Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by CaptainDoggles

Kurfurst,

Could you kindly post a link to this article written by the australian author directly? I have been waiting almost 2 weeks for my account at allaboutwarfare.com to be activated but it hasn't happened yet.

I can re-post for you the original post(s) from July 2004. Needless to say, Neil Stirling got a heart attack when he saw it. Neil, like some other here were pushing for a pet theory about 100% 100 octane use in FC for some years, but have found no evidence during 10 years of research. It must have been very sobering to him.

Originally Posted by PipsPriller on Jul 12 2004 at [url

http://www.allaboutwarfare.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=230&st=0&start=0][/url]
The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

Given that large quantities were not available until late August, the volume of usage/week of 87 Octane must be far higher than that quoted for 100 Octane.

I came across it when I was in fact researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives.

It's from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance.

It was quite an interesting paper actually, even though i found it to be a very dry subject.

The most interesting part is that "Pips" found this well before, in 2004 or earlier, and it agrees with every single document Neil managed to dig up afterwards, though Neil and now Glider tries to discredit this research with whatever means, basically calling Pips a liar behind his back at every opportunity, but never to his face.. The problem is, if Pip would have made it up, he was extremely talented, because Pips information from 2004 - for example that the large scale fighter conversion begun in late September 1940 - agrees perfectly with what Neil found in British archives in 2009 about 87 vs 100 octane consumption rates (and then waited two years before publishing it, as it was obviously not very helpful to his own thesis).

Note that as per the consumption figures, 100 octane did not become the main fuel until late September 1940, just like Pips stated, 7 years ago.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by PipsPriller on Jul 12 2004 at [url
http://www.allaboutwarfare.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=230&st=0&start=0][/url]
The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

As mentioned before the first units started using 100 Octane in February not March. Document Attached.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use.

The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

As before this section I do fundamentally disagree with. In December 1939 stocks of 100 Octane were 202,000 tons, by May 1940 stocks were 294,000 tons and by August 1940 stocks were at 404,000 tons (documents are attached). We know that in June – August the average consumption was 10,000 tons a month (document attached).
The question I suggest we need to ask is If you have what is in effect a two and a half year stockpile, is this a strain, let alone a great strain on the stockpile. In my opinion it isn’t a strain at all, it’s barely noticeable

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The British War Cabinet didn’t discuss 100 Octane at all in May and as a result no decisions were made. I spent a day in the NA going through all the papers for the meetings, the meeting notes and the actions resulting, and Fuel of any kind was not discussed. I should add that in May 1940 the War Cabinet met almost daily and it was a huge amount of paper, literally hundreds of sheets making it impossible to copy and post. Clearly as this wasn't discussed there were no actons or decisions made along this line.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels.

The first part is correct, the first shipment from the middle East did arrive in August, however the rest is misleading. Numerous other tankers arrived from others parts of the world between May and August and stocks continued to increase . On July 11th stocks of 100 Octane were 343,000 tons as specified in the Narrow Margin page 87 (document attached).

With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

This is clearly wrong In August 1940 permission was given for all commands to use 100 Octane in Operational aircraft. (Document attached)

Given that large quantities were not available until late August, the volume of usage/week of 87 Octane must be far higher than that quoted for 100 Octane.

Given that FC were using 100 Octane and the bombers plus the rest of the RAF were using 87 Octane I would expect 87 Octane use to be higher.

It's from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance.

It was quite an interesting paper actually, even though i found it to be a very dry subject.

Now if someone could produce this and its supporting inforation then we would be in a good position.

I should point out that all my comments are supported by original documentation. The posting isn't supported by anything.

If the people working on the code base there scenario's on Pips posting as above, they have only themselves to blame if the adverse comments arrive.

[lane]

Originally Posted by Glider

As mentioned before the first units started using 100 Octane in February not March. Document Attached.

As before this section I do fundamentally disagree with. In December 1939 stocks of 100 Octane were 202,000 tons, by May 1940 stocks were 294,000 tons and by August 1940 stocks were at 404,000 tons (documents are attached). We know that in June – August the average consumption was 10,000 tons a month (document attached).
The question I suggest we need to ask is If you have what is in effect a two and a half year stockpile, is this a strain, let alone a great strain on the stockpile. In my opinion it isn’t a strain at all, it’s barely noticeable

The British War Cabinet didn’t discuss 100 Octane at all in May and as a result no decisions were made. I spent a day in the NA going through all the papers for the meetings, the meeting notes and the actions resulting, and Fuel of any kind was not discussed. I should add that in May 1940 the War Cabinet met almost daily and it was a huge amount of paper, literally hundreds of sheets making it impossible to copy and post. Clearly as this wasn't discussed there were no actons or decisions made along this line.

