Request tacticle help for USN planes

[majorfailure]

Originally Posted by Flanker1985

Also, about the choice between F4U and F6F, which do you thinks it's better?

The F4U for me. Faster then the F6F, does not like to be hamfisted though.
IMHO the supposedly pleasant attitude of the F6F does not translate in this game. And the F4U has great high speed roll rate.

Originally Posted by Flanker1985

By the way, is that true?? That F4F had a kill-to-loss ratio of 5.9:1 in 1942 and 6.9:1 for the entire war???

I think I have read that numbers before. I do think that they were for the combined F4F and FM-2 kills. The FM-2 was a somewhat improved Wildcat, and was used mostly from escort carriers later in the war.

Originally Posted by gaunt1

In my opinion, USN fighters were quite unimpressive (or outright bad in some cases) compared to japanese planes. The very professional training and tactics that helped the US to win the war against japan. Ingame, online this is not the case, so the Zero, Hayabusa, Hien and especially the Hayate and the Raiden are more than a match for Wildcats or Hellcats. The only tactics that work against them is hit & run.

The problem is in the game IMHO. It simulates all planes up to factory specs, and while at least later in the war an average USN plane would perform almost up to factory specs and be ready the next day to fly again, the average Japanese plane - especially the Hayate and Hien - would underperform factory specs, and/or require lots of maintainance to be ready for the next flight. And the average online pilot knows most of his planes advantages and the enemys planes disadvantages, knows fighter team tactics, and communicates with his fellow pilots - as USN pilot as well as IJN/IJA pilot.

Originally Posted by gaunt1

Offline, I think its a bit easier, because it seems that IJN/IJA AI is stupid. While USN AI is trying to cooperate to a degree, they dont.

I don't know if IJN/IJA AI really is worse than USN AI. I sometimes get the impression that Ace level IJN pilots do at least some sort of coordinated attack - and average USN/USAAF AI does not work

[JtD]

Even in game the carrier based USN fighters are better than carrier based IJN fighters in all around performance. Of course, they don't turn on a dime.

[ElAurens]

Up until late 42/early 43 the Japanese were the best trained combat pilots in the world, hands down, especially the IJN. They washed out pilots to crew positions that would have been aces in any other air force in the world.

This coupled with the poor tactical doctrine that the Allies started the war with (the dogfight), created the perfect storm for them in the first year or so of the war.

This insane training regime also was the downfall of the Japanese air arm.
They simply could not keep up with losses as the Allies adapted their tactics, and aircraft, to thawrt the Japanese.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by ElAurens

Up until late 42/early 43 the Japanese were the best trained combat pilots in the world, hands down, especially the IJN. They washed out pilots to crew positions that would have been aces in any other air force in the world.

This coupled with the poor tactical doctrine that the Allies started the war with (the dogfight), created the perfect storm for them in the first year or so of the war.

This insane training regime also was the downfall of the Japanese air arm.
They simply could not keep up with losses as the Allies adapted their tactics, and aircraft, to thawrt the Japanese.

The proof, as they say, is in the pudding. Most rigorously trained, maybe. Tough? Hell yeah. Best?

USN & USMC pilots facing Zeros for the second time usually came away with about equal results, and by the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, flying Wildcats, were well ahead in terms of victories to losses. Like the Finns, they had a very high standard of gunnery, and men who were acknowledged the best shots in the pre-war competitions were very successful when they got their chances (hint: Thach, O'Hare, and a guy named McCampbell were considered among the best marksmen in the USN-what a coincidence!). They were a tight-knit community who eagerly traded tips and tactics whenever they met, so Thach's weave and a clearer picture of Japanese capabilities and tendencies got around quickly in 1942. We tend to forget that the prewar US military could only afford to train and keep the very best, out of a much larger population pool than was available to Japan; the RAF and RCAF were the happy recipients of the services of a great many American aces and leaders who washed out of or were refused even the chance to get into USAAF and USN training.

The Japanese, flying aircraft superior in every respect excepting dive acceleration and pilot protection, in many cases having years of combat experience, and all quite well-informed of their opponents' aircraft performances vs their own mounts, did not adjust well to changing circumstances and tactical innovations by their opponents and paid the price. Their training had also made them slaves to doctrine.

That doesn't square with my understanding of 'best' training.

cheers

horseback

[JtD]

Originally Posted by horseback

The Japanese, flying aircraft superior in every respect excepting dive acceleration and pilot protection...

Sounds like a quote from history channel.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by JtD

Sounds like a quote from history channel.

Well, every once in a while, even a blind squirrel finds an acorn. If you can cite one performance/tactical advantage that the F4F or even the F2A held over the A6M series besides the ones I mentioned, you win a prize.

cheers

horseback

[JtD]

High speed maneuverability.

What did I win? Can I win more if I name another half dozen?

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by horseback

The proof, as they say, is in the pudding. Most rigorously trained, maybe. Tough? Hell yeah. Best?

Arguably, in terms of victories scored, the top Japanese aces were superior to the top American aces. OTOH, in terms of kill ratios after the first 6-12 months of the war the U.S. mopped the floor with the Japanese in terms of kill ratios.

Your posts - not just the one above - point out some extremely important difference between IJN and IJAAF and American pilots. The Americans had lots of little, intangible differences which came from, essentially, being American. And, I DON'T say that in a jingoistic sense - it's little things like greater population, better diet, more robust manufacturing base and higher levels of personal initiative which was based as much on American culture as U.S. military training.

