WW1 Paved the Way for the Battle of Britain.

[MB_Avro_UK]

It's not always understood that a mini-Battle of Britain occured in WW1. Mainly between 1916 and 1918.

Britain was being bombed by Zeppelins and later by German bombers in WW1.

The defending British aircraft of the RFC and RNAS had huge problems as regards interceptions and the destruction of these crafts.

It was realised that both a Detection System and heavily armed high performance fighters was the answer.

Hence, radar and eight gunned fast fighters desigined for the RAF in the 1930's.

The only flaw in the calculations was as follows. It was anticipated that the German Luftwaffe bombers would have to fly unescorted from Germany. The fall of France was not envisaged.

Enter the Defiant. Built to intercept unescorted bombers.

Any thoughts?


Best Regards,
MB_Avro.

[baronWastelan]

And yet, the RAF still only avoided defeat in BoB owing to faulty German strategy.

[BadAim]

But what would defeat for the Brits have looked like? Sure the Germans might have gained air superiority over a quarter of the Island, but then what? Invasion? With the half hearted preparations they made? I'm not sure. (of course the lack of real planning for the invasion could be included in the poor German strategy)

[BadAim]

Had the Germans not wasted so much of their Naval resources on the utterly useless Norway operation, the whole Idea of an invasion of England might not have been so farfetched.

Of course England could possibly have been subdued by air and Naval action (Including, of course the U-Boats), had German (and Italian, and French) resources been managed properly, thus rendering an invasion unnecessary.

All of the above said, knowing as many Brits as I do, I can hardly entertain the thought of them being subdued by such minor inconveniences as starvation and overwhelming military force. Perhaps if you cut off the supply of Tea............

Sorry Avro, I've strayed horribly off topic. It's the Baron's fault.

[Blakduk]

It's not always understood that a mini-Battle of Britain occured in WW1. Mainly between 1916 and 1918.

Britain was being bombed by Zeppelins and later by German bombers in WW1.

The defending British aircraft of the RFC and RNAS had huge problems as regards interceptions and the destruction of these crafts.

It was realised that both a Detection System and heavily armed high performance fighters was the answer.

Hence, radar and eight gunned fast fighters desigined for the RAF in the 1930's.

The only flaw in the calculations was as follows. It was anticipated that the German Luftwaffe bombers would have to fly unescorted from Germany. The fall of France was not envisaged.

Enter the Defiant. Built to intercept unescorted bombers.

Any thoughts?


Best Regards,
MB_Avro.

I agree with you- the British got a huge fright from the Zeppelin and Gotha raids in WW1. The damage done was relatively light due to the low bomb loads and primitive navigation and bomb aiming used (they basically went over a large town and dropped by guesswork). It served to illustrate that Britain was vulnerable and intercepting incoming raids needed careful planning. The British planned for exactly the type of Battle the Germans offered in 1940, whereas the German battle plan was ill-considered and poorly coordinated. As you say the only element the Brits hadn't counted on was the proximity of German airbases- they had developed tactics for confronting flotillas of unescorted bombers and had to adapt quickly.
A similar scenario happened with the Allies use of tanks in WW1- sending waves of tanks in poorly organised ranks with little/no support from artillery and aeroplanes was barely effective. The later battles of WW1 where the allies used tanks tightly packed to punch holes in enemy ranks with artillery and planes interfering with the German efforts to reinforce the breaches in their lines were extremely effective.

In WW2 the Germans had learned their lesson well and used exactly those tactics against the Allies whereas the Allies seemed to have forgotten what had worked (Many don't realise the French had far more tanks than the Germans but used them quite ineffectively).
As Napoleon said 'You must not fight the same enemy too often or you'll teach him all your art of war'.

[ElAurens]

The Germans had no chance of winning the BoB.

Their industry was not on a true war time footing.

Even during June and July they could not keep up with the losses they were incurring at the hands of the RAF.

The Luftwaffe was over politicized and poorly led, and it was organized as a tactical support branch of the Heer. It was not designed or equipped for long range strategic conflict, how could they be with only medium bombers and short range interceptors as the bulk of their force?

Coupled with the laughable state of the Kriegsmarine and the fact that Great Britain had the best planned and organized air defense on the planet at the time, and the world's largest navy and it's plain that they had no chance of success.

None.

[meplay]

And yet, the RAF still only avoided defeat in BoB owing to faulty German strategy.

Yup and the fact that we are on an island with the best (at that time) navy.

[Tiger27]

I dont think Germany could have taken Britain, we may have lost a fair bit of the fleet, but those invasion barges wouldnt have been able to take the necessary supplies nor withstand the Royal Navy ships that would have been able to get through the German bombers.

