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FM/DM threads Everything about FM/DM in CoD |
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#1
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The report quoted by 'gbailey' deals only with German 87 octane fuel samples, and the subsequent papers deal with German 100 octane fuel samples. But they are prepared by the same people - D. A. Howes of Anglo American Oil for example is listed just the same in samples I have posted - in the same format, and follow each other in the files, and reference to the other reports, so its very hard to miss the fact that you are not looking at the whole paper. Of course if you are set out to prove that the American contribution of high octane aviation fuel was not significant, and the Brits could do it all by themselves, you might also want to 'prove', by omitting otherwise available information that those poor Germans had to do with whatever British 100 octane stock they could find. Of course such views become very comical, when you know that Germany was producing domestically all its 100 octane needs, while Britain was importing it or later given by Lend-Lease, and in fact that British desire in 1938 for 100 octane was fueled by fear that German synthetic plans could essentially produce as much 100 octane as they wanted, and Britain did not want to be left behind in the technology race. Either its quite simply intellectually dishonest to say the Germans had nothing else but 87 octane fuel, and relied on captured British 100 octane stock, because a report on German 87 octane fuel samples - surprise surprise! - lists only 87 octane fuel samples and one British 100 octane sample. Especially when the next report in the pile of papers says that German 100 octane fuel samples were found in 110s, 88s etc. in the same period. That may even be a honest mistake, but in that case the 'research' was very superficial and amateurish. Either case, whoever he is, his opinion is sadly mistaken and instead of addressing it and admitting the mistakes, he resorts to incivility and thin verbal diarrhea. I would also like to know your version. Do you believe the Germans did not use 100 octane in the Battle of Britain? Do you believe that the only 100 octane they had access to was captured British stocks? Quote:
But let's forget about the 2nd TAF. I've just found a rather interesting table which shows the ratio of combat hours and non-operational hours flown by a plane sorties/time for planes on hand with combat units (i.e. the ones in OTU, storage, manufacturer's flight testing is not included) in mid-1943. http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/Tom%2...0Item%201A.pdf For Spitfires in NW Africa, an average of 13.2 combat sorties were flown per plane per month, the average combat hours flown per month per plane was 18.5 hours, the non-operational hours flown per month per plane was 19.7 hours. Hourly consumption was 49.7 gallons/hour. The ratio for P-47s in the UK was very similar, it was 16.3 hours per month for combat sorties and 17.3 for non-operational flights. So combat sorties amounted quite typically to about just 40% of the total consumption. The remaining 60% is non-operational flights in combat units, which none of your calculations take into account, nor the requirements of bomber command's Blenheim Sqns.
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Il-2Bugtracker: Feature #200: Missing 100 octane subtypes of Bf 109E and Bf 110C http://www.il2bugtracker.com/issues/200 Il-2Bugtracker: Bug #415: Spitfire Mk I, Ia, and Mk II: Stability and Control http://www.il2bugtracker.com/issues/415 Kurfürst - Your resource site on Bf 109 performance! http://kurfurst.org ![]() |
#2
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I haven't read the paper but trust official documents I do not doubt that the same people prepared later papers but we are looking at the BB period Quote:
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Last edited by Glider; 04-20-2012 at 02:25 PM. |
#3
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The papers say the British obtained four samples of German produced synthethic C-3 in the BoB period: Sample GF 28 from a Ju 88, in 'Summer of 1940'. Sample 40/41 from a Bf 110, on '27 September 1940'. Sample GF 31 from a Bf 110, in 'Automn 1940'. Sample GF 32 from a Bf 110, in 'Automn 1940'. All of these were samples of German produced 100 octane fuel. Summer of 1940, 27 September 1940, Automn of 1940 does sound like BoB period to me. They list one sample of what is believed captured British 100 octane. Denial in the face of this evidence is beyond comic. ![]() Quote:
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That's more than enough for me to assert his level of credibility, whoever he is. Quote:
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Its interesting though. You claim all British fighter squadrons were using 100 octane during the Battle and deny that the Germans were using their own 100 octane at the same time. A not so well hidden agenda perhaps..? Quote:
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Il-2Bugtracker: Feature #200: Missing 100 octane subtypes of Bf 109E and Bf 110C http://www.il2bugtracker.com/issues/200 Il-2Bugtracker: Bug #415: Spitfire Mk I, Ia, and Mk II: Stability and Control http://www.il2bugtracker.com/issues/415 Kurfürst - Your resource site on Bf 109 performance! http://kurfurst.org ![]() |
#4
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All pages taken from the National Archive, from various weekly or monthly Oil Position reports.
All are available free to download from the NA's website. ![]() ![]() from the same report ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Consumption from start of war. ![]() What shortage are we talking about...? Last edited by winny; 04-20-2012 at 04:47 PM. |
#5
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#6
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they show the date.
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#7
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Yes and they tell you that unit was using the fuel on that date. They don't say "All Operational Units" nor do they say if the unit was using it on any other day.
Again, the 1942 Pilots Operating Notes for the Spitfire Mk I is a damning piece of evidence against the claim "All Operational Units". |
#8
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If you compare the fuel at the airfields in September 1939 with the strategic reserves of 87 Octane you can get an idea of the ratio's they used. Usually it is about 40:1 between Strategic Reserves and point of use. 16,000 tons at the airfields in September thru November 1939 leaves us ~8,000 tons per month. Strategic Reserves of 87 Octane from 31 August 1939 to 7 December 1939 is (323,000 + 309,00)/2 = 316,000 tons 316,000 tons / 8,000 tons = 35.5 Now, they will maintain that ratio as best they can. It represents the 18 weeks of fuel in reserve. So with 146,000 tons of fuel, roughly 3825 tons was usable. Now that 8,000 tons per month is training and administrative flying, not operational. When the war starts, 3825 tons is less than a quarter of the fuel required to conduct operational, training, and administrative flying. Anyway, it is interesting but not applicable because it is logistical documentation and not operational. |
#9
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It is an indicator of the importance of the change over to 100 Octane. Do you really think if it occurred earlier they would not have immediately republished the Operating Notes? Of course they would have republished them. It was a legal requirement from the Air Ministry by convention and our June 1940 Pilots Operating Notes would appear with the same notation for "ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS - 100 OCTANE ONLY". The fact none of the operational documentation reflects that notation prior to January 1942 is a huge indicator. |
#10
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Here's the page from the "June, 1940" Pilot's Notes that specifies the fuel (which actually is from "May, 1940" as can be seen in the "List of Content" of Section 1).
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