Pony talk

[Codex]

Originally Posted by JtD

Just to put the 1400 into the proper context: In March 1945, the USAAF flew 146000 sorties against Germany. That is 4700 a day. 62000 of these were fighter sorties, that is 2000 a day.
Add to these the VVS and RAF, plus the various smaller air forces, and you'll have to realize that even if all Me 262's produced up to a certain point had been available at that point, it would not have made a significant difference to the outcome.
One can assume one devastating battle against the 8th air force, which would have been a pyrrhic victory for the LW. Nothing left to flatten the Allied armour.

The point missing about the 262 was that Galland saw these aircraft as a means to kill bombers, Hitler wanted them to be bombers so there is a stark difference in tactical thinking. Obviously Hitler got his way and Germany lost. But if Galland had the 1400 or so aircraft ready and they were all configured for interception as Galland had wanted, the allied bomber squads would have not had the success they did in killing off Germany's production when they did, and I stress when they did. By D-Day I personally don't think Germany would have lasted even if they had best aircraft and pilots at their disposal, the numbers against them were just too great, but the 262 would have certainly either slowed or even stopped the bleeding of Germany's war production and prolonged the war.

[WTE_Galway]

Originally Posted by Codex

The point missing about the 262 was that Galland saw these aircraft as a means to kill bombers, Hitler wanted them to be bombers so there is a stark difference in tactical thinking. Obviously Hitler got his way and Germany lost. But if Galland had the 1400 or so aircraft ready and they were all configured for interception as Galland had wanted, the allied bomber squads would have not had the success they did in killing off Germany's production when they did, and I stress when they did. By D-Day I personally don't think Germany would have lasted even if they had best aircraft and pilots at their disposal, the numbers against them were just too great, but the 262 would have certainly either slowed or even stopped the bleeding of Germany's war production and prolonged the war.

This is what Galland himself had to say in a 1994 interview:

Originally Posted by Adolf Galland 1994

http://www.acepilots.com/german/galland.html

The Me-262 would most certainly not have changed the final outcome of the war, for we had already lost completely, but it would have probably delayed the end, since the Normandy invasion on June 6, 1944, would probably not have taken place, at least not successfully if the 262 had been operational. I certainly think that just 300 jets flown daily by the best fighter pilots would have had a major impact on the course of the air war. This would have, of course, prolonged the war, so perhaps Hitler's misuse of this aircraft was not such a bad thing after all.

[ElAurens]

Isn't speculation fun?

OK, 262s are operational in some numbers.

The war is prolonged.

The US then deploys P-80s in numbers that the Luftwaffe cannot match.

Game over.

Or...

A a massive night B-29 raid escorted by P-80s, P-51Hs, and P-82 Twin Mustangs, flys to Berlin one night. Only one B-29 has a bomb though...

Game really over.

Any scenario that the pro-facisti can come up with is easily countered.

[dduff442]

Originally Posted by ElAurens

Isn't speculation fun?

OK, 262s are operational in some numbers.

The war is prolonged.

The US then deploys P-80s in numbers that the Luftwaffe cannot match.

Game over.

Or...

A a massive night B-29 raid escorted by P-80s, P-51Hs, and P-82 Twin Mustangs, flys to Berlin one night. Only one B-29 has a bomb though...

Game really over.

Any scenario that the pro-facisti can come up with is easily countered.

It's not really necessary to be pro-fascist to speculate on such matters. The fact is that the war could have been a lot worse if rationality and common sense had not disappeared from Germany's leadership.

When it came down to it, in spite of all the rhetoric about the body national etc Germany was just a vehicle for the personal ambitions of the top Nazis. Even nuclear weapons couldn't have guaranteed their surrender, because they cared more about themselves than anything else and would have dreamt up rationales for fighting on. The actual effects of the 1000-bomber raids on Germany were not less than atomic bombs in any case. Atomic weapons might have even reinforced the millenarian mindset the Nazis encouraged.

Retaliation with chemical weapons, including nerve gas on a large scale, would have been possible. Large regions might have been made uninhabitable, and the fury of the allies would have been much more intense when they finally did break into Germany.

dduff442

[Blackdog_kt]

Yup, that's pretty much the way i tend to see it when theorizing about it. The difference was that the man with the funny mustache was expecting a sudden rebound and counterattack in his paranoia, while people like Galland were realists and were pushing for a different outcome: a stalemate in the west, maybe going as far as ensuring a separate peace agreement, so that they could concentrate on holding off the Soviets.

The 262 still couldn't win the war, but when the LW almost crippled the 8th AF bomber offensive with prop fighters alone up until the arrival of a long range allied escort, it's obvious that they would have benefitted greatly from having 262s in sufficient numbers.
The reasons the 8th AF loss figures dropped and the disasters of the Regensburg and Schweinfurt raids were not repeated is exactly what you guys are pointing out, long range meant a bunch of mustang groups roaming at will in big wolfpacks, able to cover the bombers all the way to the targets. The 262 was the tool that although unable to directly take the mustangs out, it was perfectly capable of bypassing them entirely and nullifying their impact to a great extent. The real objective was the bombers.
If the LW was able to maintain a 10% atrrition rate against the 8th on most raids, the Normandy landings would have been delayed and German industrial production would have got a very significant respite (as evindeced by data that showed production rising even during the strategic bombing campaign under Speer's guidance).

However, there's an small tid-bit here that sometimes doesn't get enough recognition and it's pretty important, as even if enough 262s and capable pilots were available it would still put a serious dent in LW's plans.

