flights, etc could use 87 octane fuel instead of 100.

June to August: 10,000 tons x 3.5 = 35,000 fuel loads
September: 14,000 tons x 3.5 = 49,000 fuel loads
October: 17,000 tons x 3.5 = 59,500 fuel loads

June to October = 41,000 tons x 3.5 = 143,500 fuel loads in 22 weeks = 6,523 fuel loads = 931.8 fuel loads per day

If Woods and Dempster 22,000 tons distributed (not consumed) between July and September = 77,000 fuel loads divided by 13 weeks = 5,923 fuel loads per week = 846 fuel loads daily.

The Battle of Britain by T.C.G. James shows 51,364 sorties, day & night from July 10 through Sept 30; some of the most intensive combat took place between these dates. Of course there were quiet periods when far fewer combat sorties were flown by Fighter Command; eg: August 16 & 17, between two days of intensive combat August 15 & 18.

51,364 divided by 13 weeks = 4,280 fuel loads = 611 fuel loads daily
average:

Hooton’s Eagle in Flames, Table 2, FC flew Sep 23-29: 4,825 defensive sorties Sep 30 – Oct 6: 1,782 defensive sorties, and yet consumption of 100 Octane was still increasing.

Been here before, unfortunately http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-pt-2-a-20108-7.html

[TomcatViP]

Now, there is no doubt that 100 Octane fuel was available to Fighter Command before and during the Battle of Britain.



really ?

20000 post of the same "piece of evidence" does not makes it a demonstrated fact. We are still waiting for some cross references.

[41Sqn_Banks]

really ?

20000 post of the same "piece of evidence" does not makes it a demonstrated fact. We are still waiting for some cross references.

One combat report that shows the use of +12 boost (which requires 100 octane) is enough to proof that 100 octane was available. Of course it doesn't proof that it is available to all units, that's why NZtyphoon did the calculation.

[lane]

One combat report that shows the use of +12 boost (which requires 100 octane) is enough to proof that 100 octane was available.

Here's one!

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/lane-26-5-40.jpg

;)

[lane]

June - Aug 1940 = 10,000 tons consumed
Sept - = 14,000 tons consumed
Oct = 17,000 tons consumed


Hi NZtyphoon:

Please note that the 10,000 tons of 100 octane, shown in Table II - Consumption (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/100oct-consumption-bob.jpg) consumed for the period June - Aug 1940, is the monthly average of those 3 months, therefore for the period June - Aug 1940 30,000 tons were actually consumed.

[VO101_Tom]

Here's one!
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/lane-26-5-40.jpg
;)

IIRC no one contested this (availabe or not), only the quantity.
Interesting report. When he used the 12 lbs boost on deck, he was able to fly with only 300 mph...

[Kurfürst]

IIRC no one contested this (availabe or not), only the quantity.


Indeed. I don't think anybody has doubts that 100 octane was used in a number of FC's - and also BC's Squadrons., as a number of Blenheim Squadrons (3 or 4 I believe), were also issued with the fuel. Which is why NYTyphoons 'calculations' are flawed and be considered at best for their entertainment value, as he ignores all bombers with many times the consumption and requirement of a fighter squadron, as well as training, moving flights and engine manufacturer demands, which are are simply ignored.

But the evidence to somewhat sensational claim that 100 octane was the only fuel issued is still sorely lacking and is directly contradicted by a number of primary and secondary sources. As another poster said, its a bit boring to see the same piece of non-evidence posted the 20000th time, it only seems to reinforce the sense that some people are perhaps a bit fanatical about enforcing their views on the others.

The trend shown in the consumption of 87 octane and 100 octane fuel is, however intererting. It is clear that about 2/3s of the fuel consumed during the Battle was 87 octane (by all Commands) and 1/3 consumed was 100 octane (by Fighter and Bomber Commands).

Checking the trend lines of operational (combat) Fighter sorties and 87 octane consumption during the Battle is interesting. When Fighter Command flew a lot of sorties, 87 octane issues also increased, when Fighter Command flew less of sorties, 87 octane demands decreased, with some delay of course. I think the conclusion is quite obvious.

Another interesting trend is that 87 octane issues suddenly plummeted during early october, while 100 octane issues increased. This is in line with Pips summary of the Australian paper, which notes that Fighter Command only switched completely over to 100 octane in the late automn 1940.

Its also completely in line with what an unquestionably reputable secondary source, Morgan nad Shacklady's ultimate Spitfire book, 'Spitfire: The History' notes about the initial uncertainity of 100 octane shipments (as all 100 octane had to be imported from overseas).

It also refers to the fact that RAF was intending to initially equip 16 fighter Squadrons and 2 bomber Squadrons with 100 octane, which is again underlined by the memo of the Fuel Commitee's meeting, noting that the selected fighter Squadrons and Blenheim Squadrons have been converted, the memo of which was summarized in a 'doctored' textus on Mike William's site to further the site's agenda.

Also of interest that the RAF wished to build up a reserve of 800 000 tons for precaution, which couldn't be met in 1940.

[Osprey]

What exactly would make you happy Kurfurst?

[TomcatViP]

A 100° British lager ?:rolleyes:

[Kurfürst]

What exactly would make you happy Kurfurst?

How about even a decision or plan after the spring of 1940 (when this paper states that select squadrons are to be issued with 100 octane, so we can know for quite certain that at this point, it was meant for some and not all) that all Fighter Squadrons are to switch over to 100 octane? Even a plan, a draft..? Apparently, people who have been quite desperate to find such evidence for years could find none, even though I am quite sure they looked under every rock and grow rather frustrated in the process.

I am quite certain that if the British took such pain to note and discuss at such high levels that some Squadrons will use 100 octane from - was it March? - there should be ample discussion and record about extending the avgas issues to other Squadrons.

The lack of such evidence makes it quite likely that such sudden, overnight changeover simply didn't happen until after the Battle.

[Kurfürst]

A 100° British lager ?:rolleyes:

The suggestion is worthwhile for further consideration.. and an experimenting with.

[Al Schlageter]

This is in line with Pips summary of the Australian paper, which notes that Fighter Command only switched completely over to 100 octane in the late automn 1940.

LOL, this mysterious paper that only one person has ever seen. :rolleyes:

So tell me Barbi, which fighter squadrons that were based on airfields on the CloD map were only using 87 octane fuel.

[Kurfürst]

So tell me Barbi, which fighter squadrons that were based on airfields on the CloD map were only using 87 octane fuel.

Well I guess http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=250748&postcount=43 already covered that question.

"Based on the current evidence (feel free to add new sources showing 100 octane at the said airfield during the Battle and I'll update the list) shows that 100 octane aviation spirit was supplied to

8 out of 19 Sector Airfields
9 out of 32 Fighter Airfields (however 7 of the 32 functioning as satellite airfield for rotation etc., with no Sqn permanently based there)."

Which follows that appearantly 11 Sector Airfields and 23 Fighter airfields show no evidence at all that they have been supplied by anything else but the standard 87 octane. Of course even in the rest of the airfields its rather difficult to find out from what time is there any evidence to 100 octane fuel supply - for some airfields we have for example combat reports from October 1940, and they may or may not have been supplied with 100 octane earlier.

In 11 Group, 87 octane airfields apparently include, at the current level of evidence

RAF Debden.

RAF Debden was home to the Debden Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 85 Squadron from 22 May 1940
No 17 Squadron from 19 June 1940
No 257 Squadron from 15 August 1940
No 601 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 111 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 17 Squadron from 2 September 1940
No 25 Squadron from 8 October 1940

RAF Detling.

Detling was one of the 11 Group satellite airfields used by units on a day-to-day basis as required, often flights or squadrons would detach to such an airfield in the morning and return to their main operating and maintenance base in the evening.

RAF Eastchurch.

RAF Eastchurch was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 266 Squadron from 12 August 1940

RAF Ford.

RAF Ford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 23 Squadron from 12 September 1940

RAF Gosport.

Gosport was, along with Lee-on-Solent, one of the Royal Navy's airfields used in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. Royal Navy fighters were permanently based there, and occasionally RAF units were detached, using the airfield in the same way as a satellite or relief landing ground.

RAF Hendon.

RAF Hendon was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 257 Squadron from 17 May 1940
No 504 Squadron from 5 September 1940

RAF Lee on Solent.

Lee on Solent was, along with Gosport, one of the Royal Navy's airfields used in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. Royal Navy fighters were permanently based there, and occasionally RAF units were detached, using the airfield in the same way as a satellite or relief landing ground.

RAF Lympne.

Lympne was one of the 11 Group satellite airfields used by units on a day-to-day basis as required, often flights or squadrons would detach to such an airfield in the morning and return to their main operating and maintenance base in the evening. Due to the extreme forward position of this site it was under constant threat of attack and was not permanently manned during the Battle by any one Squadron.

RAF Manston.

RAF Manston was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 604 Squadron from 15 May 1940
No 600 Squadron from 20 June 1940

RAF Martlesham.

RAF Martlesham was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 25 Squadron from 19 June 1940
No 257 Squadron from 5 September 1940
No 17 Squadron from 8 October 1940

RAF Stapleford.

RAF Stapleford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 151 Squadron from 29 August 1940
No 46 Squadron from 1 September 1940

RAF Thorney Island.

RAF Thorney Island was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 236 Squadron from 4 July 1940


RAF West Malling.

RAF West Malling was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 141 Squadron from 12 July 1940
No 66 Squadron from 30 October 1940


In 10 Group, 87 octane airfields apparently include, at the current level of evidence>

RAF Filton.

RAF Filton was home to the Filton Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 504 Squadron from 26 September 1940


RAF Boscombe Down.

RAF Boscombe Down was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 249 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 56 Squadron from 1 September 1940

RAF Colerne.

RAF Colerne was used as a satellite and relief airfield for Middle Wallop during the Battle, units rotated in and out of the station on a daily basis.

RAF Exeter.

RAF Exeter was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 213 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 87 Squadron from 5 July 1940
No 601 Squadron from 7 September 1940

RAF Pembrey.

RAF Pembrey was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 92 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 79 Squadron from 8 September 1940

RAF Roborough.

RAF Roborough was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 247 Squadron from 1 August 1940

RAF St Eval.

RAF St Eval was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 222 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 236 Squadron from 8 August 1940
No 238 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 222 Squadron from 11 September 1940

[Al Schlageter]

I see you didn't update.

11 Group

RAF Detling
No. 85 Squadron May 1940

RAF Ford
23 Squadron flew the Bristol Blenheim which you yourself said used 100 octane fuel

RAF Manston
600 (City of London) Squadron - Bristol Blenheim and Bristol Beaufighter
604 (County of Middlesex) Squadron - Bristol Blenheim and Bristol Beaufighter

RAF Martlesham
25 Squadron - Bristol Blenheim and Bristol Beaufighter
17 Squadron May 1940

RAF Stapleford
56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940

RAF Thorney Island
236 Squadron - Bristol Blenheim

RAF West Malling
66 Squadron 6 Sept 1940

12 and 13 Groups are irrelevant.

[Al Schlageter]

10 Group

RAF Boscombe Down
249 (Gold Coast) Squadron 6 Sept 1940
56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940

RAF Exeter (not on the CloD map)
87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940

RAF Pembrey (not on the CloD map)
92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB
79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940

RAF St Eval (not on the CloD map)
236 Squadron - Bristol Blenheim

[Osprey]

How about even a decision or plan after the spring of 1940 (when this paper states that select squadrons are to be issued with 100 octane, so we can know for quite certain that at this point, it was meant for some and not all) that all Fighter Squadrons are to switch over to 100 octane? Even a plan, a draft..? Apparently, people who have been quite desperate to find such evidence for years could find none, even though I am quite sure they looked under every rock and grow rather frustrated in the process.

I am quite certain that if the British took such pain to note and discuss at such high levels that some Squadrons will use 100 octane from - was it March? - there should be ample discussion and record about extending the avgas issues to other Squadrons.

The lack of such evidence makes it quite likely that such sudden, overnight changeover simply didn't happen until after the Battle.


No Kurfurst. You are not even an honest man. What would make you happy is if everyone agreed with your rhetoric wholeheartedly, that 100 octane was never used. This way you could be a bigger ace online.
Over time you have been forced into changing that view to admit it was used by at least some, but that is a battle lost as part of a wider war.

Let me put this other prosecutive angle on your theory for you (I made up a new word). You believe in the 109, you see it as superior and dislike the thought that it was matched, or worse, bettered. So you seek to discredit your foe as much as you can and display an enormous bias to the impartial viewer. Let us say that you are wholly correct and the 109 was as superior as you make out - in that case can you explain how the Luftwaffe was so decisively beaten? I can draw a conclusion given the superiority of the 109 in your world that the Luftwaffe pilots must've been rubbish. It can't be tactics, the RAF were hugely outnumbered and only had 300 Spitfires out of the 900 fighters, and the tactics only changed when Goering started to panic.

So what is your agenda? Are you just a bad virtual pilot or something?

[41Sqn_Banks]

RAF Manston certainly had 100 octane fuel on 29th July 1940.

41 Squadron took off from Manston of on this day and one of it's pilots used 12 boost during this sortie.

http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/424/4240182.gif
http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/424/4240191.gif
http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/424/4240192.gif

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/Webster-29july40.jpg

[NZtyphoon]

Indeed. I don't think anybody has doubts that 100 octane was used in a number of FC's - and also BC's Squadrons., as a number of Blenheim Squadrons (3 or 4 I believe), were also issued with the fuel. Which is why NYTyphoons 'calculations' are flawed and be considered at best for their entertainment value, as he ignores all bombers with many times the consumption and requirement of a fighter squadron, as well as training, moving flights and engine manufacturer demands, which are are simply ignored.

Note what I said:
NB: Not all aircraft returned with empty tanks and RAF policy was to refill each aircraft as soon as possible after landing, or each evening or early morning, to avoid vapour traps.

Blenheims were the only other aircraft known to have used 100 Octane fuel, albeit only in their outer wing fuel tanks, making things complicated for the poor pilots. (Warner, The Bristol Blenheim:A Complete History 2nd ed, page 100.)

Merlin III & XIIs could still use 87 octane fuel, hence training flights and other secondary flight duties, such as delivery, ferry flights, etc could use 87 octane fuel instead of 100.

Other aircraft known to have been using 100 Octane fuel were a small number of Beaufighters and PR Spitfires.

Westland Whirlwinds still used, and continued to use 87 Octane right through their operational lives.

But the evidence to somewhat sensational claim that 100 octane was the only fuel issued is still sorely lacking and is directly contradicted by a number of primary and secondary sources....

Nor did I say anywhere only 100 Octane fuel was issued. And where are KF's primary and secondary sources? The main primary sources "presented" by KF are a mysterious Australian/Beaverbrook paper which no-one apart from KF and "Pip" can find (The Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it), and some pre-war planning papers.

The trend shown in the consumption of 87 octane and 100 octane fuel is, however intererting. It is clear that about 2/3s of the fuel consumed during the Battle was 87 octane (by all Commands) and 1/3 consumed was 100 octane (by Fighter and Bomber Commands).

All KF is saying is that large numbers of aircraft in other commands were using 87 Octane. Big deal.

Checking the trend lines of operational (combat) Fighter sorties and 87 octane consumption during the Battle is interesting. When Fighter Command flew a lot of sorties, 87 octane issues also increased, when Fighter Command flew less of sorties, 87 octane demands decreased, with some delay of course. I think the conclusion is quite obvious.

Yup, there were things like training flights, delivery flights, ferry flights and other second-line duties which naturally increased at times when the frontline units were operating more intensively.

Another interesting trend is that 87 octane issues suddenly plummeted during early october, while 100 octane issues increased. This is in line with Pips summary of the Australian paper, which notes that Fighter Command only switched completely over to 100 octane in the late automn 1940.

Meaning FC switched to 100 Octane fuel for secondary as well as frontline duties? Seeing as no-one else apart from KF and "Pip" has seen this paper, and it is missing from the Australian National Archives I guess we have to take his word for it...:-|

Its also completely in line with what an unquestionably reputable secondary source, Morgan nad Shacklady's ultimate Spitfire book, 'Spitfire: The History' notes about the initial uncertainity of 100 octane shipments (as all 100 octane had to be imported from overseas).

Convoys started operating in September 1939; the most important were the HX convoys which sailed from Halifax to (mainly) Liverpool. The first - HX.1 - sailed on 16 September 1939. Referring to http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html
The HX convoys incorporated cargo ships, some of which carried aviation fuel, and tankers: many of the latter had sailed from refineries in the West Indies and America. The BHX series sailed from Bermuda, starting in May 1940 (BHX.41), and joined the main HX convoys in Halifax. Some of the tankers from the HX convoys diverted to French ports, enough to supply the RAF fighters in France.

From the HX series of convoys alone (HX 11, 13, 31, 33-35, 40, 43, 49, 55, 57-59, 64-68, 70, 73, 76) 44 tankers carrying AVGAS arrived in British or French ports; one tanker was destroyed by a mine in the Bristol channel. This contradicts the assertion in Shacklady and Morgan that ...large numbers of tankers were sunk by German submarines...

Another reputable secondary source is "Oil" by Payton-Smith which, as noted, is the official war history. He notes that "...in the summer of 1940 there was a surplus of these ships (tankers) because of the incorporation into the British merchant marine of tanker fleets from countries over-run by Germany." pp. 128–130.

It also refers to the fact that RAF was intending to initially equip 16 fighter Squadrons and 2 bomber Squadrons with 100 octane, which is again underlined by the memo of the Fuel Commitee's meeting, noting that the selected fighter Squadrons and Blenheim Squadrons have been converted, the memo of which was summarized in a 'doctored' textus on Mike William's site to further the site's agenda.

This memo was a planning paper from 16 March 1939 , based on a pre-war assumption that US supplies would be denied to Britain in wartime, limiting the numbers of front-line units able to use the fuel.

In "Oil" (Official Second WW history) Payton-Smith said:

"By 1939...The prospects of securing sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel in addition to the 87-octane petrol required for non-operational flying looked doubtful...(he goes on to state on page 57)...It was true that by 1939 it seemed increasingly unlikely that American supplies would be withheld. But to have accepted anything less than absolute certainty, to have depended on the goodwill of foreign suppliers to meet the essential needs of the Royal Air Force, would have been a radical break with traditions that had governed British oil policy since long before the First World War."

Meaning that the pre-war planning papers quoted by KF were being conservative in their estimates, as per a long held tradition.
Payton-Smith went on to say:

"...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared; production of the new fuel in the US, and in other parts of the world, increased more quickly than expected with the adoption of new refining techniques." pp. 259-260

Interesting how KF resorts to pre-war planning documents to say what happened up to 16 months later, during the Battle of Britain, yet cannot provide primary documentation to prove that the situations discussed up to two years earlier actually eventuated in 1940. And his assertions about "doctored" documents when his own documentation is so shoddy and questionable?

Also of interest that the RAF wished to build up a reserve of 800 000 tons for precaution, which couldn't be met in 1940.

Proving nothing really, except that in wartime pre-war plans can change. There was still more than enough 100 Octane fuel consumed by FC, and some Blenheims during the Battle to allow all operational sorties to be flown on this fuel alone.

Interesting to note that Merlin engines using 100 Octane fuel were being built in 1938, as well as C.P propellers

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1938/1938%20-%203453.html

[lane]

Hi NZtyphoon:

One small correction if I may regarding the Westland Whirlwind:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/100oct-tanker-137sqdn-whirlwind.jpg

:)

[lane]

Just for fun whilst on the subject - from Flight, March 28, 1940 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Flight_March28_1940_Fighter_Station.pdf)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Flight_March28_1940pg293.jpg

From IWM (http://www.iwmprints.org.uk/image/742587/ground-staff-refuelling-a-supermarine-spitfire-mk-iia-of-no-19-squadron-raf-at-fowlmere-near-duxford-in-cambridgeshire-september-1940): 19 Squadron, Fowlmere, Sept. 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/CH_001357-1200.jpg

:)

[NZtyphoon]

Hi NZtyphoon:

One small correction if I may regarding the Westland Whirlwind:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/100oct-tanker-137sqdn-whirlwind.jpg

:)

In Victor Bingham "Whirlwind: The Westland Whirlwind Fighter (Airlife Publishing, 1987) he wrote that in April 1940 the Director of Design/Research and Development in the Air Ministry, W Farren, commented that it was wrong that one of the latest types of fighter aircraft (the Whirlwind and its Peregrines) was only rated to use 87 Octane fuel instead of 100. (p.36)

The photo is of a 137 Sqn "Whirlybomber" from at least mid-to late 1942, so is it possible that the R-R Peregrine was rated to use 100 Octane by then?

[NZtyphoon]

From another forum:

Reserves Information
The following information are the reserve stocks of 100 Octane fuel during the BOB period
This information has come from the War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly report (a) that is available from the National Archives, as well as Gavin Baileys paper(b) and Wood and Dempster(c).

Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)

Oh found this: from http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1951/1951%20-%202155.html "It fell to the
Shell Development Company in California to produce for the first time a commercially manufactured 100-octane gasoline
in 1935. It was 50/50 straight-run material with synthetic blending agents, plus 4.8 c.c. tetra-ethyl-lead per Imperial
gallon."

[lane]

In Victor Bingham "Whirlwind: The Westland Whirlwind Fighter (Airlife Publishing, 1987) he wrote that in April 1940 the Director of Design/Research and Development in the Air Ministry, W Farren, commented that it was wrong that one of the latest types of fighter aircraft (the Whirlwind and its Peregrines) was only rated to use 87 Octane fuel instead of 100. (p.36)

The photo is of a 137 Sqn "Whirlybomber" from at least mid-to late 1942, so is it possible that the R-R Peregrine was rated to use 100 Octane by then?

Thanks for the info from Bingham's book. I don't know much about the Whirlwind, so I'm going to see if I can find a used copy. I appreciate the tip. I too figured the photo of the Whirlwind and bowser to be a 137 Squadron Whirlwind; probably taken around September-October of 1942. Don't know where though, maybe Manston? It's pretty clear they were cleared for 100 octane by the time the photo was taken though ;)

I have Warner's Blenheim book and in reviewing the bit about 100 octane in the outer wing tanks he wrote:

"To take full advantage of 100 octane petrol the supercharger pressure could be increased from the normal 'Plus 5 lb/sq.in. boost' by the operation of an 'Emergency Boost Override' lever on the instrument panel. This overrode the Automatic Boost Control to allow 'Plus 9 lb' pressure, and was used for take-off and in emergencies only, for a maximum of 5 minutes."

Interesting - and not unlike the Hurricane and Spitfire use of the boost cut-out enabling +12 lbs, although rather more complicated in practice apparently.

[ACE-OF-ACES]

19 Squadron, Fowlmere, Sept. 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/CH_001357-1200.jpg

Nuff said imho

[Blackdog_kt]

I did some research on this when i was active on my pet project, "getting off the ground in a Blenheim in CoD" :grin:

After reading through a copy of the pilot's operating handbook i found online, that's what i could gather:

1) Extra tanks were installed in the wings for more range.

2) This made the aircraft too heavy to safely take-off with bombs loaded.

3) Higher boost was needed.

4) Only the outer tanks got 100 octane fuel to assist in take-off, enabling use of +9 psi boost.

This can be easily gleaned from reading the checklists. It was not as much of a WEP setting, as it was simply a "take off when overloaded" power setting.

There were also other kinds of weirdness involved because only one pair of tanks had the ability to jettison fuel, the default inner tanks.

This meant that the potential for WEP was completely wasted: crews were instructed to cruise to the target on the outer 100-octance tanks and drain them completely before switching to the inner ones, since the outer ones couldn't be drained by jettisoning fuel in an emergency.
As such, the 100 octane fuel was effectively used during the probably safest part of the journey at cruise settings (or at least when some element of surprise still existed, during the inbound leg), not during the return from the target for escaping flak and fighters when it would mostly be needed.

Historical loadouts for short range missions were what we use when we fly it in multiplayer on the CoD map: just 55%-60% of fuel (that is the threshold between inner and outer tanks), with the engines limited at +5 psi boost.

