A pilot compares cockpits between the Spitfire and the 109

[bobbysocks]

P/O Roger Hall of No. 152 Squadron based at Warmwell in 10 Group described a 4 September scramble:

We were traveling at full throttle and climbing at nearly three thousand feet a minute in the general direction of the enemy formation, which was just visible high up above and in front of us. I could see Yellow Section in front and above us also, going at full boost. Black streams of petrol vapour were coming away from their engines. ‘Better use your energy boost, Roger,’ Ferdie called out to me, as he started to increase speed himself. The makers stipulated that the emergency boost must not be used for more than five consecutive minutes, but now the occasion seemed to warrant the risk. I throttled back, pushed the red half-lever forward and then opened up the main throttle again. Immediately the aircraft seemed to leap forward with a jolt, hitting me in the back as it did so, and the engine started to vibrate – black smoke pouring out of each exhaust port. The engine vibration transmitted itself to the entire aircraft and I began to appreciate the maker’s instructions. 65

F/O Robert Oxspring (later Group Captain) of No. 66 Squadron, based at Kenley, wrote of a 6 September 1940 combat:

Still turning toward the bombers, I saw another 109 crossing ahead at my level. I throttled up to max power to reduce the distance and get my sights on. Just getting to firing range, I suddenly thought of Ken's 'watch your tail' warning. I looked back over my left shoulder and sure enough, another 109 was below my tail pulling bead and about to let go. There was no point in sticking around to see if he could shoot straight and my reactions were unbelievably fast. I parked everything in the left hand corner. Cranking on full left aileron and rudder, at the same time I shoved the throttle through the gate for emergency power.

Hauling back on the stick, I reefed into a blacked-out turn... I held the turn for a number of seconds which I judged had completed about 270 degrees... Then with the pressure relaxed my eyesight returned and I peered rearwards to seek my aggressor. He was nowhere in sight, but then nor was the rest of my flight.66

P/O R. D. Elliott of No. 72 Squadron, flying out of Biggin Hill, wrote on his Combat Report for 9 September 1940:

...I turned and was then astern E/A - & with the aid of MAX Boost (12 lbs) I gradually closed with enemy... 67

F/O Brian Macnamara of 603 Squadron recorded on his Combat Report of 27 September 1940:

I was Guard section leader when the squadron was proceeding north near Dungeness. I saw a 109 flying very low going south. I peeled off and chased it, firing continuously. I could see my incindiaries bursting on the machine and black smoke began to come from the engine and the enemy began to slow down and turn as if to land on the water. However two Me109's suddenly appeared 200 yards ahead of me out of the haze and shooting at me. I was forced to turn and run. The enemy chased me till I had crossed the English coast. I flew about 20 feet off the water, taking violent evasive action and the enemy's bursts missed mostly through insufficient deflection. In fine pitch, with full throttle and the red lever pressed, I appeared to be drawing away from the 109's as their fire slackened for the last mile of two and when I turned, they were further behind me than at the start of the action. 68

P/O Bob Doe described his usual routine after being scrambled, whilst flying Spitfires with No. 234 Squadron out of Middle Wallop, 10 Group:

Once we were in the vicinity of the enemy, I would 'pull the plug', which was the release so that we could get extra boost, but I wouldn't use it, and would start my search. 69

He had occasion to use emergency boost during a couple of low altitude tail chases of Me-109s, most notably whilst shooting down Hauptmann Rolf Pingell of I./JG26 on 18 August.

Geoffrey Wellum, flying with No. 92 Squadron out of Biggin Hill from early September to the end of the Battle, wrote of his routine when combat was imminent:

Things are starting to get rough. Automatically I have followed my self-imposed drill that I always do at times like this. Reflector sight on; gun button to fire; airscrew pitch to 2,650 revs; better response. Press the emergency boost override. Lower my seat a notch and strap tight. Ok men, I’m all set. Let battle commence. 70

P/O David Crook, with No. 609 Squadron at Middle Wallop, published an interesting account in his book of his most successful day of the Battle of Britain, 30 September 1940:

It was now obviously a matter of moments only before we were in the thick of it. I turned my trigger on to 'Fire', increased the engine revs. to 3000 r.p.m. by slipping the constant speed control fully forward, and 'pulled the plug', i.e. pushed the small handle on the throttle quadrant that cuts out the automatic boost control thus allowing one to use emergency power.
A few seconds later, about six Me. 109s flew across right in front of us. I don't think they saw us till too late as we were coming out of the sun. Michael was leading Blue Section and I was leading Green, and immediately we swung our sections round and turned on to the tails of the enemy. They saw us - too late - and tried to escape by diving.
We all went down after them in one glorious rush and I saw Michael, who was about a hundred yards ahead of me, open fire at the last Messerschmidt in the enemy line. A few seconds later, this machine more or less fell to pieces in mid-air - some very nice shooting on Michael's part. I distinctly remember him saying on the R.T., 'That's got you, you bastard,' though he never recollects it!
The victim that I had selected for myself was about 500 yards ahead of me, and still diving hard at very high speed. God, what a dive that was! I came down on full throttle from 27,000 feet to 1,000 feet in a matter of seconds, and the speed rose with incredible swiftness - 400 m.p.h., 500, 550, 600 m.p.h. I never reached this speed before and probably never shall again. I have a dim recollection of the sea coming up towards me at an incredible rate and also feeling an awful pain in my ears, though I was not really conscious of this in the heat of the moment. I pulled out of the dive as gently as I could, but the strain was terrific and there was a sort of black mist in front of my eyes, though I did not quite 'black out'.
The Messerschmidt was now just ahead of me. I came up behind him and gave him a terrific burst of fire at very close range. The effect of a Spitfire's eight guns has to be seen to be believed. Hundreds of bullets poured into him and he rocked violently, then turned over on his back, burst into flames and dived straight down into the sea a few miles off Swanage. The pilot made no attempt to get out and was obviously dead. I watched him hit the water in a great cloud of white foam, and then turned round to see what else was going on.
A few of our Spitfires were chasing Messerschmidts all over the place and obviously a very nice little massacre was in progress, as a few seconds later I saw another Hun go into the sea. I then saw another Me. 109 going back to France as hard as he could and I chased him, caught him fairly easily, and put a good burst into him. He swerved slightly, his cockpit covering broke off the machine and flew just past my head and he then dived steeply.
I waited to see him hit the water, but he was only shamming, as he flattened out again just above the sea, and continued full speed for home, though his machine was now smoking and obviously badly hit.
For the first time in this war, I felt a certain pity for this German pilot and reluctant to finish him off. From the moment I saw him, he had no chance of escape as my Spitfire was so much faster than his Messerschmidt, and the last few moments must have been absolute hell for him. I could almost feel his desperation as he made this last attempt to get away.
But if I let him go, he would come back to England another day and possibly shoot down some of our pilots. In the few seconds during which all this was happening, I did not consciously make these reflections; my blood was up anyway and I was very excited, but distinctly remember feeling rather reluctant.
However, I caught him up again and made no mistake this time. I fired all my remaining ammunition at very close range, and he crashed into the sea, going at a terrific speed, and disappeared immediately. I circled round the spot, but there was no trace of anything. 71

