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#311
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It represents 3.74% of the aviation fuel from the stock yards, to the railheads, to the airfields for the first year of the war. Quote:
That is why placarding is not a choice or option. Any alternative fuels will be specifically listed by specification. That is by convention and still followed today. Quote:
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#312
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It is 10K tons consumed by airplanes. If I consume a glass of beer, the beer is in my stomach, not still in the glass. |
#313
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That straw is getting awfully short Crumpp
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#314
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Your credibility has been destroyed. Why not go away and come back when you find evidence for 87 octane use, or are when you ready to man up and admit that you are wrong. 100% 100 octane use = no evidence for 87 octane because it wasn't used. Last edited by Seadog; 06-07-2012 at 06:43 PM. |
#315
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#316
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Here are the documents which show the cumulative fuel stocks from which the figures in red are taken: 17th Weekly Oil Position Report Dec 31 1939: ![]() 24th WOPR ![]() 25th WOPR 28 Feb 1940 ![]() 28th WOPR 17 Mar 1940 ![]() 33rd WOPR 23 April 1940 ![]() Note also how much 100 Octane fuel is being stocked outside of Britain ie; West of Suez - the only other active war theatre was France and, later Norway. And the reasons why Crumpp's reasoning that stocks of 800,000 tons was required, based on pre-war plans, is so erroneous (Oil HMSO Payton-Smith) ![]() ![]() ![]() The pre-war plans were based on an assumption that American supplies would be withheld and that losses due to air attack would be heavy. Using pre-war plans to decide what happened in wartime is a waste of time; as is obvious here, those plans for stocks of 800,000 tons were not realised even two years into the war: ![]() Also note that stocks of 100 Octane v Other Grades reached near parity in May 1940 294,000 tons v 298,000 tons, and by August, when permission was given to use 100 Octane in all commands, it was the dominant fuel. Prove it by providing one single WW2 RAF or Air Ministry document which says that the fuel was merely kept at airfields and not consumed. By the same reasoning it could be argued that the RAF didn't consume "Other Grades" of fuel either, which makes one wonder what was used instead of aviation fuel? Last edited by NZtyphoon; 06-07-2012 at 08:26 PM. |
#317
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#318
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NZtyphoon, great post
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#319
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If we follow your logic the 26,000 tons of 87 octane consumed wasn't consumed either, it was also at the airfields. So the next question would be, what were the RAF consuming ( sorry, would you prefer burning up, using, please tell us what term you would prefer) Quote:
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PS still waiting for you to say where you got the information re the full transfer of FC to 100 octane completing in May 1941. If you do not support that statement can you give one good reason as to why we shouldn't ignore every other statement that you have made without support. |
#320
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Once again, I have not seen a thing that overrides the operational doucmentation or what the Notes on a Merlin Engine say for the specified fuel. When 100 Octane becomes the norm, Notes on a Merlin engine relects it. You guys are all in a frenzy and foaming at the mouth to disprove the fact the Battle of Britain was transitional time period and we need to have more information. |
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