Mitsubishi Stuka and Thunderbolt

[MiloMorai]

The American bombing never stopped, they just didn't bomb anything that was outside escort range.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by MiloMorai

The American bombing never stopped, they just didn't bomb anything that was outside escort range.

Technically correct; there were, however, 'pauses' during the periods in summer of 1943 and later, when losses made big formation missions difficult for a few weeks. The winter of '43-'44 was also pretty bad, weather-wise, which also created week-long gaps in large-scale operations. Bombing over France had a limited effect on the German war effort; in fact it could be argued that the Germans did a poor job of integrating the industries and economies of their conquered territories and folding them into their own.

The tempo of operations slowed markedly after Second Schweinfurt in early October '43, due to weather, bringing new fighter and bomber units up to speed and the changes in command at 8th AF, and didn't pick back up until Big Week, which began in mid February of 1944.

Another note on an earlier post; the B-24 was a lot harder to keep in close formation than the B-17, and Liberator groups suffered accordingly. Its superior range, speed and payload made it a valuable patrol bomber and more useful in the Pacific, but it was not well thought of in the ETO, and there were fewer B-24s in the 8th AF's order of battle as a result. Fortresses required a lot less attention and physical effort to keep close formation at all altitudes than most heavy bombers of the era, which allowed a greater degree of mutual support (meaning that more gunners could fire their guns in the general direction of an attacker).

cheers

horseback

[Woke Up Dead]

When the PZL P-11c was introduced to the original IL-2 game, it came with a write-up that had some interesting info about how the plane's wing mounted guns were designed to fire beyond the range of bombers' guns. You can read the whole document here: http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...ient=firefox-a

Here is the most relevant part, highlights are mine:

The gun pairs have separate triggers since they can never be fired usefully at the same time. The wing guns may be fired by pressing the second trigger. There is no "all guns together" mode.

No one publishes documents concerning their war fighting doctrine at the time and classified documents tend to be destroyed when countries are overrun. With hindsight it is not too hard to work out the doctrine though. During WW1 it had become clear that the effective range of single hand manipulated rear guns was very low. Certainly less than 100 meters. The Poles were clearly trying to evolve stand off tactics for use by their fighters against the large formations of Soviet bombers which they were built to destroy. In the thirties most of these had mobile defensive mounts which were hardly superior to those of WW1. The best probably had an effective range of no more than 200 meters. The elevated wing guns in the P-11c could be used for stand off attacks from the rear arc from a range of perhaps 300 meters. Ideally engaging from very slightly below and at the same speed.

The P-11c wing guns had no convergence but at 300 meters their cones of dispersion were large and had merged anyway. The idea was to create a shotgun effect. The sight is ignored when firing the wing guns. Tracer is used to spray the intended straight and level formation target from safe stand off range. Any Soviet fighters which could not be avoided by using the superior speed of the gull winged monoplanes would be engaged at close quarters with nose guns only.

If this does not sound like a winning strategy imagine what the real pilots thought. They wanted four gun fighters with all guns harmonized. They never got them. The wing mounts although outboard of the shoulder were an integral part of the shoulder construction of the unusual gull wing design and apparently could not be altered. Only about sixty of the 175 P-11cs delivered to the Polish Air Force ever had the wing guns fitted. The rest just had the nose guns. Stories that this was because there was a shortage of guns lasting for years were just a cover up for a halfhearted implementation of the doctrine.

A decade later the Luftwaffe barely made stand off attacks work with much greater firepower and high quality reflector sights. The doctrine was correct of course, and two decade after the P-11c entered service guided missiles finally made stand off fighter attacks against bombers a practical reality. The P-11c pioneered the concept though and so this release models the four gun fighters with all their strengths and weaknesses. Just remember to obtain a firing solution for the nose guns using the sight and a firing solution for the wing guns using tracer only. Never fire both at the same time.

The Poles were smart enough to expect the Soviets to use the same tactics. Even in 1936 all the mobile mounts in the P-23B Karas were semi rigid with hydraulic power assistance to train the mounts. This significantly increased their effective range compared to most other mobile manually trained mounts of the day.

[RPS69]

Originally Posted by Pursuivant

Even so, the U.S. practice of heavily armed bombers flying in close formation didn't work so well unless they had fighter escort. U.S. attempts at unescorted missions deep into Europe were disastrous and forced a temporary halt to U.S. bombing raids while the generals figured out a different strategy.

The British learned this lesson earlier and told the Americans, but the Americans wouldn't listen. Without extremely long-ranged fighters like the P-47, P-51 and P-38 to escort their bombers, the British had to revert to night bombing.