[Skoshi Tiger]

19 Squadron, Fowlmere, Sept. 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/CH_001357-1200.jpg

Nuff said imho

details of plane in picture from http://www.spitfires.ukf.net/p004.htm

P7420 IIa CBAF MXII 6MU 16-9-40 19S 26-9-40 flew into tree nr Boxford Sussex Sgt Roden killed 15-11-40 SOC 23-11-40 FH44.40

[NZtyphoon]

Thanks for the info from Bingham's book. I don't know much about the Whirlwind, so I'm going to see if I can find a used copy. I appreciate the tip. I too figured the photo of the Whirlwind and bowser to be a 137 Squadron Whirlwind; probably taken around September-October of 1942. Don't know where though, maybe Manston? It's pretty clear they were cleared for 100 octane by the time the photo was taken though ;)

I have Warner's Blenheim book and in reviewing the bit about 100 octane in the outer wing tanks he wrote:

"To take full advantage of 100 octane petrol the supercharger pressure could be increased from the normal 'Plus 5 lb/sq.in. boost' by the operation of an 'Emergency Boost Override' lever on the instrument panel. This overrode the Automatic Boost Control to allow 'Plus 9 lb' pressure, and was used for take-off and in emergencies only, for a maximum of 5 minutes."

Interesting - and not unlike the Hurricane and Spitfire use of the boost cut-out enabling +12 lbs, although rather more complicated in practice apparently.

http://www.amazon.com/Whirlwind-Westland-Victor-F-Bingham/dp/1853100048 ?
The photo is part of a whole sequence of 137 Sqn photos taken at Manston in 1943; the last Whirlwind ops for 137 occurred on 21 June 1943, when 137 stood down to re-equip with Typhoons.The remaining Whirlwinds were transferred to 263 Sqn which had its last op in December before re-equipping with Typhoons.

[lane]

http://www.amazon.com/Whirlwind-Westland-Victor-F-Bingham/dp/1853100048 ?
The photo is part of a whole sequence of 137 Sqn photos taken at Manston in 1943; the last Whirlwind ops for 137 occurred on 21 June 1943, when 137 stood down to re-equip with Typhoons.The remaining Whirlwinds were transferred to 263 Sqn which had its last op in December before re-equipping with Typhoons.

Hi NZtyphoon,

Thanks for the info on the book and the photograph. I’ll get the book. That sure is a nice photo! ;) Unfortunately, I forget where I got it.

Following on the discussion about consumption and the use of 100 octane in the Blenheim, it shouldn’t be overlooked that the Defiant also used 100 octane and +12 boost. See the
Combat Report of T. D. Welsh of 264 Squadron from 29 May 1940 (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/264-welsh-29may40.pdf) where he recorded "I pulled the boost cut out…" for example.

A.&A.E.E. reported on trials of the Defiant operating +12 boost.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Defiant-K8620-level-speeds.jpg

And last but not least see Dowding’s memo from 1st August, 1940, with copies to all Stations and Squadrons, regarding Handling of Merlin in Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant Aircraft (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/dowding.pdf) wherein he mentions "The use of the automatic boost cut out control enables the pilot to get an emergency boost of + 12 lbs. per sq.in. from the engine for 5 minutes when circumstances demand it. Some pilots "pull the plug" with little excuse on every occasion."

[Glider]

Note what I said:
Nor did I say anywhere only 100 Octane fuel was issued. And where are KF's primary and secondary sources? The main primary sources "presented" by KF are a mysterious Australian/Beaverbrook paper which no-one apart from KF and "Pip" can find (The Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it), and some pre-war planning papers.

Small alteration. KF has never found or when I last heard, even looked for this paper. The reason he gave for not looking was that he doesn't live in Australia and he was too busy.

Posting 92 in attached thread
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-pt-2-a-20108-7.html

PS Its worth noting that the key to this Pips was a decision made by the War Cabinet to stop roll out of 100 octane. Earlier in this thread I did give KF the file nos for the War Cabinet minutes to look at on line, so he could confirm the Pips theory. I would be interested to see if he has done this easy, available and free basic check and let us know what it said.

[Kurfürst]

Note what I said:

Nor did I say anywhere only 100 Octane fuel was issued. And where are KF's primary and secondary sources? The main primary sources "presented" by KF are a mysterious Australian/Beaverbrook paper which no-one apart from KF and "Pip" can find (The Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it), and some pre-war planning papers.

Small alteration. KF has never found or when I last heard, even looked for this paper. The reason he gave for not looking was that he doesn't live in Australia and he was too busy.

Posting 92 in attached thread
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-pt-2-a-20108-7.html

And another: Glider never looked for the paper, he sent an email to the Archieve's staff without giving any reference. The Archive did not reply that they don't have it, they have replied that without Glider giving them a correct reference, they cannot find it. A world of difference I guess, just to straight out the spin our friend NZTyphoon is putting on it. ;)

[Kurfürst]

PS Its worth noting that the key to this Pips was a decision made by the War Cabinet to stop roll out of 100 octane. Earlier in this thread I did give KF the file nos for the War Cabinet minutes to look at on line, so he could confirm the Pips theory. I would be interested to see if he has done this easy, available and free basic check and let us know what it said.

I have checked as much as I could, there are however gazillion pages of several cabinets, as what you (and Pips) call "War Cabinet minutes" are actually covering a broad range of aspects, and apparently the work was split between several committees for fuel, ammunition, air, production and similar.

Now, as far as the documentary evidence goes, the only relevant paper you've produced so far is the May 19th meeting's summary, and that says some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons, which is what it reads. As we all know this is the paper that has been doctored on the Mike Williams site to have the meaning 'all'.

If that decision was not overruled by later ones, then it was some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons it is. There is no evidence of it (yet?) that it was overruled.

You were certainly unable to show any such decision, though I recall that you have claimed Committee on 29th June or 10th August supposedly overruled this. I have asked many times to supply these papers instead of giving your view of them, but you always evade that for some reason.

And for some reason you are refusing to post files referring to the meeting after May 1940, which is what the Beaverbrook paper covers, namely, that any further expansion was halted and frozen.

Simply to put, you can argue until you are blue in the face about if the Beaverbook paper can be found again or not (I think though I may have a single page from it, as the context seems very similiar, which was posted many many years ago on Ring's site).

But its all irrelevant since the only British decision presented says some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons, and it takes an amazing level of spin - or as some solved the question, doctoring - making 'some' to mean 'all'.

[Kurfürst]

Blenheims were the only other aircraft known to have used 100 Octane fuel, albeit only in their outer wing fuel tanks, making things complicated for the poor pilots. (Warner, The Bristol Blenheim:A Complete History 2nd ed, page 100.)

This seems mighty unlikely during the 1940 timeframe given that it seems the two (or three) Blenheim Stations identified earlier were only supposed to be supplied with 100 octane. If there is no 87 octane in the Station just 100 octane, how they are supposed to tank up from both? This may have been true earlier, but certainly not in these Stations concerned.


Merlin III & XIIs could still use 87 octane fuel, hence training flights and other secondary flight duties, such as delivery, ferry flights, etc could use 87 octane fuel instead of 100.[/i]

As well as operational Squadrons on combat missions of course.

Other aircraft known to have been using 100 Octane fuel were a small number of Beaufighters and PR Spitfires.

Source?

Nor did I say anywhere only 100 Octane fuel was issued.

Grand, then we agree that Fighter Command used both 87 and 100 octane fuel for its operational fighters.

And where are KF's primary and secondary sources? The main primary sources "presented" by KF are a mysterious Australian/Beaverbrook paper which no-one apart from KF and "Pip" can find (The Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it), and some pre-war planning papers.

I think you do disservice to your already marginal credibility by pretending things anyone can check by reading the thread.

I am afraid I have posted the 87 and 100 octane fuel consumption during the Battle, which is a primary source, the May 18 decision that explicitly says that 100 octane is not issued to all Fighter Squadrons, as well as the earlier decision in agreement that the plans were for 16 fighter and 2 bomber Squadrons, by September 1940. Of course the sour in your mouth about the other pre-war papers is that they note that British 100 octane fuel programme was fueled by fear that the Germans could much more easily produce great quantities via their synthetic process.

And yes I have also made reference to the paper Pips found, and yes you are lying when you say that "the Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it", and not for the first time.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst
The trend shown in the consumption of 87 octane and 100 octane fuel is, however intererting. It is clear that about 2/3s of the fuel consumed during the Battle was 87 octane (by all Commands) and 1/3 consumed was 100 octane (by Fighter and Bomber Commands).

All KF is saying is that large numbers of aircraft in other commands were using 87 Octane. Big deal.[/QUOTE]

You seem to have reading comprehension problems when you believe that when I write ALL commands I meant OTHER commands. But I agree, its not a big deal, everyone else but you seemed to get it.

Yup, there were things like training flights, delivery flights, ferry flights and other second-line duties which naturally increased at times when the frontline units were operating more intensively.

'Naturally'. Really? Whenever the RAF was battling the Luftwaffe in a frenzy, it automatically meant that suddenly bomber command flew more sorties, training units flew 10 times as much, and coastal command was flying more sorties too?

Or did Spitfires after landing at a fighter base quickly drain their tanks of 100 octane, refill with 87 octane to fly training flights, move between airfields, and then drained the tanks of 87 octane and refilled again with 100 octane?

If this happened, they surely made a big fuss in 1940 just to support some silly-ass speculation of a Spitfire-fan in 2012 didn't they. :D

Meaning FC switched to 100 Octane fuel for secondary as well as frontline duties? Seeing as no-one else apart from KF and "Pip" has seen this paper, and it is missing from the Australian National Archives I guess we have to take his word for it...:-|

Or we should take the word of you, who has just lied that its 'missing' from the ANArchives...

[QUOTE]Originally Posted by Kurfürst
Its also completely in line with what an unquestionably reputable secondary source, Morgan nad Shacklady's ultimate Spitfire book, 'Spitfire: The History' notes about the initial uncertainity of 100 octane shipments (as all 100 octane had to be imported from overseas).[QUOTE]

Convoys started operating in September 1939; the most important were the HX convoys which sailed from Halifax to (mainly) Liverpool. The first - HX.1 - sailed on 16 September 1939. Referring to http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html
The HX convoys incorporated cargo ships, some of which carried aviation fuel, and tankers: many of the latter had sailed from refineries in the West Indies and America. The BHX series sailed from Bermuda, starting in May 1940 (BHX.41), and joined the main HX convoys in Halifax. Some of the tankers from the HX convoys diverted to French ports, enough to supply the RAF fighters in France.

From the HX series of convoys alone (HX 11, 13, 31, 33-35, 40, 43, 49, 55, 57-59, 64-68, 70, 73, 76) 44 tankers carrying AVGAS arrived in British or French ports; one tanker was destroyed by a mine in the Bristol channel. This contradicts the assertion in Shacklady and Morgan that ...large numbers of tankers were sunk by German submarines...

No, its just your spin on it.

Morgan nad Shacklady writes of concerning tanker losses, while you write of tanker losses in convoys (obviously a lot of them weren't travelling in one), and then further limited your 'research' to the HX convoys (obviously again not all tankers went through HX convoys), and then even further limited to scope to 'tankers carrying AVGAS' (obviously again a tanker capacity lost is a tanker lost - if it also carried some kind of fuel it was even worse, but a tanker sunk with ballast en route to America was just as painful for shipping space as a tanker lost inbound to Britain).

This is how tanker losses suddenly became 'tanker losses carrying avgas while travelling in convoys in the HX series convoys'. Its a classic straw-man argument.

Now, anyone who searches back in this thread will find the actual figures for British / Allied tanker losses in the period, they were quite serious indeed, iirc several hundred thousends of GRT worth. Mines, torpedo planes and bombers, uboots all took their toll. I don't bother to post them again.

Another reputable secondary source is "Oil" by Payton-Smith which, as noted, is the official war history. He notes that "...in the summer of 1940 there was a surplus of these ships (tankers) because of the incorporation into the British merchant marine of tanker fleets from countries over-run by Germany." pp. 128–130.

I believe Morgan and Shacklady are quite aware of Payton-Smith's book.

What seems to be at odds is Payton-Smith and Morgan-Shacklady, but your humble - and rather untrustworthy - interpretation and quoting of Payton-Smith vs. Payton-Smith's interpretation by rather distinguished British aviation historians.

This memo was a planning paper from 16 March 1939 , based on a pre-war assumption that US supplies would be denied to Britain in wartime, limiting the numbers of front-line units able to use the fuel.

I agree. So is there ANY documented evidence that it was amended? Anything at all?


In "Oil" (Official Second WW history) Payton-Smith said:

"By 1939...The prospects of securing sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel in addition to the 87-octane petrol required for non-operational flying looked doubtful...(he goes on to state on page 57)...It was true that by 1939 it seemed increasingly unlikely that American supplies would be withheld. But to have accepted anything less than absolute certainty, to have depended on the goodwill of foreign suppliers to meet the essential needs of the Royal Air Force, would have been a radical break with traditions that had governed British oil policy since long before the First World War."

Meaning that the pre-war planning papers quoted by KF were being conservative in their estimates, as per a long held tradition.

Payton-Smith went on to say:

"...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared; production of the new fuel in the US, and in other parts of the world, increased more quickly than expected with the adoption of new refining techniques." pp. 259-260

Can you explain to me how Payton-Smith speaks one thing on page 59. - about the 1939 situation, when the British evidently seeked 'absolute certainity 'went on to say' on page 259-260

To me it seems you are cherry picking quotes out of the context and putting them together from two hundred page apart.

For example, what is the context "...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared on pg. 259? Does the second quote it even remotely related to 1939-1940, or you just frankensteined them together?

Interesting how KF resorts to pre-war planning documents to say what happened up to 16 months later, during the Battle of Britain, yet cannot provide primary documentation to prove that the
situations discussed up to two years earlier actually eventuated in 1940.

No, actually evidence was provided that the 1939 papers speak of partially converting Fighter and Bomber Command to 100 octane, and all the 1940 papers supplied so far also speak of partially converting Fighter and Bomber Command to 100 octane.

The March 1939 papers speak of 16 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons, the May 1940 papers speak of the fighter and bomber squadrons 'concerned'.

Not a single paper could be found or supplied that would say that or hint that all of Fighter Command is to be converted to 100 octane fuel.

Its quite clear to any reasonable man.

Proving nothing really, except that in wartime pre-war plans can change. There was still more than enough 100 Octane fuel consumed by FC, and some Blenheims during the Battle to allow all operational sorties to be flown on this fuel alone.

Of course pre-war plans can change. But did they?

Interesting to note that Merlin engines using 100 Octane fuel were being built in 1938, as well as C.P propellers

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1938/1938%20-%203453.html

Yes, though I would not necessarily equate 'quoting figures on the Rolls-Royce stand for the Merlin R.M. 2M rated on 100 octane fuel' to 'being built'. While Rolls-Royce was quoting figures, DB 601 powered Heinkels and Bfs using 100 octane were setting records anyway. :p

[Glider]

And another: Glider never looked for the paper, he sent an email to the Archieve's staff without giving any reference. The Archive did not reply that they don't have it, they have replied that without Glider giving them a correct reference, they cannot find it. A world of difference I guess, just to straight out the spin our friend NZTyphoon is putting on it. ;)

A couple of points:-
1) In normal debate the person who is relying on a paper is expected to produce thier evidence
2) Clearly Kurfurst hasn't tried looking for the paper
3) Also he hasn't looked up the War Cabinet Minutes which are available and would support his case. I should add that I have looked at these both on line and in the original paper copies and no decision of this was made and it was not even discussed by the War Cabinet. If Pips said that the War Cabinet made the decision then they would have made the decision. You would not exepect the War Cabinet to do the research but they did make decisions or were informed of decisions, and 100 Octane was never mentioned.
4 ) as for his assertion that I didn't ask the following is the reply I received from the Australian War Records, which gives a reference for the question I raised.

Australian War Memorial Research Centre
ReQuest

Response to your question with Question #: RCIS20344


Your question is:
I am trying to find a copy of the following Document which I have been told is held in your archives.

Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And Its Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War

The first question is of course do you have a copy of this document and secondly if you do what is the process to try and obtain a copy.
Our response is:
Dear David,

Thank you for your enquiry to the Research Centre of the Australian War Memorial.

I have searched our books database (which includes journals), RecordSearch (which is the National Archives of Australia's search engine for our Official Records) and our general search field in the hope that your text may be picked up as a reference in an online article without success.

Do you have any more information about the record? Is it a journal article or a monograph? If you can think of any other identifying markers, please email our Publishing and Digitised team at pub&dig@awm.gov.au A curator will search again for you.

I'm sorry I couldn't help you.

Kind regards,
I

Kurfurst is aware of this and I invite him to add anything he knows to help track this paper down.

PS Kurfurst, I believe you owe NZ an apology for saying he was lying about the Australian Archives not having the paper

[Glider]

I have checked as much as I could, there are however gazillion pages of several cabinets, as what you (and Pips) call "War Cabinet minutes" are actually covering a broad range of aspects, and apparently the work was split between several committees for fuel, ammunition, air, production and similar.

Now, as far as the documentary evidence goes, the only relevant paper you've produced so far is the May 19th meeting's summary, and that says some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons, which is what it reads. As we all know this is the paper that has been doctored on the Mike Williams site to have the meaning 'all'.

If that decision was not overruled by later ones, then it was some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons it is. There is no evidence of it (yet?) that it was overruled.

You were certainly unable to show any such decision, though I recall that you have claimed Committee on 29th June or 10th August supposedly overruled this. I have asked many times to supply these papers instead of giving your view of them, but you always evade that for some reason.

And for some reason you are refusing to post files referring to the meeting after May 1940, which is what the Beaverbrook paper covers, namely, that any further expansion was halted and frozen.

Simply to put, you can argue until you are blue in the face about if the Beaverbook paper can be found again or not (I think though I may have a single page from it, as the context seems very similiar, which was posted many many years ago on Ring's site).

But its all irrelevant since the only British decision presented says some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons, and it takes an amazing level of spin - or as some solved the question, doctoring - making 'some' to mean 'all'.

There is no Beaverbrook paper. After May the subject of roll out of 100 Octane was never mentioned again by the oil committee until May 1944 when the RAF had supply difficulties due to the volume being used in the preparation of the Invasion. I have been through the entire file and its a big one.

I should add that I have never said that 29th June or the 10th August made any decisons overuling anything. Tell me where I did and I will apologise and go into the records and copy the papers.

[Al Schlageter]

http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/konvois/hx-39.htm

Ships lost in 1939 and 1940 for SC and HX convoys > 85

HX convoys originated from Halifax (9-knot convoys for ships of sustained speeds less than 15 knots)
SC convoys originated from Sydney NS (7-knot convoys of eastbound ships too slow for the 9-knot HX convoys)

HX
Year: Convoys / Ships / Lost
1939: 22 / 431 / 1 (0.232%)
1940: 91 / 3424 / 54 (1.577%)

SC
Year: Convoys / Ships / Lost
1939: * / * / *
1940: 16 / 508 / 30 (5.905%)

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)

Date: patrols/lost/aborts

Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1

Total 1939: 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Date: patrols/lost/aborts

Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0

Total 1940: 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

The only one putting a spin on anything NZTyphoon is Barbi.:)

[NZtyphoon]

This seems mighty unlikely during the 1940 timeframe given that it seems the two (or three) Blenheim Stations identified earlier were only supposed to be supplied with 100 octane.

If there is no 87 octane in the Station just 100 octane, how they are supposed to tank up from both? This may have been true earlier, but certainly not in these Stations concerned.


Because clearly Blenheim stations were supplied with both grades. Source Warner The Bristol Blenheim: A Complete History (2nd ed) - as definitive a book on the Blenheim as Morgan and Shacklady is on the Spitfire.

P.100 "But the introduction of 100 octane fuel caused further problems for Blenheim pilots...Blenheims were adapted to carry it only in the outer tanks, with 87 octane in the inner tanks.

P.136 (September 1939) "Further difficulties and complications arose as working parties in the hangers of several squadrons were still involved in a hectic programme of bringing up to specification those aircraft that had not been modified to full Mk IV standard, by installing the new outer fuel tanks for 100 octane petrol, plumbing the jettison systems, changing the engines to Mercury XVs....the modifications were all completed by 7 October."

Now, anyone who searches back in this thread will find the actual figures for British / Allied tanker losses in the period, they were quite serious indeed, iirc several hundred thousends of GRT worth. Mines, torpedo planes and bombers, uboots all took their toll. I don't bother to post them again.

Nope, I have checked through all of this thread and [U]nowhere has Barbi, or anyone else, posted figures on tanker losses until AL Schlagater's posting at 8:41 am today. Barbi makes mention of the mysterious "Pip's" paper with some vague stuff about increasing tanker losses, but no other evidence to support his claims...

The Germans were sinking British tankers at an increasing rate, and all 100 octane fuel was coming in those tankers....but this was increasingly uncertain as Uboot took their toll on the tankers, and, during May and June, until the French capitulation, with 25% of their fighters and some of their bombers running on 100 octane the British consumed 12 000 tons of 100 octane and 42 000 tons of other (87) grades, or 54 000 ton of avgas at total - and there was no tanker running in with 100 octane until August 1940.

No "actual figures" and no evidence that there was "no tanker running in with 100 octane until August"

I believe Morgan and Shacklady are quite aware of Payton-Smith's book.

If they are, it isn't listed in their bibliography, nor do M & S refer to it in the text, so how can Barbi make such a leap?


Can you explain to me how Payton-Smith speaks one thing on page 59. - about the 1939 situation, when the British evidently seeked 'absolute certainity 'went on to say' on page 259-260

For example, what is the context "...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared on pg. 259? Does the second quote it even remotely related to 1939-1940, or you just frankensteined them together?

The book is not entirely about aviation fuel - it deals with all aspects of oil supplies to wartime Britain. The first chapter on Aviation fuel dealt with the pre-war situation when Britain had to plan for the possibility that America would bar fuel supplies to combatant nations.

""By 1939...The prospects of securing sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel in addition to the 87-octane petrol required for non-operational flying looked doubtful...(he goes on to state on page 57)...It was true that by 1939 it seemed increasingly unlikely that American supplies would be withheld. But to have accepted anything less than absolute certainty, to have depended on the goodwill of foreign suppliers to meet the essential needs of the Royal Air Force, would have been a radical break with traditions that had governed British oil policy since long before the First World War."

Meaning that the pre-war planning papers quoted by KF were being conservative in their estimates, as per a long held tradition."

After this chapter came several others on other issues - civilian oil supplies, shipping etc. Then came another chapter on Aviation fuel which deals with the situation from the declaration of war through to 1942, in which P-S notes that late in 1939...

"...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared; production of the new fuel in the US, and in other parts of the world, increased more quickly than expected with the adoption of new refining techniques." pp. 259-260

[Glider]

Re the statement
The Germans were sinking British tankers at an increasing rate, and all 100 octane fuel was coming in those tankers....but this was increasingly uncertain as Uboot took their toll on the tankers, and, during May and June, until the French capitulation, with 25% of their fighters and some of their bombers running on 100 octane the British consumed 12 000 tons of 100 octane and 42 000 tons of other (87) grades, or 54 000 ton of avgas at total - and there was no tanker running in with 100 octane until August 1940.

If there weren't any tankers coming in can someone explain how the reserves went up, in particular the 49,000 tons in the six weeks between 31st May and 11th July .
I think we can rule out air freight or submarine cargo

Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)

PS remember these are reserves total inports would have to cover usage as well

[VO101_Tom]

If there weren't any tankers coming in can someone explain how the reserves went up, in particular the 49,000 tons in the six weeks between 31st May and 11th July .

Because they not used it with the Spits! :grin:
(sorry, i can't resist ;) )

[Glider]

Like it, it was an open goal

[NZtyphoon]

Because they not used it with the Spits! :grin:
(sorry, i can't resist ;) )

Damn Brits, all that 100 octane coming in, so they just hoard it like squirrels...:rolleyes:

[Kurfürst]

Convoys started operating in September 1939; the most important were the HX convoys which sailed from Halifax to (mainly) Liverpool. The first - HX.1 - sailed on 16 September 1939. Referring to http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html
The HX convoys incorporated cargo ships, some of which carried aviation fuel, and tankers: many of the latter had sailed from refineries in the West Indies and America. The BHX series sailed from Bermuda, starting in May 1940 (BHX.41), and joined the main HX convoys in Halifax. Some of the tankers from the HX convoys diverted to French ports, enough to supply the RAF fighters in France.