F/O D. McMullen with 222 Squadron at Hornchurch wrote on his Combat Report for 15 October:

I was leading the squadron, flying at 20,000 feet, when I saw two smoke trails approaching above me. I climbed and chased them same way. E/A then turned and came back through us. I engaged one E/A firing approximately one half my ammunition. Another Spitfire overshot me so I then engaged the second one. Both the E/A dived steeply towards cloud. I chased the second E/A at about 100 ft. out to sea over Hythe. Owing to the windscreen freezing up and extremely bumpy air I was handicapped. I overtook E/A easily without 12 boost. One piece of fuselage appeared to fall off. 72

[bobbysocks]

TURNING ( ya bored yet??...didnt think so ) a few german views at the end..

Jeffrey Quill wrote of his combat experience whilst flying with No. 65 Squadron:

Nearly all our engagements with Me 109s took place at around 20,000 - 25,000 ft. The Spitfire had the edge over them in speed and climb, and particularly in turning circle. (...) One engagement with several Me 109s at about 25,000 ft over the Channel sticks in my memory. It all happened very suddenly; in fact we were mildly 'bounced' and soon I found myself behind two 109s in a steep left-hand turn. I was able to turn inside the second one and fired at him from close range. He went on pulling round as sharply as he could. I followed him without any difficulty and went on firing bursts at him. There were puffs of black smoke and then a trail of white vapour streamed from his aircraft. By this time I could no longer see the first 109 and then realized that he was on my tail. As I was by now just shuddering on the verge of a g-stall, I quickly turned inwards and dived. I pulled up again when I was sure I had shaken him off... I was pleased with that little episode – partly because I was damn sure that the first 109 was not going to get home and also because I was now convinced that the Spitfire Mk I could readily out-turn the 109, certainly in the 20,000 ft region and probably at all heights. 75

F/Lt Al Deere (NZ), with No. 54 Squadron during the Battle of Britain, commented:

My experience over Dunkirk had taught me that when attacked the best counter was to go into a right turn. In this manoeuvre, the Spitfire was infinitely superior to the Messerschmitt, and so long as one remained in the turn, the enemy pilot could not bring his guns to bear. And this I did, as the German pilot flashed past, turning as he did so to get behind me. But it was I who finished astern of him. The rest was easy. 76

F/Sgt William H. Franklin of No. 65 Squadron recorded in his Combat Report for 25 June 1940:

65 Squadron on offensive patrol North of Abbeville sighted about 12 ME.109 at about 15,000 feet. We attacked per section, I was Blue 2. An enemy aircraft circled on to my sections tail and I broke away to engage, but Blue 3 got there before me. I was then attacked by 2 enemy aircraft, and turned sharply to get on the tail of one. I manoevured into position on his tail and fired a very short burst at about 200 yards. Enemy aircraft burst into flames and dived vertically. I was now engaged by second enemy aircraft. I manoevured onto his tail, as 2 other enemy aircraft attacked me from the rear. I broke away and after considerable manoevuring we had lost height to 4000 feet. One Me.109 again attacked from behind but I was able to turn slightly and get on his tail. I followed him as he turned and seeing me closing on him he half rolled. This brought the other two aircraft out of position for attack on me. I followed inside the first enemy aircraft and fired two very short bursts at about 250 yards and I saw enemy aircraft dive into the ground. 77

F/LT John Ellis of No. 610 may have learned from Deere's experience, recording in his Combat Report for 24 July 1940:

I was the leader of 610 Sqdn. which was sent to attack e/a attacking shipping N. of Margate on 24/7/40. The Squadron left Hawkinge at 1230 and climbed through 3,000 ft of cloud which was down to 400' over the aerodrome. We came out of the cloud over Margate and as we had penetrated the cloud by sections I gave orders for the sections to rendezvous over the convoy which was 5 miles N. Margate. While circling the Convoy Green 1 called me up to say he was on my starboard beam and below. I sighted green section immediately but at the same time saw three Me 109's diving down in vic to attack them so I gave orders for green section to do a tight a turn as possible to the right this they did and successfully evaded the enemy who had just commenced to open fire as they turned. Blue Section immediately attacked the 109's which broke up two diving down and one climbing. I attacked the one that climbed, closed to 250 yds and fired two bursts of roughly 6 seconds closing eventually to 50 yds. The e/a was enveloped in black & white smoke after the first burst and it eventually rolled on its side and dived straight down and crashed into the sea eight miles N.N.E. Margate. This is confirmed by F/O Wilson & Sgt Arnfield. 78