That "classical" aproach to the bombers self protecting capacity is not that fair at all. If germans tried to take down american bombers as any other single flying aircraft, they will probably got serious losses. Even if they look dumb on holywood films, they played smart with their resources, and instead of making extremely daring attacks on bombers, by single engined fighters, they picked them with heavy two engined fighters and with long range devices. Those bombers forced to fall back, were then to be finished by single engined fighters.

So, the doctrine wasn`t that wrong, it just generated new tactics, and new weapons that made this doctrine obsolete. Actually US bombers faired fairly well at he begining. Germans just happened to readjust faster than expected. When escorts started coming with the bomber formations, single engined fighters were not as goood as the bi-motors on the bomber killing task, but will have some chance against escorts, where bi-motors would have none.

[MiloMorai]

Combat sorties flown in the ETO, http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t119.htm

1943
Jun - 2,107 - 1,268 (airborne - effective)
Jul - 2,829 - 1,743
Aug - 2,265 - 1,850
Sep - 3,259 - 2,457
Oct - 2,831 - 2,117
Nov - 4,157 - 2,581
Dec - 5,973 - 4,937

1944
Jan - 6,367 - 5,027
Feb - 9,884 - 7,512

As can be seen there was a dip in Oct '43 but there was a steady increase in the number of sorties flown.

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by horseback

Bombing over France had a limited effect on the German war effort; in fact it could be argued that the Germans did a poor job of integrating the industries and economies of their conquered territories and folding them into their own.

That might have been more due to bad targeting decisions by the USAAF. Especially during early 1943, the U.S. was under a lot of pressure by the Brits to do something about the u-boats which were a mortal threat to Great Britain's existence. So, the U.S. wasted a lot of effort on bomb-proof u-boat pens at Brest and Lorient. Later, they took a lot of casualties for not a whole lot of effect bombing u-boat production centers at Kiel. It wasn't until the middle of 1944, when the USAAF figured out that POL assets were the perfect target, that the U.S. bombing offensive had any real strategic impact other than just destroying a lot of buildings.

As to the ability of the Nazis to integrate conquered economies into their own, blame it on very short time frame (just a couple of years), deliberate sabotage and heel-dragging by the conquered peoples, and, of course, the savage Nazi ideology which justified slave labor and genocide. The latter element was a particularly big factor in Poland and the Ukraine.

Originally Posted by horseback

The tempo of operations slowed markedly after Second Schweinfurt in early October '43, due to weather, bringing new fighter and bomber units up to speed and the changes in command at 8th AF, and didn't pick back up until Big Week, which began in mid February of 1944.

This was the period I was thinking of in my previous post.

Originally Posted by horseback

Another note on an earlier post; the B-24 was a lot harder to keep in close formation than the B-17, and Liberator groups suffered accordingly.

Additionally, it's ceiling wasn't as good and the B-24 didn't have quite the same reputation for ruggedness that the B-17 did. Luftwaffe pilots knew these things and choose their targets accordingly. B-17 crews sardonically remarked that the best escort they could have was a squadron of B-24s as low squadron. (Low and rear squadrons in group formations suffered disproportionately in any case.)

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by RPS69

If germans tried to take down american bombers as any other single flying aircraft, they will probably got serious losses. Even if they look dumb on holywood films, they played smart with their resources, and instead of making extremely daring attacks on bombers, by single engined fighters, they picked them with heavy two engined fighters and with long range devices. Those bombers forced to fall back, were then to be finished by single engined fighters.

Basically correct. And, the Luftwaffe commanders weren't stupid, just overmatched. (As an aside, it's interesting to read Adolf Galland's memoir from the 1960s, originally written for a German audience, where he claims that he was trying to get all the planes and pilots he could get to defend Germany. Of course, that strategy would have completely deprived the German army of air support, especially on the Russian Front.)

But, the German strategy of heavy fighters was countered by long-ranged U.S. single-engined fighters which could easily defeat twin-engined fighters loaded with aerial mortars, bombs or cannon gondolas.

And, once the Americans were able to get drop-tank equipped P-47 and P-51 over German in sufficient numbers, the end was inevitable. Arguably, the most important invention in the American bomber offensive was the humble waxed-paper 110-gallon drop tank!

It all goes to show that ultimately, WW2 wasn't about individual heroism or vision, it boiled down to bloody attrition and economics. Big economy + large population (e.g., the U.S. and the British Commonwealth) meant that you came through the war in pretty good shape (overall - the UK itself got hurt quite badly). Big population but smaller economy (e.g., China or Russia) means that your country survived, but a shocking number of your people didn't. Middling population and/or economy (e.g., Italy, France, Germany, Japan, Poland) meant that your country was defeated.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by MiloMorai

Combat sorties flown in the ETO, http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t119.htm

1943
Jun - 2,107 - 1,268 (airborne - effective)
Jul - 2,829 - 1,743
Aug - 2,265 - 1,850
Sep - 3,259 - 2,457
Oct - 2,831 - 2,117
Nov - 4,157 - 2,581
Dec - 5,973 - 4,937

1944
Jan - 6,367 - 5,027
Feb - 9,884 - 7,512

As can be seen there was a dip in Oct '43 but there was a steady increase in the number of sorties flown.