From the HX series of convoys alone (HX 11, 13, 31, 33-35, 40, 43, 49, 55, 57-59, 64-68, 70, 73, 76) 44 tankers carrying AVGAS arrived in British or French ports; one tanker was destroyed by a mine in the Bristol channel. This contradicts the assertion in Shacklady and Morgan that ...large numbers of tankers were sunk by German submarines...

Well let's see now the reality.

Tanker losses to all causes, I have gathered a total of 78(!!) tankers were sunk by mine, U-boot (typically), aircraft and raiders, between September 1939 and November 1940. About 90% of them were British, though there are a couple of Swedish, Dutch, French etc. tankers

I have them by name, date, cause of loss, route, cargo, tonnage and so on. For example indeed one tanker that went through Halifax, Inverdagle (9456 tons) was sunk by mines laid by the submarine U 34, with 12 500 tons of avgas - about a month worth consumption of 100 octane, though I am not sure what grade it actually carried - on the 16 January 1940.

The first one was Regent Tiger, with about 15 000 tons of oil products, five days after Britain declared war on Germany. The worst blow was possibly the sinking of 13 000 ton San Fernando by the fabled U-47 on the 21 June 1940 (U-43 got another one on the same day). This one alone carried 18 000 tons of oil product that never reached Liverpool.

Alltogether 558,260 GRT of tankers went to Davy Jones locker, by the end of November 1940, along with 385,957 tons of oil product. Half of that, ca. 243 000 GRT worth of tankers were sunk by the end May 1940.

Fuel oil was the greatest loss, 116 000 tons of it went down with tankers (luckily, no green peace back then). Avgas seems quite untypical as a load, but in the end it didn't really matter, because if a tanker sunk with diesel oil, or even empty, the next one had to haul about its cargo again.

Tanker losses were serious, unfortunately.

[NZtyphoon]

Oh, and as for that Australian paper used so extensively by Barbi, here is its title, as used by Barbi as a reference in a Wikipedia article:

"Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War, February 1941, Australian War Memorial Archives."

This came from:
Revision as of 08:39, 16 July 2008 (edit)
Kurfürst (talk | contribs)
(Revised section on 100 octane fuel with more reliable and referenced information; noted fact that the German Air Force also used 100 octane fuel in the Battle. Better sectioning. Added armament info.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Aircraft_of_the_Battle_of_Britain&action=historysubmit&diff=478579188&oldid=225978800


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Aircraft_of_the_Battle_of_Britain/Archive_1#References_to_100_octane_fuel

Barbi's explanation of the origins and importance of this paper:

"The document which relealed the details of 100 octane use in the BoB by the RAF was a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. Its a British-made document, prepeared for the highest circles. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report." Kurfürst (talk) 10:53, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

Now, in 2008 I inquired of the AWM whether they had such a paper, giving this specific title, referencing Beaverbrook, Rolls-Royce, the Australian Military Commission etc etc...The AWM's response was that they had no such paper.

Just googled, yahooed, binged "Australian Military Commission England WW2" nada - no such organisation appeared to even exist, but I'll cross reference with Australia's Official War Histories to see if there is mention of it there.

I've also just submitted a search inquiry to the AWM:

"I am making an inquiry as to whether the AWM Archives have a paper entitled:

"Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War, February 1941'

This was a paper written by Rolls-Royce and used by Lord Beaverbrook to address the supply of aviation fuel to Australia via the Australian Military Commission in Britain in February 1941.

I am sorry that there appears to be no AWM reference number, so, hopefully, the title and key references will help."

(Question # RCIS34105
Request type Reference Other
Question )

I am sanguine that they will indeed find this paper and clear this matter up.

[ACE-OF-ACES]

wouldn't be the first time

[NZtyphoon]

Well let's see now the reality.

Tanker losses to all causes, I have gathered a total of 78(!!) tankers were sunk by mine, U-boot (typically), aircraft and raiders, between September 1939 and November 1940. About 90% of them were British, though there are a couple of Swedish, Dutch, French etc. tankers

I have them by name, date, cause of loss, route, cargo, tonnage and so on. For example indeed one tanker that went through Halifax, Inverdagle (9456 tons) was sunk by mines laid by the submarine U 34, with 12 500 tons of avgas - about a month worth consumption of 100 octane, though I am not sure what grade it actually carried - on the 16 January 1940.

The first one was Regent Tiger, with about 15 000 tons of oil products, five days after Britain declared war on Germany. The worst blow was possibly the sinking of 13 000 ton San Fernando by the fabled U-47 on the 21 June 1940 (U-43 got another one on the same day). This one alone carried 18 000 tons of oil product that never reached Liverpool.

Alltogether 558,260 GRT of tankers went to Davy Jones locker, by the end of November 1940, along with 385,957 tons of oil product. Half of that, ca. 243 000 GRT worth of tankers were sunk by the end May 1940.

Fuel oil was the greatest loss, 116 000 tons of it went down with tankers (luckily, no green peace back then). Avgas seems quite untypical as a load, but in the end it didn't really matter, because if a tanker sunk with diesel oil, or even empty, the next one had to haul about its cargo again.

Tanker losses were serious, unfortunately.

Okay, so let's see the list and the sources.

[Al Schlageter]

Vessel Pdt. Tons Built Cargo Notes

SC 21
AMSCO (Br) 72 4,627 1920 Crude Oil

SC3
NOREG (Nor) 43 7,605 1931 Fuel Oil

SC4
SUDERHOLM (Nor) 73 4,908 1917 Fuel Oil
WOENSDRECHT (Du) 52 4,668 1926 Avgas RETURNED

SC5
WOENSDRECHT (Du) 81 4,668 1926 Avgas

SC6
STANMOUNT (Br) 43 4,468 1914 Crude Oil

SC9
GLOXINIA (Br) 61 3,336 1920 Lub Oil

SC14
SOLSTEN (Nor) 42 5,379 1929 Petrol

SC15
TAHCHEE (Br) 52 6,508 1914 Fuel Oil

The above are ships in SC convoys carrying petro gargoes for 1939 and 1940

The below are ships in HX convoys carrying petro cargoes just in 1939.

HX
LANGUEDOC (Fr) * 9,512 1937 crude oil Le Havre

HX3
ONTARIOLITE (Br) 63 8,889 1925 crude oil Le Havre

HX4
ELONA (Br) 61 6,192 1936 lub oil

HX5
SAN ERNESTO (Br) 51 8,078 1939 petrol
VACLITE (Br) 32 5,026 1928 lub oil

HX6
CADILLAC (Br) 72 12,062 1917 PETROL
D L HARPER (Br) 54 12,223 1933 CRUDE OIL
DARONIA (Br) 47 8,139 1939 PETROL
ECLIPSE (Br) 62 9,767 1931 CRUDE OIL HAVRE
F J WOLFE (Pan) 53 12,190 1932 CRUDE OIL
FRANCHE-COMTE (Br) 75 9,314 1936 PETROL BORDEAUX
LUSTROUS (Br) 95 6,156 1927 CRUDE OIL PAUILLAC
NARRAGANSETT (Br) 45 10,389 1936 PETROL
PEDER BOGEN (Br) 91 9,741 1925 DIESO
PENELOPE (Pan) 66 6,559 1925 CRUDE OIL RETURNED
ROBERT F HAND (Br) 94 12,197 1933 PARAFFIN
SAN CALISTO (Br) 81 8,010 1937 PARAFFIN
SCOTTISH HEATHER (Br) 63 7,087 1928 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
VOCO (Br) 23 5,090 1925 LUB OIL

HX7
EL MIRLO (Br) 42 8,092 1930 CRUDE OIL
HORN SHELL (Br) 81 8,272 1931 FUEL OIL
REGINOLITE (Br) 73 9,069 1926 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
SARANAC (Br) 23 12,049 1918 PETROL
ROCAS (Br) 63 7,406 1927 FUEL OIL

HX8
ADELLEN (Br) 83 7,984 1930 FUEL OIL
COWRIE (Br) 52 8,197 1931 DIESO, FUEL OIL
HEINRICH VON REIDEMANN (Pan) 83 11,020 1930 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
LUXOR (Br) 74 6,554 1930 AVGAS LE HAVRE
MIRALDA (Br) 51 8,013 1936 DIESO, CRUDE OIL
PELLICULA (Br) 54 6,254 1936 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
PERSEPHONE (Pan) 64 8,426 1925 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
PRESIDENT SERGENT (Fr) 72 5,344 1923 CRUDE OIL DUNKIRK
SAN CONRADO (Br) 34 7,982 1936 PARAFFIN
SAN FLORENTINO (Br) 24 12,842 1919 FUEL OIL
VICTOLITE (Br) 53 11,410 1928 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE

HX9
ARLETTA (Br) 22 4,870 1925 PETROL
CERINTHUS (Br) 42 3,878 1930 LUB OIL
CHARLES PRATT (Pan) 94 8,982 1916 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
CONCH (Br) 63 8,376 1931 PETROL
DILOMA (Br) 34 8,146 1939 PETROL, PARAFFIN
HARRY G SEIDEL (Pan) 83 10,354 1930 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
REGENT PANTHER (Br) 61 9,556 1937 PETROL
SAN ADOLFO (Br) 64 7,365 1935 FUEL OIL
SAN CIRILO (Br) 62 8,012 1937 PETROL
SAN FABIAN (Br) 71 13,031 1922 FUEL OIL
SAN TIBURCIO (Br) 33 5,995 1921 GAS OIL
SAN UBALDO (Br) 23 5,999 1921 FUEL OIL
VENETIA (Br) 73 5,728 1927 PETROL

HX10
BRITISH WORKMAN (Br) 82 6,994 1922 PARAFFIN
C O STILLMAN (Pan) 72 13,006 1928 CRUDE OIL
CARONI RIVER (Br) 64 7,807 1928 DIESO
CLIONA (Br) 93 8,375 1931 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
GOLD SHELL (Br) 74 8,208 1931 CRUDE OIL
LUNULA (Br) 12 6,363 1927 AVGAS
AN GASPAR (Br) 21 12,910 1921 FUEL OIL
SCOTTISH CHIEF (Br) 94 7,006 1928 CRUDE OIL PAUILLAC
VANCOLITE (Br) 83 11,404 1928 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
VICTOR ROSS (Br) 63 12,247 1933 FUEL OIL LE HAVRE

HX11
ALDERSDALE (Br) 83 8,402 1937 FUEL OIL
ATHELVISCOUNT (Br) 65 8,882 1929 FUEL OIL
BRITISH UNION (Br) 92 6,987 1927 FUEL OIL
CASPIA (Br) 52 6,018 1928 PETROL
COMANCHEE (Br) 71 6,837 1936 LUB OIL
EL GRILLO (Br) 93 7,264 1922 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
COTTISH MAIDEN (Br) 95 6,993 1921 CRUDE OIL DONGES
ARAND (Br) 53 6,023 1927 AVGAS

HX12
ARNDALE (Br) 34 8,296 1937 FUEL OIL
ATHELCHIEF (Br) 94 10,000 1939 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
ATHELPRINCESS (Br) 81 8,882 1929 CRUDE OIL DUNKIRK
FREDERICK S FALES (Br) 64 10,525 1939 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
GEORGE H JONES (Pan) 53 6,914 1919 CRUDE OIL
JAMES McGEE (Pan) 84 9,859 1917 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
MACTRA (Br) 74 6,193 1936 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
MONTROLITE (Br) 63 11,309 1926 CRUDE OIL
SAN FELIX (Br) 73 13,037 1921 FUEL OIL

HX13
BEACONHILL (Pan) 42 6,941 1919 AVGAS
CHAMA (Br) 73 8,077 1938 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
ERODONA (Br) 74 6,207 1937 LUB OIL
AN ELISEO (Br) 43 8,042 1939 GAS OIL
SAN FERNANDO (Br) 64 13,056 1919 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
SAN GERARDO (Br) 32 12,915 1929 FUEL OIL
SCHUYLKILL (Br) 52 8,965 1928 PETROL
SOCONY (Br) 63 4,404 1936 AVGAS
SOLARIUM (Br) 44 6,239 1936 PETROL
W C TEAGLE (Br) 62 9,552 1917 CRUDE OIL SOUTHAMPTON

from http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html

[Al Schlageter]

1939:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)

Sep39 48/178,621
Oct39 33/156,156
Nov39 27/72,721
Dec39 39/101,823

Tot39 147 (36.75/month)/509,321 (127,330.25/month)

British merchant ship construction capacity from 1939-1941 did not exceed 1.2 million GRT per year.
US merchant ship construction in 1939 was 0.242 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)

Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1

Tot39 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Thus for 1939, an average of 2.94 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 21 ships sunk (note that throughout these averages will be slightly inflated since they do not include the minor contribution of the Italian submarine fleet.)

1940:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)

Jan40 53/163,029
Feb40 50/182,369
Mar40 26/69,826
Apr40 6/30,927
May40 14/61,635
Jun40 66/375,069
Jul40 41/301,975
Aug40 56/288,180
Sep40 60/288,180
Oct40 66/363,267
Nov40 36/181,695
Dec40 46/256,310

Tot40 520 (43.33/month)/2,462,867 (205,238.91/month)
US merchant ship construction for 1940 was about 0.5 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)

Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0

Tot40 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

[NZtyphoon]

Thanks Al: I'll go through the http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/ database as well and find out how many tankers and other ships carrying avgas were destroyed in 1940 - last time I looked a couple of years ago I could only find one Inverdagle (9456 tons) which, as Barbi mentions, was sunk by a mine in (I think) the Bristol Channel? I know that some tankers diverted to France up to May or June 1940, accounting for some of the 100 Octane fuel used there.

[lane]

Regarding the Blenheim and 100 octane in the wing tanks - 14 April 1940:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Blenheim-100-octane-14april40.jpg

[Blackdog_kt]

Yup, that's what the pilot's handbook says for the Mk.IV.

100 octane only when the long range outer tanks are needed for take off and cruise to target, 87 octane in the inner tanks for all other cases (return from target on long range missions, or the entire mission in case of short range hops).

[Glider]

Well let's see now the reality.

Tanker losses to all causes, I have gathered a total of 78(!!) tankers were sunk by mine, U-boot (typically), aircraft and raiders, between September 1939 and November 1940. About 90% of them were British, though there are a couple of Swedish, Dutch, French etc. tankers

I have them by name, date, cause of loss, route, cargo, tonnage and so on. For example indeed one tanker that went through Halifax, Inverdagle (9456 tons) was sunk by mines laid by the submarine U 34, with 12 500 tons of avgas - about a month worth consumption of 100 octane, though I am not sure what grade it actually carried - on the 16 January 1940.

The first one was Regent Tiger, with about 15 000 tons of oil products, five days after Britain declared war on Germany. The worst blow was possibly the sinking of 13 000 ton San Fernando by the fabled U-47 on the 21 June 1940 (U-43 got another one on the same day). This one alone carried 18 000 tons of oil product that never reached Liverpool.

Alltogether 558,260 GRT of tankers went to Davy Jones locker, by the end of November 1940, along with 385,957 tons of oil product. Half of that, ca. 243 000 GRT worth of tankers were sunk by the end May 1940.

Fuel oil was the greatest loss, 116 000 tons of it went down with tankers (luckily, no green peace back then). Avgas seems quite untypical as a load, but in the end it didn't really matter, because if a tanker sunk with diesel oil, or even empty, the next one had to haul about its cargo again.

Tanker losses were serious, unfortunately.

Still waiting for
a) Your explanation of how the reserves went up during the BOB if the tankers didn't bring it in.
b) An explanation as to how you came to believe that I hadn't looked for the document
c) An explanation as to why NZ was lying about the Australian records not having it
d) As you agree that the War Cabinet clearly didn't approve any stopping of the roll out of 100 Octane to FC in May a position supported by the Oil Committee who didn't discuss it from May 1940 to May 1944. Can I ask who you believe would have the authority to overule the Prime Minister, who was the leader of the War Cabinet, The Chief of the Air Staff who asked for the fighter squadrons to be equipped with 100 Octane, and the Oil Committee who had responsibility for the purchase, storage and distribution of the fuel.
e) Where is this Beaverbrook Paper

I could go on with the list of questions you have yet to respond to but I think the point has been made.

[Kurfürst]

Yup, that's what the pilot's handbook says for the Mk.IV.

100 octane only when the long range outer tanks are needed for take off and cruise to target, 87 octane in the inner tanks for all other cases (return from target on long range missions, or the entire mission in case of short range hops).

Hmm, I wonder if its the case that both versions are correct - all Blenheims seem to have had 100 octane as a general rule apart from 87 octane in the inbord engines, but some Blenheim Squadron Stations of No. 2 Group were a bit more 'more equal' and were supplied with 100 octane only, while 87 octane was removed from thesestations - and consequently, could only fill 100 octane in both inner and outer tanks of their Blenheims.

See attached papers David has posted a while ago and compared them to the April note by Mike above. It would also mean that Blenheims consumed far more than originally thought.

[TomcatViP]

Guys the 100 oct justified itself whenn it comes to hve low alt extra power (short time) or increased fuel efficiency at low revs. That's why you see that kind of usage on the Blenheim.

It's not compatible with any highly charged eng usage untill the eng was specifically designed for (impeller etc...)

We hve alrdy say tht and this show that 100 oct usage by high flyng Spit makes no sense*.

Temp issue with the usage of that fuel were to be found even in 1945 with some latte war engines.

Moreover 100 oct costed twice as much as 87 oct fuel. This in pre-war doc. I think at today high soaring fuel cost you will easily imagine that this can draw attention of any war planners.

The only raison tht I see any large FC usage of 100oct is for a low alt air campaign such as to fight back to the sea any German ground force steping on English soil.

*Now the first Spits IIa reached Op unit in mid september if I do recall well. Those type being the only succeptible to hve an eng upgraded if ever they had.

[41Sqn_Banks]

We hve alrdy say tht and this show that 100 oct usage by high flyng Spit makes no sense*.

The only raison tht I see any large FC usage of 100oct is for a low alt air campaign such as to fight back to the sea any German ground force steping on English soil.

Fighters that need to intercept a high flying enemy first need to climb to that high altitude. It makes a lot of sense to reduce the climb time through the first 10,000 feet to a minimum by the use of highest engine power available (which required 100 octane fuel), especially if you can't detect the enemy on a long distance.

[NZtyphoon]

Guys the 100 oct justified itself whenn it comes to hve low alt extra power (short time) or increased fuel efficiency at low revs. That's why you see that kind of usage on the Blenheim.

It's not compatible with any highly charged eng usage untill the eng was specifically designed for (impeller etc...)

We hve alrdy say tht and this show that 100 oct usage by high flyng Spit makes no sense*.

Temp issue with the usage of that fuel were to be found even in 1945 with some latte war engines.

Moreover 100 oct costed twice as much as 87 oct fuel. This in pre-war doc. I think at today high soaring fuel cost you will easily imagine that this can draw attention of any war planners.

The only raison tht I see any large FC usage of 100oct is for a low alt air campaign such as to fight back to the sea any German ground force steping on English soil.

*Now the first Spits IIa reached Op unit in mid september if I do recall well. Those type being the only succeptible to hve an eng upgraded if ever they had.

Then explain why many FC pilots described using the extra boost in their combat reports, right through the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain, either to evade attack, or to catch an enemy a/c, and why did Dowding issue a notice warning FC pilots against overusing the extra boost? Why were instructions issued to cover the conversions of Merlin IIIs to use 100 octane, and why did Spitfires and petrol bowsers have 100 octane stencilling?

[NZtyphoon]

Hmm, I wonder if its the case that both versions are correct - all Blenheims seem to have had 100 octane as a general rule apart from 87 octane in the inbord engines, but some Blenheim Squadron Stations of No. 2 Group were a bit more 'more equal' and were supplied with 100 octane only, while 87 octane was removed from thesestations - and consequently, could only fill 100 octane in both inner and outer tanks of their Blenheims.

See attached papers David has posted a while ago and compared them to the April note by Mike above. It would also mean that Blenheims consumed far more than originally thought.


Fair enough: Assuming all Blenheims used 100 octane (six Blenheim units may have used 100 octane in all tanks)

Wyton:
XV
40

Watton:
82

Wattisham:
107

West Raynham:
101

Blenheim = 479 imp gals
Defiant= 97
Hurricane = 90
Spitfire = 85
Total= 751 divided by 4 = 187.75

1 ton 100 octane = 315.5 divided by 187.75 = 1.7 fuel loads

"Please note that the 10,000 tons of 100 octane, shown in Table II - Consumption consumed for the period June - Aug 1940, is the monthly average of those 3 months, therefore for the period June - Aug 1940 30,000 tons were actually consumed." (Lane#318)

June to August 30,000 tons 100 octane consumed x 1.7 = 51,000 fuel loads divide by 92 days = 554.3 fuel loads per day

Sept 14,000 tons 100 octane x 1.7 = 23,800 divided by 30 days = 793.3 fuel loads per day

Oct 17,000 x 1.7 = 28,900 divided by 31 = 932.2 fuel loads per day

June to Oct = 61,000 tons consumed x 1.7 = 103,700 divide by 153 = 677.7 fuel loads per day consumed on average.

51,364 sorties, day & night from July 10 through Sept 30; some of the most intensive combat took place between these dates. Of course there were quiet periods when far fewer combat sorties were flown by Fighter Command; eg: August 16 & 17, between two days of intensive combat August 15 & 18.

51,364 divided by 13 weeks = 4,280 fuel loads = 611 fuel loads daily
average:

Even with all Blenheims theoretically using 100 octane fuel, there was still more than enough being 100 octane fuel being consumed - not issued - from June through end of October to supply 100% of FC, and some BC, operations. Once again this is also assuming all aircraft landed with empty tanks and had to be completely refueled, rather than being topped up.

[Kurfürst]

I am not quite sure if I got your calculations right - are you saying that the consumed amount was sufficient for a very rough average of 793.3 fuel loads per day for September 1940 for example?

Now the calculation doesn't account for non-operational flights - this was looked into earlier, at around post no 87. It was found that three s-e Sqns that were looked at flew about 230 hours of training/non-operational flights in a single first week of August 1940:

54 sqn for example:
http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/511/5110313.jpg

32 Squadron flew 60 and-a-half non-operational hours in the first week of August 1940, all of which were transfers to and from their forward base.
43 Squadron flew approximately 10 non-operational hours in the first week of August 1940, namely one transfer of six aircraft and their return and another transfer of seven aircraft, and three night practise flights.
54 Squadron flew approximately 159 non-operational hours

This works out as a rough avarage of 76 non-operational flight per Sqn per week, or about 300 hours a month per Squadron.

[Glider]

These records are interesting. I note that on 8th August 54 squadron had 22 pilots and an ample supply of machines. I wonder if any Luftwaffe units were so well equiped in early August 1940.
Do you have any records Kurfurst?

PS I am waiting for your comments on the questions I raised earlier with interest.

[lane]

Fighters that need to intercept a high flying enemy first need to climb to that high altitude. It makes a lot of sense to reduce the climb time through the first 10,000 feet to a minimum by the use of highest engine power available (which required 100 octane fuel), especially if you can't detect the enemy on a long distance.

Yes, that and take-off too.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/24sept38-spitfire-100oct-approval.jpg

[lane]

These documents relating to fuel requirments of the the Advanced Air Stiking Force and the Air Component, both in France during May 1940, give some idea of consumption, stocks, and how fuel requirements were calculated. As can be seen the Hurricanes used 100 octane, the Blenheim used a mix, while the Battle and Lysander used 87 octane, as did any transport, liason, visiting types etc.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/AASF-fuel-stocks-7may40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/AASF-fuel-stocks-pg1.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/AASF-fuel-stocks-pg2.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/AASF-fuel-stocks-pg3.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/AASF-fuel-stocks-pg4.jpg



http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Petrol-RAF-component-15may40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Petrol-RAF-component-15may40-app-a.jpg

[lane]

To underscore the above documentation of Hurricanes using 100 octane fuel in France please note the following:

P/O John Bushell, 151 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/bushell-151sqdn-18may40.jpg

F/O Paul Richey, 1 Squadron, 11 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/richey-pg76.jpg

F/O E. J. Kain, 73 Squadron, 14 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/monks-pg98.jpg

P/O D. W. A. Stones, 79 Squadron, 14 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/stones-pg32.jpg

P/O R. P. Beamont, 87 Squadron, 15 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/87-beamont-15may40.jpg

P/O F. B. Sutton, 56 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/sutton-pg80.jpg

F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/87-gleed-18may40.jpg

F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 19 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/87-gleed-19may40.jpg

Sgt. L. H. B. Pearce, 79 Squadron, 20 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/79-pearce-20may40.jpg

[41Sqn_Banks]

100 Octane Fuel. Completion of the Thornton Plant. Memorandum by Minister of Aircraft Production.

1940 Oct 30

AVIATION fuel of 100 octane content is now a necessity for operational
aircraft.
...
4. Our requirements of this fuel for 1941 are covered. But in 1942, after
allowing for purchases already made and the estimated output from Heysham
and Trinidad, we shall have to find 600,000 tons from other sources to meet our
needs. These will increase in 1943.
...
7. A decision is now necessary on whether we are to continue with the
erection of the Thornton plant.