P/O Art Donahue, an American serving with No 64 Squadron, described his 8 August combat with a Me 109:

Then one got on my tail and gave me a burst just as I saw him, and I laid over into a vertical turn; and as he did likewise, following me, I hauled my Spitfire around as tight as I could. We were going fast and I had to lean forward and hold my breath to keep from blacking out, and I turned this way for several seconds. Then I eased my turn so that I could straighten up and look out my cockpit, and I spotted the other in front of me. I had turned around on his tail now. He apparently became aware of it at the same time, for he abandoned his turn and took to flight; but he was a little late now. 79

P/O D. Hastings of No. 74 Squadron recorded in his Combat Report for 11-8-40:

I was Red No. 3 of No. 74 Squadron on patrol over Dover at about 24,000 feet. A.A. fire at 25,000 feet gave indication of bandits, and I saw 8 fighters to port. Red leader gave chase and dived after M.E. 109. I followed in line astern, Red Leader dived to about 5,000 feet towards the French coast. As no further E/A were near I went to the aid of a Spitfire who was engaging another M.E. 109, but which had a further M.E. 109 on its tail. I engaged the later E/A and gave it a 2 seconds burst at 300 yards range which immediately caused him to cease fire and he broke away to starboard. I followed him round and gave two 4 seconds deflection shots, this caused a stream of white liquid to pour from him. I then broke off as another M.E. 109 was closing in on my tail and firing at about 250 yards range.
I found that with full throttle and 2800 revs. I did a steep climbing turn to starboard which easily out-turned the M.E. 109. They had the usual silver grey camouflage and black crosses and were apparently working in pairs. 80

F/O William Nelson D.F.C., an American in the R.C.A.F. and serving with No. 74 Squadron, recorded in his Combat Report for 11-8-40:

I was yellow 3 in No. 74 Squadron, on patrol over Dover at about 24,000 feet and sighted 8 M.E. 109s's to port. My leader suddenly dived on one ME 109, so I circled looking for any E/A coming down on our section. While climbing and turning I saw 6 M.E. 109's at 28,000 feet who obviously did not see me, they were circling widely so I climbed onto the last E/A. I was sighted and they started turning steeply, I easily out-turned them. They all broke up and the last E/A flich-rolled away from me, I closed rapidly and at the short range of 150 yards I opened fire with a 3 seconds burst dead astern, and he burst into flames. I immediately turned quickly away and saw the remainder E/A speeding for home, well away. Not seeing any further E/A I pancaked Manston. The M.E. 109's were sky - blue beneath and ordinary camouflaged above with black crosses. 81

F/Sgt William H. Franklin of 65 Squadron recorded in his Combat Report of 16 August 1940:

The squadron was operating from Manston and ordered to patrol Deal at 16.17 hours. We first sighted numbers of enemy fighters high above and climbed to engage. I suddenly found myself passing straight through a compact formation of about 24 Heinkel 113. Two end He.113's engaged me firing deflection shots. The shooting was bad, all going astern, and it struck me that they could not turn very quickly. In the ensuing fight I had no difficulty in firing a short burst from astern which sent one e/a down in flames. The others vanished. I ended in mid-channel and after a few minutes saw below me a Dornier 17 followed by a Me.109 well astern going towards France. I dived from about 20,000 feet down to 6,000 feet and closing in, fired a good burst from astern into the Do.17. It blew out grey smoke from both motors and bits came off the fuselage. I then had to attend to the Me.109 which dived towards Inglevert aerodrome. At 1,500 feet I fired a 3 second slight deflection shot and the e/a crashed into the ground off Inglevert. I then returned to base. 82

S/P Andrew McDowall, flying with No. 602 Squadron, recorded his opinion in his Combat Report for 18 August 1940:

In this dogfight I was able to get a long burst at one Me 109 and saw it crash into the sea... In my opinion Me 109's cannot hit Spitfires in tight right hand turn because they can't turn inside you in stern attack. 83

Sgt N. Ramsay of No. 610 Squadron recorded in his Combat Report for 26 August 1940:

I was Green 2, and we were flying at 12,000 feet when the leading section dived to attack some E/A over Folkestone. My leader saw aircraft above and did not follow down. He ordered 'line astern' and started turning in a circle. I saw E/A coming down at different angles, one came down astern with me. I turned very steeply to the left, and eventually got on to his tail, he started turning left and right and I fired three short bursts. On the last burst he emitted a cloud of black smoke and started spiralling down very fast. As he went down the smoke ceased and he vanished into the cloud looking very much out of control. I did not go through the cloud immediately because I wanted to see if there were any more E/A near me. There were some above, but I decided they were too high so I went through the clouds and saw an E/A blazing on the ground West of Folkestone. 84

P/O Ronald Berry of 603 Squadron used the Spitfire's turning ability to transition from evasion to attack, recording in his Combat Report for 28 August 1940:

When approximately over Dover, the Squadron split up on sighting several Me.109s. Looking above 3 Me.109's crossed my bow in line astern. Shortly after, on my beam. Me.109 was firing and I immediately whipped up my aircraft and round and found myself on his tail, and at close range pumped lead into it until it opened into a heavy cloud of smoke. On turning again, another Me.109 was attacking from quarter astern. I steep turned to the right and got on his tail and he dived. I followed him and attacked, some bits fell off from E/A. As my ammunition was expended, I broke off combat and returned to base. 85