Germany was lucky in the early stages that no one called their bluff, they wern't really prepared for a lengthy war and probably suprised themselves at how easily they took France, Belgium etc, Britain called there bluff and no matter how much bombimg they did, you cant capture a country by bombing it, you have to have troops on the ground.

[41Sqn_Stormcrow]

I think Hitler believed after the 1938 crisis and the Western power stance on many deeds on his part that he would never have to fight France or Britain as they would just do what they had done before: protest and then accept it.

If I remember well, I once heard in a documentary that he was really surprised when he got the declaration of war from France and Britain.

One may conclude from it that the German Luftwaffe and army was never actually meant to invade France, let alone Britain. It was done and attempted because facts were different from what was planned for and had to be accounted for by going into the offensive, trying to take out France and Britain, with what they had, before turning to their real objective.

[Sternjaeger II]

And yet, the RAF still only avoided defeat in BoB owing to faulty German strategy.

+1

[winny]

And yet, the RAF still only avoided defeat in BoB owing to faulty German strategy.

Surley you mean the Germans avoided winning because they f'd it up..
On all levels.
(It's usually what happens when the lunatics take over the assylum)

I'm forever gratefull to German WWII 'intelligence'

[41Sqn_Stormcrow]

Could we please stick to topic instead of country bashing of any sort?

[JimmyBlonde]

http://www.amazon.co.uk/First-Blitz-Neil-Hanson/dp/0552155489

I can highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the German bomber campaign against Britain during WW1.

As for Britain only winning due to bad German strategy...

I lol'd. The Luftwaffe was getting its arse handed to it in June 1940 by the AASF and continental air forces. Where do you dream this crap up? Even the Polish Airforce did remarkably well against it.

In 1939 the Poles managed to destroy 285 German aircraft, for a total 333 aircraft lost. Not bad for an airforce which was flying relics a which were a generation behind the Luftwaffe and outnumbered by almost 10 to 1.

Sorry dude but your much vaunted Luftwaffe is just a propagandists dream.

[41Sqn_Stormcrow]

I feel slightly ignored ... :D

On a more factual basis and hopefully on a less bashing tone that settled in a couple of threads ago (it closes in on youtube comment level):

I too think that the Luftwaffe is usually overestimated. It had at the beginning of the war machines that outclassed usually the opposing types. They had a minor advantage in experience and tactics over a short time. This changed progressively with the campaign in the West, where they encountered the more advanced planes that were close or equal in performance and when the pilots gained more experience there. With slower pace the same happened in the Eastern campaign, when initially the Soviet planes were completely outclassed and pilot experience was bad. They cought up later. It ended up in a number game during the last stage of the war.

PS: The German planes lost in Poland were mostly lost to ground fire not Polish planes that had been primarily destroyed on ground.

[ATAG_Dutch]

And yet, the RAF still only avoided defeat in BoB owing to faulty German strategy.

Poppycock, balderdash and not to say perfect twaddle old bean.:rolleyes:

'In the 1966 world cup final, England still only avoided defeat owing to faulty German strategy'

'still only avoided defeat' - you mean 'won' yes?

Here we go again. 'The Luftwaffe were great, the Brits were crap and didn't really win, the Germans just had more important things on the agenda and decided to retire from the game'.

German Strategy is only one factor amongst many.

The Luftwaffe got their arses kicked in goodstyle.

Game over. :)

[JimmyBlonde]

Oh crap sorry mate, It's like playing tennis with someone who keeps lobbing tha ball at you. I just couldn't...

You know.

My bad.

:D

[JimmyBlonde]

"230 aircraft were destroyed in action, primarily by Polish fighters and anti-aircraft artillery."

- Cynk, Jerzy B. The Polish Air Force at War: The Official History, 1939-1943. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1998

We'll split the difference huh?

[MB_Avro_UK]

Back on topic....

British WW1 squadrons operated from such airfields as Biggin Hill and Manston.

I own an original Log Book from a Home Defence pilot. He flew with 50 Squadron 'C' Flight. On 22nd August 1917 he wrote in his Log Book that whilst on patrol with his Be12 Flight, they attacked a formation of Gotha bombers. He fired over 70 rounds. He also flew many anti-Zeppelin night patrols.

Interestingly, Winston Churchill was responsible for the defences at an early stage.

There's a recently discovered Royal Flying Corps airfield in Essex on the approach to London. This was home to 37 Squadron whose role was the defence of London. They aided in the destruction of a Zeppelin.

The airfield is known as Stow Maries and I've been there several times.

http://www.stowmaries.com/


Best Regards,
MB_Avro.