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=7&CATID=-4397596&SearchInit=4&SearchType=6&CATREF=CAB+67%2F8%2F81

They even thought about cancelling the construction of a new plant in October 1940. Looks like there was plenty of 100 octane fuel available.

[phoenix1963]

There is a point where interesting theories meet reality.
The secondary historians say 100 octane fuel was an important factor, the primary sources say 100 octane was used.
I suggest the people still peddling this theory use their skills for something more productive for us COD flyers.

56RAF_phoenix

[Blackdog_kt]

I really hope that when the SDK gets released we'll get both 87 and 100 octane versions of the flyables and then it will be the server admin's job to choose what they will use in each mission, rendering this whole debate moot.

Because let's face it, apart from the historical accuracy of things, a lot of the gnashing of teeth on both sides of the argument simply boils down to "i want my plane to be better than yours at the sim's primary design level so i'll always have an advantage". :-P

[lane]

100 Octane Fuel. Completion of the Thornton Plant. Memorandum by Minister of Aircraft Production.

1940 Oct 30

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=7&CATID=-4397596&SearchInit=4&SearchType=6&CATREF=CAB+67%2F8%2F81

They even thought about cancelling the construction of a new plant in October 1940. Looks like there was plenty of 100 octane fuel available.

Nice, thanks for sharing 41Sqn_Banks,

Apparently they decided to keep the Thornton plant -- partially for post war employment reasons. They sound almost apologetic for being awash in 100 octane fuel. "It might be that after the war not only aeroplanes but motor cars will run on 100 octane fuel. :)

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/100_octane-7nov40.jpg

[NZtyphoon]

I am not quite sure if I got your calculations right - are you saying that the consumed amount was sufficient for a very rough average of 793.3 fuel loads per day for September 1940 for example?

Now the calculation doesn't account for non-operational flights - this was looked into earlier, at around post no 87. It was found that three s-e Sqns that were looked at flew about 230 hours of training/non-operational flights in a single first week of August 1940:

54 sqn for example:
http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/511/5110313.jpg

32 Squadron flew 60 and-a-half non-operational hours in the first week of August 1940, all of which were transfers to and from their forward base.
43 Squadron flew approximately 10 non-operational hours in the first week of August 1940, namely one transfer of six aircraft and their return and another transfer of seven aircraft, and three night practise flights.
54 Squadron flew approximately 159 non-operational hours

This works out as a rough avarage of 76 non-operational flight per Sqn per week, or about 300 hours a month per Squadron.

And as you have also noted, there was a rise in consumption of 87 octane fuel as frontline operations intensified. The Merlins and Mercurys could still use 87 octane fuel and for secondary duties would not need to use 100 octane fuel.

Remember also that the figures are for fuel consumed, not fuel issued , and my rough calculations assume that all aircraft used a full fuel load for every sortie, which, of course, didn't always happen. For example, if a Hurricane lands after a half hour flight with 45 gallons of fuel left, the fuel tank would then be topped up with 45 gallons - next sortie it lands with an empty fuel tank. To undertake two sorties that Hurricane consumed 135 gallons of fuel, not 180 gallons. Entire squadrons often landed after a sortie with half full fuel tanks.

BTW: Other grades of fuel means that 87 Octane wasn't the only grade used - from memory there was also 73 and 80 octane used? I think the Gypsy and Gypsy Major engines used in the likes of Tiger Moths could use these lower grades? (Getting way OT here)

[Al Schlageter]

Because let's face it, apart from the historical accuracy of things, a lot of the gnashing of teeth on both sides of the argument simply boils down to "i want my plane to be better than yours at the sim's primary design level so i'll always have an advantage". :-P

I can think of one for which that is true for but for myself and some other it is about historical accuracy.

[Osprey]

Same here Al. I get my ego boosted by rocking on stage with my band. Stat whoring in a CFS doesn't do it for me.

[TomcatViP]

In 1954, flight made a retrospective of RR engines history.

Obviously, as an aero specialised magazine, they took much care in detailling every versions of the merlin with dates, fuel, boost level, SHP, planes in wich they were fitted and service users.

A fairly good read :rolleyes: : http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1954/1954%20-%201286.html

For those who wants to understand the differences btw the direct injected engines and its carburated conterpart, here is another detailled account :
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1941/1941%20-%200562.html

You don't hve to be an engineer to read this or hve any PhD. Just relax, take a tasty (soft) drink and let your mind be enlighten by history written by those that really went trought.

~S!

PS: shld I made a special thread of this?

[NZtyphoon]

Yep, the 1954 article is a good overview of the development of R-R engines. A more specific article on the development of the Merlin can be found here:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/merlin-lovesey.pdf

and more general pages on 100 octane

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1940/1940%20-%201142.html?search=100%20octane%20fuel

and the Blenheim

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1939/1939-1-%20-%201364.html?search=100%20octane%20fuel

[TomcatViP]

Yep, the 1954 article is a good overview of the development of R-R engines. A more specific article on the development of the Merlin can be found here:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/merlin-lovesey.pdf

A document outsourced from nowhere with a very specific account of history and so contradictory with - for example - the doc I linked from Flight Journal an internationaly respected publication : humm


and more general pages on 100 octane

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1940/1940%20-%201142.html?search=100%20octane%20fuel

A document writed in a civil publication right when war was ranging .... Humm Humm


and the Blenheim
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1939/1939-1-%20-%201364.html?search=100%20octane%20fuel

this one is not too bad but still a civil publication explaining in 1939 why the enemy shld take seriously hence fear the mighty Blenheim ;)


Well you guessed that I am even more ... less convinced. Even more as in their respective history, Flight didn't quote those pages from their own magazine when they did on the other points.

30lb yeah really with 300 hour of endurance ?!

and what next, the Brit first detonated a nuke INSIDE a Merlin engine when the US were still craking nuts in the French Ardennes ? :-|

[Al Schlageter]

During June 1937 a Merlin II, mounted in a Horsley, began a 400-hr flight endurance test at Farnborough, and a specially rated "racing" engine was developed from it with a view to installation in the special Speed Spitfire, with which an attack on the world's speed record was contemplated. The engine used was a Merlin III, which differed from the Merlin II in having a standardized de Havilland/Rotol airscrew shaft and dual accessory-drive. It was taken from stock and was fitted with strengthened pistons, gudgeon-pins and connecting rods to withstand the extra load. "The power output of the standard engine," writes Harold Nockolds, "was 1,030 b.h.p. at 3,000 r.p.m. at 10,250ft with plus 6i lb boost. "Solely by opening the throttle, raising the supercharger pressure, and using fuel of a higher octane," he goes on [the petrol normally used at that time was 87 octane], "the engine was made to develop no less than 2,160 b.h.p. at 3,200 r.p.m. with the supercharger giving 27 Ib/sq in boost. This was a phenomenal performance, for it meant that a power to- weight ratio of 0.621 lb per horsepower had been achieved — a considerable improvement on the 0.71 lb per horsepower of the 1931 R engine.
"This tremendous output, which was admittedly only attained for a short period, nevertheless gave ample proof of the inherent possibilities of the Merlin. But Elliott and Hives were perhaps even more satisfied with a 15-hr endurance run at 1,800 b.h.p., 3,200 r.p.m. and 22 lb boost accomplished during the development period. After this they felt perfectly satisfied that the Merlin would be capable of meeting all the demands that might be made of it. How right they were!"

15 hours at 22lb boost in 1937!!!

[Al Schlageter]

A document outsourced from nowhere with a very specific account of history and so contradictory with - for example - the doc I linked from Flight Journal an internationaly respected publication : humm

Alfred Cyril Lovesey CBE, AFRAeS, was an English engineer who was a key figure in the development of the Rolls-Royce Merlin aero engine.

Now what were you saying Tomcat.

[Al Schlageter]

A document writed in a civil publication right when war was ranging .... Humm Humm


But you say Flight Journal is a respected international publication.

A document outsourced from nowhere with a very specific account of history and so contradictory with - for example - the doc I linked from Flight Journal an internationaly respected publication

[TomcatViP]

Where all this cleverness and fine written irony are gone Schlag?

At war, truth can follow strange path, especially for such a strategical items like the Merlin.

Note pls that I hve no problem regarding the competentcies of Mr Lovesey who ever he was but hve some issues with a scanned doc only available on the website where it was extracted.

Every others sources claim very differents data regarding boost, date and HP.

I think that the Flight article is a good abstract and a far more reliable source per se.

[lane]

A.C. Lovesey, Development of the Rolls-Royce Merlin from 1939 to 1945, Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Volume 18 Issue 7, July 1946 (pp. 218 - 226) (http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=0002-2667&volume=18&issue=7)

It can be purchased for $25 at the above link or alternately read for free here (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/merlin-lovesey.pdf).

A. C. Lovesey was Research and Development Engineer for Rolls Royce and was responsible for Merlin engine development throughout WWII.

[Al Schlageter]

I think that the Flight article is a good abstract and a far more reliable source per se.

The Flight article is a more reliable source than what comes straight from the mouth of Lovesley? :rolleyes: Give your head a shake.

I will repeat what lane posted.

A. C. Lovely was Research and Development Engineer for Rolls Royce and was responsible for Merlin engine development throughout WWII.

The source where this Lovesley article was posted should have NO bearing what so ever.

[whoarmongar]

Note pls that I hve no problem regarding the competentcies of Mr Lovesey who ever he was

Unbelievable !

My thanks to the esteemed self styled tomcatvip.

Clearly Mr Lovesey was simply an ignorant self opinionated anonymous trol too fond of his own voice, trying to impress others with his own brand of "knowledge" merely to stoke his own ego.

I shall place him on my ignore list immediatly, clearly he hasnt got a clue what hes talking about.

What a jerk.

[lane]

In keeping with the thread's title topic, the following documents are essential reading for the sim developers or anyone wishing to understand the performance of the Hurricane I during the Battle of Britain.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/100oct-2oct39.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/hurricane-12lbs-14nov39.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/hurricane-l1717-cal.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/151-orb-16feb40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/ap1590b.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/Hurricane_I_boost-cut-out.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/Hurricane_MkI_AP1564A-p15-boost-cut-out.jpg

Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/pilots-notes-merlin3-pg6.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/bushell-151sqdn-18may40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/dowding-1aug40-pg1.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/dowding-1aug40-pg2.jpg

[TomcatViP]

Unbelievable !

My thanks to the esteemed self styled tomcatvip.

Clearly Mr Lovesey was simply an ignorant self opinionated anonymous trol too fond of his own voice, trying to impress others with his own brand of "knowledge" merely to stoke his own ego.

I shall place him on my ignore list immediatly, clearly he hasnt got a clue what hes talking about.

What a jerk.

Wew... are you turning rogue ?

[Kurfürst]

Clearly Mr Lovesey was simply an ignorant self opinionated anonymous trol too fond of his own voice, trying to impress others with his own brand of "knowledge" merely to stoke his own ego.

I would say that noting that Lovesey was on Rolls-Royce's payroll sums it up very nicely. I am sure he was a skilled engineer and all, but obviously R-R was interested in publishing PR articles. The article about carburetors is a fine example, apparantly R-R was trying convince everyone that icing, negative-G cut-outs, worse fuel economy, backfires and so on were actually good to have in an engine.

Whats surprise me though that unlike today, the editors of Flight at the time clearly had the courage to put some distance between them and PR articles, regardless of their paper's interests in advertisement fees. I am not sure they would have the same backbone today.

[NZtyphoon]

I would say that noting that Lovesey was on Rolls-Royce's payroll sums it up very nicely. I am sure he was a skilled engineer and all, but obviously R-R was interested in publishing PR articles....the editors of Flight at the time clearly had the courage to put some distance between them and PR articles, regardless of their paper's interests in advertisement fees. I am not sure they would have the same backbone today.

BTW - The source for Lovesy "Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Volume 18, Issue 7. London, MCB UP Ltd., July 1946."

So I guess that means that while Tomcat thinks Flight is a load of P R crap, apart from the articles he favours, Barbi knows that they are better than that and more reliable than Cyril Lovesy, who was just putting out propaganda for R-R.

This is the same person who believes in a so far non-existent February 1941 memo, issued, supposedly, by Lord Beaverbrook of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, which says to the non-existent Australian Military Commission in London that stocks of 100 Octane were so perilous that Fighter Command had to revert back to 87; which just happens to be contradicted by this paper, issued by Lord Beaverbrook, head of MAP in October 1940

100 Octane Fuel. Completion of the Thornton Plant. Memorandum by Minister of Aircraft Production.

1940 Oct 30

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=7&CATID=-4397596&SearchInit=4&SearchType=6&CATREF=CAB+67%2F8%2F81

They even thought about cancelling the construction of a new plant in October 1940. Looks like there was plenty of 100 octane fuel available.

Hmmm, which one can be believed? ;)

[Kurfürst]

Well I tend to think you compensate for you lack of reading comprehension skills with a considerable amount of wishful thinking, but that's just my opinion. ;)

At the same time, its such a pity that your theory about universal use of 100 octane by RAF FC lacks any documentary evidence that you manage to work up yourself when other people are not entirely convinced by R-R's ' load of P R crap' as you put it. Its a curious thing though that knowledge man on R-R's payroll were spending time on these PR articles about the disadvantages of direct fuel injection, and how less displacement is better, everyone went to direct fuel injection eventually, and R-R was working hard to finish the Griffon with a displacement similar to the DB and Hispano-Suiza engines. :D

[ACE-OF-ACES]

Well I tend to think you compensate for you lack of reading comprehension skills with a considerable amount of wishful thinking, but that's just my opinion. ;)
Do you know how to spot the person who is wrong, but for some reason is unable to admit it?

It's easy, look for the person that has to resort to name calling (perfect example quoted above)

Why you ask?

Simple they do this to take the focus of the fact that they are wrong by trying to get the person or persons they are replying to to respond in kind (call them names) and turn the thread into a mud slinging match and hopefully get it locked.

[Glider]

Well I tend to think you compensate for you lack of reading comprehension skills with a considerable amount of wishful thinking, but that's just my opinion. ;)

At the same time, its such a pity that your theory about universal use of 100 octane by RAF FC lacks any documentary evidence that you manage to work up yourself when other people are not entirely convinced by R-R's ' load of P R crap' as you put it. Its a curious thing though that knowledge man on R-R's payroll were spending time on these PR articles about the disadvantages of direct fuel injection, and how less displacement is better, everyone went to direct fuel injection eventually, and R-R was working hard to finish the Griffon with a displacement similar to the DB and Hispano-Suiza engines. :D

Speaking of documentary evidence, have you got any at all, on anything? For instance that page of the Beaverbrook paper that you thought you might have.

Or any comments on the War Cabinet who clearly didn't decide to stop the roll out of 100 Octane as per the paper that the Australian Records cannot find?

[Kurfürst]

[QUOTE]Or any comments on the War Cabinet who clearly didn't decide to stop the roll out of 100 Octane

Source please.

[Glider]

[QUOTE=Glider;394576]

Source please.

I admit, I laughed out loud when I saw this.
The minutes of the War Cabinet, the minutes that are on line (all of them), the ones I gave you the file number to look up.

The same War Cabinet that Pips insisted stopped the roll out in May, that decided to make 87 octane the primary fuel.

Tragically for your case, the minutes don't mention these decisions at all.

As sources go, I would suggest that the official minutes of the War Cabinet are a pretty good source to prove or disprove that statement of Pips

PS I am still waiting for your comments about how the fuel reserves went up from May to August without any tankers getting through.

PPS I can confirm that the original paper papers from the War Cabinet are the same as the on line ones. I went through the originals before they were made avaialble on line

[Kurfürst]

[QUOTE=Kurfürst;394577]

I admit, I laughed out loud when I saw this.

The minutes of the War Cabinet, the minutes that are on line (all of them), the ones I gave you the file number to look up.

I don't recall you giving me file numbers. I have asked you again, and you haven't provided file numbers now either.

So I ask you for the third time: can you give us a source where you claim that "the War Cabinet who clearly didn't decide to stop the roll out of 100 Octane".

YES / NO.

So far your standpoint can be summerized as denial of, from a position of complete ignorance, the existence of a paper in the Australian War Memorial archives that was found and summarized by a researcher there, based on papers you have never seen in your life and completely unaware of their contents, but assume they say want you want them to say.

The same War Cabinet that Pips insisted stopped the roll out in May, that decided to make 87 octane the primary fuel.

There are literally hundreds of those 'War Cabinet' papers, as anyone can confirm who took a peep in the search engine and you haven't seen their contents.

Tragically for your case, the minutes don't mention these decisions at all.

Tragically for your case, its entirely transparent that you haven't actually looked into those papers, and simply making your story up.


As sources go, I would suggest that the official minutes of the War Cabinet are a pretty good source to prove or disprove that statement of Pips

That I agree. So disprove the statement of Pips. Since you misrepresent his position, I put it forward to you in its originality:

This is from a researcher, researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

PS I am still waiting for your comments about how the fuel reserves went up from May to August without any tankers getting through.

Well anyone who reads Pip's words (and not your strawmen of them) can read: "The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August,".

I am sure tankers got through. And a large number of them were sunk, as noted by secondary sources. This seems to have been worrying the British somewhat, since by that time the Germans has sunk about 10% of the British tanker fleet, and twice as many tankers that was under construction (19) in Britain.

And I am still waiting for your comments as to wheter you found a decision that would say the whole of Fighter Command is to convert to 100 octane fuel.

A simple YES / NO will do, because you seem to be very keen on asking questions, excellent at making up stories, but absolutely terrible in answering the questions asked.

PPS I can confirm that the original paper papers from the War Cabinet are the same as the on line ones. I went through the originals before they were made avaialble on line

No, you haven't went through. Unless you want to tell us you have went through 10 000s of pages created by the War Cabinet's 200+ Committees.

[Glider]

Re the Minutes of the War Cabinet Minutes
On Post 305 I advised that these records were available on line,
On post 307 you asked for the link,
On post 308 Winny attached a link
On post 309 I gave you the file no and was willing to help if you had problems.

Re Yes or No
The reply is yes, the War Cabinet Minutes do not record any decision of this kind.

Re the Paper you quoteAs mentioned a number of times The Australian War Memorial Archives have not heard of it. I do not believe it exists. The actions you highlight were not made by the War Cabinet in May as proven by the Minutes which do not mention this decision, in turn puts a huge hole in the existance or if it does exist, the accuracy of the said paper.

100% of Fighter Command using 100 OctaneYes, all the evidence points towards it. I have always said the case for it was a good case but not a perfect case, however there is no evidence to say that any squadron was using 87 octane for combat missions.

Did I go through the whole file for the War Cabinet
Yes I did. The files I concentrated on were, The War Cabinet , The Oil Committee, The Chief of the Air Staff official papers. The private papers of the Chief of the Air Staff which mainly consisted of memos between him and Churchill, plus people who became involved in resolving Churchils questions and the Air Ministry committee papers.

It was very interesting and the detail that people of this level got involved with was unbelievable. I did get my hopes up when there was a file on the availability of tankers. Turned out Churchill had a conversation with a pilot officer on a visit who said that the squadron could turn around quicker if they had an extra tanker to refuel the aircraft. As you might guess the topic was not what I hoped. If anyone is interested the delay wasn't in refueling the aircraft it was in rearming them and the Chief of the Air Staff had to inform Churchill of the steps being taken to speed this up. The steps were to train guards and others on how to rearm the aircraft so if there was an emergency situation they could assist.

You can now see why I get a little frustrated that I have put quite a considerable amount of effort into researching this topic, and you haven't even tried to find the one paper that you base your case on.

Edit
For a detail set of comments on the Pips Paper (with supporting docs) refer to posting 141

Can you tell us where you get 200 plus committees?

[NZtyphoon]

This is from a researcher, researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.


Time to answer this directly: I have read the relevant sections in "Australia in the War of 1939-45: Civil: War Economy 1939-42 by S J Butlin. (Petrol and Substitute Fuels 280-292)

http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/B003ZE9DH4/ref=sr_1_1_up_1_main_olp?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1330331816&sr=1-1&condition=used

1) There was no "Australian Military Commission" or any such organisation in Britain during WW 2.

2a) The Australian Government dealt directly with the oil companies when requesting stock of fuels of all types, including aviation fuels. "After the outbreak of war stocks continued to come from the oil companies and to be imported and distributed through their organisation...there were special features in the requirements of the forces: fuel oil for the navy; petrol for the army; and the special high grade aviation fuel for the air force. (p. 285): "Liaison with the oil companies had been maintained from before the war..."(p. 286):

b) Lord Beaverbrook and the Ministry of Aircraft Production had nothing whatsoever with deciding what types of fuels were supplied to Australia, nor how much. The Australian War Cabinet made decisions on aviation fuel supply and storage "In August 1940 the War Cabinet was asked for a decision on aviation spirit stocks....The suggestion therefore was that the Department of Supply should purchase 3,000,000 gallons and that three 1,200,000-gallon storage tanks be built. The Cabinet approved the purchase...(p. 287)

3) What did need to be co-ordinated with the British was the shipment, allocation of tankers etc. "Diversion of tankers to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom...(p. 288)

The book should be available through libraries, second hand bookshops etc so anyone can check.

[41Sqn_Banks]

There is a document (97 pages) available in the National Archives of Australia that deal with the supply of 100 octane fuel for the RAAF that covers 1940 and 1941.

Fortunately they are available online:
A705, 164/1/975 (searching for this reference number doesn't return a result, search for "Supply of Octane 100 aviation gasoline" will give you the result)
RAAF - Directorate of Supply - Supply of Octane 100 aviation gasoline
http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/using/search/

You can also simply type "100 octane" in the search field, there are only 4 documents.

Maybe there can be found a evidence that the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF.
Or there might be evidences that this was not the case, for example if there was enough supply on 100 octane fuel available there was no need to protest.

So far I didn't read through all the pages.


Interesting find page 97:
14th August 1940.
...
Brief survey of the engines likely to be available for aircraft that may meet Australian requirements indicate that fuel of 90 and 95 octane rating is called for.
...
Even these engines likely to disappear from serious production early 1941 and some of the new engines will require 100 octane. Understand that Great Britain now using at least the appropriate octane fuel in all engines that can benefit thereby and has probably standardized on 100 octane fuel for engines of this class.
...

[NZtyphoon]

McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

Exactly where and in what context? A J P Taylor did an excellent biography of Beaverbrook, dealing extensively with his duties as Minister in charge of MAP, and using Beaverbrook's records and direct interviews with Beaverbrook. Nowhere is there any mention of Beaverbrook dealing with the Australians on a question of fuel supply and one would have thought that a biography of this nature would have at least mentioned something that was of such apparent importance that Churchill quoted from parts of it.

[Glider]

There is a document (97 pages) available in the National Archives of Australia that deal with the supply of 100 octane fuel for the RAAF that covers 1940 and 1941.

Fortunately they are available online:
A705, 164/1/975
RAAF - Directorate of Supply - Supply of Octane 100 aviation gasoline
http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/using/search/

You can also simply type "100 octane" in the search field, there are only 4 documents.

Maybe there can be found a evidence that
Or there might be evidences that this was not the case, for example if there was enough supply on 100 octane fuel available there was no need to protest.

So far I didn't read through all the pages.


Interesting find page 97:

An excellent Link many thanks.

[NZtyphoon]

An excellent Link many thanks.

