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#61
05-16-2008, 02:08 AM
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The Germans were deadly serious about the invasion of Britain, they drew up detailed plans for the occupation of England, as well, as I have mentioned earlier, plans to have all 'subversive' elements, ie. Churchill and his supporters, labour union leaders, Jews, Communists, and anyone else who they deemed to be unsatisfactory to be liquidated. S.S. supervised Concentration camps were planned to be set up. Hitler appointed a bureaucracy and military governor to rule the country in summer 1940. The plans also included the removal of King George and his replacement with the Nazi sympathizing Edward VIII. Things were to be much the same as in France and the situation there with the Vichy state, with the occupation of most of industrial Britain, with a British 'puppet' government being installed at the Nazis pleasure in a smaller northern city, I think York was mentioned. You are correct in assuming that the Nazis did not want the destruction of the British Empire, but that didn't mean they wanted things to remain as they were. The British were to be treated in the same way as the French, all their overseas possessions were to be run by the puppet government, under Nazi supervision, and in instances where the Eastern overseas possessions could not be controlled by the puppet government, then they would be handed over to Japanese supervision. (in the same way that Indochina was handed over to the Japanese when the Vichy government couldn't guarantee that it would stay in the Nazi orbit) Canada, Australia and New Zealand would not have surrendered, the British Government would have gone into exile in Canada, and would have continued the war, while appealing for American protection. (which would likely have been offered, the U.S. under the Monroe doctrine, would not tolerate European control of areas of North America, or Australia) What was left of the British Fleet would have rebased, likely to Halifax, Canada, which is the largest deep water port in Canada. Australia would likely have tried to conclude an alliance with the U.S. in protection against Japanese attack. The United States would probably have built up its bases in Iceland, as a screen and warning for any potential threats from Europe. India would also likely initially have stayed in the war, but there would have been a lot of agitation by Indians for independence, and a self controlled parliament, which might have wanted a peace. The Japanese would have automatically occupied Hong Kong, Singapore, and the British Pacific islands. Let's not forget who was running Germany. Hitler was a genocidal sociopath, not some altruistic statesman, and his Nazi party cohorts were just as bad. That was one of the major reasons that Britain would not surrender after the fall of France. Churchill and the British knew that Hitler could not be trusted, and that any peace treaty would not allow the British people to remain masters of their own destiny. Hitler would not have accepted a peace which did not involve the surrender of the British fleet, and with their fleet gone, Britain could be occupied at anytime by the Nazis. Last edited by *Buzzsaw*; 05-16-2008 at 02:34 AM. |
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#63
05-16-2008, 11:14 AM
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The Battle of Britain was a draw. Neither side won outright.
The loss of pilots was similar on both sides. As far as Britain was concerned a draw was enough to stay in the fight. Germany gave up the attempt and concentrated its efforts elsewhere. So a tactical draw but strategic defeat for Germany. |
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#64
05-16-2008, 12:41 PM
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#66
05-17-2008, 03:52 AM
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Start with 'Sealion' by Richard Cox, and look for other sources which detail the German plans. |
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#67
05-17-2008, 05:55 PM
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http://funsite.unc.edu/hyperwar/ETO/BOB/BoB-German/ Remember that this is a USAF Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course, written by a United States Air Force Officer. It disturbs me to see my own countrymen accuse their own Military analysts and Officers of being "revisionist". That's usually internet speak for "Traitor". I think that's what is meant, but I could be wrong. For Britain it turned out to be a Strategic victory. For Germany, on the other hand, it was an Operational defeat. Both of these conditions, however clear in the 20/20 of hindsight, could very well have turned differently, based upon Hitler's decision making AFTER the fall of 1940. The German decisions which followed are best viewed as Strategic mistakes, lead by an emboldened Hitler, most namely the invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece, the expedition into North Africa and the maddeningly idiotic invasion of Russia. Had Hitler simply left Mussolini to bear the burden of his mistakes early-on, the war would certainly have gone differently. But of course, this was one of the most fatal flaws in the "Little Corporals" strategic decision making. He was simply unable to focus on a few critical objectives for too long. He was constantly changing his mind and adding objectives. I think that the point of the original poster was to present the differing perspectives from which the same outcome can be viewed. Hitler, Goering, Von Rundstedt, Raeder, Student - for example - had differing purposes, priorities and expectations concerning both the realistic goals