Near the end of the war, allied fighters operated mostly in advance fighter sweeps and not close escort. Some people in the brass fought tooth and nail to convince their peers to "set the fighters free" as they put it. Not easy to convince people about that when it had become clear that unescorted bombers resulted in prohibitive loss figures. However, it proved to be very effective, because it's exactly this strategy that enabled the allies to camp LW bases and deny them a safe haven. Regardless of the range of the pony, if they stuck to operating them in the close and top cover escort roles there wouldn't be mustangs camping over the 262 bases to catch them at their most vulnerable.

In brief, if the hardware is good enough and compares well to contemporary adversaries, the outcome rests mainly on the application of said hardware. It seems to me that it's actually two factors, the flawed application of the 262 that delayed its production and the waste of experienced LW aircrew in the ardennes offensive, coupled with the new doctrine in allied fighter operations favoring advanced roaming squads instead of point defence, that really tipped the scale during the final months. In that sense, it's not the pony that won the war...it's the sound way it was employed in, combined with the faulty way the LW employed their jets.

[dduff442]

Originally Posted by Blackdog_kt

Yup, that's pretty much the way i tend to see it when theorizing about it. The difference was that the man with the funny mustache was expecting a sudden rebound and counterattack in his paranoia, while people like Galland were realists and were pushing for a different outcome: a stalemate in the west, maybe going as far as ensuring a separate peace agreement, so that they could concentrate on holding off the Soviets.

The 262 still couldn't win the war, but when the LW almost crippled the 8th AF bomber offensive with prop fighters alone up until the arrival of a long range allied escort, it's obvious that they would have benefitted greatly from having 262s in sufficient numbers.
The reasons the 8th AF loss figures dropped and the disasters of the Regensburg and Schweinfurt raids were not repeated is exactly what you guys are pointing out, long range meant a bunch of mustang groups roaming at will in big wolfpacks, able to cover the bombers all the way to the targets. The 262 was the tool that although unable to directly take the mustangs out, it was perfectly capable of bypassing them entirely and nullifying their impact to a great extent. The real objective was the bombers.
If the LW was able to maintain a 10% atrrition rate against the 8th on most raids, the Normandy landings would have been delayed and German industrial production would have got a very significant respite (as evindeced by data that showed production rising even during the strategic bombing campaign under Speer's guidance).

However, there's an small tid-bit here that sometimes doesn't get enough recognition and it's pretty important, as even if enough 262s and capable pilots were available it would still put a serious dent in LW's plans.

Near the end of the war, allied fighters operated mostly in advance fighter sweeps and not close escort. Some people in the brass fought tooth and nail to convince their peers to "set the fighters free" as they put it. Not easy to convince people about that when it had become clear that unescorted bombers resulted in prohibitive loss figures. However, it proved to be very effective, because it's exactly this strategy that enabled the allies to camp LW bases and deny them a safe haven. Regardless of the range of the pony, if they stuck to operating them in the close and top cover escort roles there wouldn't be mustangs camping over the 262 bases to catch them at their most vulnerable.

In brief, if the hardware is good enough and compares well to contemporary adversaries, the outcome rests mainly on the application of said hardware. It seems to me that it's actually two factors, the flawed application of the 262 that delayed its production and the waste of experienced LW aircrew in the ardennes offensive, coupled with the new doctrine in allied fighter operations favoring advanced roaming squads instead of point defence, that really tipped the scale during the final months. In that sense, it's not the pony that won the war...it's the sound way it was employed in, combined with the faulty way the LW employed their jets.

I tend to agree. Surprise and concentration are two of the most fundamental principles of war. Germany was surprised by massive concentrations of P-51s on a daily basis from Feb-44 on.

dduff442

[IceFire]

Blackdog_kt and ElAurens... you guys both make some great points! The tactics employed on the strategic level enabling the Mustangs to "go free" had a huge impact... It's much bigger than the plane itself. But having fighters marauding over the entire airspace and being encouraged to show initiative and shoot up anything they can find changes things so much.

And it's also true that since Germany was on the front lines they were able to bring to bear more recently developed aircraft in the late days of the war while the U.S. geographic distance from the conflicts prevented the higher performance types from reaching the battle... It's important to remember the much improved P-51H, P-80, P-82 and B-29 that likely would have been deployed had the war continued.

[ElAurens]

Not to mention the B-36 if things had gone really bad.

Remember, it was initially designed to bomb Germany from bases in the US.

..we went from pony talk to phoney talk

[IceFire]

Originally Posted by Codex

The point missing about the 262 was that Galland saw these aircraft as a means to kill bombers, Hitler wanted them to be bombers so there is a stark difference in tactical thinking. Obviously Hitler got his way and Germany lost. But if Galland had the 1400 or so aircraft ready and they were all configured for interception as Galland had wanted, the allied bomber squads would have not had the success they did in killing off Germany's production when they did, and I stress when they did. By D-Day I personally don't think Germany would have lasted even if they had best aircraft and pilots at their disposal, the numbers against them were just too great, but the 262 would have certainly either slowed or even stopped the bleeding of Germany's war production and prolonged the war.

Actually aside from a few key raids the bombing campaigns did little to halt German production. It's almost ironic that the best months of production for Germany were close to the end... in the months leading up to defeat. I don't have the sources readily available but any university library should have the details (that's where I got mine ). What the bombing campaigns did do was tie up valuable resources in defending against them. So I would speculate that even if the 262 was successful in dealing deadly blows to the 8th Air Force operations the Allies would still have won the long term battle as they were holding up resources that could have been used along the Eastern Front in particular.

I think a Luftwaffe victory in the skies over Germany would only serve to redraw the maps of Europe during the latter half of the 20th Century in favour of the Soviet Union.