Sgt R. Hamlyn of 610 Squadron recorded in his Combat Report for 30 August 1940:

I was Green Leader. I first sighted enemy aircraft over Ashford and started to attack them but a number of M.E. 110's attacked me before I could open fire. So I eventually fired at one of the M.E's. He fell away from the rest, but I could not possibly see any result owing to the other enemy aircraft. On returning to base at 1,000 ft I noticed more aircraft bombing Biggin Hill. I at once climbed up to about 20,000 ft and was attacked by 5 M.E. 109's which were circling. Owing to my slow speed I was easily able to get on the tail of the last 109. I fired a burst of about 2 seconds from astern with slight deflection. He fell away from the others smoking badly. I followed him and gave him the rest of my rounds in one burst. He went straight in the ground. I came down to the place I thought I had seen him hit and there was a large fire burning in the wood round West Malling aerodrome. 86

Sgt B. Douthwaite, of 72 Squadron, recorded on his Combat Report for 2 September:

I then turned to port and attacked an Me 109 who was turning steeply to port. I could easily out turn him and fired until he broke away in a steep left hand dive. As I had expended my ammunition I did not follow him but returned to Hawkinge. 87

S/L Brian Lane, of No. 19 Squadron, got into a tight turning fight with an Me 109 on 15 September 1940:

That German pilot certainly knew how to a handle a 109 - I have never seen one thrown about as that one was, I felt certain that his wings would come off at any moment. However, they stayed on, and he continued to lead me a hell of a dance as I strove to get my sights on him again. Twice I managed to get in a short burst but I don't think I hit him, then he managed to get round towards my tail. Pulling hard round I started to gain on him, and began to come round towards his tail. He was obviously turning as tightly as his kite could and I could see that his slots were open, showing he was nearly stalled. His ailerons were obviously snatching too, as first one wing and then the other would dip violently. Giving the Spitfire best, he suddenly flung out of the turn and rolled right over on his back passing in front of me inverted. ...he flew on inverted for several seconds, giving me the chance to get in a good burst from the quarter. 88

F/S George Unwin, also of No. 19 Squadron, recalled his combat of 15 September:

Anyway I went into a tight turn and stayed in it and there, I don't know how many of these aircraft there were, I shot at several of them as they went through my sights but I actually shot two of them down. One of them strangely enough, I fired at the first one, I got the first one, and he bailed out. And of course the Messerschmitt pilot unfortunately sat on his tank, did you know that? He sat on his petrol tank and it wasn't a very, if they got a bullet there - up it went. This chap bailed out and I went to sight the next one, when suddenly the light - the reflector sight was an electric bulb lit up, and the bloody bulb failed. So I am without a sight but we did have this ammunition so the next one I got, I was still in a tight turn all the time, I mean, that was what probably saved me, you kept on turning and turning. Because the Messerschmitt couldn't turn like a Spitfire and I kept on turning, I don't know how many aircraft there were and the second I shot down without a sight. It was really wild and, you know, the fall off on the trace of a bullet and I got him exactly the same way, his tank went up but that frightened me I can tell you. I was all on my own in the middle of, I don't know how many, how many Messerschmitts there were but fortunately, as I say, I got away with it. I didn't even get a hole in me that day and yet against the odd ones I have several times got holes in me, but that day I got away with it. I must have had a guardian angel with me that day. 89

Unwin, also recounted:

I had survived this mission simply because the Spitfire could sustain a continuous rate of turn inside the BF 109E without stalling - the latter was known for flicking into a vicious stall spin without prior warning if pulled too tightly. The Spitfire would give a shudder to signal it was close to the edge, so as soon as you felt the shake you eased off the stick pressure.

F/Lt J. W. Villa of No 72 Squadron recorded on his Combat Report for 15 September:

The ME 109 which I attacked half rolled as I opened fire and before he could dive away he caught fire and exploded. I was then attacked by five other ME 109. I did a steep turn to starboard and continued to turn until I out turned one ME 109 which was on my tail. I gave him two short bursts and he burst into flames. 90

Geoffrey Wellum of No 92 Squadron found himself in quite a fix after expending all his ammunition shooting down an HE-111:

I've behaved like a beginner, bounced from behind. My own fault, shouldn't have relaxed after I'd finished with that bloody Heinkel. Elementary rule number one: never relax vigilance. I asked for it and got caught napping, well and truly bounced...

Looking back over my shoulder, an Me 109 is sitting on my tail not thirty yards away, or so it seems, and turning with me. I see the flash from his cannons and puffs of greyish smoke as he tries a quick burst. Not a bad one either as I hear more hits somewhere behind the fuselage.

The German pilot is trying to tighten his turn still more to keep up with me and I'm sure I see the 109 flick. You won't do it, mate, we're on the limit as it is. I can see his head quite clearly and even the dark shape of his oxygen mask. Yet again I imagine that the 109 gives a distinct flick, on the point of a high speed stall. He has to ease his turn a fraction. The Spitfire gains slowly. I exalt and yell at him. Sweat starts to get into my eyes...

The 109 finally comes out of his turn and pulls up, trying to gain height on me. As he climbs he goes into another steep turn, very steep, well over the vertical. I look up at him but he has made his effort and failed. I've gained too much and now I'm more behind him than he is behind me...