[Kurfürst]

The Luftwaffe was getting its arse handed to it in June 1940 by the AASF and continental air forces.

Huh...? Wake up..

Even the Polish Airforce did remarkably well against it.

"For a historical evaluation the only really important fact is that from the third day of the day of the battle on the Polish air opponent was non-existent, no Polish air forces existed which could have intefered even only slightly in ground operations. All further developments in the air situations in Poland resulted from this circumstance. For the Luftwaffe, this circumstance also had the result that all German air missions from the third day of battle on could be flown under conditions equivalent towith those of peacetime."

From: The Luftwaffe in the Polish Campaign in 1939, by General der Flieger Wilhelm Speidel.

[ElAurens]

The fact remains that the Luftwaffe lost a lot of aircraft, both in Poland and in the Battle of France, that seriously degraded their abilities.

Add the losses between the time of Dunkirk and the "start" of the BoB in August and it is clear that the Luftwaffe could not sustain a campaign to "take" Great Britain. It's laugable to think that they could.

The mistakes made by Hitler, Goering and the OKL only added to the issue.

The Luftwaffe was a very young service. There was no depth of experience in their officer corps, unlike the RAF, which is of course the world's oldest independent air force.

Like most of the German High Command, they suffered from strategic blindness. Too concerned with tactics and not enough with logistics.

[Kongo-Otto]

The fact remains that the Luftwaffe lost a lot of aircraft, both in Poland and in the Battle of France, that seriously degraded their abilities.

Add the losses between the time of Dunkirk and the "start" of the BoB in August and it is clear that the Luftwaffe could not sustain a campaign to "take" Great Britain. It's laugable to think that they could.

The mistakes made by Hitler, Goering and the OKL only added to the issue.

The Luftwaffe was a very young service. There was no depth of experience in their officer corps, unlike the RAF, which is of course the world's oldest independent air force.

Like most of the German High Command, they suffered from strategic blindness. Too concerned with tactics and not enough with logistics.

The Kriegsmarine "laughable"
The Luftwaffe just a bunch on incompetent loons.
The whole Army probably just Feldwebels like Schultz was. ;)
Well with such a bunch of really incompetent guys we gave you a pretty good fight for almost 6 years.

[JimmyBlonde]

From: The Luftwaffe in the Polish Campaign in 1939, by General der Flieger Wilhelm Speidel.

Please excuse my my derision but I'd be about as apt to believe Herr Spiedels' assessment of the facts as I would the 1940 Telegraphs' claims for RAF aerial victories.

If you're going to cite a source then at least find one who doesn't have a vested interest in the issue and doesn't stem from one of the most notoriously censored and propagandist regimes to have ever existed.

I'm not saying that the Luftwaffe was laughable, just pointing out that they didn't enjoy the superiority which they are often misconceived as having. They were fortunate in being spared a prolonged campaign by some very poor French leadership and some very excellent Wehrmacht soldiering. The Luftwaffe fared quite indifferently considering their advantages and the facts reflect this if you care to examine them.

That said I'm out of this topic, check out the book I posted if you would like to read about some exceptional German airmanship.

[609_Huetz]

I'd be very careful with the country bashing or country praising.

The unpleasant truth is, with the experiences gained in Spain, Poland, Norway and France, the Luftwaffe was as prepared as they could possibly be, despite the losses in previous campaigns. In addition, they had the abolute advantage in numbers and what's much more important the initiative.

What spoiled it for Hitler, Goering, etc. were three factors:

a.) The abysmal intelligence service of the OKL. Their CO Oberst Beppo Schmidt reported on 19.July 1940 that the 110 and the 109 were both much superior to anything the RAF could and would field during the upcoming campaign. In addition, his report doesn't underestimate the effect of radar, it didn't even mention it!

b.) British Air Defense and Early Warning Systems. While the Few had to face desperate odds as far as numbers go, just imagine what would have happened if they had to fill slots on standing patrols 24/7 during the BoB. The sophisticated combined system of OC and Radar was indeed a dealbreaker for Goerings praised (and overrated) Luftwaffe.

c.) Strategical/Tactical Errors. Intially, the Germans did pick their targets well in accordance of their goals for the campaign (radar, airfields, etc.), however they did not learn from their mistakes during the inital stages and grossly underestimated the true strength of the RAF. During the early days of September 1940, Goering and Kesselring both overconfidently claimed that the RAF is on it's knees and that it's time to deal the final blow, this time to the people of Britian. While losses remained high on both sides, that was the final and capital error in Germany's strategy. One can only imagine what could have happened if it (thank god) wasn't for Hitler's and Goering's stupidity. Here's personell loss percentages for both sides during the BoB (Fighter Command and Jagdwaffe):

RAF: July 10%
August 26%
September 28%

LW: July 11%
August 15%
September 23%

An interesting aspect worth mentioning is also how little was learned from the experiences in the BoB during the later stages of the war within the RAF and the USAAF. Both thought long range fighter escort unneccesary and attributed German losses to poor discipline, inadequate equipment and low combat altitude. Two attacks on Schweinfurt in '43 had to proove them wrong.