Excellent? A small understatement:

Page 13 "Suggest therefore that Shell be asked to import the whole of 500,000 gallons at their own expense"

page 19 (30-1-41) "Only a small portion of this percentage of 100 Octane Spirit is yet to be delivered, but the balance is now on the water according to our latest advices from the SHELL Company."

page 55 (22-2-41) 2 "Meantime I have spoken to Captain Jones of the Shell Company and informed him that we require 100,000 gallons (or some substantial portion thereof) of Octane 100 to be ordered at once for delivery..." (Group Captain Department of Supply)

page 59 (19-2-41) Cable to Shell "It is a provision of the new contracts about to be entered into with your company and the Vacuum Oil Company....The Department of Air now desires...that 1,000,000 gallons of 100 octane base fuel be substituted in lieu thereof...(Deputy Director of Contracts to General Manager Shell)

page 60 (19-2-41) Similar cable to Vacuum Oil.

and lots more besides - bottom line Australian Government ordered supplies of 100 octane directly from oil companies Shell and Vacuum

[41Sqn_Banks]

From what I've read so far in 1941 Australia received their 100 octane fuel directly from Shell and Vacuum Oil Company.

In fact they didn't need 100 octane fuel in 1941 as they didn't have any aircraft that required it. What they actually needed was 90 octane fuel for their Catalina flying boats.

It was possible to blend 90 octane fuel from 73 octane base fuel by slightly violating the specifications in case of emergency. However they decided to mix it locally from 100 octane and 87 octane fuel.

Ironically on 21 February 1941 (page 61) where the Australian Government is supposed to protest against the continuous supply of 87 fuel:

It must be understood that approximately 115,000 gallons of 100 Octane Base Spirit is already in order, and delivery anticipated within the next few days.


Page 47-53 gives stock in Feb/March 1941 and approx. consumption of 90 and 100 octane for 1941.

Page 44 gives expected amount of 100 octane for June 1941

Which were in fact delieverd, see Page 41:

As you are aware, wer are now unloading 347,000 gallons of the 100 Octane base product, ...


To come back to the previous theory:
The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF.

1. Supply of 100 octane fuel to Australia was received directly from Shell and Vacuum Oil Company without the involvement of any other Government.
2. They did in fact receive the amount of 100 octane fuel they have ordered.
3. The RAAF only "wanted" to employ 90 octane fuel where the engine required it.

[TomcatViP]

Excellent? A small understatement:

Page 13 "Suggest therefore that Shell be asked to import the whole of 500,000 gallons at their own expense"

page 19 (30-1-41) "Only a small portion of this percentage of 100 Octane Spirit is yet to be delivered, but the balance is now on the water according to our latest advices from the SHELL Company."

page 55 (22-2-41) 2 "Meantime I have spoken to Captain Jones of the Shell Company and informed him that we require 100,000 gallons (or some substantial portion thereof) of Octane 100 to be ordered at once for delivery..." (Group Captain Department of Supply)

page 59 (19-2-41) Cable to Shell "It is a provision of the new contracts about to be entered into with your company and the Vacuum Oil Company....The Department of Air now desires...that 1,000,000 gallons of 100 octane base fuel be substituted in lieu thereof...(Deputy Director of Contracts to General Manager Shell)

page 60 (19-2-41) Similar cable to Vacuum Oil.

page 69 (31-10-40) "Shell now propose to import 100 Octane Base Spirit in lieu of 100 Octane spirit already mixed."

and lots more besides - bottom line Australian Government ordered supplies of 100 octane directly from oil companies Shell and Vacuum

Oh Yeah it's a great document. And thx for that. But what is buzzing me as hell is why are you so one sided in your citation.

In the doc they said that as of Jan/feb 41, no op plane needs 100Oct fuel.
They are also concerned abt what kind of fuel shld be used in the engines of the US planes they ordered (some seems to be outsourced from some French former order) as the Octane quality seemed higher than what they were presently using.

In all their discussion I hve read so far the 100oct fuel is to be mixed with lower grade (old stocks such as basic 73 octane fuel)and additive (TEL) to obtain grade of 95, 90 and 87 octane according to the types of eng in OP use.

They even estimate the quantity of needed 100 oct to be blended in to 95 octane fuel for their operational fighter(US fighters?). In no way they are mentionning any type requiring 100 oct fuel. (14.2.1941 - entry nbr sixty-eight - see bellow - extracted from http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/)

The price of 1 gallon of 100 oct fuel is fixed at 18 cents from Vacuum (company name). It wld be intersting to know what was the price for other grade (87 mainly)

Regarding the Brit situation it is interesting to note that if in August 40 they envisoned a large use of 100 octane, in the latest document (see attached files) even in feb 1941 they still hve no direct use of that grade in their fighters ;)

Pls that time don't wall text or insult me. Thx in advance.

[41Sqn_Banks]

Regarding the Brit situation it is interesting to note that if in August 40 they envisoned a large use of 100 octane, in the latest document (see attached files) even in feb 1941 they still hve no direct use of that grade in their fighters ;)

Keep in mind which aircraft types were operated by the RAAF in Australia in 1941. Was there even any fighter available? I mean they even didn't receive Brewsters or P-40s before 1942.

[lane]

There is a document (97 pages) available in the National Archives of Australia that deal with the supply of 100 octane fuel for the RAAF that covers 1940 and 1941.

Fortunately they are available online:
A705, 164/1/975 (searching for this reference number doesn't return a result, search for "Supply of Octane 100 aviation gasoline" will give you the result)
RAAF - Directorate of Supply - Supply of Octane 100 aviation gasoline
http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/using/search/

You can also simply type "100 octane" in the search field, there are only 4 documents.

Maybe there can be found a evidence that
Or there might be evidences that this was not the case, for example if there was enough supply on 100 octane fuel available there was no need to protest.

So far I didn't read through all the pages.

Interesting find page 97:

Nice find 41Sqn_Banks, thanks for sharing! Good job summarizing the material in your post 407.

[TomcatViP]

Keep in mind which aircraft types were operated by the RAAF in Australia in 1941. Was there even any fighter available? I mean they even didn't receive Brewsters or P-40s before 1942.

Ok fair enough for the fighters. But with so many RAAF personnel flying Hurries and SPits in ENgland, any 100 oct probable requirement would hve been listed.

What import most in the doc is that 100 OCT was a safety measure to prevent any lack of required grade fuel during the forseen switch in engine fuel with increased "technologies" (and even more lowered safety level ;) )

I pointed out (or I shld hve - lol ) a paper listing the composition of all grade of blended fuel (11.5% for 87 for exemple).

This shld be put in perspective with the average quantities of 100 oct consumption in england (the Kurves Kurfust traced).


ANd plse for the sake of the reader don't over quote each other with hundreds of lines of citations only to add a single sentence.

Over 400 post in this thread and I am sure that less than 20% are original meanings :rolleyes:

[TomcatViP]

sOk fair enough for the fighters. But with so many RAAF personnel flying Hurries and SPits in ENgland, any 100 oct probable requirement would hve been listed.

What import most in the doc is that 100 OCT was a safety measure to prevent any lack of required grade fuel during the forseen switch in engine fuel with increased "technologies" (and even more lowered safety level ;) )

I pointed out (or I shld hve - lol ) a paper listing the composition of all grade of blended fuel (11.5% for 87 for exemple).

This shld be put in perspective with the average quantities of 100 oct consumption in england (the Kurves Kurfust traced).


ANd plse for the sake of the reader don't over quote each other with hundreds of lines of citations only to add a single sentence.


Just like that :rolleyes:

[Osprey]

Firstly, I want to thank Glider, NZTyphoon, Banks and Lane for coming in here to lance this historical boil. I have no problem with Kurfurst having an opinion but what alarms me is when it may affect other's opinions on history due to his agenda driven bias. It's all very well being on this forum but it actually disgusts me that this man sees fit to edit Wikipedia with his theories which are at odds with the painstakingly researched work of proper historians who seek the real answers, agenda free. I found it annoying enough that he wishes to pad his online stats by trying to negatively influence the flight model of his online enemy, that affects the hobby I enjoy enough - but to deliberately doctor popular information websites to suit his agenda is a disgrace.

@Tomcat, regarding your fighter question. The RAAF didn't operate in the Battle of Britain, only some Australian pilots did along with Kiwi pilots such as Al Deere. They made their own way to the UK and joined the RAF flying the same aircraft in British squadrons. The point being made here though is nothing to do with what the RAAF used, but the fact that the Australian government did not deal with the UK government in order to obtain their fuel and that this is contrary to Kurfursts long standing opinion which he will not move from and tells everybody that he can that it's the truth.

What you are seeing from Kurfurst is very bad science who clearly has an agenda which is contrary to finding out the truth. He can draw you as many graphs as he likes but the bottom line is that he's having strong evidence shoved in front of him and is still arguing about it. Did you know that 99% of people in prison are not guilty? It's the same mentality.

[ACE-OF-ACES]

+1

[NZtyphoon]

Okay, for Tomcat's convenience, let's break it down.

1)Since about 2004, Kurfurst has held up the "Pips" memo as being an exemplar of accurate information regarding the supply of 100 Octane fuel to the RAF.

2) Whenever asked to show the original document, or at least provide solid evidence that it exists, on this and in other forums, KF has fobbed people off, and told them to find the document themselves, or contact Pip and ask him, or travel to Australia, often with insults and sneers.

3) When people like Glider have contacted the Australian War Memorial Archives to find the document, and have been told it cannot be found, KF has almost invariably resorted to calling the inquirer a liar.

Enough of history:

(KF #400, p. 40) So disprove the statement of Pips. Since you like to misrepresent other's position, I put it forward to you in its originality:

This is from a researcher, researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

1) The reason for the "Pips" memo supposedly being in the AWM Archives is because it was copied to "the Australian Military Commission". No such Commission existed. On that basis alone, this Pips memo is a fabrication.

2) Beaverbrook apparently used the memo, supposedly from Rolls-Royce, to explain to the "Australian Military Commission" the reasons why Australia was still being supplied with 87 Octane fuel, rather than the 100 Octane it wanted: "The Australian Government was protesting vigoriously..."

3) At no time was the Australian Government accountable to the British regarding supplies of aviation fuel of any grade. The Australian Government got its fuel supplies directly from the oil companies, after negotiating directly with the oil companies. Beaverbrook had absolutely no say in the matter, nor could he influence the process in any way. There is an Official Australian War History and, far more importantly, a whole swag of documents discovered by 41Sqn_Banks, which proves this.


4) It doesn't matter what grades of fuel were being requested by the Australians - fact was they were getting all that was needed, and their requirements changed according to the types of engines being mooted for the Catalinas, Hudsons and other types ordered from the Americans.

Nuff said? It is pathetic that KF who has a deal of intelligence (?), has wasted so much of other people's time and energy on such a sham. If you want to continue to defend KF, be my guest. :cool:

[Al Schlageter]

Well said Osprey and NZtyphoon.

[Bounder!]

Simply put, as I understand it from reading the various threads on this forum plus the threads on ww2aircraft.net linked by Klem on page 9 of the Spit MK I/II thread (http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthread.php?t=28753&page=9), RAF fighter command's Spitfires and Hurricanes flew combat sorties using 100 Octane fuel during the Battle of Britain - there is ample and overwhelming evidence for this backed up by references linked; there has been no evidence provided backed up by a reference for the use of 87 Octane fuel by Spitfires or Hurricanes during BoB. So simply put, in a combat flight sim of BoB, Spitfire and Hurricanes should be modeled using 100 Octane fuel.

[Crumpp]

There is no black and white!

There is evidence that selected squadrons where supported with 100 oct.

There is NO evidence that ALL squadrons where supported with 100 oct.

There is a grey zone, or maybe schroeders cat, which isn't, and can't be, defined.


That is really the best summation of this whole argument.

There is not enough evidence for it to be decided with facts, only on opinion.

Reminds me of the 100/150 grade fiasco.....how many "tons" of that horse pucky was thrown around as proof of widespread adoption in gamer world.

[Glider]

That is really the best summation of this whole argument.

There is not enough evidence for it to be decided with facts, only on opinion.

Reminds me of the 100/150 grade fiasco.....how many "tons" of that horse pucky was thrown around as proof of widespread adoption in gamer world.

If you have any evidence that 87 octane was used in combat I would be very interested to see it. Kurfurst whole approach is to never supply any evidence to support his view but to nitpick at any evidence that is offerred the other way, magnify it and blow it up out of proportion.

So it would be nice to see someone prove that 87 octane was used in combat. Hundreds of books and pieces have been written on the battle. Many personal accounts have been published. It would be nice to find one, just one that says 87 octane was used, or even frustration at not having 100 octane available.

I have stated many times that the case for the use of 100 octane is a strong one but not a perfect one. However there is no evidence of any kind that says 87 octane was used in combat.

Instead of shouting from the sidelines it would be nice to see someone who supports the belief that 87 was octane was used in combat, to back up those shouts.

For instance, did Kurfurst ever get capt doggles included onto the thread that was supposed to support his case. If not did he even copy the details of the exchange and make them available to him. Penny to a pound says he didn't.

I have put up with a number of insults from Kurfurst and Captdoggles (who has gone very quiet) but just supplied documents to support my case being honest and admitting the case wasn't perfect. Now its time for Kurfurst and others who believe 87 octane was used to support their belief with something substantial

To put it another way, its time they put up or shut up

[JG52Uther]

Enough with the personal attacks. Discuss, disagree etc, but personal attacks are unacceptable.

[Kurfürst]

Time to answer this directly: I have read the relevant sections in "Australia in the War of 1939-45: Civil: War Economy 1939-42 by S J Butlin. (Petrol and Substitute Fuels 280-292)

http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/B003ZE9DH4/ref=sr_1_1_up_1_main_olp?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1330331816&sr=1-1&condition=used

Let me translate what it actually.

NZTyphoon found the Second World War Official Histories, legally and freely available to anyone at the Australian Goverment's website at http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/

Instead of giving the link where everyone could check what the source said, he magnamiously shared an amazon link, where people can buy, what he could read for free. Of course nobody will buy the books, so he can 'quote' them in any way he see it to his liking. At wikipedia he often resorted to this, 'backing' his own ideas that he wanted to be included to the enrichment of the wider public with references to the works of respected authors, even though those authors never said anything like it.

Let's see now some examples.

1) There was no "Australian Military Commission" or any such organisation in Britain during WW 2.

Says NZTyphoon - the 'ustralia in the War ' official histories of course make no such statement. But, as we are all aware, NZTyphoon have told us recently with equivalent certainty that British tanker losses were marginal, then it was shown that they've lost 600 000 GRT worth of tankers in the year under question according to the records.


2a) The Australian Government dealt directly with the oil companies when requesting stock of fuels of all types, including aviation fuels. "After the outbreak of war stocks continued to come from the oil companies and to be imported and distributed through their organisation...there were special features in the requirements of the forces: fuel oil for the navy; petrol for the army; and the special high grade aviation fuel for the air force. (p. 285): "Liaison with the oil companies had been maintained from before the war..."(p. 286):

Only the bottomline is missing from the quote - see below. Yes Australia contact various oil companies for supply. For various reasonons detailed below, the companies could not get the oil to Australia.


b) Lord Beaverbrook and the Ministry of Aircraft Production had nothing whatsoever with deciding what types of fuels were supplied to Australia, nor how much. The Australian War Cabinet made decisions on aviation fuel supply and storage

This is a classic strawmen arguement. Strawmen arguements are about deliberately misrepresenting the other's actual position, and then 'disproving' that distorted position, and therefore 'winning' the argument.

In reality however, nobody said or claimed that it was Lord Beaverbrook and/or the Ministry of Aircraft Production were deciding what types of fuels were supplied to Australia, nor how much.

The context in what Beaverbrook's name came up was that Pips found a paper, that says that British were worried about 100 octane fuel position for the future, and decided to halt further 100 octane conversions until the supplies could be secured.

The paper wan copied by the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by[b] Roll Royce [b]to[b] Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

As you can see, Beaverbrooks name came up in a different context, and nobody said Beaverbook decided in the question.

"In August 1940 the War Cabinet was asked for a decision on aviation spirit stocks....The suggestion therefore was that the Department of Supply should purchase 3,000,000 gallons and that three 1,200,000-gallon storage tanks be built. The Cabinet approved the purchase...(p. 287)

And this is classic selective quoting. NZTyphoon wishes to create the impression that Australia was fully autonomous in fuel suppy, that they had no contract whatsoever with the British in that regard etc. He wants people to believe that the background of the papers has been fabricated, the Australian goverment was in such an excellent position with regard of fuel, that discussions with the British about fuel supplies is a surreal idea.

This has been not the case, however. The bits on pages 288-289 tell a whole lot more of the story, which is I believe why NZTyphoon was careful not to share his source in the first place. You can't cherry pick qoutes if anyone can find it out in a minute, now can you?

Pages 288-289 in full:

In August 1940 the War Cabinet was asked for a decision on aviation
spirit stocks . Before the war the plan had been for a reserve of 6,400,00 0
gallons (that is, the requirements of nineteen squadrons) [b]and although
this had not been achieved (approximately 5,500,000 was the holding )
it did not matter so much because a force of nineteen squadrons had no t
been achieved either. When the Empire Air Training Scheme requirement s
could be calculated the companies had agreed to increase their holding s
progressively, but now plans were afoot to expand the force to thirty-tw o
squadrons, the present contract was to expire on 31st December, and i t
was "not considered reasonable that the present contractors should b e
requested to further increase their stocks without some assurance of continuance
of business for a reasonable period " . 2 The suggestion therefor e
was that the Department of Supply should purchase 3,000,000 gallon s
and that three 1,200,000-gallon storage tanks should be built .

The Cabinet approved the purchase and sent the storage problem to the Commonwealth
Oil Board. The board recommended six 200,000-gallon tanks—two each
in three centres, to be approved by the Air Staff . But by March 1941
the three centres were revised to twelve and the total capacity was no w
4,030,000 gallons .

There might be grounds for satisfaction with these attempts to provide
extra storage tanks ; there could be none over the provision of the petrol
they were intended to hold . After the reduction of the ration which came
into force on 1st April 1941, the Supply Minister in the middle of that
month placed before the full Cabinet comparative sales figures for six
months. 3 "The effect of rationing and of all other inducements to reduced
consumption," he submitted, "may therefore be estimated at a figur e
of 16 per cent (that is, consumption has been reduced by 16 per cent) . "
Diversion of tankers to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, side
by side with the persistently high sales, had reduced stocks to 82,000,00 0
gallons, "with no immediate prospects of restoring stocks even to thei r
former level" .

By the beginning of May he reported "the prospective stock position
has deteriorated so much and the prospects of tankers are so uncertain
that I feel bound to report the matter to Cabinet ". He complained about
inability to get information from the United Kingdom authorities despite
attempts by the Prime Minister and another visiting parliamentarian. The
Government had protested about "our insecurity" with reference to tankers
and had been promised a tanker programme which, if maintained, woul d
bring stocks at the end of June to about 65,000,000 gallons . 4

Meantime on 2nd May the minister sought and received permission to
reduce use of private cars and cycles to 2,000 miles a year and to make
varying percentage reductions in other classes to fulfil the one-third cu t
"recommended by the original rationing board about twelve months ago" .


BTW, did anyone notice that despite I and others have asked him many times to post the alleged text in its full context from Payton - Smith, he always evades that request?


3) What did need to be co-ordinated with the British was the shipment, allocation of tankers etc. "Diversion of tankers to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom...(p. 288)

Again, the quoting is selective and out of context; reading the full text reveals that aviation fuel reserves could not be met, despite previous contacting with various companies. The reasons were two-fold: the British were buying up much what was available in the (American) market, which had finite amounts of 100 octane to offer. Indeed this is a returning subject in all British papers, can sufficient amount of American supply secured?

Secondly, Australia had no sea-going tanker capacity worth to mention - all oil had to be imported in British-owned tankers.

In short, the context of the Australian Military Commission's mission to Britain about getting 100 octane was that the Australians tried to build up large reserves, constructed tanks to hold it, but they couldn't buy enough on the market, and couldn't transfer it to Australia, because - despite NZTyphoons's claims that the British had no tanker capacity problems whatsoever, everything was green and nice - the Brits who controlled the whole Commonwealth tanker capacity suddenly decided to use the whole to their own purposes.

This left the Australians in an unenviable position, their reserves were dropping, and had to introduce severe rationing of fuel to the civilian sector to ensure sufficient reserves for the military.

The Page 288:

The army's figures were repeated in a submission by the Minister fo r
Supply to the full Cabinet on 11th June 1941, in which he reported tha t
the new ration scale to bring consumption to a figure of 20,000,000 gallon s
a month was now in force . [b]But news of future tankers was poor. In an
endeavour to bring aviation spirit reserves up, only 7,000,000 gallons o f
motor spirit would come in in June ; quantities for July were uncertain .
The minister recounted at length the sorry story of the delay in rationing
and that "it resulted in only half the saving in consumption that had been
forecast by the motor trade whose advice had been accepted by the
Government in August". He reiterated the statement that no warning was
given by the United Kingdom of any alteration in the tanker position an d
only early in 1941 was it known that diversions, thought to be temporary ,
would become pronounced.

He concluded :
It is open to question whether severe rationing of the order I am now bound t o
suggest should be conducted by the civil authorities on their own account or unde r
the authority of the army . The army in association with my Controller of Liqui d
Fuels has evolved a mobilisation petrol scheme which would be operated by my
department. I gather that the army would prefer the rationing to be conducte d
entirely under the authority of my department .
In view of the opinion expressed by the Oil Board, strongly supported as it is
by the Department of the Army, I have no option but to recommend that I be
authorised to reduce the monthly consumption of motor spirit for civil purposes
to a level of 12,000,000 per month as soon as that may be practicable . If necessary
the use of private cars other than for business purposes could be stopped as from
the beginning of next month and certain other classes could be reduced at the sam e
time . The full scheme could not be introduced, unless the Army Mobilisation System
were brought in, until August . ?

Such proposals were drastic ; but the Cabinet deferred only long enough
to ask the Minister for Supply to present two schedules, one with, an d
one without, private cars (that is, class 2 in the rationing schedule) ,
designed to bring consumption to the required 12,000,000 gallons . 8 The
decision was to keep private cars on the road, but to allow them 1,00 0
miles a year only . The following evening, 17th June, the Prime Ministe r
announced the reductions which would begin with the August issue o f
ration tickets .

The shoe was beginning to pinch . If further restrictions were needed—
and no one could say that they would not be—some thought would have
to be given to other ways of economising : rationalising delivery services ,
zoning, transport pools . In effect, for the future, the petrol problem was
not just one of simple restriction. Like so many other problems it could
no longer be dealt with in isolation, and indicative of the Government ' s
realisation of the need to relate problems one with another, the Prime
Minister included in his reorganised....


The book should be available through libraries, second hand bookshops etc so anyone can check.

Or at the Australian Goverments website, where you have found it yourself while researching the Australian online archives, should you bothered to give a link to it.

http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/

The pages I have provided the full quote can be found here: http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/records/awmohww2/civil/vol3/awmohww2-civil-vol3-ch8.pdf

[Kurfürst]

@Glider about post 401.

I am afraid I cannot answer you in detail now due to the lack of time and won't be in the position to do so in the next two weeks.

On the other hand, I do not see any appearance new evidence or even argument in your post, as it only repeats the ones you have been telling us in the last 40 pages of discussion, and probably no undue haste should be spent in addressing these points again.

FYI I have looked over about 1500 pages of 'War Cabinet' and related files at Kew.
I could not find any decision about the alleged full conversion of Fighter Command to 100 octane in the War Cabinet Minutes.

Which tells me that the reason you can't find any reference to 100 octane 'conversion freeze' in the War Cabinet Minutes either is because it was discussed and decided at lower levels, in one of the apprx. 200 War Cabinet commitees - which still are the part of the War Cabinet.

For the number of Committees, please refer to the relevant page of the National Archives website which provides general information about the War Cabinet on the apropos providing 'open access' to the public via digital copies.

[Talisman]

Simply put, as I understand it from reading the various threads on this forum plus the threads on ww2aircraft.net linked by Klem on page 9 of the Spit MK I/II thread (http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthread.php?t=28753&page=9), RAF fighter command's Spitfires and Hurricanes flew combat sorties using 100 Octane fuel during the Battle of Britain - there is ample and overwhelming evidence for this backed up by references linked; there has been no evidence provided backed up by a reference for the use of 87 Octane fuel by Spitfires or Hurricanes during BoB. So simply put, in a combat flight sim of BoB, Spitfire and Hurricanes should be modeled using 100 Octane fuel.