If you want to shake someone off your tail you have to fly your Spitfire to its limits. In a tight turn you increase the G loading to such an extent that the wings can no longer support the weight and the plane stalls, with momentary loss of control. However, in a Spitfire, just before the stall, the whole aircraft judders, it's a stall warning, if you like. With practice and experience you can hold the plane on this judder in a very tight turn. You never actually stall the aircraft and you don't need to struggle to regain control because you never lose it. A 109 can't stay with you. 91

P/O George Bennions, of No 41 Squadron, demonstrated that the Spitfire was especially effective against the Me 109 when the turn was combined with a steep climb:

As Mitor Red 2 in line astern of Red 1 while acting as rear guard to blue and green sections, I noticed 2 ME 109's above and to the right diving to attack Red 1. I warned Red 1 and we turned right to evade them. We then turned left behind them to engage them. Half way around the turn I noticed another ME 109 about 800 yards astern and to the left. I immediately went into a steep right hand climbing turn at full throttle. The ME 109 tried to follow but after about 2 turns he fell out of the turn completely stalled, and I turned down on his tail. He carried out a left hand climbing turn and he ded S.E. at full throttle. I immediately closed astern but slightly left and opened fire at approx 100 yards. After two very short bursts I observed coolant pouring from the radiator... 92

Leading Blue Section I was attacked by ME 109. After a steep right hand climbing turn the ME 109 with a Yellow nose fell out of the turn and I turned on to his tail. He rolled over and went vertically downwards and pulled out heading south east as soon as he straightened up. I gave him three short bursts. He burst into flames and after knocking off his roof bailed out. 93

Evidently Bennions was well schooled in tactics arising from the RAE's comparative trials, where it was determined that:

Another effective form of evasion with the Spitfire was found to be a steep, climbing spiral at 120 mph, using +6 1/4 boost and 2,650 rpm; in this manoeuvre, the Spitfire gained rapidly on the ME 109, eventually allowing the pilot to execute a half roll, on to the tail of his opponent. 94

Sgt. Jack Stokoe of No 603 Squadron found the Me 109s to be vulnerable when they tried to use the spiral climb as an evasion, recording in his Combat Report of 31 August 1940:

We were ordered to patrol base at 12,000 feet. As I was rather late, the formation took off without me. I took off alone, climbed into the sun, and rejoined the formation which was circling at about 28,000 feet. I observed 2 Me 109s above, and climbed after them in full fine pitch. The ME's kept close together in a steep spiral climb towards the sun. I pumped several bursts at the outside one from about 200 yards with little effect. I closed to 50 yards and fired two more long bursts. Black smoke poured from his engine which appeared to catch fire, and 8 or 9 huge pieces of his fuselage were shot away. He spun steeply away and crashed inside the balloon barrage. I continued climbing after the other ME 109, and fired two long bursts from about 150 yards. White smoke came from his aircraft, and he spiralled gently downwards. I broke away as I was out of ammunition, and failed to see what happened to him. 95

P/O J. G. Drummond of 92 Squadron recorded in his Combat Report for 24 September 1940:

As leader of Blue Section 92 Squadron we intercepted enemy aircraft South of Estuary in the Maidstone area. I did a beam attack on the rear Section of Ju. 88's from below and right and fired a 3 second burst and hit the Port engine. After breaking away from the 88 I did a steep turn and found 3 Me. 109's on my tail. I turned on to the tail of the rear Me. 109 and fired a 5 second burst at about 300 yards from the quarter. Clouds of white smoke indicated that I had hit his glycol. I turned round and fired at another 109 which was on my tail. I saw my bullets hit the enemy aircraft. I then broke away and dived for the ground. 96

P/O D. C. Winter of No. 72 Squadron used a descending spiral turn as an effective evasive:

Then six more Me 109's came down on me & as I turned port an He 113 pulled up in front of me & I had a good bead for about 2 secs. during which time I was firing. The He 113 turned over & dived seawards... By then I was being attacked by six more Me 109 & by doing steep spiral turns I managed to avoid their fire. After awhile I saw the He 113 I had shot at, plane down into the water & sink about 2-3 miles off Beachy Head. This was confirmed by Red 3. Meanwhile I was still spiralling steeply & the Me 109's followed me down to about 1,000 ft & then I got down to about 50 ft & they left me. It was impossible to get a bead on them owing to their numbers. 97

Sgt P. Else of No. 610 Squadron also used a diving turn to good effect, recording in his Combat Report for 25 July 1940:

I was flying No. 2 position in Blue section when we sighted about 20 or more Me 109's above about 12 JU 87. We climbed in line astern to attack the ME and fired at one with considerable deflection with no result. I then had to shake off one Me 109 off my tail which I did with comparative ease with a tight diving turn. I then found myself on the edge of the mellee and slightly on the starboard rear beam of two ME 109's flying in line astern.
I attacked the rear machine from the quarter closing to astern opening fire at 200 yds and closing at about 25 yds. I could see the explosive bullets from my guns hitting him in the rear of the fuselage and the tail unit.
As I broke off the attack owing to the danger of hitting him he fell on one side, evidently from the attitude the machine had adopted, out of control. Both Me 109's took no evasive action at all, as I caught them both by surprise. The Me 109's were definitely working in pairs. I also saw one Me 109 shot down by F/Lt Ellis. 98

P/O Colin Gray (later Group Captain) of No. 54 Squadron reflected:

The problem of manoeuvrability was of prime importance in enabling one to turn inside the enemy, certainly in fighter versus fighter combats, and thus to get a shot in when on attack, or avoid being shot down when on the defensive - and here the British aircraft had a decided advantage in my experience. 99

F/O Hugh Dundas, with No. 616 during the Battle, wrote:

In one vital aspect the ME109 was at a disadvantage against the British airplanes. It could be out-turned both by the Spitfire and the Hurricane. This was a serious handicap to the Luftwaffe pilots allotted the duty of providing close escort for the bombers. Their freedom of action was curtailed. They could not pursue the tactic, best suited to their planes, of a high-speed attack followed by dive and zoom. They had to stick around and fight it out; and that involved the matching of turning circles. They never found a way round that problem and their difficulties were made all the greater when Goering, infuriated by the losses inflicted on his bombers, ordered the fighter squadrons to cling ever closer to the bombers they were escorting. 100