If you want to do some good reading on the subject, I'd recommend Williamson Murray's "War in the Air 1914-45" for starters, that goes a long way further than just comparing numbers, but also elaborates on the doctrines of the mid-war years that led to what was happening in those fateful months of 1940.

Let's also not forget that this should be about history, not about which country is better or worse than the other.

[MB_Avro_UK]

Anyway.... back on topic:rolleyes:


Here's a picture of my WW1 Royal Flying Corps pilot's helmet and goggles. Also shown is my RFC Mark V Omega cockpit watch, the pilot's Log Book I mentioned earlier and a .303 bullet casing found at Stow Maries airfield.

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/S5002474.jpg

The WW1 German raids exposed the British vulnerability to air attack. Things were changed by 1940.

But did the Germans learn anything from their WW1 experiences against the British defences?


Best Regards,
MB_Avro

[baronWastelan]

Considering the technology and the objectives were vastly different from 1st war to the 2nd, the Germans would have been well served forgetting the WWI experiences. Unfortunately for the LW, WWI experiences were 99% of Goering's knowledge.

[ATAG_Dutch]

Considering the technology and the objectives were vastly different from 1st war to the 2nd, the Germans would have been well served forgetting the WWI experiences. Unfortunately for the LW, WWI experiences were 99% of Goering's knowledge.

Yes that's quite correct.

The decimation of the Luftwaffe in 1940 had nothing to do with the British having the most comprehensive air defence system ever conceived.

Or that Britain had a more efficient training and manufacturing output.

Or that the British believed in giving the pilots a rest as opposed to making them fly until they died.

It was all the fat git's fault.:rolleyes:

By the way, there was nothing unfortunate about it, unless you believe the world would be better off under nazi rule.

[ATAG_Dutch]

Good God, everything you just said is so wrong on so many counts I can't begin.

No offence! :)

Just realised that someone's being reeeeally sarcy. Result. You got me! :D

[41Sqn_Stormcrow]

One should keep in mind that BoB was the FIRST ever attempt for an oversea invasion with air power playing a role, afaik. There was NO precedent to learn from and learning was by doing it. And it was obviously a very difficult task. And it was done against a defense system that was by its time unique and extremely efficient.

WW1 was a complete different story and the raids had a completely different task.

[winny]

"Of all Germany's possible enemies, Britain is the most dangerous." - Oberst Beppo Schmid

That's about the only thing he got right.. He was a huge reason why the LW was so badly let down by it's commanders.

[BadAim]

Anyway.... back on topic:rolleyes:


Here's a picture of my WW1 Royal Flying Corps pilot's helmet and goggles. Also shown is my RFC Mark V Omega cockpit watch, the pilot's Log Book I mentioned earlier and a .303 bullet casing found at Stow Maries airfield.

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/S5002474.jpg

The WW1 German raids exposed the British vulnerability to air attack. Things were changed by 1940.

But did the Germans learn anything from their WW1 experiences against the British defences?


Best Regards,
MB_Avro

I think most of the worlds airforces learned the wrong lessons, from both perspectives on both sides. Nearly all had some form of "the bomber will always get through" doctrine in operation during the interwar years and we know how well that worked out for everyone. For the most part the tactics that were used during WWII were more or less stumbled upon through a mixture of expediency and necessity, and the farsightedness of a few individuals who were in the right place at the right time.

I think that pretty much all of the players were keenly aware of their (and their potential enemies) vulnerabilities to airpower. They just, for the most part didn't see how it would work out.

[Kurfürst]

The fact remains that the Luftwaffe lost a lot of aircraft, both in Poland and in the Battle of France, that seriously degraded their abilities.

I partially agree. Poland was a victory march for the Luftwaffe, they wiped out the Polish Air Force in a matter of days .Not to downplay the PAF, they fought bravely but were essentially steamrolled. They lost 250-300 aircraft in total, but only 93 of these were to enemy action: 13 Bf 109, 9 Bf 110, 27 Do 17, 25 He 111, 16 Ju 87, 3 Hs 123. This probably includes losses to everything, ie. Polish AA. PAF fighters had little chance as they could hardly catch up with LW bombers. As far as the losses go though, the LW had more and better aircraft (they dumped obsolate versions like Jumo engined 109s and 110s for example) by the end of September 1939 than at the start.

