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#781
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Last edited by NZtyphoon; 03-23-2012 at 06:30 PM. |
#782
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2) Kurfürst has not seen the Pips papers, which were presented eight years ago as a summary in a members only forum, so the thread and the discussion surrounding Pips' "evidence" is not readily available. As Captain Doggles noted Pips himself admitted that they might have been misleading. For Kurfürst to pin 100% faith on papers he has not seen then demand 100% proof from others is a bit rich to say the least. 3) Morgan and Shacklady's claims about heavy tanker losses do not stack up. Cabinet papers show 1,157 tankers arriving in Britain September 1939 - November 1940. 78 tankers were sunk in the same time period. 5) And what exactly did other Commands use for fuel? An absurd claim to make in light of the fact that Bomber Command, for example, was engaged in intensive operations against invasion preparations - coincidentally, when Sealion was called off on September 17 and the invasion fleet began to disperse fuel consumption of Other Grades (not 87 Octane) tapered off as well. The fuel capacity of a Wellington, for example was 750 imp gallons; for Coastal Command a Sunderland needed 2,552 imp gal. Does this help explain why other grades of fuel were dominant? Kurfürst has presented no evidence but continues to demand others present theirs then, when more than enough evidence is presented, continues to whine about small details or simply restates his original position as gospel. Last edited by NZtyphoon; 03-23-2012 at 07:23 PM. |
#783
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Nice document Glider. Thanks for sharing!
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#784
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Question: How much fuel was needed to fly all defensive sorties flown by FC during the battle? (revised - previous posting included Hooton Sep 23-29: 4,825 defensive sorties, which are already included in James' figures)
The Battle of Britain T.C.G. James: 51,364 sorties, day & night July 10 - Sept 30: Hooton’s Eagle in Flames Sep 30 – Oct 6: 1,782 defensive sorties. Total = 53,146 sorties to October 6 1 imperial gallon of 100 Octane = 7.1 pounds ("Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith the official British war history on the oil and petroleum industry during WW2 page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"): 1 ton of 100 octane = 2,240 lbs divided by 7.1 = 315.5 imp gal Fuel Capacities: Defiant I = 97 imp gal Hurricane I = 90 imp gal Spitfire I & II = 84 imp gal Total 271 imp gal divided by 3 = 90.3 imp gal 315.5 divided by 90.3 = 3.5 fuel loads per ton of fuel 53,146 divided by 3.5 Answer: 15,184 tons of fuel total 100 Octane fuel issued between July 11 and October 31 = 62,000 tons: fuel consumed = 51,000 tons - 16,563 tons = 35,816 tons available for other purposes. The only engines cleared to use 100 Octane fuel were Merlin II, II, X(? Flight 1938 article), XII and Bristol Mercury XV. 1) Was 100 octane fuel available to Fighter Command? Yes 2) Was there enough 100 octane fuel available to cover all sorties flown by Fighter Command during the battle? Yes 3) Was enough 100 Octane fuel distributed and used throughout the battle to allow Fighter Command to fly all 53,146 sorties from July to 6 October? Yes, with more than enough left over to allow Blenheim IVs of Bomber Command and Coastal Command to operate, and more than enough to allow for secondary duties. Can anyone explain what happened to all that fuel if only half of FCs frontline fighters were allowed to use it? Last edited by NZtyphoon; 03-26-2012 at 06:02 AM. |
#785
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Or maybe they were drinking it? ![]() |
#786
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Anyway, thanks very much for the information, your research is appreciated, I bet I am not alone here reading these documents with interest. Cheers for that NZ (and others, too!)
__________________
Bobika. |
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(It is called strategic reserves...) We all know what happened when the same group of people started using the logic on that one. Quote:
You take a very very simplistic view. You do realize that in December 1944, the USAAF in Europe, had 4 billion barrels of aviation gasoline issued out and some 12 billion in reserve. The next thing you seem to refuse to deal with is 87 grade remains the predominate fuel in the RAF until September 1940. Only then do we see 100 grade beginning to equal 87 grade. That corresponding rise in consumption very much agrees with Morgan and Shacklady. Until then, it appears the RAF is simply building up the logistical base required to support the eventual change to 100 grade. I will scan those Order of Battle charts from the RAF today. |
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Can we see the rest of that document Glider?
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#789
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You can have anything that I have but which document in particular are you looking for, I posted a number of different ones. If its the Order of Battle I have posted this on posting 746
Last edited by Glider; 03-25-2012 at 05:29 PM. |
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