Adolf Galland recalled a conversation with Göring in August 1940:

I tried to tell him otherwise, replying that the Spitfire was better able to reduce speed, because of its lower wing loading. It was also better able to turn at low speeds. 101

Heinz Knoke was still flying a Me 109 E4 with II/JG 52 over England in May 1941 when he wrote of the Spitfires he encountered:

The bastards can make such infernally tight turns; there seems to be no way of nailing them. 102

The War Diary of I/JG 3 entry for 31 August 1940 states:

The Spitfires turn very well even at higher altitudes and tighter than the Bf 109. 103

[bobbysocks]

ROLL RATE

The RAE reported: "At 400 m.p.h. the Me.109 pilot, pushing sideways with all his strength, can only apply 1/5 aileron, thereby banking 45 deg. in about 4 secs.; on the Spitfire also, only 1/5 aileron can be applied at 400 m.p.h., and again the time to bank is 45 deg. in 4 secs. Both aeroplanes thus have their rolling manoeuvrability at high speeds seriously curtailed by aileron heaviness." 104

Elevator:- The BF 109E flight handbook states: "Die Höhenruderkräfte und Flossenbelastungen werden bei hoher Fahrt sehr groß." 105 (The elevator forces and fin loads become very large during high speed). The RAE also found the 109's elevators to be heavy: "Throughout the speed range the elevator is heavier than that of the Hurricane or Spitfire, but up to 250 m.p.h. this is not objected to, since it is very responsive. Above 250 m.p.h. the elevator becomes definitely too heavy for comfort, and between 300 m.p.h. and 400 m.p.h. is so heavy that manoeurvability in the looping plane is seriously restricted; when diving at 400 m.p.h. a pilot, pulling with all his strength, cannot put on enough "g" to black himself out if trimmed in the dive." 106 It was found that the Spitfire pilots were able to evade Me 109's by "doing a flick roll and then quickly pulling out of the subsequent dive", and "if a Me.109 pilot can be tempted to do this at low altitude a crash is almost inevitable". 107 F/Sgt. Tew, of No 54 Squadron, put this tactic to good use, being credited with 1 Me. 109 destroyed without firing a shot:

During Patrol at approximately 1300 hours on 18/8/40 I was attacked by one Me 109 when I was at 2,000 feet. I turned towards enemy aircraft in a diving turn. Enemy aircraft half-rolled and followed me. I pulled out of dive at low altitude but enemy aircraft continued his dive and struck the ground bursting into flames. 108

The Spitfire on the other hand was known to have a sensitive elevator control, perhaps a bit too sensitive.

Aerobatics:- The RAE's view on the Me 109E's aerobatic capability:

Aerobatics are not easy on this aeroplane. Loops must be started from 280 m.p.h. when the elevator is unduly heavy; there is a marked tendency for the slots to open near the top of the loop, resulting in aileron snatching and loss of direction, and in consequence accurate looping is almost impossible.

At speeds below 250 m.p.h, when the ailerons are light and very effective, the aeroplane can be rolled very quickly, but there is a strong tendency for the nose to fall in the final stages of the roll, and the stick must be moved well back in order to keep the nose up.

Upward rolls are difficult; the elevator is so heavy at high speed that only a gentle pull-out from the preliminary dive is possible, and a considerable loss of speed is thus inevitable before the upward rolls can be started. 109

The Spitfire I's Pilot's Notes states:

This aeroplane is exceptionally good for aerobatics. Owing to its high performance and sensitive elevator control, care must be taken not to impose excessive loads either on the aeroplane or on the pilot and not to induce a high-speed stall. Many aerobatics may be done at much less than full throttle. Cruising r.p.m. should be used, because if reduced below this, detonation might occur if the throttle is opened up to climbing boost for any reason. 110

Leutnant Hans-Otto Lessing of II.JG/51 observed in a letter to home written 17 August 1940:

During the last few days the British have been getting weaker, though individuals continue to fight well. Often the Spitfires give beautiful displays of aerobatics. Recently I had to watch in admiration as one of them played a game with thirty Messerschmitts, without itself ever getting into danger; but such individuals are few. 111

Leutnant Max-Hellmuth Ostermann of 7./JG 54 wrote in his diary for 31 August 1940:

Utter exhaustion from the English operations has set in. Once more I lost contact with my squadron. The Spitfires showed themselves wonderfully manoeuvrable. Their aerobatics display - looping and rolling, opening fire in a climbing roll - filled us with amazement. I did no shooting but kept trying to get into position, meanwhile keeping a sharp watch on my tail. 112

S/Ldr. Leathart of No 54 Squadron put the Spit's capabilities, as well as his own, to use on 2/9/40 when he "played a game" with the Me 109s:

I was caught at a disadvantage about 4/5,000 feet below two squadrons of Me 109's. I decided that the best thing to do would be to act as a decoy. I harassed them and weaved among them and ended up getting them about 20 miles away from the aerodrome and North of Rochford. 113

CONCLUSIONS

Major Werner Mölders, JG 51, compared the British fighters to his own prior to the Battle:

It was very interesting to carry out the flight trials at Rechlin with the Spitfire and the Hurricane. Both types are very simple to fly compared to our aircraft, and childishly easy to take-off and land. The Hurricane is good-natured and turns well, but its performance is decidedly inferior to that of the Me 109. It has strong stick forces and is "lazy" on the ailerons.
The Spitfire is one class better. It handles well, is light on the controls, faultless in the turn and has a performance approaching that of the Me 109. As a fighting aircraft, however, it is miserable. A sudden push forward on the stick will cause the motor to cut; and because the propeller has only two pitch settings (take-off and cruise), in a rapidly changing air combat situation the motor is either overspeeding or else is not being used to the full. 114

