Mitsubishi Stuka and Thunderbolt

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by horseback

The closer you get, the more gunner skill enters into the equation, but individual accuracy did not become a factor unless the range was very short (as in under 150m) and the speed difference and angles were minimal.

This squares with my attempts at air gunnery in IL2 - and that's ignoring all the other factors that make real gunnery difficult.

Citing that book you mentioned, I think that these are the "money quotes," at least for U.S. bomber turrets equipped with 0.50 caliber MG.

"In reply to those who felt that firing should begin at a range of 1,200 yards, although the aircraft was not in a position to make an attack, he claimed that tests conducted at the University of New Mexico and reports from theaters of action indicated that the .50-caliber machine gun could not be fired accurately at a distance beyond 600 yards. It was also pointed out that reports and experiments indicated that computing sights then in use on B-17's and B-24's were not accurate under combat conditions. It was believed by some, however, that the General Electric Computing Sight used on the B-29 incorporated "all known principles and should give very accurate results."

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/...-4.html#page66

Also:

"during 1942 gunnery students had to became familiar with six different types of iron ring sights and four varieties of optical sights." The same authority has given the following excellent description of the relative speed system of sighting, which was the first scientific system:

The gunner was taught to use the following sequence of action in sightings: (1) recognize the enemy ship, (2) estimate the range with 600 yards as the critical distance for opening fire, (3) estimate the difference in speed between his ship and the enemy ship by holding the sight stationary for one second, (4) compute the lead according to a definite table which he had memorized, and (5) open fire. Under combat conditions there was usually no target in sight by the time the student had gone through this involved system of computing the lead."

"Another experiment was the use of tracer as an aid to sighting. This had been tried during World War I, but had been abandoned because it gave the gunner the impression he was hitting the target when he was not, and because flight speeds were then slow enough to allow the use of an alternative system of sighting. It was believed, however, that the increased flight speeds during the present war made its use practicable, provided it was used in conjunction with other sighting systems."

"Approximately one year after this time Headquarters AAF indicated to the Commanding General of the Fourth Air Force that not more than 10 per cent of the ammunition used by an aerial gunner would be loaded with tracer and that it should be fired during the final training phase. It was claimed that when gunners resorted to tracer they depended upon it entirely,and to the complete neglect of their gun sights. After students were proficient as a result of training, they might explore the possibilities and proper use of tracer."

"Tests at the Kingman Army Air Field in the fall of 1943 suggested in a practical way the defects in tracer firing. One of these tests involved the use of an AT-23 for towing a target at high speed and a B-17 for air-to-air firing against the target. The tam plane did all of the maneuvering. The experiment produced poor results, for "in every case the individual whose tracer appeared to be piercing the target and who might be considered to have high scores received no hits on the target, and in every ease the individuals whose tracer appeared not to pierce the target were in all cases the individuals who received hits on the target."

"It is claimed that tracer, if its illusion is controlled, has distinct advantages. It makes possible visual checking of harmonization of guns and sights, and indicates whether there is proper lead in deflection shooting. However, the student "must realize that he sees the light, not the bullet; and he must realize that light does not give the same effect of distance as a bullet. For example, a bullet half the size of another bullet is twice as far away. But a light half the size of another equal light, is not twice as far away; in fact, when it is twice as far away, it is only a quarter the size of the other." (Emphasis mine)

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/...AFHS-31-4.html


So, add to all the other woes of realistic gunnery the fact that tracers produce an optical illusion that makes the gunner think that he has proper lead on his target when he does not!

And, mind you, this is 1944. By then, the U.S. had been at war for about 2 years and they'd produced whole classes of gunners whose training was useless. (This squares with 8th Air Force doctrine of immediately retraining gunners who were direct from training schools in the States. I thought that this was just "advanced training," but it might be that the guys in the 8th Air Force actually had a clue that gunnery schools were teaching their students incorrect methods of engaging targets.)

One possible fix for TD is to make Rookie gunners basically useless and Average gunners only slightly useful. Only Veteran or Ace gunners should be anything like a threat.