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#26
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For example, the same rhetoric can be applied to the population of a middle eastern nation: "The western allies attacked Iraq on the pretext of WMDs, which has been proven false, hence we're suspicious that it was done for other reasons. How long should we sit idly by and watch while they compartmentalize the invasion of neighboring friendly states in easy-to-chew-off chunks and how long before it's our turn? Maybe we should all strike back at once if we want to have a chance at overwhelming them and stopping it?" Of course, this is usually presented with videos featuring traditional music, civilian victims and kamikaze attacks supposedly punishing those responsible for the aforementioned civilian deaths, but that is just the propaganda topping on the plate. It has to carry the local flavor to attract willing participants, just like the western equivalent features the allure of continuing the good guy tradition standing up against tyranny since the two world wars. Colonialist opression and post-WWII violence from the "good guys" against much of Africa and Asia is conveniently brushed aside, just like the middle eastern guys do with their own wrong-doings against others. However, the underlying theme in both cases is the above example part in quotes, which is surprisingly common regardless of who it comes from. People are scared of each other, in many cases with good reason. Too much complacency can bite one in the behind, as much as too much paranoia can get one in uneccessary trouble. The hard part is balancing these insticts in a way that ensures one's survival without going overboard with pre-emptive bloodshed that usually earns one enemies for entire generations. As you have correctly stated, it's always much more complicated than black and white ![]() On the topic of the Korean war, it was indeed a UN sanctioned operation. As for Vietnam however, i think i have a slightly different reading of the situation. From what i've read, the Vietcong problem was a local insurgency. It relied a lot on the freedom of moving supplies through North Vietnam and neighboring states sympathetic to their cause but it was not an invasion, it was south Vietnamese locals turned guerrillas. Much like it was during the civil war in my country (45-49, right after WWII) between communist guerrillas and the official Greek government forces returning from exile as part of the allied forces in the N.Africa, the rebels received safe haven and supply routes from neighboring communist states like Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Had the Greek government army attacked these countries, it's safe to assume that the situation would have escalated. Instead, they focused strictly on COIN operations and relocating the rural population to metropolitan areas under government control, which denied the guerrilas their source of support in the countryside (supplies, food and recruits, either from willing sympathisers or by force). This cut off the guerrilla's lifeline inside the country to such an extent that outside help was a non-issue, especially since the states helping them preferred to stay covert than get actively mixed-up and risk all out war. The American strategy in Vietnam did follow along these routes as far as operations within S.Vietnam were concerned, with the added benefit of mobile air-lifted armies. In fact, i think the US tactically won every single major engagement they fought, or most of them. Where they went wrong was that they attacked the neighboring VC sympathisers, effectively dragging them into more actively supporting the VC and broadening the pool of enemies. This is a bad move if the other guy is willing to bleed more than you do and as history has shown, you can win the battles on the tactical level, come ahead in the body-count contest and yet still lose the war on the whole. That's essentially what's happening in the current wars as well, where instead of isolating the problem into easy to tackle, set-piece situations, there is an overwhelming urge to go overkill on any kind of opposition all at once, which only serves to lengthen the list of people with an axe to grind. A recent example were the battles in Faluja, where a city that was governed by an openly pro-American council turned into a hotbed of anti-occupation activity, mainly due to ignorance of the local customs and socially accepted practices. It might sound funny or hard to juggle, but in COIN situations it's things like that that count the most: knowing how the locals think and what is likely to get on their nerves and turn them into raving fanatics overnight is far more beneficial to knowing how to call a fire support mission, not to mention far less costly in lives on both sides. It's pretty interesting how the British were always better versed in this type of warfare, in fact it's due to them being the main advisors of the Greek army during most of the civil war that the local guerrillas were defeated. |
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