Oberleutnant Ulrich Steinhilper of III/JG 52 wrote of the difficulties new pilots found operating the Me 109's propeller:

We began our climb almost immediately after take-off and he was constantly using the radio to ask us to slow down so that he could keep up. It was obvious that he wasn't manipulating the pitch control with the skill of the more seasoned pilots to produce the same power as our machines. We tried to tell him what to do on the radio but to no avail. Eventually, about half way across the Channel at 4,000 metres Kühle told him to leave the formation and return to base. 119

Leutnant Erich Bodendiek, II/JG 53 engaged in a 18 September combat which demonstrated that the Me 109's propeller could be troublesome:

I was not flying my usual plane but, as I was the Technischer Offizier, I had to fly a plane with a new automatic propeller just to test it. That was my bad luck, having that bloody plane on that day for the first time because that 'automatic thing' turned that angle of the propeller so that an average speed was always maintained and not a kmh more! That meant trouble when starting and trouble at high altitude as the plane was nearly always unmanoeuvrable and swaggered through the air like a pregnant duck.

It was fine weather with clouds at an altitude of about 8,300m and out of this swung the RAF fighters when we were at 8,000m. They were obviously directed by radar but just missed us as they came out of clouds about a kilometre to the right of us. The Gruppen Kommandeur, Hpt von Maltzahn, did the best he could by climbing and trying to hide in the clouds. Everybody succeeded but me, thanks to my excellent propeller. My aircraft could not climb like the others had and therefore all the RAF fighters turned on me and I had no chance of escaping by diving as that wonderful propeller would ensure that I would travel at just 300 to 350kmh. Therefore I decided to fly straight ahead trying to gain altitude a metre at at time, perhaps reaching cloud without being shot down. I saw the Spitfires flying around me and shooting and my plane was hit several times... He then hit my my fuel tank which caught fire immediately. Within a second, my cabin was full of smoke and fire and I had to get out. 120

Oberleutnant Jochen Schypek, 5/JG 54, reiterated Mölders' view of the Spitfires' negative 'g' problems:

We were attacked when the bombers had reached the London Docks and I yelled an alarm "Indians at six o'clock!" ...With them, we had developed a standard and often successful procedure - our Daimler Benz engines were fuel injection ones whilst the Spitfires had carburettor engines. This meant once we put our noses down vertically and quick enough, our engines would continue to function without interruption whilst the Spitfires - and Hurricanes - attempting to stick to our tails would slow down long enough for us to put a safer distance between them and ourselves. The slowing down was the consequence of the float in the carburettor getting stuck due the the sudden change in position.

I had managed to break away at least a dozen times by means of this manoeuvre but lo and behold, it did not work this time! The 'Indian' was right on my tail in my steep dive and opened fire. I could see bullets hitting my wings and, from the white trails on both sides, I knew he had hit my radiator... My 'Indian' drew alongside and the aircraft appeared strange to me as I had never been so close to a live Spitfire before. I was rather relieved that he recognised I did not have any chance of getting home and that he did not insist he complete his kill... 121

Oberleutnant Gerhard Schöpfel, Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 26 wrote of the Me 109 E:

It was superior to the Hurricane and above 6,000 metres, faster than the Spitfire also. I believe that our armament was the better, it was located more centrally which made for more accurate shooting. On the other hand, the British fighters could turn tighter than we could. Also I felt that the Messerschmitt was not so strong as the British fighters and could not take so much punishment. 122

Oblt Hans Schmoller-Haldy of JG 54 commented:

My first impression was that it had a beautiful engine. It purred. The engine of the Messerschmitt 109 was very loud. Also the Spitfire was easier to fly, and to land than the Me 109. The 109 was unforgiving of any inattention. I felt familiar with the Spitfire from the start. That was my first and lasting impression. But with my experience with the 109, I personally would not have traded it for a Spitfire. It gave the impression, though I did not fly the Spitfire long enough to prove it, that the 109 was the faster especially in the dive. Also I think the pilot's view was better from the 109. In the Spitfire one flew further back, a bit more over the wing.
For fighter-versus-fighter combat, I thought the Spitfire was better armed than the Me 109. The cannon fitted to the 109 were not much use against enemy fighters, and the machine guns on top of the engine often suffered stoppages. The cannon were good if they hit; but their rate of fire was very low. The cannon had greater range than the machine guns. But we were always told that in a dogfight one could not hope to hit anything at ranges greater than 50 metres, it was necessary to close in to short range. 123

Günther Rall, who served with III./JG 52 during the Battle of Britain, reflected on the strengths and weaknesses of the adversaries at that time:

The elliptical wings of the Spitfires had fantastic characteristics, great lift. They were very maneuverable. We couldn't catch them in a steep climb. On the other hand they could stall during inverted maneuvers, cutting off the fuel because the force of gravity prevented the flow of fuel. But they were still a highly respected enemy. In contrast, our Bf 109s had shortcomings. I didn't like the slats and our cockpits were very narrow, with restricted rear visability. Fighter pilots need a good all-round field of vision and we didn't have it. 124

Adolf Galland wrote of the matchup: "the ME-109 was superior in the attack and not so suitable for purely defensive purposes as the Spitfire, which although a little slower, was much more manueuverable" and in a fit of frustration uttered the famous passage to Göring "I should like an outfit of Spitfires for my Squadron". 125

The conclusions of the RAF, beginning with the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE):

Longitudinally the aeroplane is too stable for a fighter. There is a large change of directional trim with speed. No rudder trimmer is fitted; lack of this is severely felt at high speeds, and limits a pilot's ability to turn left when diving.