France was another matter, there the LW indeed had serious losses, as a matter of fact it rivaled the losses as though the only serious was the bombers which strenght fell by about 200 aircraft compared to the begining of the campaign, but all other strenght was maintained or even improved. As a sidenote, they handed the RAF's and the FAF their respective assess (the former lost some 900 aircraft, the latter was simply annihilated) and were instrumental in creating a strategical position in Western Europe that was simply not going to change until the Americans entered the war. The French Army, the only one that could hope to defeat the German army was defeated, and the Brits were kicked out of the continent, and everyone knew they just can't come back on their own.

Add the losses between the time of Dunkirk and the "start" of the BoB in August and it is clear that the Luftwaffe could not sustain a campaign to "take" Great Britain. It's laugable to think that they could.

Laughable or not, they did exactly that, from mid-August 1940 to mid-May 1941. With the war industry on peacetime footing. Even with the Kriegsmarine's weakness that prohibited a landing (certainly in 1940), they could keep up an air campaign until Britain sinks into the sea..

The Luftwaffe was a very young service. There was no depth of experience in their officer corps, unlike the RAF, which is of course the world's oldest independent air force.

Silly. First of all all this empty boasting about the RAF - I find it difficult to find a talented officer amongst the rows of aristocratic idiots, to be frank. At least I can find no other reason why they appeared to have no single idea what to do with all those aircraft during the whole war. Certainly between 1939 and 1940 they seemed to have done nothing but f.ing up all the time - BC was forced to bomb at night when they could hit virtually nothing, the expediationary air force they sent over to the continent was wiped out with nearly 1000 aircraft lost, and as for Dunkerque, well, they managed to score of 92 German aircraft, with only 37 fighters amongst them, for the loss of 106 RAF fighters.

Secondly that 'very young air service' had a top brass made up by people who were flying in combat before the 'world's oldest independent air force' came into being, with top/mid-level commanders like Moelders, Osterkamp Richthofen, Sperrle, Stumpf, Kesselring etc. who had seen actual combat flying and organisation in Spain. A little reading wouldn't hurt you as a matter of fact.. ;) They had top notch aircraft to do their bidding, and in sufficient numbers, and the service was technologically advanced - look at the bomb sights, or blind bombing equipment for example, the RAF simply didn't have such, neither it had, on avarage either fighters like the Luftwaffe had (mostly Hurricanes) nor bombers (mostly Wellingtons and Blenheims), nor close support aircraft (err... Battle :D )

Considering how much younger and more inexperienced they were supposed to be, they seem to have built a better and larger air force on all levels by 1940.

[Kurfürst]

a.) The abysmal intelligence service of the OKL. Their CO Oberst Beppo Schmidt reported on 19.July 1940 that the 110 and the 109 were both much superior to anything the RAF could and would field during the upcoming campaign. In addition, his report doesn't underestimate the effect of radar, it didn't even mention it!

c.) Strategical/Tactical Errors. Intially, the Germans did pick their targets well in accordance of their goals for the campaign (radar, airfields, etc.)

The two statements seem to be at odds with each other. On hand - a logical fallacy often repeated in British BoB literature - it claims the Germans didn't even know about radar, so poor was their intelligence - another favourite British theme - yet they somehow kept bombing them still.

Now either Göring should have played lottery instead of beim RM of the LW, for being so lucky picking targets he supposedly did not even know of, OR the Beppo Schmidt report was hardly the only German intelligence material, nor the only considered in mission planning, and British historians (who often state a ridiculus amount of wishful commentary regarding the 'truth' vs this report) simply - probably also out of complete ignorance of German intel during WW2 - simply set up a strawman arguement to illustrate how ingenious the British, and in contrast how stupid the Germans were.

IMHO Beppo's report was mostly correct, he made one cardinal serious mistake, when he underestimated current fighter production - though his numbers would be quite correct a few months before, as British production was just about ramped up in mid-1940 from its modest levels, also inspired by the state of the Army after Dunkerque.

