Mitsubishi Stuka and Thunderbolt

[horseback]

Originally Posted by MiloMorai

The American bombing never stopped, they just didn't bomb anything that was outside escort range.

Technically correct; there were, however, 'pauses' during the periods in summer of 1943 and later, when losses made big formation missions difficult for a few weeks. The winter of '43-'44 was also pretty bad, weather-wise, which also created week-long gaps in large-scale operations. Bombing over France had a limited effect on the German war effort; in fact it could be argued that the Germans did a poor job of integrating the industries and economies of their conquered territories and folding them into their own.

The tempo of operations slowed markedly after Second Schweinfurt in early October '43, due to weather, bringing new fighter and bomber units up to speed and the changes in command at 8th AF, and didn't pick back up until Big Week, which began in mid February of 1944.

Another note on an earlier post; the B-24 was a lot harder to keep in close formation than the B-17, and Liberator groups suffered accordingly. Its superior range, speed and payload made it a valuable patrol bomber and more useful in the Pacific, but it was not well thought of in the ETO, and there were fewer B-24s in the 8th AF's order of battle as a result. Fortresses required a lot less attention and physical effort to keep close formation at all altitudes than most heavy bombers of the era, which allowed a greater degree of mutual support (meaning that more gunners could fire their guns in the general direction of an attacker).

cheers

horseback

[Woke Up Dead]

When the PZL P-11c was introduced to the original IL-2 game, it came with a write-up that had some interesting info about how the plane's wing mounted guns were designed to fire beyond the range of bombers' guns. You can read the whole document here: http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...ient=firefox-a

Here is the most relevant part, highlights are mine:

The gun pairs have separate triggers since they can never be fired usefully at the same time. The wing guns may be fired by pressing the second trigger. There is no "all guns together" mode.

No one publishes documents concerning their war fighting doctrine at the time and classified documents tend to be destroyed when countries are overrun. With hindsight it is not too hard to work out the doctrine though. During WW1 it had become clear that the effective range of single hand manipulated rear guns was very low. Certainly less than 100 meters. The Poles were clearly trying to evolve stand off tactics for use by their fighters against the large formations of Soviet bombers which they were built to destroy. In the thirties most of these had mobile defensive mounts which were hardly superior to those of WW1. The best probably had an effective range of no more than 200 meters. The elevated wing guns in the P-11c could be used for stand off attacks from the rear arc from a range of perhaps 300 meters. Ideally engaging from very slightly below and at the same speed.

The P-11c wing guns had no convergence but at 300 meters their cones of dispersion were large and had merged anyway. The idea was to create a shotgun effect. The sight is ignored when firing the wing guns. Tracer is used to spray the intended straight and level formation target from safe stand off range. Any Soviet fighters which could not be avoided by using the superior speed of the gull winged monoplanes would be engaged at close quarters with nose guns only.

If this does not sound like a winning strategy imagine what the real pilots thought. They wanted four gun fighters with all guns harmonized. They never got them. The wing mounts although outboard of the shoulder were an integral part of the shoulder construction of the unusual gull wing design and apparently could not be altered. Only about sixty of the 175 P-11cs delivered to the Polish Air Force ever had the wing guns fitted. The rest just had the nose guns. Stories that this was because there was a shortage of guns lasting for years were just a cover up for a halfhearted implementation of the doctrine.

A decade later the Luftwaffe barely made stand off attacks work with much greater firepower and high quality reflector sights. The doctrine was correct of course, and two decade after the P-11c entered service guided missiles finally made stand off fighter attacks against bombers a practical reality. The P-11c pioneered the concept though and so this release models the four gun fighters with all their strengths and weaknesses. Just remember to obtain a firing solution for the nose guns using the sight and a firing solution for the wing guns using tracer only. Never fire both at the same time.

The Poles were smart enough to expect the Soviets to use the same tactics. Even in 1936 all the mobile mounts in the P-23B Karas were semi rigid with hydraulic power assistance to train the mounts. This significantly increased their effective range compared to most other mobile manually trained mounts of the day.

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by horseback

Bombing over France had a limited effect on the German war effort; in fact it could be argued that the Germans did a poor job of integrating the industries and economies of their conquered territories and folding them into their own.

That might have been more due to bad targeting decisions by the USAAF. Especially during early 1943, the U.S. was under a lot of pressure by the Brits to do something about the u-boats which were a mortal threat to Great Britain's existence. So, the U.S. wasted a lot of effort on bomb-proof u-boat pens at Brest and Lorient. Later, they took a lot of casualties for not a whole lot of effect bombing u-boat production centers at Kiel. It wasn't until the middle of 1944, when the USAAF figured out that POL assets were the perfect target, that the U.S. bombing offensive had any real strategic impact other than just destroying a lot of buildings.

As to the ability of the Nazis to integrate conquered economies into their own, blame it on very short time frame (just a couple of years), deliberate sabotage and heel-dragging by the conquered peoples, and, of course, the savage Nazi ideology which justified slave labor and genocide. The latter element was a particularly big factor in Poland and the Ukraine.

Originally Posted by horseback

The tempo of operations slowed markedly after Second Schweinfurt in early October '43, due to weather, bringing new fighter and bomber units up to speed and the changes in command at 8th AF, and didn't pick back up until Big Week, which began in mid February of 1944.

This was the period I was thinking of in my previous post.

Originally Posted by horseback

Another note on an earlier post; the B-24 was a lot harder to keep in close formation than the B-17, and Liberator groups suffered accordingly.

Additionally, it's ceiling wasn't as good and the B-24 didn't have quite the same reputation for ruggedness that the B-17 did. Luftwaffe pilots knew these things and choose their targets accordingly. B-17 crews sardonically remarked that the best escort they could have was a squadron of B-24s as low squadron. (Low and rear squadrons in group formations suffered disproportionately in any case.)