Official Fulqrum Publishing forum - Just curious about the P-51 FM

Quote:

Originally Posted by JtD (Post 507930)

Just pointing out silly double standards. I'm pretty sure horseback thinks that 400% turnover in US units are brutal, yet when a Luftwaffe unit suffers the same losses, without even achieving any of its objectives, it is "winning the war easily".

When Hitler got hold of the spear of destiny, he thought he'd be invincible. But this turns Stalingrad into a victory just as much as wrong assessments by a few Luftwaffe members turn 1943 into a year of victory for the Luftwaffe.

Eventually, I don't even think it's silly, it's clearly beyond silly. Probably intentionally posting nonsense in order to provoke arguments. And I am idiot enough to fall for it...

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For those interested in history and maybe not yet knowing everything - I recommend to browse the USAAF statistical digest. In particular, related to how the Luftwaffe did not easily win the air war in the West in 1943, number of (heavy bomber) sorties by month or tonnage of bombs dropped (by heavy bombers) by month. It is glaringly obvious that by the end of 1943, the USAF flew more sorties and dropped more bombs than any time before. And where the entire(!) German fighter force remained near constant at around 1500 total for most of 1943, the 8th AF alone grew from a force fielding a few hundred aircraft to a force approaching 2000 aircraft.

You appear to miss the point that your original post on the subject made a big deal out of Luftwaffe JG loss rates: 400% casualties over a 39 month period, implying that their 'suffering' was unique, unusual and/or unfair. Military aviation has always been a very hazardous job, even in peacetime; people entering that profession (especially in the 1930s) went in with their eyes open and knew quite well that they would lose friends or even die themselves--it is the nature of the job. The tradeoff was that pilots and aircrew were expected to be in combat for relatively short times once or twice a day, and lived in relative comfort (to foot soldiers) the rest of the time.

My responses were intended to illustrate that those losses were neither unique or disabling; for example, the 4th FG took over 200 casualties in its first two years of operations (Sept '42 -Sept '44), which is very close to 400% (and the wastage of aircraft was significantly higher). They remained quite effective throughout hostilities. That the bomb groups were able to increase their 'tonnage' (with embarrassingly poor accuracy) throughout the course of 1943 only illustrates the willingness of the Army Air Force command structure to throw more young men into the fire for minimal return, coupled with the steady increase in sheer output of the training commands and the industrial effort back in the States, not that the campaign was gaining any traction that they could detect.

In terms of military usefulness and probability of success for the 8th AF's 1943 bombing campaign, I'm inclined to think of the 'Charge of the Light Brigade' in Crimea or Pickett's charge at Gettysburg in the mid-19th century. In retrospect, it was mostly an empty gesture, and a very costly one. It turns out that the 'bomber barons' who dominated the USAAF's strategic thinking in the 1930s were horribly wrong about many key concepts, and that fighter-centric theoreticians like Claire Chennault were horribly right.

But no one on either side knew half of the things we know today; certainly not enough to pick out the relevant facts and trends that would lead to victory. It is not fair to judge their actions or beliefs on the basis of 20/20 hindsight, and it hinders our own understanding of what was going on or why.

cheers

horseback