Well said Bounder. Is there anyone out there that would disagree with Bounder?

Bounder, I respectfully suggest that you could be accused of applying intelligent, reasonable logic; however, such thinking is not acceptable to a 100 Octane denier.

The burden of proof in a UK criminal court is “beyond all reasonable doubt”. Given the evidence, I believe that RAF Fighter Command would be found guilty of premeditated and wide spread use of 100 Octane fuel by a jury of 12 good citizens of sound mind. LOL. Moreover, in a civil court, with the burden of proof being “on the balance of probability” the RAF would have been locked up long ago!

Happy landings,

Talisman

[Blackdog_kt]

I can understand a passionate discussion guys, but keep the emotions in check if it starts to get too personal.

I've had reported posts about namecalling and personal attacks in this thread, so i urge everyone to go back 3-4 pages and see if they have any in their posts and then edit them out before the moderating team has to step in and issue infractions.

On the matter at hand, the best way to solve this debate is to model both versions. It's not like they are useless to have: in a dynamic campaign (either offline or online) there will be cases where 100 octane supplies will be low due to enemy action.

For people that want an exact day-to-day recreation of BoB then yes, the most widespread version is the only one they will need.

However, there's a large amount of users who are interested in a dynamic campaign. That definitely needs both versions, because otherwise there's no real incentive to go after the opponent's fuel supply, essentially cutting off a pretty vital part of strategic bombing objectives and throwing it out of the picture.

Better yet, each one can use what they want offline or fly on the servers that use what they prefer when going online, instead of trying to convince each other in the hopes their favorite ride will be better.

I really don't get why we should restrict everyone to a single way of doing things, especially when both fuel types actually existed in the first place.

Like i said, many people want things in the sim to be exactly like they were in the 40s. Many however want the conditions to be the same, but they also want the ability to change the outcomes somewhat. Bomb the enemy's supplies of 100 octane to make their fighters intercept you with more difficulty, so you can then move on to bombing other targets with reduced casualties and so on. It's a whole extra layer of interesting tactical considerations that would be a must for any dynamic mission environment.

Having only 87 oct or 100 oct is not conducive to that. So why should these players be limited in their enjoyment of the product when the first group has nothing to lose by the inclusion of both versions (they can simply choose which version to fly)?

[Kurfürst]

Pretty much agree on all your points.

Anyway I've always said that both 87 and 100 octane versions would be nice to be implented in the sim. As you noted, having two versions is better for all. It allows for dynamic campaigns, it does not restrict the hands of mission designers or server hosts to decide what versions of planes they want to have in. It allows OPTIONs.

The only loosers are the small group who wants to set their version of history to all in stone, and having only the bestest planes to fly for one side. And its a miniscule group compared to the entire group.

[41Sqn_Banks]

Petrol rationing in Australia during the Second World War (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j36/petrol.asp)

[TomcatViP]

Well at least, what we hve shown lately with our research in th Au archives is that :

- there was 100 oct fuel ordered and delivered
- This fuel was used ONLY to be blended with old stock of 74 octane fuel to create adequate 87, 90 or 95 octane fuel
- The stoichiometry of the blend is defined in the archive
- To be blended adequately, some specified additives where requested and delivered by the oil companies
- There was no plane in Australian air force that needed a single drop of pure 100 octane fuel as of feb 1941

What we also learned is that the cost of 100oct fuel was stated after some negotiations at 18 cents a gallon

my 1/9th gallon (of 100octane of course)

[Osprey]

@Kurfurst. I believe you could learn from the "Russells Teapot" argument.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell's_teapot

I'm not interested in the flaky Australian argument anymore since it appears far too unconvincing and more importantly, irrelevant. It matters not even if, as you suggest, that the UK wouldn't give the Australians any 100 octane because they were short. That is not evidence that the RAF didn't have enough to use themselves.

We can use simple logic to decide the truth here. I ask you, do you deny any of these 4 points listed?

1. That the RAF used fuel.
2. Every flight recorded a combat report (provided the pilot returned).
3. That the fuel type or boost to indicate the type was frequently mentioned in combat reports throughout the BoB.
4. That 87 is never ever mentioned and 100 was in every case.

Therefore the entire RAF MUST have used 100 in in combat and no other type. It really is that straightforward. What I do not find straightforward are your reasons for objection. Please, what are they?

[NZtyphoon]

From KF in another post: http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthread.php?p=378110&highlight=Kurf%C3%BCrst#post378110
Now, despite being perfectly aware that he needs to contact this Australian guy, Glider kept b!tching to me about producing the paper, of which I have only seen a summary on a board. I kept telling him to contact Pips and ask him.


"...I have only seen a summary on a board..." Kf has not actually seen the original, but it is guaranteed to be 100 percent accurate. :rolleyes:

'Nuff said.

[Kurfürst]

Credibility can add tons to the weight of a man's words. ;)

I have no reason not to trust Pips account. He had no take or special interest in the matter, just shared his research's result.

On a different note, may I ask why you keep changing your login handles?

[Osprey]

Your first sentence makes no sense to me. But, may I ask why you avoid answering questions which destroy your argument? If you cannot answer without resorting to character assassination then you are defeated.

[klem]

What the hell do Australian Fuel Supplies in 1940 have to do with the Battle of Britain?

Are we seriously to believe that the British Government's reluctance to assist in the supply of 100 octane fuel to Australia, at a time when there was no war in the Australian region, was an indication that they didn't have enough for the RAF in Europe where there was a war raging? "Here you go Australia, we actually need it more than you do at the moment because we're trying to survive but we're nice guys so we'll take a chance ..."

The British 100 octane fuel position in 1940 is explained in many documents, links etc already posted. And if there was any doubt about sufficient supplies for the entire RAF does anyone seriously imagine that the key front line defence units (fighter squadrons) would have had to make do with anything less than the best that was available?

Oh, wait. We've already had that discussion.

I don't care if 87 octane aircraft are modelled as long as 100 octane types are too. Both fuels were available during the BoB. Beyond that, take it up with the mission builders.

[ACE-OF-ACES]

What the hell do Australian Fuel Supplies in 1940 have to do with the Battle of Britain?

Are we seriously to believe that the British Government's reluctance to assist in the supply of 100 octane fuel to Australia, at a time when there was no war in the Australian region, was an indication that they didn't have enough for the RAF in Europe where there was a war raging? "Here you go Australia, we actually need it more than you do at the moment because we're trying to survive but we're nice guys so we'll take a chance ..."
Exactally

[TomcatViP]

In the series of " What archives tells us" here is the FLIGHT archives that I cited two days ago :

- There was no 100 octane fuel usage during BoB in the FC. Here I am putting my money on British pride that would hve pushed forward any of its usage (ok Brits are not French but never the less ;) )

- in 1941 increased power Merlin's had 9lb boost level

- 100 oct fuel was used by some aircraft in the RN (Fulmar) fitted with special engines such as the Merlin VIII (presumably to compensate for the extra weight of the 2nd crew member and low alt missions)

- In 1941 planes were still using 87 octane such as was the Hurricane with Merlin XX

Sources : (http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%201286.html)

1. "International power of the Merlin I and II was 950/990 h.p. at
2,600 r.p.m. at 12,250ft, and the maximum take-off output was
890 h.p. at 2,850 r.p.m."

2. Merlin III : "The power output of the standard engine,"
writes Harold Nockolds, "was 1,030 b.h.p. at 3,000 r.p.m. at
10,250ft with plus 6i lb boost. "

3. "the petrol normally used at that time was 87
octane"

4. "The Merlin II and I I I were installed in the Spitfire I, Defiant I,
Hurricane I, Sea Hurricane I, and Battle I, and were—as will
always be remembered—vital factors in the winning of the Battle
of Britain. The Merlin IV had pressure-water cooling in place
of the glycol cooling of the earlier models, and was developed
for installation in the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley IV bomber.
The Mk VIII, installed in the Fairey Fulmar I, was a medium supercharged
unit rated at 1,010 h.p. at 2,850 r.p.m. at 6,750ft,
and, using 100-octane fuel, delivered 1,080 h.p. at 3,000 r.p.m. for
take-off."

5. "The Merlin X—installed in the Halifax I, Wellington II and
Whitley V and VII—represented a very important advance in
that it had a two-speed supercharger to improve take-off, lowaltitude
performance during climb or level flight, and fuel
economy under cruising conditions. The speed change was
effected through an oil-pressure system, the actual changeover
under full power taking about a second. In low gear the Merlin X
gave 1,145 h.p. at 5,250ft, and in high gear 1,010 h.p. at 17,750ft."

6. "The Merlin XII, driving a Rotol three-blade constant-speed
airscrew, was installed in some Spitfire lls ; its maximum output
was 1,150 h.p. at 3,000 r.p.m. at 14,000ft and it had a 0.477:1
reduction gear."

7. "The next production-type engine was the Merlin XX, which,
compared with the X, delivered a greatly increased power at
height." [...] "Thus, using 100-octane fuel,
the international rating in low gear was 1,240 h.p. at 2,850
r.p.m. at 10,000ft and plus 9 lb/sq in boost; in high gear the
figure was 1,175 h.p. at 2,850 r.p.m. at 17,500ft, again at plus
9 lb boost."

8. "The Merlin XX powered the Beaufighter II, Defiant II, Halifax II and V, Hurricane II and IV, and Lancaster I and III."

9. "An increase in take-off output from 1,300 h.p. to 1,600 h.p. characterized
the Merlin 32, which powered the Barracuda II and
Seafire II."

10. "A variant which saw very extensive service was the Merlin 45,
fitted in the Spitfire V, P.R.IV and VII, and Seafire I I ; at 16,000ft
and 2,850 r.p.m. its output was 1,200 h.p. The Merlin 45M was
rated for duty at lower levels and delivered 1,585 h.p. at 2,750ft;
it was fitted in the Spitfire L.F.V"

11. "The Merlin 46 and 47 were
both high-altitude engines (1,115 h.p. at 19,000ft); the 46 powered
the Spitfire V, P.R.IV and VII, and Seafire I, and the 47 (which
had a cabin supercharger) found its application in the Spitfire VI."

12. "The key feature of the Merlin 61 was its two-speed, two-stage
supercharger, with two rotors on a common shaft. The mixture
was compressed by the first stage and was delivered to the inlet of
the second stage, where it was further compressed before being
delivered to the induction pipe. In order to reduce the mixture
temperature to a normal figure, a box-like intercooler was interposed
between the outlet of the second-stage supercharger and
the rear of the cylinder blocks. In a typical Spitfire installation
the intercooler radiator was mounted under the port wing in a duct, which also housed one of the main engine-cooling radiators."

13. "The real significance of the Merlin 61 was that at 40,000ft it
developed double the power given at a much lower altitude by the
Merlin II of 1939/40. Even at 23,500ft its maximum power was
1,390 h.p. The weight had risen to 1,640 lb."

14. The 67 had a reduction gear of 0.42:1 instead of 0.477:1,
as had the 63, 64 and 66, and the 68 was a Packard-built model,
designated V-1650-3 and installed in the Mustang I I I . Its takeoff
output was 1,400 h.p.

15. "The 67 had a reduction gear of 0.42:1 instead of 0.477:1,
as had the 63, 64 and 66, installed in the Mustang I I I . Its takeoff
output was 1,400 h.p. In the Merlin 69—another Packardbuilt
variant, known in America as the V-1650-7—1,490 h.p. was
available for take-off; this engine powered Mustang I l l s and IVs."

16. "The Merlin 130 and 131 were the first of their family to incorporate
downdraught carburettors; and, to eliminate the air scoop
as used on the Mosquito, ducted air intakes were faired into the
leading edges of the wing. The war-time Bendix/Stromberg
carburettor was replaced by a low-pressure fuel-injection system,
which delivered through a spray nozzle into the supercharger eye*.

17. The sum total of improvements incorporated
in these remarkable engines raised the output to 2,030 h.p. at
1,250ft with a boost of plus 25 lb/sq in.

18. Feel free to add your own episode !

*Ivan are your sure of your doc ?

[Osprey]

I don't understand your point Tomcat. Are you seriously arguing the 87 octane case here? I expect it from Kurfurst because he appears to have painted himself into a corner with too much personal pride invested in the argument. But you claim to be a man of education by profession?

@klem, I am a mission builder for our server and it does and will run historical missions only. We have a Luftwaffe faction too, they won't have a problem with it.

[41Sqn_Banks]

What the hell do Australian Fuel Supplies in 1940 have to do with the Battle of Britain?

Of course there is no connection. However Kurfürst claims that the reason why the infamous Australian document exists is because the Australia Government "rigorously protested" to receive 100 octane fuel from Great Britain in February 1941. It was shown that this was not the case because
a) they didn't intent to switch to 100 octane fuel at that time,
b) they received the requested amount of 100 octane fuel to mix the 90 octane fuel required for the Catalinas and
c) they received the 100 octane fuel directly from Shell and Vacuum Oil Company without negotiation of Great Britain.

[TomcatViP]

@Osprey :

I don't push frwrd the 87 case.

I firmly believe that there was some MkII fitted with improved Merlins. That the improvement was only linked in operational level to fuel is something that I do not believe if we are talking abt 100 octane. But it's only my own opinion.

I also will gladly eat my hat if I am wrong.

Regarding Kurfurst, I hve to say that I dislike the way some are referring to him here. That he deserve it for some past actions... well perhaps you know something that I don't but I do not really like to read some of the comments.

I am not in anyway perfect myself.

~S!

[Al Schlageter]

In the series of " What archives tells us" here is the FLIGHT archives that I cited two days ago :

- There was no 100 octane fuel usage during BoB in the FC. Here I am putting my money on British pride that would have pushed forward any of its usage

Are you saying that Flight stated the above?

You would be correct that RAF FC did use 100 octane fuel.

Below is a list of squadrons that I have found references for that used 100 octane fuel.

No. 92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 111 Squadron pre BoB H
No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940 H
No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 609 (West Riding) Squadron pre BoB S

No. 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 3 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 17 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 19 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 54 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 74 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 73 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 85 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 229 Squadron May 1940 H

No. 43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 H
No. 41 Squadron June 1940 S
No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 S
No. 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 S

No. 145 Squadron July 1940 H

No. 64 Squadron 5 Aug 1940
No. 65 (East India) Squadron 12 Aug 1940 S
No. 303 Polish Fighter Squadron 9 Sept 1940 H
No. 234 (Madras Presidency) Squadron 18 Aug 1940 S
No. 603 (City of Edinburgh) Squadron 31 Aug 1940 S
No. 616 (South Yorkshire) Squadron 15 Aug 1940 S

No. 66 Squadron 6 Sept 1940 S
No. 152 (Hyderabad) Squadron 4 Sept 1940 S
No. 249 (Gold Coast) Squadron 6 Sept 1940 H

So much for the accuracy of the Flight article. LOL and some say that Lovesey is a Rolls-Rroyce PR lackey. :rolleyes:

[Blackdog_kt]

@Kurfurst. I believe you could learn from the "Russells Teapot" argument.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell's_teapot

I'm not interested in the flaky Australian argument anymore since it appears far too unconvincing and more importantly, irrelevant. It matters not even if, as you suggest, that the UK wouldn't give the Australians any 100 octane because they were short. That is not evidence that the RAF didn't have enough to use themselves.

We can use simple logic to decide the truth here. I ask you, do you deny any of these 4 points listed?

1. That the RAF used fuel.
2. Every flight recorded a combat report (provided the pilot returned).
3. That the fuel type or boost to indicate the type was frequently mentioned in combat reports throughout the BoB.
4. That 87 is never ever mentioned and 100 was in every case.

Therefore the entire RAF MUST have used 100 in in combat and no other type. It really is that straightforward. What I do not find straightforward are your reasons for objection. Please, what are they?

Like i said, i want both versions in the sim but ok, i'll bite and play devil's advocate here just for the sake of showing you guys what i get from the whole discussing here. Lets go ahead and take each numbered point one by one, shall we?

1. Correct
2. Correct
3. Correct, the operative word being "frequently". Which could mean it was a differing practice (to be mentioned in the first place) but widespread enough (to be mentioned frequently).
4. Correct. Which could mean 87 wasn't mentioned because it was the default, while 100 was mentioned because for one it was the exception to the rule and secondly, extra boost warranted extra inspections by the mechanics.

I'm not arguing either case, this is just an example to show everyone here how flaky the whole thing appears to an outside observer, no matter which side of the argument one tends to support.

I just think no side has provided any undisputed facts: i see a lot of credible sources in this thread but far too often a lot of them are conflicting, with no real means to discern which i should "believe more". I'm not convinced either way and that's why (as well as the dynamic campaign considerations) i advocate the presence of both types for all aircraft that use higher grade fuel during the BoB.

I remember seeing similar evidence about half the 110 units being also equipped with better fuel and higher rated engines. I want to have both versions, no matter if its a Spit or Hurri or 110. Forgive me when i say that i doubt some of the most invested posters in this thread would do the same, as i have a suspicion that many who support 100 octane Spits would denounce DB601N-equipped 110s and vice versa.

Let's have options is all i'm saying ;)

[Glider]

@Glider about post 401.

I am afraid I cannot answer you in detail now due to the lack of time and won't be in the position to do so in the next two weeks.

On the other hand, I do not see any appearance new evidence or even argument in your post, as it only repeats the ones you have been telling us in the last 40 pages of discussion, and probably no undue haste should be spent in addressing these points again.

FYI I have looked over about 1500 pages of 'War Cabinet' and related files at Kew.
I could not find any decision about the alleged full conversion of Fighter Command to 100 octane in the War Cabinet Minutes.

Which tells me that the reason you can't find any reference to 100 octane 'conversion freeze' in the War Cabinet Minutes either is because it was discussed and decided at lower levels, in one of the apprx. 200 War Cabinet commitees - which still are the part of the War Cabinet.

For the number of Committees, please refer to the relevant page of the National Archives website which provides general information about the War Cabinet on the apropos providing 'open access' to the public via digital copies.

You have hit on a key item, I never claimed that the War Cabinet approved or decided on the roll out of 100 Octane fuel. It wasn't their decision.
The point is that this Pips clearly stated that the War Cabinet halted the roll out, that they restarted it later, they didn't it would be in the minutes. This paper if it exists is wrong. If you believe that someone else made the decision find it,, and explain why Pips made such an obvious mistake.

You have stated a number of times that you believe in his paper, that is your choice. I suggest you prove that any statment, he made on any topic on the paper is correct and I do mean any statement, your choice. Something, anything to confirm that any point is correct.

The choice is huge. Take the 25% being converted when the roll out stopped, with 75% of FC using 87 octane you should be able to find something. The Oil Committee who were responsible for the purchase storage and distribution must, if its true, mention it somewhere.

[NZtyphoon]

Credibility can add tons to the weight of a man's words. ;)

I have no reason not to trust Pips account. He had no take or special interest in the matter, just shared his research's result.



Where is your evidence that this material actually exists? You have not viewed the material itself - Your words, not mine.

You are quoting material from another forum the thread of which which - conveniently - is no longer accessible: http://www.allaboutwarfare.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=230&st=0&start=0

So either ask Pips - who you can easily connect, I gave you his contact (http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthread.php?t=20110&page=28)

So, you do have a contact for Mr Pip but cannot provide the material you so strenuously defend?

Have you actually searched for the papers yourself? You keep telling others to do so, but have not bothered to do some basic research of your own?

If you are so right about them, I would have thought you would have long ago jumped at the chance to present them and prove everyone else wrong - you know, embarrass the naysayers. Why haven't you?

It's easy enough to start a search, just go onto http://www.awm.gov.au/database/ go down to "Official Records" which puts you onto http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/using/search/ - The AWM and NAA use the same search engine. Type in the title, or keywords if you don't have the official archive numbers...

Alternatively you can go onto this page http://www.awm.gov.au/contact/ and directly ask a question http://awm.altarama.com/reft100.aspx?key=research

Its easy - no long trips to Australia needed, and anyone here can do it.

[Al Schlageter]

The Pip statement:

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

As can bee seen the above is total nonsense.

"By 11th July 1940 the RAF had 343,000 tons of 100 octane in store, and the rate of importation was such that stocks rose to 424,000 tons by 10th October, 1940 after 22,000 tons had been issued during the Battle. Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin. The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power 1930-1940 (Hutchinson, London 1967. First published 1961), p.101-102. Importation from BP at Abadan alone was sufficient to meet this consumption. Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, p.244"

Less than 6% of the July stock was used during the BoB, so hardly well below the level considered necessary for widespread use.

NZ, this is from the link you posted.

[Al Schlageter]

Forgive me when i say that i doubt some of the most invested posters in this thread would do the same, as i have a suspicion that many who support 100 octane Spits would denounce DB601N-equipped 110s and vice versa.

So absolutely wrong.

[Kurfürst]

Glider,

Pips didn't say it was mentioned in War Cabinet Minutes papers - that's something that you seem to be reading into it, and you have entered a circular logic, that you think it should be in the papers titled 'War Cabinet minutes'' in CAB 65 (iirc) reference, and since it isn't, Pip's research is wrong. The logical error is clear to see, and I think mistake (in logic) is your's not Pip's.

The 'War Cabinet' is a rather general term and could refer to the War Cabinet with W.C. and the other people at the top, or any of the many Committees under the W.C.

Now I believe it was you who posted the attached paper. It seems to mention some kind of problems with tanker allocation. This sounds familiar from Morgan and Shacklady isn't it?

It also says: 'certain Fighter and Bomber squadrons should begin the use of 100 octane fuel'

and

'removal DDT 230 (ie. 87 octane - my note) fuel from Bomber and Fighter Command stations where 100 octane fuel is being bought into use'.

This hardly sounds as univeral use, David. In fact, it quite clearly says that there were to be selected Fighter and Bomber bases where 100 octane fuel was to be used. On another page they specifically say 'no' to Bomber Command's demands to have only 100 octane fuel on Bomber Stations on economical grounds (100 octane was more expensive, and Britain was running out of cash), save the 4 BC Stations mentioned.

Of course I haven't seen all the series of these papers. It would be nice to see them for all I guess. But since these and all subsequent papers I have mention 'stations concerned', the 'fighter units concenred' I have no reason to believe other that the high octane fuel was always meant to be supplied to select stations, while the others kept operated on the standard fuel of the RAF - 87 octane.

[Kurfürst]

Where is your evidence that this material actually exists? You have not viewed the material itself - Your words, not mine.

You are quoting material from another forum the thread of which which - conveniently - is no longer accessible: http://www.allaboutwarfare.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=230&st=0&start=0

(http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthread.php?t=20110&page=28)

Glider already tried this line. The Forum and the thread is easily accessible, for registered AND approved members.

So, you do have a contact for Mr Pip but cannot provide the material you so strenuously defend?

You can contact him on the forum in PM if he still reads it. Not much is happening there anymore.

Have you actually searched for the papers yourself? You keep telling others to do so, but have not bothered to do some basic research of your own?

Yes I asked Pips about them and tried the Australian archieve digital site. Few things are digitalised there unfortunately - one of them is named 'Proposal of securing 100 octane...'.

You have seen that one, I gave you the link, and IIRC you also got a heart attack when a British doc mentioned that one of their driving force for getting 100 octane is that German synth plants are so suitable for producing virtually any amount. :D So I am puzzled about why you ask if I had searched the site.

If you are so right about them, I would have thought you would have long ago jumped at the chance to present them and prove everyone else wrong - you know, embarrass the naysayers. Why haven't you?

Because I have a life and only a very passing interest the RAF... and to be honest I've probably had plowed too many young bucks like you into the ground already to find particular excitement in it anymore. :D


It's easy enough to start a search, just go onto http://www.awm.gov.au/database/ go down to "Official Records" which puts you onto http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/using/search/ - The AWM and NAA use the same search engine. Type in the title, or keywords if you don't have the official archive numbers...

Alternatively you can go onto this page http://www.awm.gov.au/contact/ and directly ask a question http://awm.altarama.com/reft100.aspx?key=research

Its easy - no long trips to Australia needed, and anyone here can do it.