The first part is correct, the first shipment from the middle East did arrive in August, however the rest is misleading. Numerous other tankers arrived from others parts of the world between May and August and stocks continued to increase . On July 11th stocks of 100 Octane were 343,000 tons as specified in the Narrow Margin page 87 (document attached).

This is clearly wrong In August 1940 permission was given for all commands to use 100 Octane in Operational aircraft. (Document attached)

Given that FC were using 100 Octane and the bombers plus the rest of the RAF were using 87 Octane I would expect 87 Octane use to be higher.

Now if someone could produce this and its supporting inforation then we would be in a good position.

I should point out that all my comments are supported by original documentation. The posting isn't supported by anything.

If the people working on the code base there scenario's on Pips posting as above, they have only themselves to blame if the adverse comments arrive.

Good post Glider. Amongst the odd things in that supposed Australian mystery document, this sentence struck me as rather off the mark: "This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude". This just doesn’t make sense when all the documentation available shows an increase in maximum boost from +6.25 to +12 with the Merlin III. That’s just a bloody obvious error. Dr. Alfred Price wrote that "The higher octane fuel allowed an increase in supercharger boost from +6 lbs to +12 lbs, without risk of detonation that would damage the engine. […] The emergency power setting increased maximum speed by 25 mph at sea level and 34 mph at 10,000 ft. It also improved the fighter’s climbing performance between sea level and full-throttle altitude" (see attached scan). The RAF’s old History page pretty much said the same thing.

[Crumpp]

"This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude". This just doesn’t make sense when all the documentation available shows an increase in maximum boost from +6.25 to +12 with the Merlin III.

If you read in the July 1940 POH for the Spitfire II, it clearly lists 100 Octane as the fuel and that +12lbs is a Take Off rating and +9lbs is an Emergency rating limited for 5 minutes.

[Kurfürst]

Mike (this time using the handle lane) already knows that for years, in fact he has seen the papers showing the early rating of +9 for All out level, but hey, he was never afraid of posting manipulating BS in order to push an agenda under various new logins..

[Al Schlageter]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Mike (this time using the handle lane) already knows that for years, in fact he has seen the papers showing the early rating of +9 for All out level, but hey, he was never afraid of posting manipulating BS in order to push an agenda under various new logins..

Now this is really hilarious by someone who is well known for doing such.

A prime example of Barbi's manipulating BS is the graph he posted on the issuing of fuel. First off, he doesn't give a source for the data points he plotted on his graph. Secondly, the fuel issuing was for the whole RAF, not for FC.

To see the double standard of proof used by Barbi one only has to look at his 1.98ata boost for the K-4. He even goes on and suggests that other units besides the 4 Gruppen converted to 1.98ata.

There should be no question that 100 octane fuel was in widespread use by RAF FC during the BoB if one uses Barbi's logic for the widespread use of 1.98ata boost by the 109s.

[Kurfürst]

Who says 1,98ata was in widespread use? It seems it was in use in four or five Gruppen. Possibly more, but nobody is getting a heart attack over the question, just a few RAF zealots that bite into a citrus over 100 octane.. but these same guys even question that MW-50 was in use, so why would anyone concern himself with such people?

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Glider

As mentioned before the first units started using 100 Octane in February not March. Document Attached.

Irrelevant.

As before this section I do fundamentally disagree with. In December 1939 stocks of 100 Octane were 202,000 tons, by May 1940 stocks were 294,000 tons and by August 1940 stocks were at 404,000 tons (documents are attached). We know that in June – August the average consumption was 10,000 tons a month (document attached).
The question I suggest we need to ask is If you have what is in effect a two and a half year stockpile, is this a strain, let alone a great strain on the stockpile. In my opinion it isn’t a strain at all, it’s barely noticeable

What you think is irrelevant again. The RAF considered 800 000 tons of reserves necessary, they had about 220-294 000 by the spring of 1940, and supply was uncertain.

At 10 000 tons per month consumption the storage would be enough for 20 months, but this is with about 25% of the fighters and some bombers running 100 octane.

Complete conversion would have meant the reserves would not be enough for more than about 5-6 months, running out by October.

Morgan and Shacklady in Spitfire the History also notes the concerns about supply, and the U boot thread. In fact up to that time about 300 000 tons of oil shipments were sunk by uboots and mines.

The British War Cabinet didn’t discuss 100 Octane at all in May and as a result no decisions were made. I spent a day in the NA going through all the papers for the meetings, the meeting notes and the actions resulting, and Fuel of any kind was not discussed. I should add that in May 1940 the War Cabinet met almost daily and it was a huge amount of paper, literally hundreds of sheets making it impossible to copy and post. Clearly as this wasn't discussed there were no actons or decisions made along this line.

David, can we see the post-May 18 decisions by the Oil Committee in their completeness?

