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so lets say that RAFFC had 57 operational squadrons during the 1st week of Sept. 57 squadrons into 5700 sorties = 100 sorties week/squadron. Lets assume 15 Blenheim squadrons (5 x RAFFC and 10 X RAFBC) = 1500 sorties at 230 gallons/sortie = 1108 tons of 100 octane. So our 5 Blenheim squadrons flew 500 of RAFFC's sorties leaving 5200 to be flown by Merlin engined fighters @ 75 gallons/sortie = 1254 tons, so total RAFFC and RAFBC 100 octane use = 2362 tons. This is only about 1/2 the total consumption of 100 octane and it accounts for 5200 SE fighter and 1500 hundred twin engined Blenheim sorties. There simply isn't enough 100 octane fuel users left over to consume the ~4400 tons if RAFFC isn't using 100% 100 octane. Quote:
Can you present evidence stating that even one RAFFC Merlin engined squadron was using 87 Octane from July to Oct 1940? If I was an RAFFC pilot and my Hurricane/Spitfire was using 87 octane, when the squadron down the road was using 100 octane, you can be sure that I would have mentioned it my memoirs or complained about it while writing up a combat report: "The Ju-88 got away because I couldn't use overboost..." Yet there isn't a single statement anywhere about RAFFC pilots complaining about the lack of 100 octane engines or fuel, during the Battle. |
Did they complain abt the lack of reheat on their Jet engines ?
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I wonder, is there a single statement anywhere about Luftwaffe pilots complaining about the lack of 100 octane engines or fuel, during the Battle..? Or the Italians..?
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Here is a quote directly from the book as made by Galland (you obviously haven't read it). "The theme of fighter protection was chewed over again and again. Goering clearly represented the point of view of the bombers and demanded close and rigid protection. The bomber, he said, was more important than record bag figures. I tried to point out that the Me109 was superior in the attack and not so suitable for purely defensive purposes as the Spitfire, which, although a little slower, was much more manoeuvrable. He rejected my objection. We received many more harsh words. Finally, as his time ran short, he grew more amiable and asked what were the requirements for our squadrons. Moelders asked for a series of Me109's with more powerful engines. The request was granted. 'And you ?' Goering turned to me. I did not hesitate long. 'I should like an outfit of Spitfires for my group.' After blurting this out, I had rather a shock, for it was not really meant that way. Of course, fundamentally I preferred our Me109 to the Spitfire, but I was unbelievably vexed at the lack of understanding and the stubbornness with which the command gave us orders we could not execute - or only incompletely - as a result of many shortcomings for which we were not to blame. Such brazen-faced impudence made even Goering speechless. He stamped off, growling as he went." So Galland even in his own book states he preferred the 109 over the Spitfire and that his quote was made purely to get at Goering. How can you expect to be taken seriously when you twist words and meanings to suit your own agenda? |
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Galland asked for spitfires facetiously, because he was receiving orders from above that the escort fighters were to stay close to the bombers, a role to which the spitfire was better suited than the 109. He was trying to make a point that his fighters were not being used to their strengths, not that he felt the spitfire was superior. Similarly Moelders did not ask for "100 octane 109s" since the Germans didn't classify their fuel that way (and in some cases measured the octane number differently). He asked for 109s with more powerful engines. |
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