Aileron snatching occurs as the slots open. All three controls are too heavy at high speeds. Aerobatics are difficult.

The Me 109 is inferior as a fighter to the Hurricane or Spitfire. Its manoeuvrability at high speeds is seriously curtailed by the heaviness of the controls, while its high wing loading causes it to stall readily under high normal accelerations and results in a poor turning circle. 126

The Aeroplane and Armament Establishment at Boscombe Down reached a similar conclusion:

In general flying qualities the aeroplane is inferior to both the Spitfire and the Hurricane at all speeds and in all conditions of flight. It is much inferior at speeds in excess of 250 m.p.h. and at 400 m.p.h. recovery from a dive is difficult because of the heaviness of the elevator. This heaviness of the elevator makes all manoeuvres in the looping plane above 250 m.p.h. difficult including steep climbing turns. No difference was experienced between climbing turns to the right and left. It does not possess the control which allows of good quality flying and this is particularly noticeable in acrobatics. 127

Jeffrey Quill, Chief Test Pilot for Supermarine, compared the Me 109E to the Spitfire I as follows:

My experience in fighting against the BF. 109 E in a Spitfire Mk. I was mostly around or above 20,000 feet and led me to the conclusion that the Spitfire was slightly superior both in speed and rate of climb, that is was a more 'slippery' or lower drag aeroplane, and that it was outstandingly better in turning circle. 128

In October 1940 I flew a captured Me 109E; to my surprise and relief I found the aileron control of the German fighter every bit as bad - if not worse - at high speed as that of the Spitfire I and II with fabric-covered ailerons. They were good at low and medium speed, but at 400 mph and above they were almost immovable. I thought the Me 109E performed well, particularly on the climb at altitude, and it had good stalling characteristics under g except that the leading-edge slats kept snapping in and out. But it had no rudder trimmer - which gave it a heavy footload at high speed - while the cockpit, the canopy and the rearward vision were much worse than in the Spitfire. Had I flown the Me 109 earlier I would have treated the aeroplane with less respect in combat. 129

F/L Robert Stanford Tuck, who had an opportunity to fly a captured Me 109 E3 in May 1940, had a rather more positive view of the 109 stating: "without a doubt a most delightful little airplane - not as maneuverable as the Spit mind you, nor as nice to handle near the ground", giving high marks to the 109's higher rudder pedals and agreeing with Mölders that the the 109 had an advantage in that "our Merlin engines couldn't stand up to negative 'G' whereas the Messerschmitt's Daimler-Benz seemed quite unaffected". 130

P/O H.R. "Dizzy" Allen (later Wing Commander) of No. 66 Squadron, echoing Tuck, wrote of the matchup with an eye on tactical doctrine:

We were better at dogfighting than the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe, but only because both the Spitfire and Hurricane were more manoeuvrable than the Messerschmitts 109 and 110. In fact, dog-fighting ability was not all that important during the war. Fighter attacks were hit-or-miss affairs on average. Either you dived with the sun behind you and caught him napping, or he did that to you. I occasionally had to mix it in dog-fights with German fighter pilots, and either I would shoot them down or they would shoot me down, or I would lose sight of them because their camouflage was better than mine. The reason we were more manoeuvrable than them was because the Me-109 had a higher wing loading than our fighters. This gave us advantages, but they also had certain benefits. We had no idea that the Daimler-Benz engines in the 109s were fuelled by direct-injection methods. Our carburettors were a definate handicap. The Germans could push down the nose of their fighters, scream into a vertical dive, as if beginning a bunt, and accelerate like made away from us. When we tried that tactic, our carburettors would flood under negative gee, and our engines would stall momentarily - as they frequently did - which lost us all-important seconds during the engagments. 131

Alan Wright of No. 92 Squadron wrote:

There seemed to be more dog-fighting over Dunkirk than later, in the Battle of Britain or when escorting bombers over France. By then one side or the other was only too well aware of the distance and fuel necessary to get back to base. Then it became a matter of ‘bounce’, from up-sun if possible, attack and climb up again and out of the way. The Germans, when attacked over the UK, and occasionally over Dunkirk, would usually open up the taps and dive for home. There was good reason for this. Other things being equal, the Spitfire had the edge in the climb over the 109, while the 109 had the edge in the dive flat out. The ME109 pilots also found out over Dunkirk that the Spitfire had the tighter turned circle, which meant that after a turn or two of a two-plane dogfight, the Spitfire would have the 109 in its sights. At Dunkirk we were discovering these things. 132

Alan Deere, who served with No. 54 Squadron during the Battle of Britain, summed it up:

Undoubtedly, the 109 in the hands of a good pilot was a tough nut to crack. Initially, it was faster in the dive, but slower in the climb; the Spitfire could out-turn, but it was at a disadvantage in manoeuvres that entailed negative G forces. Overall there was little to choose between the two fighters. 133

Hugh Dundas thought the antagonists to be evenly matched:

There is no doubt, that Goering and his commanders overrated the effectiveness of their fighters in relation to our own. In fact the Messerschmitt 109 and the Spitfire were extraordinarily evenly matched. Their duel for supremacy lasted throughout the war, as each plane was constantly improved and given increased power and performance. At times the Germans, by rushing out a new version before our own next improvement was ready, would get one jump ahead. At other times the advantage would be to the RAF. But on balance the Spitfire was, I believe, slightly the better aircraft. And so it was in 1940. In particular, such advantages as it enjoyed over the ME 109 at the time were enhanced by the circumstances of the battle. 134

there ya go....break is over so back to work i go...

[Davedog74]

great stuff dale