OTOH the British also seem to have very faint idea what was happening on the other side of the channel, they had no clear idea how many planes the Germans had, how many were they producing, and where they were located in France, nor did they had any idea on German radar (and for about a year or two, knew next to nothing about it) or German radio navigation and blind bombing systems. So on what ground do they criticize German intel in 1940, I do not know. :)

[Blakduk]

It's quite silly to question the LW as being the preeminent airforce in the world in 1940- they were better equipped and better led in tactics than then RAF. During the BoB the RAF learned some very hard lessons, the ill-conceived Defiant and 'Vic' formations are prime examples. In 1941 the RAF's performance over France was pathetic- the attrition in Spitfires alone was almost criminally negligent.
The BoB campaign was really aimed at imposing a cost on the British and challenging the will of their citizens to continue hostilities against Germany when they were cast out of the continent of Europe. The intransigence of Churchill and the unexpected resilience of the populace were what thwarted the German offensive.
The British failed to learn the lesson however and made exactly the same mistakes against the Germans when they started to take the offensive in the air. The Germans developed a coordinated air defence, chose which raids to confront, and the German people displayed the same stoicism as the British had when bombs fell on their cities. The RAF performance during the Dieppe raid was a travesty.
What the Germans didn't do however was gear their industry for full war production until Speer took over in late 1943- far too late. The LW never acquired a large enough strategic reserve and each pilot basically flew until he was dead, captured or crippled.

The attrition finished them in the end- their men were men after all, not ubermensch.

[Blakduk]

Kurfurst- the Germans knew about the British radar, but it was so far inferior to the German's that they dismissed it. They failed to realise how the radar information was used as part of an integrated intelligence gathering network to give the RAF dispatchers an almost real-time picture of what was happening.
The British mistakenly overestimated the LW capabilities and geared production to match it- they believed the German propoganda!

[Blakduk]

Back on topic- the fact that the Germans invested a lot of energy into developing the Knickebein radio guidance system may have been stimulated by their difficulties finding targets in WW1. I can't find a direct reference that suggests that but it seems reasonable.

[609_Huetz]

Maybe a bit got lost in translation here: of course Schmidt, Goering and the LW were aware of radar, that's why they initially focused their raids on those as well.

What they did underestimate was the effectiveness of the RAF as long as they could fly intercept missions only and did not have to waste fuel and their pilot's strenght by sending up patrol after patrol in anticipation of the big one.

In addition, the LW didn't seem to be aware what they had to do in order to keep radar down.

Back OT, I do not think that the Germans learned much from their Gotha and Zeppeling raids on Britain, except (as pointed out by Blakduk) the need for targeting systems to increase precision of navigation and bombing.

What they did not learn is that in order to keep up a strategic bombing campaign you will have to find a cure for the disease, not the symptoms. That means you can not excpect to win such a campaign by only bombing airfields and forcing the enemy to fight it out, that's when the airwar is starting to resemble the worst battles of attrition in the trenches of WW1.

What the USAAF and Bomber Command did very well during the later stages (despite bombing the cities) was their choice of targets. A/C factories, fuel depots, training facilities etc..

[winny]

The two statements seem to be at odds with each other. On hand - a logical fallacy often repeated in British BoB literature - it claims the Germans didn't even know about radar, so poor was their intelligence - another favourite British theme - yet they somehow kept bombing them still.

Now either Göring should have played lottery instead of beim RM of the LW, for being so lucky picking targets he supposedly did not even know of, OR the Beppo Schmidt report was hardly the only German intelligence material, nor the only considered in mission planning, and British historians (who often state a ridiculus amount of wishful commentary regarding the 'truth' vs this report) simply - probably also out of complete ignorance of German intel during WW2 - simply set up a strawman arguement to illustrate how ingenious the British, and in contrast how stupid the Germans were.

IMHO Beppo's report was mostly correct, he made one cardinal serious mistake, when he underestimated current fighter production - though his numbers would be quite correct a few months before, as British production was just about ramped up in mid-1940 from its modest levels, also inspired by the state of the Army after Dunkerque.

OTOH the British also seem to have very faint idea what was happening on the other side of the channel, they had no clear idea how many planes the Germans had, how many were they producing, and where they were located in France, nor did they had any idea on German radar (and for about a year or two, knew next to nothing about it) or German radio navigation and blind bombing systems. So on what ground do they criticize German intel in 1940, I do not know. :)


I'll tell you why I can criticise German intelligence..

Of course they knew what Radar was, they already had Freya..
However, in '39 they sent a zepplin over (General Wolfgang Milch) to see what the giant masts were. They were expecting to hear some kind of response from the masts, but they had discounted using HF radio for radar (because they were using VHF and UHF) it simply did not occur to them that what they were looking at was radar because it was so primative.

They sent another zepplin over because they thought that there must be a defect with thier own radio equipment and by massive coincidence on that day the station they were looking at was switched off for repairs. This further confused them, and they stopped investigating them.

