Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[winny]

All pages taken from the National Archive, from various weekly or monthly Oil Position reports.
All are available free to download from the NA's website.




from the same report












Consumption from start of war.


What shortage are we talking about...?

[Crumpp]

So what about the combat reports that show the use of +12 boost, which was only allowed in when 100 octane fuel was used?

Those are good evidence only when placed in context in a timeline. Without context, they are useless.

[fruitbat]

they show the date.

[Crumpp]

Originally Posted by fruitbat

they show the date.

Yes and they tell you that unit was using the fuel on that date. They don't say "All Operational Units" nor do they say if the unit was using it on any other day.

Again, the 1942 Pilots Operating Notes for the Spitfire Mk I is a damning piece of evidence against the claim "All Operational Units".

[fruitbat]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Yes and they tell you that unit was using the fuel on that date. They don't say "All Operational Units" nor do they say if the unit was using it on any other day.

Again, the 1942 Pilots Operating Notes for the Spitfire Mk I is a damning piece of evidence against the claim "All Operational Units".

And how many units were actually flying the Mk1 in 1942, lol.

[Crumpp]

Originally Posted by winny

All pages taken from the National Archive, from various weekly or monthly Oil Position reports.
All are available free to download from the NA's website.




from the same report












Consumption from start of war.


What shortage are we talking about...?

Interesting but you cannot answer operational questions with logistical answers.

If you compare the fuel at the airfields in September 1939 with the strategic reserves of 87 Octane you can get an idea of the ratio's they used.

Usually it is about 40:1 between Strategic Reserves and point of use. 16,000 tons at the airfields in September thru November 1939 leaves us ~8,000 tons per month.

Strategic Reserves of 87 Octane from 31 August 1939 to 7 December 1939 is (323,000 + 309,00)/2 = 316,000 tons

316,000 tons / 8,000 tons = 35.5

Now, they will maintain that ratio as best they can. It represents the 18 weeks of fuel in reserve.

So with 146,000 tons of fuel, roughly 3825 tons was usable. Now that 8,000 tons per month is training and administrative flying, not operational. When the war starts, 3825 tons is less than a quarter of the fuel required to conduct operational, training, and administrative flying.

Anyway, it is interesting but not applicable because it is logistical documentation and not operational.

[Crumpp]

And how many units were actually flying the Mk1 in 1942, lol.

Exactly Fruitbat....

It is an indicator of the importance of the change over to 100 Octane.

Do you really think if it occurred earlier they would not have immediately republished the Operating Notes?

Of course they would have republished them. It was a legal requirement from the Air Ministry by convention and our June 1940 Pilots Operating Notes would appear with the same notation for "ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS - 100 OCTANE ONLY".

The fact none of the operational documentation reflects that notation prior to January 1942 is a huge indicator.

[41Sqn_Banks]

Here's the page from the "June, 1940" Pilot's Notes that specifies the fuel (which actually is from "May, 1940" as can be seen in the "List of Content" of Section 1).

[winny]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Interesting but you cannot answer operational questions with logistical answers.

If you compare the fuel at the airfields in September 1939 with the strategic reserves of 87 Octane you can get an idea of the ratio's they used.

Usually it is about 40:1 between Strategic Reserves and point of use. 16,000 tons at the airfields in September thru November 1939 leaves us ~8,000 tons per month.

Strategic Reserves of 87 Octane from 31 August 1939 to 7 December 1939 is (323,000 + 309,00)/2 = 316,000 tons

316,000 tons / 8,000 tons = 35.5

Now, they will maintain that ratio as best they can. It represents the 18 weeks of fuel in reserve.

So with 146,000 tons of fuel, roughly 3825 tons was usable. Now that 8,000 tons per month is training and administrative flying, not operational. When the war starts, 3825 tons is less than a quarter of the fuel required to conduct operational, training, and administrative flying.

Anyway, it is interesting but not applicable because it is logistical documentation and not operational.

Absolute rubbish. I posted these documents in response to the repeated claims made that there was a shortage of 100 octane fuel. There wasn't.

So, you're saying that the British sat on over 100,000 tons of fuel because they needed a reserve? When the threat of invasion was looming...?
.

For operational documentation see the combat reports.