of Operation Sea Lion and it's viability. The assumption presented by some seems to be that since there was a plan for Seelowe, the Germany was 100% committed to it. This is only true with respect to the Luftwaffe. Hitler had other things on his mind, Student knew he could not drop troops after June, Raeder knew that he did not have anywhere near the forces to even partially complete his tasking. Von Runstedt knew that the opportunity of taking England by the Heer, was probably lost at Dunkirk and certainly lost within a three week period after it. Only the idiot Goering, believed that he could accomplish his mission, which he executed poorly - making three disastrous assumptions (that his fighter pilots had no bravery, that he had enough strike capability, and that those tall metal towers on the coast were communications antennae) and at least one completely bone-headed co-decision (with Hitler, to switch from military to civilian targets). I would suggest Sir B.H. Liddell-Hart's interviews with captured German decision makers, leaders and other witnesses, documented in "The Other Side of the Hill" (UK Edition) and "German Generals Talk (condensed US Edition)" - first published in 1948 as a reference. Particularly pages 144 to 153 in the U.S. Edition. "Hitler's Generals" - edited by Correlli Barnett is also an excellent book which documents much of what is known and understood about Hitler's reluctance to fully "kick off" Operation Sea Lion. Based upon the statements of Von Rundstedt, members of his staff including Blumentritt, the actual history goes like this - After allowing the BEF to escape at Dunkirk, Hitler fully expected to work out a "deal" with Britain. No matter what we may think about the prospects of Hitler's expectation - that was his objective in stopping 5 German Divisions from closing the encircled BEF BEFORE the BEF hardened defensive positions at Dunkirk and ultimately evacuated the brunt of their forces, back to Britain. Some of the arguments and conclusions drawn in this thread are over-simplified, one dimensional and limited in scope. Without studying the German side in detail - you simply cannot grasp the complexity and ever changing nature of strategic decision-making as effected by Hitler. For example, the argument that the British success in the Air Defense of the home Island started a chain reaction that forced Hitler to invade Yugoslavia is absurd. The poster of that silly conclusion needs to examine the Balkans campaign in it's entirety. I know it's complicated but, alas those details, which have no relationship to the Battle of Britain, are essential in forming an opinion. In summary, the overarching point to this entire subject can best be summarized as follows: The Battle of Britain was a fight for the British Home Islands, which if lost, would have had horrific consequences, and resulted in a strategic loss of the greatest magnitude. The British public, leadership and military was completely aware of what these air battles meant - the awareness driven home by falling bombs and visible death and destruction of civilian areas. For Germany, it was a failed excursion - almost unknown to the public - and militarily a limited defeat. The failure of Seelowe barely made a dent in the next two years of Hitler's horrific expansion. The actual forces committed to the defense of France, after the fall of 1940 were minimal. Two Jagdgeswader were able to hold off and maul the next two years of RAF efforts into France, while minimal ground forces were actually required in defense. Only when the USAAF came to full operational capability, adding it's forces to the RAF - did the tides start to turn. S~ Gunny |
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#68
05-17-2008, 06:34 PM
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You and I we don’t know what Hitler or the OKW where thinking or planning at the time right? So the word “Wrong” is misplaced, references to your sources would have been welcomed in the first post; but one should be cautious as most writers have an agenda or is trying to prove a thesis. Research is a serious matter and involves cross checking many independent sources and a lot of thinking “outside the box”, reading a book or two simply doesn’t qualify. I still believe that the prime motive for the whole kanalkamp etc. was to force the British to the negotiating table and finish the war in west, perhaps only for the time, while Hitler conquered Russia and, most essentially, reached the oilfields in Caucasus. There was simply nothing of value in England for the continuation of the conquering of the world. It was also urgent to finish the war in west, or to make the British look weak enough, to stop the Americans from getting involved. In order to make this “bluff” credible enough it had to be backed by visible planning and some hardware to back it up but in my mind there never was intent from the leaders to follow through. It would have been too plain stupid with the hardware available and the knowledge at hand. Churchill on the other hand made a media show of the threat in order to show America the will and determination of the British people to resist and succeeded in getting America involved. Perhaps this was the biggest gain or “victory” in the Battle of Britain. But we don’t know now, do we? We can just speculate. Viking |
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#69
05-19-2008, 02:03 AM
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Most posters are (respectfully) missing the point about the role of the BoB in WWII. Yes, it increased UK morale, and maybe it did not actually damage German morale (though I would contend the Luftwaffe pilots would have felt it was a setback).