Additionally, I think that one of the huge things that help destroy Japanese air power is that most Japanese pilots were enlisted men, and ALL Japanese pilots were treated as being fundamentally expendable by their high command. That was reflected in everything from airplane design to quality of survival equipment. Saburo Sakai mentions this in his memoir.

Originally Posted by horseback

The Japanese, flying aircraft superior in every respect excepting dive acceleration and pilot protection, in many cases having years of combat experience, and all quite well-informed of their opponents' aircraft performances vs their own mounts, did not adjust well to changing circumstances and tactical innovations by their opponents and paid the price. Their training had also made them slaves to doctrine.

To be fair, this is because the Japanese were increasingly isolated and had progressively less ability to train due to the changing fortunes of war.

What might have been a factor is that the Japanese had a very authoritarian culture before and during WW2. Even today, in situations where national culture prevents subordinates from pointing out their errors of their superiors, tragedy can ensue. For example, until accident investigators figured this out, Korean airliner pilots had higher levels of accidents. This is because in Korean culture the command pilot is God and the copilot's job is to sit down, shut up and do as he is told.

Again, that's not meant to be any sort of endorsement of the US of A, or any sort of condemnation of any other culture, it's just different. (Also, note that frighteningly authoritarian regimes can encourage tactical innovation in the military. The 3rd Reich, which is the poster child for "evil authoritarian regime" trained its officers to improvise in tactical situations.)

[sniperton]

Originally Posted by Pursuivant

The 3rd Reich, which is the poster child for "evil authoritarian regime" trained its officers to improvise in tactical situations.)

Yeah, but the Luftwaffe was a relatively new establishment with many actual combat pilots in high ranks and having influence on decisions. Göring, Udet, Galland, just to name a few. And with Hitler being more interested in tactical details than in the strategic big picture. The Luftwaffe was more perceptible to the experiences and inventions of individual pilots than the RAF or the IJN. This has more to do with the special sociologic composition of the Luftwaffe than with the authoritarian nature of the Nazi state.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by Pursuivant

Arguably, in terms of victories scored, the top Japanese aces were superior to the top American aces. OTOH, in terms of kill ratios after the first 6-12 months of the war the U.S. mopped the floor with the Japanese in terms of kill ratios.

Your posts - not just the one above - point out some extremely important difference between IJN and IJAAF and American pilots. The Americans had lots of little, intangible differences which came from, essentially, being American. And, I DON'T say that in a jingoistic sense - it's little things like greater population, better diet, more robust manufacturing base and higher levels of personal initiative which was based as much on American culture as U.S. military training.

Additionally, I think that one of the huge things that help destroy Japanese air power is that most Japanese pilots were enlisted men, and ALL Japanese pilots were treated as being fundamentally expendable by their high command. That was reflected in everything from airplane design to quality of survival equipment. Saburo Sakai mentions this in his memoir.

I think that if you pursue the historical record of US losses at a given time and place versus Japanese claims, you will find that the IJN and IJAAF fighter pilots overclaimed much, much more than US or Allied pilots at any given point during the war. All of the Japanese claims are taken at the claimant's word, because there was no formal claims process in the Japanese system comparable to the Allied or even German systems. I think you'll find that at Coral Sea and afterwards, US and Allied losses never remotely matched Japanese claims, and that as the Allied air forces gained experience, their claims ever more closely matched recorded Japanese losses.

This was partly due to the fact that Japanese High Command never developed an intelligence function most other air forces did; most other countries' post-mission procedures included a pilot and or aircrew interview with the intelligence officer (IO)even before making a written report. This squadron or wing IO would then try to corroborate claims, point out conflicts and inconsistencies & then try to clear them up as much as possible before submitting a report listing losses taken and damages inflicted upon the enemy, including any unusual observations, etc. This report was used to develop a picture of what was going on in the air war, not just to keep track of pilots' scores. However, the result was that those pilots who were questioned and crosschecked quickly learned to be better observers and recognize the difference between what could be claimed and what could be treated like hyperbole (and nobody can hyperbolate like an American fighter pilots).

All the Japanese fighter pilots got was positive feedback; their commanders received their optimistic claims enthusiastically, and then acted upon the misconceptions that they gave rise to. Right up to the end of the war, Japanese Admirals and Generals would assume that enemy planes were destroyed, ships sunk and bases wiped from the face of the earth that still existed and threatened their own shrinking supply of aircraft, ships and bases.

Now, about the officer/enlisted distinction, I'm not sure that I can accept that one. Japanese culture was very taken up with the 'noble sacrifice' mentality; captains went down with their ships, generals and admirals died at their posts when the island they were defending was invaded, pilots repeatedly made suicidal decisions like the torpedo squadron commander at Midway who, after locating the US carriers on a recon, met his strike group in the air on the way back and turned around to lead them to the carriers (even though he knew that his position message had gotten through and his aircraft would not have enough fuel to get him back to his carrier after the strike).

The Japanese did not have the sort of mindset that allowed them to say that any one person short of the Emperor was too valuable an asset a waste on a whim, so they lost a great many skilled and specially trained men early in the war that they didn't have to, and went on to sacrifice literally millions right up to the last day of the war. Officers, enlisted, pilots, sailors, soldiers or marines, it didn't matter; you did what you were told to do, you went where you were sent and for heaven's sake, you never even considered questioning higher authority.

If MacArthur had been Japanese, he'd have either stayed on Corrigedor and died fighting to the last man, or he would have returned to Japan only so he could commit hari-kiri on the steps of the Imperial Palace to apologize for his failure. No way would he have been allowed to escape certain defeat and capture/death and then continue on in a command position--it would have been unthinkable and more importantly, unacceptable.

cheers

horseback