Ju-87G Stuka

[Furio]

Originally Posted by gaunt1

Here you go:
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/t...e-performance/

total losses are 96.500 tanks and SP guns.

source: G.F. Krivosheev , et al, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, Greenhill Books, London, 1997. p. 253, table 95.

No breakdown for these unfortunately. But one thing is sure, more than 25.000 of them can be attributed to a single type, the most successful tank killer of WW2: the StuG III.

I’ve carefully read this page, and others in the same site, including one that deals with our very topic: effectiveness of anti tank aircrafts versus tanks. Overall, the feeling is that the author read a lot of books, but didn’t do any first hand research. He then plays with available numbers (just like me…) and draws his conclusions, but the lack of direct research cast doubts about the reliability of these conclusions. They are good when he chooses a good source, but we can only have or have not faith in his choices.
That said, author cites reports from Research and Analysis teams entering combat areas, once they were secured, to verify the real effect of weapons and tactics on the battlefield. Or, to put it simply: to compare claims and reality. He cited two cases: Normandy 1,944 and Kursk 1,943 from German side. Somewhat confusing, he then analyses overall result of Soviet ground attack aircrafts for the whole war, basing his evaluation mainly on German reports.
The results are:
4-5% kill-claim ratios for Allied in Normandy, with an overclaiming of 95%, mostly by Typhoons.
2-5% for Germans at Kursk, overclaiming of 95% at best, mostly by Hs129s and Ju87Gs.
6-7% for Russian in the whole war, overclaiming of 93 %, mostly by Il2 and Pe2.
For what is worth, I read elsewhere the same analysis result about Normandy. It is perhaps significant that Russians, with the less specialized Shturmoviks and Peshkas, obtained the best results, but I doubt that the word “best” can be used for such dismal performances. The author cited as the probable causes:
Primitive gun sighting.
Poor precision of unguided rockets.
Very limited ammunition load for cannons, and very low rate of fire.
Very short useful times for target acquisition, sighting, firing and assessing results, all the while manoeuvring to avoid anti aircraft fire.
All of the above looks reasonable to me, and I would add the effect of dust and smoke on visibility, and of wind and typical low-level turbulence on sighting for slow aircraft with relatively low wing loading.
However, in all those analysis (as surely in my posts too) the author makes some suspicious mistakes. For example, talks abut the Il2 and Il10 as being specialized anti-tank types, while they were multi purpose CAS types, with the exception of the Il2-37 with 37 mm cannons, built in relatively small numbers and only briefly employed.
Elsewhere, while debunking the T34 myth, he says: “In addition, USAAF and RAF gave the Russians air superiority for the first time (in 1,944)”. This is clearly absurd, as no USAAF or RAF units were fighting in Russia. I suspect he was implying that the indirect effects of bombing offensive on Western Front should be factored, but then the reverse is equally true, as Russians kept busy Luftwaffe forces that otherwise would have been available against USAAF/RAF bomber offensive. In a “what if” folly, he says that Russia would have lost war in 1,941 if not saved by Lend Lease help received in subsequent years. I have a better “What if”. Demoralised by shameful defeats and appalling losses, Stalin committed suicide in October 1,941, Soviet Union surrendered and Germany conquered the world.
We should always be sceptical about everything: Rudel’s claims and historical analysis by book readers, like we all are.