Now, you see, I have done that before you even got to the University - no offense, but you should get a fair idea that I am actually into this stuff for, let's see 13 years now? - I have the above mentioned proposal of 100 octane fuel since March 2007. I know the AWM site, I have searched it. There's a lot of interesting stuff up there, but very little on 100 octane, at least, in an available form.

There are two practical problems:
- only a couple of random docs are digitized. I am quite sure there's a lot more WW2 100 octane in the AWM than the four or so papers it lists... some of the paper, like 'Proposals for...' is clearly copies of British papers.

- not all papers are entered into the registry. The paper recently shown and posted in this thread about the Australian attempt to buy/mix/steal/whatever 100/95/90 octane is only open since 2009 or so, at least as I recall from its sheet.

Archives often have only minimal staff and tons of papers, which is colossal work to register. When last time I was in the HTK archives, the registry was some DOS 6.0 based database program on something that resembled a 486 or an early 586. Do you even know what these things were? :D It illustrates the situation nicely - the online records are far from perfect, or accessible.

So if you think that it's just a case of browsing through the online archives, you will be disappointed. Some times questions like this just solve themselves in time.

[41Sqn_Banks]

Hi Kurfürst, I have some questions about the "Australian document".


The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.


Is the reason why it is included specifically stated in the document or is this a interpretation?
How do you know that the listed persons quoted from the report, where can these quotes be found?

Is the following quoted text a summary/interpretation by Pips or is this a actual quote of the document?

"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

I never heard of a initial limitation of +9 boost and you just mentioned that this was already discussed. Can you give me a link to this discussion or source?

[Glider]

Your playing your game again Kurfurst only quoting one paper from a complete stream. However you believe that certain means 25%, so prove it. All you need to do is look at the strength of FC compare it to the combat reports/squadron records and you will have your 25%.

Pips clearly states
Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place
We know the War Cabinet didn't make those decisions so find out who did, simple request.

The other core to the Pips position is that there was a shortage of 100 Octane which caused the decision he believes the War Cabinet made. I ask you to find any reference to any paper from any official source that states that there was a shortage of 100 Octane for FC in 1940.

[camber]

I realise this thread is a bit acrimonious but overall the content has been very interesting. The technical points have already been made but I am interested in the logic of is being argued.

Kurfurst, your argument appears to be that it cannot be proved definitively that all fighter stations during the BOB used 100 octane. On that narrow definition you are quite right, especially if you hold your own personal threshold of 'absolute proof' very high.

But based on the material presented in this thread, I still consider it likely that the BOB was fought largely if not completely with 100 octane. Almost all others in this thread, and also the previous very large thread on the same topic at another forum, seem to be of the same opinion. Perhaps someone in these threads at some point has stated that ALL RAF fighters were using 100 octane by the BOB without exception, but if you are arguing against that statement, you are presenting a variation of the straw man argument...refuting the most extreme position of your opponents instead of the typical position (and declaring victory!).

Neither using or not using 100 octane in the BOB is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence, or extra onus of proof on either side. Personally I could easily believe either of them, and have no initial bias that I am aware of. An extraordinary claim would be that the RAF had a jet squadron during the BOB, for example.

Typically when deciding between such competing ordinary claims, people examine what evidence exists and make a qualified judgement on the topic to move forward with. Seeing there is an large amount of anecdotal evidence for widespread use of 100 octane as reported in this thread, also a compelling historical reason to use 100 octane, and finally documented historic availability of 100 octane, it doesn't seem surprising to me your argument is not being taken up or accepted by others.

Going against the crowd is of course not a logical problem. If you argued against the existence of witches in the 1600s, you would be widely refuted but still correct (I hope!). But for every case like witch existance/nonexistance, there are many many more cases where the person arguing against informed peer belief is just mistaken. Of course your continuing arguing from your corner has lead to a lot of interesting technical information posted, and for that I thank you.

camber

[NZtyphoon]

And still, amongst all of his blather, KF has not presented any evidence whatsoever that the Pips memo actually exists, nor has he seen it himself except as a summary on a thread. Yet everyone who argues against KF has to provide solid, documentary evidence to back up their claim, otherwise it is dismissed out of hand.

[MoGas]

even in the current german http://www.flugzeugclassic.de/zeitschrift.cfm?heft=704&nav=621 issue, the talk about 100 octan for the RAF fighters in the BoB campaign. It seems everyone is rong lol....

;)

[lane]

There is plenty of documentation of 100 octane fuel use before and during the Battle of Britain. For starters:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/1940-0897.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/flight-january6-44.jpg

602 Sqdn. Operations Record Book
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/602-16feb40-100octane.jpg

611 Sqdn. Operations Record Book
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no611-100oct.jpg

151 Sqdn. Operations Record Book
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/151-orb-16feb40.jpg

74 Sqdn. Operations Record Book
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no74-100oct.jpg

111 Sqdn. Operations Record Book
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/111-15feb40-100-octane.jpg

David Ross, The Greatest Squadron of Them All, The Definitive History of 603 Squadron, RAauxAF, (Grub Street, London, 2003)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/603-ross-pg125.jpg

Alec Harvey-Bailey, The Merlin in Perspective, (Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 1983)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/rolls-royce-100oct.jpg

Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story, (Arms and Armour Press Ltd., London, 1986)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/price-pg74.jpg

Leo McKinstry, Hurricane, Victor of the Battle of Britain, (John Murrey Publishers, London, 2010)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/mckinstry-pg87.jpg

Leo McKinstry, Hurricane, Victor of the Battle of Britain, (John Murrey Publishers, London, 2010)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/mckinstry-pg191.jpg

W.G. Dudek and D. R. Winans, excerpt from AIAA Paper No. 69-779, Milestones in Aviation Fuels, (Esso Research and Engineering Company, New York 1969.)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Page_16_from_AIAA-42363-319.jpg

A. R. Ogston, excerpt from History of Aircraft Lubricants (Society of Automotive Enginees, Inc. Warrendale, PA USA), p. 12.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/aircraft-lubricants-pg12.jpg

RAF History
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/raf-history-100oct.jpg

602 Sqdn. Spitfire I
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/602sqdn-spitfire1-100octane.jpg

609 Sqdn. Spitfire I
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/609-spitfire-I-100oct.jpg

610 Sqdn. - Hawkinge, July 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/no610hawkinge-july40.jpg

[Glider]

I know that and I thank you for your posting, but it cannot be questioned that central to the Pips position is that there was a shortage. All I am asking is for Kurfurst to provide any evidence, that any part of the UK government, any department, considered there to be a shortage of 100 octane for FC, at any time during the BOB.

There are a raft of papers to the contrary and I could add a load more to your posting but I am not asking Kurfurst for that, I am just asking him to provide one paper, just one, that says there was a shortage.

It shouldn't be that difficult, hundreds of papers, books, articles, personal memories, histories have been written about the battle. There must be one that agrees with him.

[Bounder!]

In the series of " What archives tells us" here is the FLIGHT archives that I cited two days ago :

- There was no 100 octane fuel usage during BoB in the FC. Here I am putting my money on British pride that would hve pushed forward any of its usage (ok Brits are not French but never the less ;) )

- in 1941 increased power Merlin's had 9lb boost level

- 100 oct fuel was used by some aircraft in the RN (Fulmar) fitted with special engines such as the Merlin VIII (presumably to compensate for the extra weight of the 2nd crew member and low alt missions)

- In 1941 planes were still using 87 octane such as was the Hurricane with Merlin XX

Sources : (http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%201286.html)



Hi TomcatVIP, interesting claim given the overwhelming evidence for widespread use of 100 Octane fuel during the Battle of Britain. Perhaps there is new counter evidence in this document? EDIT: I found you post on page 39 (post 383 of this thread) that has a working link. I don’t see anywhere in that document the statement that 100 Octane fuel was not used in the Battle of Britain, or on the contrary, that 87 Octane was used by Spitfires or Hurricanes during the Battle of Britain. Nor I could not find any mention that “In 1941 planes were still using 87 octane such as was the Hurricane with Merlin XX”.

In response to your claim in point 3 of your post (434) on page 44, and I quote you said "the petrol normally used at that time was 87 Octane" I find this slightly misleading as the time in question is 1937, which you did not state nor was there an attempt to put the quote in context. Whilst it does say on Page 557 of the original text (link) (http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1954/1954%20-%201296.html) that “the petrol normally used at that time was 87 Octane” it is referring a to pre-war flight endurance test in 1937 where the Spitfire in question used “fuel of a higher Octane” (than 87 Octane). Note, this is stating that in 1937 the petrol normally used was 87 Octane – it does not mention the normal Octane used during the Battle of Britain 3 years later in 1940. I fail to see the significance of this quote regarding Octane usage during the Battle of Britain when we examine the whole quote.

If I have missed any quotes in the document regarding 87 or 100 Octane fuel usage during the Battle of Britain, and I may well have done considering it's a huge document, could you please quote them directly and list the page in the document that they appear so we may examine them in full. For example as I have done above by stating the quote and it’s appearance on page 557 with a working link to the page. Thanks.



even in the current german http://www.flugzeugclassic.de/zeitschrift.cfm?heft=704&nav=621 issue, the talk about 100 octan for the RAF fighters in the BoB campaign. It seems everyone is rong lol....

;)


MoGas, could you post a summary or even better images of the article you are referring to in english since it seems the magazine you are referring to requires a subscription.

Thanks, Bounder

[Al Schlageter]

This is what Pips said about what he found when asked: "were the British deceiving to the Australians?"

I wouldn't be surprised. The British did quite a bit of that during both World Wars.

So even Pips has his doubts about the factual truth of what he found.

(It seems that the one accusing others of being selective is himself being selective.) tut tut

There is certainly evidence that this was a deception for British stocks of 100 octane fuel was:

30th September 1939 - 153,000 tons
27th February 1940 - 220,000 tons
31st May 1940 - 294,000 tons
11th July 1940 - 343,000 tons
31st August 1940 - 404,000 tons
10th October 1940 - 424,000 tons
30th November 1940 - 440,000 tons

[MoGas]

MoGas, could you post a summary or even better images of the article you are referring to in english since it seems the magazine you are referring to requires a subscription.

Thanks, Bounder

It is written in german, but anyway, it is a story about the Supermarine Spitfire part 1 (part 2, follows next months) where they talk about early issues with the Spitfire and her problems.

"In the article it is written, that, since early 1940, WHEN possible, EVERY fighter Sqn, got 100 octan fuel!" ,"Since the end of 1939, the focused already on 100 octan fuel, to rise the performance on the engines" ,"The RAF used 100 octan since 1937 already, but it was limited very much, because, he was coming from the USA, and it was expensive"

I will scan the text, or page, but I dont like to fall in a copyright issue, if you know what I mean..

[Al Schlageter]

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachment.php?attachmentid=8655&d=1330023206

This graph is garbage as it includes 87 fuel issued to all RAF Commands. It is also unreferenced as to the source of the data plotted.

[TomcatViP]

Hi Bounder!,

The number of pages concerning the article (exception made of the 2 pages of adds) is only 3 pages p576 to 579. It seems for me that quoting the page was of no importance as I alrdy took great care of extracting for the reader AND in the same order what was the essential for the discussion.

That article was written at the occasion of the commemoration of 40 year of aero engine dev by RR and 50 years of History. The article is filled with 1 page add of RR. Obviously, we can understand that as it is today the article might hve been reviewed by RR !

The journalist of FLIGHT (H. F. K I N G , M . B . E) use a chronological order in his article and describe any major evolution of that engine IN THAT ORDER.

For example if he specified that 87 octane was the fuel grade in use at the time, when 100 oct fuel is introduced in an engine he noted the modification.

For example he clearly explains that if Hurri and Spits did rely on the Mk II and III, the Fulmar equipped with MkVIII could be fueled with 100 octane (with a max output power of 1080shp at T.O contrary to 1010 without - without meaning obviously with 87 ocatane ;) ).

On point 1: yes we are talking abt 1937. It's the beginning of the article that deal chronologically with the Merlin story.

To say that the 87 oct fuel was the normal fuel used at that date I am using the quote on point 7 saying that using 100 oct fuel the Merlin XX had a 9lb boost
The date I mentioned (remark that I didn't re-use the 1942 date as in the FLIGHT article) is in perspective with the service introduction of that engine as in my own memory.

Note also that there is no mention of any use of the XX engine in the Spitfire but one on how the process of introducing that level of improvement was difficult ("These figures represent an
increase of nearly 250 h.p. over the Merlin II of identical cylinder
dimensions, and illustrate in a convincing manner the technical
progress achieved by years of 'toil, tears and sweat,' to borrow a
classical phrase from our worthy Prime Minister.")

All that makes sense to me on the base of technical grounds.

The quote made out of the rest of article are there to put the subsequent development in perpective regarding SHP and boost with the ultimate being 25lb for the post war 131/132 on the Hornet.

Hence we have two door in the Merlin history acording to the article : one in 1937 for introduction of 87 octane (confirmed in 1940 with the mention made of the Fulmar using a special engine) and the other in 1941 (42 in Fligt article) for possibility of 100 octane usage in the mkXX.

After that date it's upon the reader to decide witch fuel was in use since the article does not mention any switch (witch I found interesting despite all the other details of the engine modifications) but it's another story ;)

Note also that in 1954, the merlin with 150000 units produced (all manufacturer included) represented more than 80% of all engines build by RR at the time (185000)

Source : http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1954/1954%20-%201286.html

[Bounder!]

Hi Bounder!,

The number of pages concerning the article (exception made of the 2 pages of adds) is only 3 pages p576 to 579. It seems for me that quoting the page was of no importance as I alrdy took great care of extracting for the reader AND in the same order what was the essential for the discussion.

That article was written at the occasion of the commemoration of 40 year of aero engine dev by RR and 50 years of History. The article is filled with 1 page add of RR. Obviously, we can understand that as it is today the article might hve been reviewed by RR !

The journalist of FLIGHT (H. F. K I N G , M . B . E) use a chronological order in his article and describe any major evolution of that engine IN THAT ORDER.

For example if he specified that 87 octane was the fuel grade in use at the time, when 100 oct fuel is introduced in an engine he noted the modification.

For example he clearly explains that if Hurri and Spits did rely on the Mk II and III, the Fulmar equipped with MkVIII could be fueled with 100 octane (with a max output power of 1080shp at T.O contrary to 1010 without - without meaning obviously with 87 ocatane ;) ).

On point 1: yes we are talking abt 1937. It's the beginning of the article that deal chronologically with the Merlin story.

To say that the 87 oct fuel was the normal fuel used at that date I am using the quote on point 7 saying that using 100 oct fuel the Merlin XX had a 9lb boost
The date I mentioned (remark that I didn't re-use the 1942 date as in the FLIGHT article) is in perspective with the service introduction of that engine as in my own memory.

Note also that there is no mention of any use of the XX engine in the Spitfire but one on how the process of introducing that level of improvement was difficult ("These figures represent an
increase of nearly 250 h.p. over the Merlin II of identical cylinder
dimensions, and illustrate in a convincing manner the technical
progress achieved by years of 'toil, tears and sweat,' to borrow a
classical phrase from our worthy Prime Minister.")

All that makes sense to me on the base of technical grounds.

The quote made out of the rest of article are there to put the subsequent development in perpective regarding SHP and boost with the ultimate being 25lb for the post war 131/132 on the Hornet.

Hence we have two door in the Merlin history acording to the article : one in 1937 for introduction of 87 octane (confirmed in 1940 with the mention made of the Fulmar using a special engine) and the other in 1941 (42 in Fligt article) for possibility of 100 octane usage in the mkXX.

After that date it's upon the reader to decide witch fuel was in use since the article does not mention any switch (witch I found interesting despite all the other details of the engine modifications) but it's another story ;)

Note also that in 1954, the merlin with 150000 units produced (all manufacturer included) represented more than 80% of all engines build by RR at the time (185000)

Source : http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1954/1954%20-%201286.html

You made broad statements claiming principally that 100 Octane fuel was not used by RAF fighter command during the Battle of Britain and to do this you used the article in Flight and listed quotes to support your argument. No where in that document is this stated at all i.e that 100 Octane fuel was not used during BoB.

The article covers the start of Rolls Royce and goes on to discuss the development of the Merlin engine. What I gather from your posts is that you are basing your argument that, when the Merlin II and III engines where first tested they used 87 Octane fuel, I have no problem with that. You are then saying that when the Merlin XX engine was introduced later in 1941 it ran on 100 Octane fuel, again I have no problem with that.

The problem I have with your argument is that it assumes Merin II or III engines could not or were not be modified to run on 100 Octane fuel – this is not stated in the article and is contrary to all the evidence posted in this thread and historical accounts showing that Spitfires and Hurricanes were converted to 100 Octane fuel before the Battle of Britain.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PS: Thanks MoGas, I wouldn't post any scans if it could cause copyright issues.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Just for the record, my concern regarding the whole 87 vs 100 Octane fuel stemmed from previous information that seemed to indicate at the time that CoD would not offer official models of the same aircraft with different octane fuel (link to post http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthread.php?p=389439#post389439). My worry is that if only one octane model per aircraft will officially be supported that we will get official models using 87 Octane fuel without corresponding models using 100 Octane. Given the overwhelming evidence of 100 Octane fuel used by Spitfires and Hurricanes during BoB against the complete lack of evidence for those aircraft flying combat sorties using 87 Octane fuel, having official models only using 87 octane would, in my opinion, be historically inaccurate.

I understand that once the SDK pack is released players could model their own variants and I feel that if people want to model 87 octane Spitfires and Hurricanes that would be great and allow for more choice, particularly in dynamic campaigns where the LW successfully target enough RAF fuel supplies, bases etc forcing RAF fighters into 87 Octane fighters. Also, I don’t have a problem with variants of the Spitfires and Hurricane we have in game modelled officially with both 87 and 100 Octane, then it’s up to the user / mission designer to pick. But if we can only have one variant per model, then it should in my opinion be the 100 Octane variant since all the evidence supports 100 Octane fuel use in BoB.

[41Sqn_Banks]

This is what Pips said about what he found when asked: "were the British deceiving to the Australians?"


So even Pips has his doubts about the factual truth of what he found.


Hi, was this a recent post was made by Pips, i.e. are you in contact with Pips? Could you provide the complete post or a link to the post (I assume it was made in the not public allaboutwarfare forum).

Thanks in advance :)

[Al Schlageter]

Yes Banks that was in the thread Barbi so loves to quote from. Pips, afaik, has not been from in years.

Sign up on the board. Lots of interesting info has been posted, though the board is rather dead now.

[TomcatViP]

You made broad statements claiming principally that 100 Octane fuel was not used by RAF fighter command during the Battle of Britain and to do this you used the article in Flight and listed quotes to support your argument. No where in that document is this stated at all i.e hat 100 Octane fuel was not used during BoB.

If it was not used no one will tell that it has not seen any use... C'mon ! DO you see flying car in the street ? What would you think if someone will tell you 70 years latter that car were flying as there is no proof of the contrary and that no one at the time as wrote that cars were not flying (for the future generations : I AM WRITING THIS IN THE EARLY 2012 AND CAN TESTIFY THAT NO CARS ARE FLYING AT THIS STAGE !) ?

humm remind me a movie with some monkeys, Bruce Willis and Brad Pitt ;)



The article covers the start of Royals Royce and goes on to discuss the development of the Merlin engine. What I gather from your posts is that you are basing your argument that, when the Merlin II and III engines where first tested they used 87 Octane fuel, I have no problem with that. You are then saying that when the Merlin XX engine was introduced later in 1941 it ran on 100 Octane fuel, again I have no problem with that.


I didn't say that - I said that the article write that once used with 100oct MkXX had a boost level of 9lb (what is confirmed by some source alrdy posted). Pls re-read the article


The problem I have with your argument is that it assumes Merin II or III engines could not or were not be modified to run on 100 Octane fuel – this is not stated in the article and is contrary to all the evidence posted in this thread and historical accounts showing that Spitfires and Hurricanes were converted to 100 Octane fuel before the Battle of Britain.



If it was the case, RR would have asked this to be included in that article and FLIGHT would have been proud to put that fact in their story.


But if we can only have one variant per model, then it should in my opinion be the 100 Octane variant since all the evidence supports 100 Octane fuel use in BoB.

That's an adventurous conclusion !

If they didn't make any mention of such "conversions" it's not because they wanted to hide it to the future WWII simmer of the early 21st century but perhaps because there was no such usage.

In the Au archive we have alrdy seen that 100 octane fuel was used to be blended with old stock of 74 octane fuel to produce 87, 90 or even 95 octane fuel.

Last but not least, when used in the MkVIII engine, the 100 octane fuel was not producing tremendous amount of extra power (1010 vs 1080).

[Osprey]

Forgive me when i say that i doubt some of the most invested posters in this thread would do the same, as i have a suspicion that many who support 100 octane Spits would denounce DB601N-equipped 110s and vice versa.



Most certainly not. If it was there then I want it. I think I speak for all RAF types when I say that they want accuracy and let the chips fall where they may. I fly Hurricanes, I am already expecting the 109 to have a big advantage on me, but I shall fight on because I want it how it was.

[lane]

Alec Harvey-Bailey, The Merlin in Perspective, (Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 1983) (http://www.enginehistory.org/Reviews/r-rht_hs01.shtml)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/merlin3-rating.jpg

"Alec Harvey-Bailey was in charge of Merlin engine defect investigation during WWII. In addition to examination of damaged engines, his role also involved development of engineering improvements and repairs. Harvey-Bailey made numerous visits to active squadrons and even flew aircraft when it was necessary to become familiar with particular problems."



Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/pilots-notes-merlin3-pg6.jpg

[Al Schlageter]

Tomcat please note the engines

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/ap1590b.jpg

[Osprey]

If it was not used no one will tell that it has not seen any use... C'mon ! DO you see flying car in the street ? What would you think if someone will tell you 70 years latter that car were flying as there is no proof of the contrary and that no one at the time as wrote that cars were not flying (for the future generations : I AM WRITING THIS IN THE EARLY 2012 AND CAN TESTIFY THAT NO CARS ARE FLYING AT THIS STAGE !) ?
humm remind me a movie with some monkeys, Bruce Willis and Brad Pitt ;)




http://img.ibtimes.com/www/data/images/full/2011/02/07/63654-flying-cars-set-to-hit-market-by-2012.jpg

;)

[NZtyphoon]

Through all his palaver KF is admitting he has not seen the Pips document himself, nor has anyone who has access to the all about warfare forum, so the preamble should read:

"This is from a researcher, researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a purported document, allegedly copied to the so-called "Australian Military Commission" in England in February 1941, allegedly by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook, allegedly outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was purported to be a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report allegedly titled "Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War;" although this has not yet been found in any of the Australian archives contacted.

The reason why it is allegedly included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was supposedly protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF; although no corroberating evidence to support this has been found. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all allegedly quoted parts from the report."

All the rest is smoke and mirrors by KF; plain fact is he pins 100% faith on a set of documents he has not seen or read, based on a short summary found on a forum, and Pips, who posted the material, has doubts about its veracity. Interesting

[TomcatViP]

;)

[Ernst]

1. The emergency use of the higher boost pressures up to 12 lbs./sq.in is now permitted for short periods by operation of the modified control cut-out.

12. The use, in an emergency, of this boost pressure is a definitive overload condition ...

Will the sim implement the bonus and the onus of such feature obligating pilots to use it wisely?

[Ernst]

No Kurfurst. You are not even an honest man. What would make you happy is if everyone agreed with your rhetoric wholeheartedly, that 100 octane was never used. This way you could be a bigger ace online.
Over time you have been forced into changing that view to admit it was used by at least some, but that is a battle lost as part of a wider war.

Let me put this other prosecutive angle on your theory for you (I made up a new word). You believe in the 109, you see it as superior and dislike the thought that it was matched, or worse, bettered. So you seek to discredit your foe as much as you can and display an enormous bias to the impartial viewer. Let us say that you are wholly correct and the 109 was as superior as you make out - in that case can you explain how the Luftwaffe was so decisively beaten? I can draw a conclusion given the superiority of the 109 in your world that the Luftwaffe pilots must've been rubbish. It can't be tactics, the RAF were hugely outnumbered and only had 300 Spitfires out of the 900 fighters, and the tactics only changed when Goering started to panic.

So what is your agenda? Are you just a bad virtual pilot or something?