The BoB served a much greater purpose, which was to ensure that the USA entered the war. To American airmen, the conflict was an exciting opportunity to fly and fight in aircraft that were the apogee of engineering at the time. The Spitfire was as iconic in the USA as it was in the UK and many pilots would give an arm and a leg (and some, their lives) for the chance to fly it. US pilots who could not qualify for the USAF training program because of its then limited intake, were welcomed with open cockpits in the RAF. Most crucial though was the role that victory in the Battle of Britain played in encouraging a reluctant America to join the war against Germany. Until the BoB, the German war machine had proven itself invincible. This perception was a powerful ally to American isolationists who argued that at most, the US should be providing materiel to Britain and its dominions, though never should it enter a conflict in Europe. They could use the spectre of an invincible Nazi war machine to scare the public and politicians and persuade them that this fight was not Americas fight. We need to consider the role of the aviator, Charles Lindbergh. Lindbergh was famous, wealthy, had frequent access to politicians including Roosevelt, and was an avowed pacifist. Working against him was an almost reclusive personality and strong dislike of the media. But his anti-interventionist message was strong, he expressed public respect, if not admiration, for German military achievements, and it can be argued he more than anyone else, he paid the biggest public role in trying to keep America out of the war. Much has been made of Lindbergh’s reputed pro-Nazi leanings, and his admiration of the achievements of the Luftwaffe and German aircraft engineers, but in the end his message was simple. Germany has achieved what it wants to achieve in Europe, the war is all but over, we should stay out of it. But the Battle of Britain outcome was effective in turning public opinion in the US, and allowing time for a change in public policy. For the first time, the German advance was stopped in its tracks. It showed that Hitler was not invincible, and gave strength to the arguments of the interventionists who had been saying he should be taken on – now it was shown that he could be taken on. The BoB created a pause in the conflict in Europe, which Roosevelt could use from Sept 1940 onwards, to overcome the isolationist voices in the US, and more importantly, to rearm, and re-equip: both British forces, but also his own underdone airforce and navy. The US sent its officers and politicians to Britain to study the conflict in real time. The visited aircraft engineering works, viewed prototype aircraft like the Typhoon (influencing their decision to prioritise the P-47 for production) and came back deeply impressed by the role of air power in the new conflict. One such delegation reported to Roosevelt: "Insofar as the defense of England is concerned, it has been for some months, is now, and probably will be for some time to come, an air war. . . . The lesson from this war, as far as we are concerned, is that we must build up the striking component of our Air Force as quickly as possible. We both have the very definite feeling that sooner or later the United States will be drawn into this war. . . ." The US also sent a corps of observers to work with all levels of the British air defence system, taking home the lessons learned the hard way in the Battle of Britain, including the importance of integrated intelligence, the value of radar, the limitations of night fighters, the inaccuracy of bomb aiming, and interestingly, the crucial role of women in armaments production, home defense, and ferrying of aircraft. Meanwhile the tide of public opinion was turning – the images of German bombers over London forced the US public and politicians to confront a future without a powerful ally like Britain in Europe, or act to change that future. And the victory gave backbone to the argument that the US not only should, but would, prevail in a conflict against Germany. It is irrelevent whether Germans believed the Battle was won or lost, the fact that the UK and USA believed it was, is all that mattered. |
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#70
05-19-2008, 06:27 AM
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