Bug 174 on 12lbs boost. Review please.

[NZtyphoon]

Originally Posted by robtek

When i read 192151000 gallons for 150 days for about 700 fighters at about 75 gallons/h i calculate 24,2h flight time a day. Confusing!

Exactly, please explain why so much fuel was expended, yet Crumpp et al maintain that only about 1/3rd of the RAF's frontline fighter strength was responsible, plus Blenheim squadrons? Say 250 fighters? How did 250 fighters chew through 192,151,000 gallons of fuel? - by flying about 72 hrs a day. Whats more confusing, the fact that 192,151,000 gallons of 100 octane fuel was consumed, or that only a small proportion of FC's frontline strength was responsible for using it?

No doubt Crumpp will come up with some old shop-worn argument that Consumption didn't mean consumption, but he has no evidence for that either, just speculation.

[Crumpp]

Or are this only the stocks?

Yes it is only the stocks. The fuel distributed to the supply system for use was only 10,000 tons for Jun-Aug 1940.

Considering that the RAF planned for 2770 tons for 4 squadrons of Hurricanes per week. Now that includes all the feeder/emergency fields to be stocked with a supply, 3 weeks of operational stores in case the trains gets bombed, and all the flying required.

Using their math, 10,000 tons is enough for 15 squadrons or adding 5 squadrons per month.

[Seadog]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Yes it is only the stocks. The fuel distributed to the supply system for use was only 10,000 tons for Jun-Aug 1940.

Considering that the RAF planned for 2770 tons for 4 squadrons of Hurricanes per week. Now that includes all the feeder/emergency fields to be stocked with a supply, 3 weeks of operational stores in case the trains gets bombed, and all the flying required.

Using their math, 10,000 tons is enough for 15 squadrons or adding 5 squadrons per month.

2770 tons = 6204800lb or 861778 gals. If we allow 75 gallons per sortie, this is sufficient fuel for 11490 sorties...

if we assume 3 sorties a day (an impossibly high number per day!), for 80 aircraft, this gives us enough fuel for 48 days at 240 sorties/day...

Crumpp, you seem to have no problems producing pages of complex formulas regarding flight data but then fall flat on your face with these simple calculations...

[Al Schlageter]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Considering that the RAF planned for 2770 tons for 4 squadrons of Hurricanes per week.

Using their math, 10,000 tons is enough for 15 squadrons or adding 5 squadrons per month.

Source?

Which 15 Hurricane squadrons?

[Crumpp]

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o.../AASF-Fuel.pdf

[Crumpp]

if we assume 3 sorties a day (an impossibly high number per day!), for 80 aircraft, this gives us enough fuel for 48 days at 240 sorties/day...

It is a little more complicated than that seadog. The RAF correctly plans for their logistical train to be interupted by the enemy.

Therefore, they correctly plan to emplace several weeks supply at the aerodrome, supply the emergency fields the aircraft might have to land at, and keep several more weeks of fuel dispursed around the log train earmarked for that unit.

If you just plan to have enough fuel on hand for what you are going to fly, then you will be in real trouble when the enemy bombs your airfield storage tanks, shoots your trucks up on the road, or hits the railyard. You will be out of the game in one enemy attack.

Read the logistical plan if they had to supply the 4 squadrons in France. That is the amount of fuel in the system earmarked for those squadrons to fly for just ONE WEEK.

If they want to continue to fly operationally and resupply their unit after an enemy attack, the RAF is planning to have some 8 weeks worth of fuel on the ground and available at short notice.

Don't you think that makes sense given the fact the Luftwaffe was targeting the airfields during the BoB?

So when you do your simplistic calculation for one week of flying, keep in mind, there is 8 weeks of fuel required to be available for that one week in the air.

[Seadog]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

It is a little more complicated than that seadog. The RAF correctly plans for their logistical train to be interupted by the enemy.

Therefore, they correctly plan to emplace several weeks supply at the aerodrome, supply the emergency fields the aircraft might have to land at, and keep several more weeks of fuel dispursed around the log train earmarked for that unit.

If you just plan to have enough fuel on hand for what you are going to fly, then you will be in real trouble when the enemy bombs your airfield storage tanks, shoots your trucks up on the road, or hits the railyard. You will be out of the game in one enemy attack.

Read the logistical plan if they had to supply the 4 squadrons in France. That is the amount of fuel in the system earmarked for those squadrons to fly for just ONE WEEK.

If they want to continue to fly operationally and resupply their unit after an enemy attack, the RAF is planning to have some 8 weeks worth of fuel on the ground and available at short notice.

Don't you think that makes sense given the fact the Luftwaffe was targeting the airfields during the BoB?

So when you do your simplistic calculation for one week of flying, keep in mind, there is 8 weeks of fuel required to be available for that one week in the air.

Fuel available is not fuel consumed.