I am sure that the Spitfire was little better than 109 in some aspects. But they were very well matched. The luftwaffe failure was not by the spitfire superiority as a fighter or tactics. But for many reasons.

Of the total of the 109s lost how many were lost simply because they did not come home due lack of fuel and not by being shot down? I will not be surprise if something more than 20% or 30% were lost this way.

[NZtyphoon]

Tomcat please note the engines

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/ap1590b.jpg

And note the dates: March 1940 and April 1940, respectively for the A.P.1590B
notes on the Merlin II & III and the Pilot's Notes.

Will the sim implement the bonus and the onus of such feature obligating pilots to use it wisely?

And will sim pilots have to note the use of overboost in the engine's log book?

[lane]

Air Commodore F. R. Banks, I Kept No Diary , Airlife Publications, Shrewsburg, 1978, Appendix II Fuel, pp 234-236

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/banks1.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/banks2.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/banks3.jpg

"With the coming of war, Banks entered the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve as a junior officer, being sent to work at the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE) at Boscombe Down, and with his previous work attracting the attention of Lord Beaverbrook, Banks was accredited as a 'troubleshooter' and given special powers. After a while, Banks was promoted to Air Commodore and was made successively, 'Director General of Engine Production', and 'Director of Engine Research and Development'.

[Ernst]

And note the dates: March 1940 and April 1940, respectively for the A.P.1590B
notes on the Merlin II & III and the Pilot's Notes.



And will sim pilots have to note the use of overboost in the engine's log book?

Nothing to do with this. My question is: Acctualy the pilots in the sim just fly with maximun power settings all the time and are not worried with engine safe. Even now with CEM the pilots could fly this way, the just have to maintain radiator and oil fully open.

[Ernst]

I mean the developers could program some weathering variable as function of how the pilot use their aircraft. The value of this variable could affect the aircraft in the next sorties and the risk of a malfunction will be higher. This has minor use in normal servers but in online wars with limited aircraft like adw or il2.org.ru this would make sense. The server program can as example numerate the disposable aircraft between 1 to n and at each sortie the weathering ll actualize for each one. The next pilot who picks that ac have higher chance to have problems etc. The commander of each squad can select some of this acs to go maintenance (then they become indisponible fot use for some time etc) reducing the weather variable. Do You understand what i am saying?

Actually in adw if you broke your ac you ll not have another until the high command send more to you. And this could last much time. My suggestion is that the developers include some feature where in an online war each pilot ll fly the same plane for many sorties and how they use the ac in the actual sortie ll influence the ac behaviour in the next. Just this... Obviously some have easier maintenance and are more rough for bad field conditions. One advantages of the 109 was the less maintenance time and cheaper to fix.

[NZtyphoon]

Nothing to do with this. My question is: Acctualy the pilots in the sim just fly with maximun power settings all the time and are not worried with engine safe. Even now with CEM the pilots could fly this way, the just have to maintain radiator and oil fully open.

Totally tongue in cheek, but I know what you mean...the limit for +12 Boost was set at 5 minutes: on a Spitfire the throttle lever was gated with a thin wire which the pilot pushed forward through to gain maximum boost; the boost cut-out control was mounted on the side of the throttle assembly. (see attachment 1: attachment 2; power curve for Merlin III courtesy http://www.spitfireperformance.com) As the Pilot's notes show the pilot had to report the use of +12 and a note was added to the engine's log book.

[Glider]

This is what Pips said about what he found when asked: "were the British deceiving to the Australians?"



So even Pips has his doubts about the factual truth of what he found.

(It seems that the one accusing others of being selective is himself being selective.) tut tut

There is certainly evidence that this was a deception for British stocks of 100 octane fuel was:

30th September 1939 - 153,000 tons
27th February 1940 - 220,000 tons
31st May 1940 - 294,000 tons
11th July 1940 - 343,000 tons
31st August 1940 - 404,000 tons
10th October 1940 - 424,000 tons
30th November 1940 - 440,000 tons

I think its worth remembering that consumption in May-July averaged 10,000 tons a month. So imports between 1 June and 31 August must have been approx 140,000 tons (stocks plus consumption) and consumption was about 21.5% of imports.

By the same token on the 11th July pretty much the peak of the fightng the UK had a stockpile of just under 3 years.

Pips and Kurfurst may believe this is a shortage, if it is, I wish my bank balance had this kind of shortage.

[NZtyphoon]

Looking at the weekly issues of 100 Octane. There seemed to be a lull in FC operations in the week prior to the invasion of France, and then the fuel issued jumps to 3,600 tons, starting May 23, as BEF and home-based fighter units, and Blenheim units were intensifying operations. Because these amounts of 100 Octane fuel was being issued it can be safely assumed that there was no drastic need to go back to 87 Octane fuel, as the Pips memo alleges. Naturally 87 Octane issues increased as all of the RAF Commands intensified their operations.

ie: Bomber Command
Coastal Command
Army Co-Operation Command

[lane]

I think its worth remembering that consumption in May-July averaged 10,000 tons a month. So imports between 1 June and 31 August must have been approx 140,000 tons (stocks plus consumption) and consumption was about 21.5% of imports. By the same token on the 11th July pretty much the peak of the fightng the UK had a stockpile of just under 3 years.

That's very interesting. Thank you Glider for taking the time to sort through the numbers and put them in perspective.

[Crumpp]

We still disputing the words for "selected units" to convert by counting fuel stockpiles??

:grin:

[lane]

I know that and I thank you for your posting, but it cannot be questioned that central to the Pips position is that there was a shortage. All I am asking is for Kurfurst to provide any evidence, that any part of the UK government, any department, considered there to be a shortage of 100 octane for FC, at any time during the BOB.

There are a raft of papers to the contrary and I could add a load more to your posting but I am not asking Kurfurst for that, I am just asking him to provide one paper, just one, that says there was a shortage.

It shouldn't be that difficult, hundreds of papers, books, articles, personal memories, histories have been written about the battle. There must be one that agrees with him.

Hi Glider:

I greatly appreciate the efforts you've made and the documents you have shared regarding the Battle of Britain and 100 octane fuel. As for the other business, it may be advisable to keep in mind the insight and wisdom found in camber's post 448 (http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=395232&postcount=448). I believe you've adequately addressed the alleged shortage in your post 475 (http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpost.php?p=395498&postcount=475) above.

[Al Schlageter]

We still disputing the words for "selected units" to convert by counting fuel stockpiles??

:grin:

:rolleyes: No Eugene. I know you have difficulties at times but the counting of stockpiles is to show that there was no shortage of 100 fuel despite what Australia, Pips and Barbi say.

[lane]

Chart below from: A.C. Lovely, Development of the Rolls-Royce Merlin from 1939 to 1945, Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Volume 18 Issue 7, July, 1946 (pp. 218 - 226) (http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=0002-2667&volume=18&issue=7)
Or alternately here (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/merlin-lovesey.pdf).

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Lovesey-fig24.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/Lovesey.jpg

[ACE-OF-ACES]

:rolleyes: No Eugene. I know you have difficulties at times but the counting of stockpiles is to show that there was no shortage of 100 fuel despite what Australia, Pips and Barbi say.
Exactally

[Talisman]

So we have a 100 Octane denier here and there. To deny something against all the evidence is a human thing. It happens and we have to accept that. Someone who has committed a crime will often deny it, even though they know they are guilty. People even deny huge world events, despite the evidence, like the holocaust in WWII. I suppose that, sometimes, the denier might like the attention they can draw to themselves or they just have fun making mischief, or have a particular agenda. Anyway, I would like to leave the 100 Octane denier’s to one side for a moment, as they will not change their view even if taken back in a time machine. The point I would like to raise is why have the developers of CloD not included the Battle of Britain historically correct Spitfire and Hurricane to the 100 Octane modified specification? Was it a calculated decision and if so, why? Was it a genuine mistake? Was it just too hard to do? Do they intend not to provide a 100 Octane Hurricane in the BoM sequel so thought they would not bother with it in BoB? Does anyone have any thoughts on this? Perhaps if any developers are reading this they might care to respond? Is 100 Octane to be ignored? What a shame if it is ignored. I would not like to see aviation history and any other aircraft, red or blue, treated this way in a flight sim.

[TomcatViP]

Tali,

with all my respect you might hve been too far inadvertantly.

Pls edit your post.

[lane]

So we have a 100 Octane denier here and there. To deny something against all the evidence is a human thing. It happens and we have to accept that. Someone who has committed a crime will often deny it, even though they know they are guilty. People even deny huge world events, despite the evidence, like the holocaust in WWII. I suppose that, sometimes, the denier might like the attention they can draw to themselves or they just have fun making mischief, or have a particular agenda. Anyway, I would like to leave the 100 Octane denier’s to one side for a moment, as they will not change their view even if taken back in a time machine. The point I would like to raise is why have the developers of CloD not included the Battle of Britain historically correct Spitfire and Hurricane to the 100 Octane modified specification? Was it a calculated decision and if so, why? Was it a genuine mistake? Was it just too hard to do? Do they intend not to provide a 100 Octane Hurricane in the BoM sequel so thought they would not bother with it in BoB? Does anyone have any thoughts on this? Perhaps if any developers are reading this they might care to respond? Is 100 Octane to be ignored? What a shame if it is ignored. I would not like to see aviation history and any other aircraft, red or blue, treated this way in a flight sim.

Absolutely beautifully written and brilliant post Talisman! Salute!

[Crumpp]

the counting of stockpiles

Yeah the same folks with the same "evidence" and agenda also used the same method of looking at stockpiles to "prove" 100/150 grade fuel was the "standard" fuel of the RAF.

All so that people's favorite WWII computer game-shape could be altered to give them an advantage. Nothing at all to do with serious historical research, just gamers wishing.

The truth and the history of 100/150 grade use turned out to be vastly different from what was presented despite the fact England did have significant stockpiles of the fuel in anticipation of widespread use that never occurred.

Nobody has denied that 100 grade was used during the BoB. The extent is what is in question. The only direct evidence from the RAF of the extent of usage we have states quite clearly "selected" units and "those units involved".

That is the simple facts. Everything else is speculation.

I don't know and unlike some do not pretend to know the answer. I just know what the RAF documentation says on its use.

I also know I use 100 grade fuel every time I fly and that is all that matters to me!! I certainly wish it was cheaper though.

Maybe you can find some stockpiles, somewhere? ;)

[NZtyphoon]

Yeah the same folks with the same "evidence" and agenda also used the same method of looking at stockpiles to "prove" 100/150 grade fuel was the "standard" fuel of the RAF.

All so that people's favorite WWII computer game-shape could be altered to give them an advantage. Nothing at all to do with serious historical research, just gamers wishing.

The truth and the history of 100/150 grade use turned out to be vastly different from what was presented despite the fact England did have significant stockpiles of the fuel in anticipation of widespread use that never occurred.

Nobody has denied that 100 grade was used during the BoB. The extent is what is in question. The only direct evidence from the RAF of the extent of usage we have states quite clearly "selected" units and "those units involved".

That is the simple facts. Everything else is speculation.

I don't know and unlike some do not pretend to know the answer. I just know what the RAF documentation says on its use.

I also know I use 100 grade fuel every time I fly and that is all that matters to me!! I certainly wish it was cheaper though.

Maybe you can find some stockpiles, somewhere? ;)

I cannot comment on the 100/150 debate, just what's happened in this thread:

Historical research rarely comes up with 100% proof that such and such an event happened, why such and such an event happened, or how events unfolded. It is generally accepted, for example, that the Roman legions of Varus were destroyed by Arminius' German forces in 9 AD, in the so-called Teutoburg Forest, because of far more fragmentary evidence than that provided here. The big mystery for nearly 2,000 years was where was the battle site? It wasn't until 1987 that archaeologists brought up evidence that the battle site was nowhere near the forest.

The weight of evidence provided in this thread is more than enough to show that 100 octane fuel was in use by more than Barbi's ""selected" units:

Those who believe that only a select group of units used 100 octane fuel have not come up with any evidence that 87 octane fuel was still being used in combat by front-line Fighter Command units during the B of B (Blenheim nightfighter units, which were still using Mk Is, were still using 87 Octane).

The main document which lies behind most of this, the "Pips memo" has not even been seen by the main protagonist, just a summary by Pips on another forum, yet Barbi pins 100% faith on this unseen document, the discussion of which is on a locked, membership only thread on another forum. Another member of this forum who now has access, says that Pip himself had doubts about its veracity. Such "evidence" is of questionable value.

[Al Schlageter]

Selective reading, faulty memory and faulty reading comprehension, as usual, on your part Eugene. It was not just the RAF that used the 150 fuel but the USAAF's 8th AF FC.

So tell me Eugene what happened to the 77,100 tons of 100 octane fuel that was issued in 1940 til the end of Oct? The ~50,000 tons consumed must have been burned in the pilots cars and motorcycles. :)

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/weekly-issues-100octane.jpg

The only direct evidence from the RAF of the extent of usage we have states quite clearly "selected" units and "those units involved".

Sure Eugene. Pilot's combat reports and unit diaries don't count. :rolleyes:

All so that people's favorite WWII computer game-shape could be altered to give them an advantage. Nothing at all to do with serious historical research, just gamers wishing.

:rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

***********************

These names below were mentioned earlier in this thread.

In the AAW thread Pips also said:

I believe that McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

Please take note of the " I believe".

[Glider]

I think I can add a little to the debate re the use of the words selected.

Kurfurst is correct in sayinig that I first posted this paper. What he hasn't done is show you all the papers in the stream which will at least give everyone the whole picture.

First some backgrouind. The conversion of FC to 100 Octane had started at the end of 1939 and was dependent on the supply of 100 octane being available at the fighter stations. However the process was that the current fuel 87 octane would be used up and replaced with 100 octane. As a result the stations and squadrons actual conversion would differ.

By February from combat records, station records we know that about 18 squadrons had converted.
At the 5th Meeting of the Oil Committee held on 24th February in item 9 of the summary of conclusions, the ACAS (Assistant to the Chief of the Air Staff) requested that Fighters and Blenheims should use 100 Octane fuel. Paper attached. Note there is no limitation or selection involved. It also recognised that this would involve the active transfer of fuel

At the 6th Meeting held on the 6th April 1940 the magic word Certain is used. (Do I wish they had used something else, you bet.). This comes up in the actions from the 5th Meeting prepared for the 6th meeting. Paper attached.
However in the Summary for the minutes of the 6th meeting it clearly states 'That the policy will be that in the very near future all aircraft in operational units will be running on 100 Octane Fuel but that there is no intention to turn this fuel over to training units.. Paper attached.

In the 7th Meeting of the Oil Committee held on 18th May in the Summary of Conclusions is states Satisfaction was expressed that the fact that the units concerned had now been stocked with the necessary 100 Octane Fuel paper attached.

It is my belief that when they say concerned they are referring to the operational units that had not in February already been converted to 100 octane and excluded the training units.

[Glider]

I should add that I have looked at most of the squadron record of units that formed after May 1940 and that I checked their records up to May 1941. In none of those records was there any mention of converting to 100 octane or CS props.

This has two impacts
1) As the papers state for the 7th meeting confirm that the units concerned had been stocked with 100 octane then it was the norm, that the units formed after May started with 100 Octane so why should they mention it.
2) If the role out had been halted as per pips and Kurfursts belief and restarted in September, then this would have shown in the squadron records.

I can only say that the case for the 100% use of 100 octane in the BOB is a strong one, not a perfect one. However there is no evidence to say that any unit went into combat in the BOB using 87 octane.

There will always be those that doubt but they cannot support their position apart from making the most of the chink of doubt left in peoples mind.

Its also worth repeating that I have been all through the Air Minestry files, the Oil Co ordination Committee file, the Chief of the Air Staffs papers both committee and private files and of course the War Cabinet file. None of these have any mention of a halting of the role out, of any shortage or any restart. If anyone believes that RAF squadrons went into combat using 87 octane then prove it.

[Crumpp]

Historical research rarely comes up with 100% proof

Nothing in this thread has convinced me anything other than we do not have enough information.

As an example, Read what Shacklady and Morgan have to say about the 100 Octane fuel.

1. Strategic Fuel Reserve was to be 800,000 tons on hand before ANY aircraft flew using the fuel.

2. Sixteen fighter squadrons and two bomber squadrons were to begin using the fuel in September 1940.

If you look at the consumption figures, you will see it is not until September 1940 that 100 octane consumption begins to equal half of the total fuel consumption.

16 squadrons is just over 1/3 of Fighter Command and our multi engine bombers of course consume more fuel proportional to the number of engines.

You can really see the drop in consumption of 87 Octane after September, 1940. Which also begs to ask, who is using all the 87 octane during July and August of the BoB???

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthread.php?t=20110&page=23

Point is you can speculate until the cows come home. Without a document saying listing it as the specified fuel, this is all assumption.

I am out of this debate at this point. There is nothing intelligent to discuss about it until a fuel specification order or something saying all units are to use it is found. All that can be said as a fact is the RAF transitioned from 87 Octane to 100 Octane by early 1941. Have fun guys and enjoy what you do.

[Blackdog_kt]

Nothing in this thread has convinced me anything other than we do not have enough information.


That's pretty much my take on things too.

I mean, it's pretty obvious 100 octane was used during the BoB, i just can't be sure, in the academically justified sense of the word, about the exact extent and timeframe of its use with the information we have in hand.

That's one of the reasons i would like to see both versions (87 and 100 octane) modeled in the sim.

[NZtyphoon]

Nothing in this thread has convinced me anything other than we do not have enough information.

Read what Shacklady and Morgan have to say about the 100 Octane fuel.

1. Strategic Fuel Reserve was to be 800,000 tons on hand before ANY aircraft flew using the fuel.

2. Sixteen fighter squadrons and two bomber squadrons were to begin using the fuel in September 1940.

If you look at the consumption figures, you will see it is not until September 1940 that 100 octane consumption begins to equal half of the total fuel consumption.

16 squadrons is just over 1/3 of Fighter Command and our multi engine bombers of course consume more fuel proportional to the number of engines.

You can really see the drop in consumption of 87 Octane after September, 1940.

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthread.php?t=20110&page=23
Once again you are quoting from a March 1939 document which bears no relationship to what actually happened in 1940;

Multi engine bombers, apart from some Blenheims - which were using 87 octane as well as 100 octane fuel - were still using 87 octane, including Wellingtons, Whitleys and Hampdens. Did you notice that these bombers were engaged in intensive operations against targets in Germany, and against French shipping ports holding concentrations of landing barges etc? Then there is Coastal Command to consider.

What on earth do you mean by "If you look at the consumption figures, you will see it is not until September 1940 that 100 octane consumption begins to equal half of the total fuel consumption." Heavy bombers using 87 octane fuel? Do the maths.

[lane]

<...>The ~50,000 tons consumed must have been burned in the pilots cars and motorcycles. :)

Well, some of the pilots noted using 100 octane in thier cars, but 50,000 tons worth? I doubt it!

Tony Bartley DFC, Smoke Trails in the Sky, (Crecy Publishing Limited, Wilmslow, Cheshire, 1997), p. 35.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/bartley-100oct.jpg

Tim Vigors DFC, Life’s Too Short to Cry, (Grub Street, London, 2006), p. 137.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/vigors-100octane.jpg

[Glider]

Nothing in this thread has convinced me anything other than we do not have enough information.

As an example, Read what Shacklady and Morgan have to say about the 100 Octane fuel.

1. Strategic Fuel Reserve was to be 800,000 tons on hand before ANY aircraft flew using the fuel.


Using that approach the UK used 87 octane to the end of the war.
2. Sixteen fighter squadrons and two bomber squadrons were to begin using the fuel in September 1940.

Pity about the combat reports we have from 34 squadrons
If you look at the consumption figures, you will see it is not until September 1940 that 100 octane consumption begins to equal half of the total fuel consumption.

That is because permission for all combat comands to use 100 octane wasn't given until August 1940. So of course consumption would increase.

16 squadrons is just over 1/3 of Fighter Command and our multi engine bombers of course consume more fuel proportional to the number of engines.

You can really see the drop in consumption of 87 Octane after September, 1940. Which also begs to ask, who is using all the 87 octane during July and August of the BoB???

The Bombers of Bomber Command and aircraft of Coastal command who were not allowed to use 100 Octane until August.

Point is you can speculate until the cows come home. Without a document saying listing it as the specified fuel, this is all assumption.

I am out of this debate at this point. There is nothing intelligent to discuss about it until a fuel specification order or something saying all units are to use it is found. All that can be said as a fact is the RAF transitioned from 87 Octane to 100 Octane by early 1941. Have fun guys and enjoy what you do.

Paper attached re the authority for all combat commands to use 100 Octane in August attached.

You are the first person I have come across who calls official original documents held in the National Archives speculation.

[TomcatViP]

Can we lock this thread ?

Nothing as come new and every pages is wallowed by huge images of the same "pieces of evidence".

I won't matter of this if only the insults were not part of the debate. Sadly it's not.

I guess that some hve blended an inch of 100 octane in their milk :evil:

[Al Schlageter]

2. Sixteen fighter squadrons and two bomber squadrons were to begin using the fuel in September 1940.

By Month (Total 23 Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons for which I have found using 100 fuel before Aug 1940)

No. 32 Squadron pre BoB H
No. 92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 111 Squadron pre BoB H
No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940 H
No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 609 (West Riding) Squadron pre BoB S

No. 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 3 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 17 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 19 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 54 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 74 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 73 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 85 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 229 Squadron May 1940 H

No. 43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 H
No. 41 Squadron June 1940 S
No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 S
No. 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 S

No. 145 Squadron July 1940 H

Now what were you saying Eugene. :rolleyes:

[lane]

Film of "The Daily Inspection of the Spitfire". Copies may be obtained from the Imperial War Museum (http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/100020765) (35 mm).

The aircraft being serviced is a 609 Squadron Spitfire I R6692 - first flight 3 June 40, 609 Sqdn 7 June 1940, Struck off charge Cat E 2 Sept 1940.
The aircraft is shown in a pre Battle of Britain white and black underside paint scheme. Note the 100 painted on the fuselage at the fuel tank location.
(Some Operations Record Books such as 602 Squadron's ORB (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/602-paint-15june40.jpg) noted a switch to all duck egg blue underside paint scheme in mid June.) 609 Squadron was stationed at Northholt during June of 1940 when the instructional film was shot.

Still taken from the film:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/609-spitfire-I-100oct-1b.jpg

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tyJiAdMD8AM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nv2x6RQxFDo

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZUnun6QmVXk

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5__b34cEORE

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ObQ4aoRT50

[NZtyphoon]

I should add that I have looked at most of the squadron record of units that formed after May 1940 and that I checked their records up to May 1941. In none of those records was there any mention of converting to 100 octane or CS props....

Its also worth repeating that I have been all through the Air Minestry files, the Oil Co ordination Committee file, the Chief of the Air Staffs papers both committee and private files and of course the War Cabinet file. None of these have any mention of a halting of the role out, of any shortage or any restart. If anyone believes that RAF squadrons went into combat using 87 octane then prove it.

Interesting how few papers, or little other evidence, has been presented by those who subscribe to the notion that the RAF purportedly refused to issue 100 octane fuel to about 2/3rds of its fighter units, while complaining that there is little evidence to the contrary presented by people who have actually spent hours physically searching the archives, and have posted the results ad nauseum.

Nor have these people explained how the RAF prevented none but "concerned" or "selected units", 16 squadrons, from using the fuel?

To KF, VIP et al:

Could you please explain in concise detail how the RAF selected the 16 squadrons, and how the RAF made sure that only 16 squadrons at a time used 100 Octane fuel, and could you provide documented evidence of the processes and logistics used by the RAF to ensure that only 16 squadrons at a time were allowed to use the fuel during the B of B?

Could you please provide some documented evidence that there was a shortage of 100 octane fuel during July, August, such that FC had to stop using the fuel?

Could you please provide documentary evidence of FC pilots (apart from Gladiators, NF Blenheims and Whirlwinds) using 87 octane fuel in combat between July and September 1940?

Pleeease???

[NZtyphoon]

Film of "The Daily Inspection of the Spitfire". Copies may be obtained from the http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/100020765 Imperial War Museum.

There is a DVD including "The Daily Inspection of the Spitfire", and 3 other IWM Spitfire films: http://www.iwmshop.org.uk/product/15406/Spitfire_Frontline_Fighter