The first part is correct, the first shipment from the middle East did arrive in August, however the rest is misleading. Numerous other tankers arrived from others parts of the world between May and August and stocks continued to increase . On July 11th stocks of 100 Octane were 343,000 tons as specified in the Narrow Margin page 87 (document attached).

So in end of April there were 294 000 tons, and some three months later in July there were some 40 000 tons more? What was the total monthly consumption again - 40-50 000 tons?

So in three months the equivalent of one months of supply arrived. Do we need to make even more clear why the British were concerned about a complete conversion to 100 octane?

This is clearly wrong In August 1940 permission was given for all commands to use 100 Octane in Operational aircraft. (Document attached)

There's nothing wrong with it. Pips says the RAF emberked again to 100 octane conversion in late September 1940. Fuel consumption shows exactly that. Of course they made decision earlier, in August, but things seem to have take some time in the RAF. Just consider they made decision about supplying 18 squadrons with 100 octane in March 1939 - and when this was realized..? In May 1940...



Noteworthy that the consumption remains pretty much the same between May (when select Fighter Squadrons converted) and late September 1940.

Now if someone could produce this and its supporting inforation then we would be in a good position.

I agree. At which point again I ask: why are you holding back the papers you have dealing with period Pips research covers?

I should point out that all my comments are supported by original documentation.

I should point out that all you comments are supported by misrepresentation of original documentation.

The posting isn't supported by anything. If the people working on the code base there scenario's on Pips posting as above, they have only themselves to blame if the adverse comments arrive.

From whom, the lone partisans in the woods..? What pips says competely agrees with all the present documents. What you keep saying rapes the same papers - after all come on, you say that of Fighter Command was using 100 octane, and all the papers you wave around say select/concerned/certain Squadrons...?!

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Irrelevant.

I don't think so, its an error

What you think is irrelevant again. The RAF considered 800 000 tons of reserves necessary, they had about 220-294 000 by the spring of 1940, and supply was uncertain.

Pre war the RAF considered the reserve to be 800,000 tons of fuel which they never achieved at all at any time but it didn't stop us using this.

At 10 000 tons per month consumption the storage would be enough for 20 months, but this is with about 25% of the fighters and some bombers running 100 octane.

Nope, its 100 % of the fighters and all No 2 Blenheims

Complete conversion would have meant the reserves would not be enough for more than about 5-6 months, running out by October.

As already said this is not the case the conversion was made

Morgan and Shacklady in Spitfire the History also notes the concerns about supply, and the U boot thread. In fact up to that time about 300 000 tons of oil shipments were sunk by uboots and mines.

It was a concern, but more go arrived than was sunk and stocks rose.

David, can we see the post-May 18 decisions by the Oil Committee in their completeness?

I don't have them but will copy them next week as per my last posting, can you get a copy of the Pips paper?

So in end of April there were 294 000 tons, and some three months later in July there were some 40 000 tons more? What was the total monthly consumption again - 40-50 000 tons?

So in three months the equivalent of one months of supply arrived. Do we need to make even more clear why the British were concerned about a complete conversion to 100 octane?

Stock increase
27th February 1940 220,000 tons
31st May 1940 294,000 tons
11th July 1940 343,000 tons
31st August 1940 404,000 tons

Stocks went up in about 6 weeks by approx 50,000 tons (May - July)
and again in about 6 weeks by another 60,000 ish tons (July - August)

Over this time the consumption was about 30,000 tons (Ave figure June - August)

So imports over the period June to August must have been in the order of 140,000 tons (consumption plus increase in stocks).

Consumption therefore was approx 17.5% of imports which is an ample margin for safety and more than enought reason to allow the use of 100 Octane to be given to all operational aircraft in all commands. It also questions Pips statement and view that the stocks were under severe strain.
We need to know how he arrived at that assumption. If you want to accuse me of misrepresenting the figures and papers that I have put forward explain how you arrived at your figures and calculations.

Can I ask where you got your figures for stocks and consumption as they do not match the documents shown. Where on earth did 50,000 tons a month come from for consumption?

There's nothing wrong with it. Pips says the RAF emberked again to 100 octane conversion in late September 1940. Fuel consumption shows exactly that. Of course they made decision earlier, in August, but things seem to have take some time in the RAF. Just consider they made decision about supplying 18 squadrons with 100 octane in March 1939 - and when this was realized..? In May 1940...

As said before the RAF decided to use 100 Octane for all operational aircraft in all commands in August. This is what the consumption figures show. As we know the 18 squadrons was replaced whenwar broke out and plans were well in place by December 1939.

Noteworthy that the consumption remains pretty much the same between May (when select Fighter Squadrons converted) and late September 1940.

When all fighter command were converted

I should point out that all you comments are supported by misrepresentation of original documentation.

I supply the documents and let people decide for themselves