The document also assumed 154 gals per Hurricane sortie, which is exactly twice the actual figure, since tank capacity was 97 gals, and aircraft will not land with empty tanks. Actual consumption will be 1/2 what the document states, for the 3840 sorties which it estimates will be flown and that works out to 950 tons

The document correctly assumes that a squadron of Hurricanes would fly about 1 sortie/day per aircraft

In the UK every airbase is providing a reserve for every other base, unlike France where a number of bases had to be stocked in expectation of rapid movement between bases, and the expectation that a base might be used briefly, but intensely.

However, the document certainly confirms 100% 100 octane use by Hurricane squadrons in France.

This document states the daily consumption per squadron as 1870gals for 24 sorties or 77.9 gals/sortie:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.pdf

so this works out to 180 tons/month/squadron based upon 24 sorties/day.

[NZtyphoon]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

It is a little more complicated than that seadog. The RAF correctly plans for their logistical train to be interupted by the enemy.

Therefore, they correctly plan to emplace several weeks supply at the aerodrome, supply the emergency fields the aircraft might have to land at, and keep several more weeks of fuel dispursed around the log train earmarked for that unit.

If you just plan to have enough fuel on hand for what you are going to fly, then you will be in real trouble when the enemy bombs your airfield storage tanks, shoots your trucks up on the road, or hits the railyard. You will be out of the game in one enemy attack.

Read the logistical plan if they had to supply the 4 squadrons in France. That is the amount of fuel in the system earmarked for those squadrons to fly for just ONE WEEK.

If they want to continue to fly operationally and resupply their unit after an enemy attack, the RAF is planning to have some 8 weeks worth of fuel on the ground and available at short notice.

Don't you think that makes sense given the fact the Luftwaffe was targeting the airfields during the BoB?

So when you do your simplistic calculation for one week of flying, keep in mind, there is 8 weeks of fuel required to be available for that one week in the air.

Not forgetting that Crumpp has previously stated that "Making the conclusion Hurricanes were using 100 Octane in the Battle of France based off some logistical projections for future war is amatuerish and clumsey. It is a paper tiger. That document is a calculation of projected needs written on 7 May 1940. The British Expeditionary Force was on the Beaches of Dunkirk 18 days later.

How much of those calculation and projections for future war do you really think became ground reality in 18 days? "
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthr...213#post416213

A lot of nonsense, of course but just a reflection of how much Crumpp tries to twist things to suit his own POV.

So, there was enough 100 Octane stored in France to supply all Hurricanes and Blenheims with 8 weeks worth of fuel. As can be seen in just one WOPR (33rd 23 April 1940) there was 7,600 tons of 100 Octane fuel in the only logical location West of Suez ie; France


It also means that the RAF provided all of its frontline Merlin engine FC squadrons in France with 100 Octane in May 1940, which make's Crumpp's continued assertions that only 16 squadrons of its frontline fighter squadrons in Britain were supplied look very suspect. 192,151,000 gallons or 61,000 tons was used between June-end October

Originally Posted by robtek

When i read 192151000 gallons for 150 days for about 700 fighters at about 75 gallons/h i calculate 24,2h flight time a day. Confusing!

Originally Posted by Al Schlageter

150 days?

10 July – 31 October 1940 = 114 days

More than enough to supply all frontline FC fighters with plenty to spare.

So tell us again Crumpp, how did the RAF ensure that just a few squadrons used 100 Octane, while the rest went without? How was this allocated?

What were the logistical arrangements used toe ensure only 16 squadrons used 100 octane.

How were the pilots briefed "Sorry chaps X Y and Z squadrons get the 100 Octane today, the rest of you stick with 87"?

How about Crumpp provide some documentary evidence showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 87 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle. He has been asked time and time again but has provided nothing.

[robtek]

If "west of suez" means the bef in france, why are then 3 quarters of the aviation fuel not 100 octane?

Somehow that doesn't make sense when there were only fighters using 100 octane.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

It also means that the RAF provided all of its frontline Merlin engine FC squadrons in France with 100 Octane in May 1940, which make's Crumpp's continued assertions that only 16 squadrons of its frontline fighter squadrons in Britain were supplied look very suspect.

I love Jeff's attempts at logical thinking.

'All of its frontline Merlin engine FC squadrons in France' - now how many FC Squadrons were in France flying Hurricane's, like about SIX (depending on when you look at it, but when stocking was made, only six were there)?

How excactly does the fact that about six Hurricane Squadrons were supplied with 100 octane in France make it 'very suspect' (Jeff loves big words ) that Britain had only 16 squadrons of its frontline fighter squadrons supplied with 100 octane? (which is BTW documented as opposed to Jeff's fantasies).

I really, really try to understand his emulation of logical thinking. He basically says:

Statement A is 6 Sqns. in France using 100 octane
Statement B is 16 Sqns in total is using 100 octane
Statement A and B rule out each other...

How about Crumpp provide some documentary evidence showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 87 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle. He has been asked time and time again but has provided nothing.

Likewise, you have been asked to provide some documentary evidence showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 100 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle.

You have been asked time and time again but has provided nothing.

Problem is, the burden of proof is on you. Which is why just about anybody with a brain is unconvinced of your claims and have noted that your documentation is way insufficient to make the conclusions you are trying to make.