Good info, but most of those sorties between October and January reflect the enormous increase of groups (both Bomb and Fighter) added to the 8th AF that became possible once the U-Boat threat had been beaten in the summer of 1943; a lot of acclimatization to radio and ground control procedures, plus re-familiarization with their aircraft after at least a month of travel (or for some fighter groups, familiarization with entirely new fighter types), and constant drill on the latest formations, tactics and the requirement for precise timing and navigation to coordinate rendezvous with escorts. Most of these groups would do their initial 3-5 missions over relatively 'safe' targets, not too close to German airspace, and well within range of their escorts.

cheers

horseback

[horseback]

A potentially useful source of information and insight into USAAF flexible gunnery training:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/...index.html#TOC

ARMY AIR FORCES HISTORICAL STUDIES No. 31

FLEXIBLE GUNNERY TRAINING IN THE AAF

I've read about the first 25 pages or so, and it should give a pretty good account of training problems and methods for the Army Air Forces' efforts during the war.

cheers

horseback

[horseback]

That "classical" aproach to the bombers self protecting capacity is not that fair at all. If Germans tried to take down American bombers as any other single flying aircraft, they will probably got serious losses. Even if they look dumb on Hollywood films, they played smart with their resources, and instead of making extremely daring attacks on bombers, by single engined fighters, they picked them with heavy two engined fighters and with long range devices. Those bombers forced to fall back, were then to be finished by single engined fighters.

This ignores the fact that the Luftwaffe had already demonstrated that they had heavily armed, long range heavy fighters like the Bf 110 and the Ju-88C, and had demonstrated that they were particularly useful against bombers, long before anyone came up with underwing rocket canisters. In fact, we could consider the American P-38 the ultimate WWII expression of the twin engine, high speed bomber destroyer concept (it was originally built to USAAF requirements for an interceptor rather than for a fighter), and the American bomber generals were certainly well aware of the Lightning’s capabilities, and the basic military principal that if you can do it, chances are very good that the enemy can do it too.

So, the doctrine wasn`t that wrong, it just generated new tactics, and new weapons that made this doctrine obsolete. Actually US bombers faired fairly well at he begining. Germans just happened to readjust faster than expected. When escorts started coming with the bomber formations, single engined fighters were not as good as the bi-motors on the bomber killing task, but will have some chance against escorts, where bi-motors would have none.

I would agree that the high altitude massed formation heavy daylight bomber doctrine would have worked very well against Bf 109E-1s over a Germany without an early warning radar system, but those days were long past by the time the 8th Air Force even arrived in England in 1942.

The US bombers fared well at the beginning because the JGs had never fired at such big targets before, and because they if anything over-respected the defensive fire from the gunners. It didn’t take them long to figure out how to estimate the range or re-set their convergences and recognize that for all the tracers flying past their ears that they were rarely hit before they could do serious damage and veered away. Even so, they recognized that being hit was a serious thing and when they were hit, they returned to base (unlike certain ai routines I could mention). If anything, the early confusion and hesitancy by the German fighters served to sucker the bomber groups into overconfidence and the early fiascoes over Germany before they had adequate numbers according to their own doctrines, much less adequate fighter escorts.

By that time, the Germans had said to themselves, “Hey, we have all these zerstörers and trained aircrew for them; they may not be very useful against enemy fighters, but they will be deadly to viermots. Let’s kick some Yankee air pirate ass.”

The reality was that long after the bomber generals’ doctrine was nullified, the bloody-minded commitment to ever bigger formations continued for reasons of ‘face’; if you look at what happened every time an unescorted US heavy bomber formation was detected and attacked by single engine fighters, the casualty figures were heavily in favor of the fighters, period. Luftwaffe Over Germany authors Caldwell & Muller reported several instances late in 1944 where bomber formations would miss their rendezvous with their escorts and were caught by even ‘light’ fighter formations of Bf 109Gs without gun pods and were decimated while the fighters got away with much fewer losses—and this was with the supposedly less capable ‘new growth’ generation of LW fighter pilots.

In any case, being hit by defensive fire is more a matter of the numbers of guns being fired in your direction than it is any one (or five) gunner's accuracy or skill. The closer you get, the more gunner skill enters into the equation, but individual accuracy did not become a factor unless the range was very short (as in under 150m) and the speed difference and angles were minimal.

cheers

horseback