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IL-2 Sturmovik The famous combat flight simulator. |
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#2
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I understand the thought process of not shooting an enemy in the back, but the reality is that retreat is not surrender. Retreat is often characterized as a strategic withdrawal. The common soldiers did not know when the war was going to end. News was often conflicting or non-existent. So unless the other guy is surrendering, he is still an enemy.
Even surrender is not always surrender. There were more than a few instances of soldiers, especially in the Pacific, who came out under white flags with grenades or guns looking to take down a few conquerors with them. Add to all of that the fact that the German and Russians fought a brutal war against one another. There was often no quarter given and none accepted. There was a good chance that capture meant death so soldiers fought desperately. Crimes happened on all sides, they always do. But in some cases those crimes were common, in others they were the anomaly. We all know of instances like the Rape of Nanking where such "crimes" were the policy. However, to show all sides being equal, people like to focus on other incidents committed by one or a small number of soldiers. All things were not, in fact, equal. Just think about it this way: you are an enemy soldier in WWII, to which countries would you rather surrender? We know who treated their prisoners "well" and who treated them brutally as policy, don't we? Some of it depends on which country you were fighting for. Germany tended to treat British and American prisoners reasonably well and vice versa. Then again, there seemed to be a special hatred between German and Russian troops and neither side had a good track record of treating the other's prisoners very well. Splitter |
#3
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A force of anywhere up to 16000 Japanese was defeated by about 2000 Australians because their comanding officer, Brigadier Potts, decided to disobey his orders (fight to the last man!) and stage a fighting withdrawl along the track. By the time the Japanese had got to within sight of Port Moresby thery were incapable of mounting any offensive action. Just because someone is running away at the moment doesn't mean that their not waiting behind the next tree ready to put a bullet through you. It's called tactics. Cheers! |
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Got any links? Quote:
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The Americans were just upset that Saddam started to sell his oil in the late 90's through French interests for Euros rather than US Dollars
![]() Truth be known its probably the REAL reason behind the Iraq War ![]() |
#7
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I don't know...Hitler's orders to hold in the winter of 1941 probably stabilized the front. Sometimes it MAY be better for a non-mechanized army to hold in place. |
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Hitler was given repeated warnings by his Marshals that, in spite of the fact that they were still moving forward, thing's had already changed from dangerous to critical in the weeks before the launch of the Soviet counter-offensive. It was Hitler's idea to keep pressing on to the point where the German forces were obviously over-exposed and logistics had broken down. As with Napoleon Hitler had plenty of supplies, including winter clothing -- hundreds of miles away in Poland. 1941 was the year when Hitler's megalomania reached full bloom. In March '42, Goebbels recorded in his diary Hitler's remark that if it wasn't for his "iron will" the front could easily have fallen apart -- not only was their no contrition for his contribution to the disaster, one from which the German army would never fully recover, the Grofaz who had never once visited the front accorded his own determination primary credit for stabilising matters from the comfort of his Berlin chancellry almost a thousand miles away. For the '42 campaign, army groups Center and North were enfeebled. Their infantry divisions were well below strength and stripped of motor transport and many new recruits inadequately trained. Their tank and motorised divisions had been 'de-motorised', i.e. their support and logistical arms had their motor transport taken away so that they no longer possessed operational mobility. Only AG South had been restored near to full strength. I'm insufficiently familiar with matters to assess the correctness of the "stand or die" order. It can't be viewed in isolation, however. The gross errors by the General Staff and by Hitler that lead to it must be taken into account. dduff |
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