Once the battle had started

They also continually bombed costal and bomber command airfields whilst trying to destroy fighter comand, thay had no knowledge of the civillian repair network, no idea about british aircraft production and they believed thier own 'kill' count (in this aspect they were different from RAF who were more concerned with how many of thier own planes thay had lost)

In September Scmhid reported to Goering that the RAF had 177 aircraft left (they had 659)
At no point during the battle did the LW have a clear picture of Fighter Commands structure, they failed to exploit the strengths they had, the use of the fighter arm was, well, incompetent. They did not look after thier men, they swictched tactics and suffered from mission creep. All because Schmid (as Galland pointed out 'Trimmed his salis to the wind' in order to please his superiors, not give them the truth)

Problem is if you say anything negative about the LW on here you get a load of 'no they weren't' posts. Can we at least have some realism here?
To use the 'well the RAF didn't know what was going on either' argument is juvenille, they didn't need to at that point they just needed to know what was coming and try and stop it.

[Blackdog_kt]

It's quite silly to question the LW as being the preeminent airforce in the world in 1940- they were better equipped and better led in tactics than then RAF. During the BoB the RAF learned some very hard lessons, the ill-conceived Defiant and 'Vic' formations are prime examples. In 1941 the RAF's performance over France was pathetic- the attrition in Spitfires alone was almost criminally negligent.
The BoB campaign was really aimed at imposing a cost on the British and challenging the will of their citizens to continue hostilities against Germany when they were cast out of the continent of Europe. The intransigence of Churchill and the unexpected resilience of the populace were what thwarted the German offensive.
The British failed to learn the lesson however and made exactly the same mistakes against the Germans when they started to take the offensive in the air. The Germans developed a coordinated air defence, chose which raids to confront, and the German people displayed the same stoicism as the British had when bombs fell on their cities. The RAF performance during the Dieppe raid was a travesty.
What the Germans didn't do however was gear their industry for full war production until Speer took over in late 1943- far too late. The LW never acquired a large enough strategic reserve and each pilot basically flew until he was dead, captured or crippled.

The attrition finished them in the end- their men were men after all, not ubermensch.

Very good, well balanced post.

There's no reason getting worked up when studying history, unless we want to reach wrong conclusions ;)

I mean, one time we hear how the RAF was fighting tooth and nail while outnumbered (the legend of the few) because we like boosting the heroic aspect of the allied war effort, then we hear how the RAF had better training and production to boost the ingenious aspect of the allied war effort and make us feel good that the allies beat the axis in their own game (industry), many times from the exact same people.

Well, it doesn't take a genius to understand that these statements openly contradict each other unless we provide the correct frame of reference for each one. We can't say the RAF had the better manufacturing and logistics AND was fighting an uphill battle at the same time. What we can say is that the RAF was in situation A until that point during the battle, then they learned from experience and their preparations started having a result which got them to a better situation B during a certain month.


Don't get me wrong, i'm glad the axis lost, but when studying history there's no need to prop up the actions of anybody.

The way i see the whole WWII in Europe is that Germany was all about trying to produce the absolute best in terms of manufacturing, equipment, new technologies and training of the people in their armed forces without having sufficient strategic resources and logistics planning in place to ensure this would work long term. Naturally, after a point in time they couldn't keep up and their system collapsed by the allied decision to do the opposite: focus on outnumbering them first, essentially throwing bodies and inferior equipment to the fire to stem the tide while stockpiling strategic reserves (of all kinds), then turning that strategic advantage into a quality advantage at a time where the axis quality factor was on the decline.

If we wanted to draw an internet meme analogy, Germany was putting 100 ninjas on the field against a haphazard crowd of 1000 less experienced and worse equipped enemies. It worked initially, but then attrition took its toll on numbers, training was accelerated to replace losses and their blacksmiths lacked the metals to give them shinny,razor sharp swords to fight with, while the crowd of 1000 was growing in numbers, improving in experience and getting better equipment, so they lost :-P

[BigPickle]

And yet, the RAF still only avoided defeat in BoB owing to faulty German strategy.

lol The RAF had around 800 pilots that went up to meet every raid with out fail why? because they knew that the rest of the war hinged on that battle, if hitler had gained control of the British Isles it would have been a different outcome in the war of this im sure.
The RAF won because of sheer tenacity and bloody-mindedness of its pilots and pilots of the occupied countries that flew for the RAF, and the radar system that been set up was second to non and designed make the full use of its mimimal resources.
Failure in german strategy was just an example of Goerings pompus ignorance about his advensaries and his understanding of supply issues effecting the Luft at that time.

[baronWastelan]

I'm surprised to see people on here discussing 'Battle of Britain' as though it was part of a campaign to put Britain under Nazi control. I've not seen any evidence that Hitler had any real desire or plan to land Wehrmacht units in England. In fact Hitler's only concern about the British in 1940 after June was to keep them at bay just long enough to conclude the campaign in Russia which he expected to finish in the autumn of 1941.

[bongodriver]

I'm surprised to see people on here discussing 'Battle of Britain' as though it was part of a campaign to put Britain under Nazi control. I've not seen any evidence that Hitler had any real desire or plan to land Wehrmacht units in England. In fact Hitler's only concern about the British in 1940 after June was to keep them at bay just long enough to conclude the campaign in Russia which he expected to finish in the autumn of 1941.

I thought it was called 'operation sea lion'

[41Sqn_Stormcrow]

I have to disagree. While I do believe that conquest of the two Western countries (France and UK) was not something on the agenda in the first place as Hitler's interest lay entirely in the East, I think the attempt to occupy Britain was serious. Occupying it was the only way to put at least the heart nation of the Empire out of action and free enough ressources for the East. Otherwise the arial campaign would have made no sense as serious attrition took place. And you don't go on an all out campaign if it is just for teasing when you actually want it only for the real thing.

[winny]

I'm surprised to see people on here discussing 'Battle of Britain' as though it was part of a campaign to put Britain under Nazi control. I've not seen any evidence that Hitler had any real desire or plan to land Wehrmacht units in England. In fact Hitler's only concern about the British in 1940 after June was to keep them at bay just long enough to conclude the campaign in Russia which he expected to finish in the autumn of 1941.

How do you conclude something you haven't started yet?

I think Hitler thought they might as well 'have a go' at Britain, I agree that He didn't show any real interest in the UK. He had no involvement in the planning of Sealion, which was very unusual because he was involved in the planning of every other major offensive.

His main target was always the Russians.

However it's easy to say in hindsight, are you saying that if the RAF had been 'defeated in 4 days' that Hitler would not have continued the offensive?

It's pretty obvious that he never really wanted to go to war with Britain (at least not in 1939).Paradoxically, he knew the longer Britain held out the more the possibility of the US getting involved increased. And he was well ware of what that would mean.

He just bit off more than he could chew. It's a recurring theme from 1941 onwards.

[MB_Avro_UK]

At the risk of derailing my own thread....

The OKW produced Invasion Plan Manuals for England. Few exist today, but here are scans of such a manual I owned. It comprised about 490 pages.

It detailed every possible landing area for a German invasion on the south coast (SudKuste) of England with troop deployments.

It is dated 15th August 1940 and this example was distributed to an Artillery Regiment.

Of all the many locations detailed in this manual, I have chosen Dover as an example.

This manual alone doesn't prove Hitler's intentions but it is interesting.


http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain1.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain3.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain4.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain5.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain6.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain7.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain8.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain9.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain75.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain77.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain79.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain80.jpg

http://i885.photobucket.com/albums/ac58/MB_Avro_UK/WW2GermanInvasionManual1940Britain82.jpg


Best Regards,
MB_Avro

[winny]

It's not always understood that a mini-Battle of Britain occured in WW1. Mainly between 1916 and 1918.

Britain was being bombed by Zeppelins and later by German bombers in WW1.

The defending British aircraft of the RFC and RNAS had huge problems as regards interceptions and the destruction of these crafts.

It was realised that both a Detection System and heavily armed high performance fighters was the answer.

Hence, radar and eight gunned fast fighters desigined for the RAF in the 1930's.

The only flaw in the calculations was as follows. It was anticipated that the German Luftwaffe bombers would have to fly unescorted from Germany. The fall of France was not envisaged.

Enter the Defiant. Built to intercept unescorted bombers.

Any thoughts?


Best Regards,
MB_Avro.

The RAF owes it's existance to the WWI air attacks by Germany.
An Air defence committee was set up because of them, the main conclusion of the committee was that Britain needed an independant (of the Army) air force. They also saw the need for a flexible defence network of interceptors, AA and detection methods.

[whoarmongar]

I too have a historical document , a transcript of a meeting somewhere in France in 1940.
It was recorded and translated by a brave French agent in the days before babel fish or any other online translator programs thus the poor quality of the translation.


Adolf Hitler. Verdammit, the stupid english island monkeys do not know that they are beaten.

Wilhelm Keitel. Indeed mein fuhrer, our boys played a blinder, slipped around the defensive wall and gave them a good kick up the arse ! They never knew what hit em. The french went running home to there mommas and the English running for the boats crying foul.

Adolf Hitler. Ah Wilhelm what am I to do ? I never wanted a war with England. Why do they not see sense ? Shh dont tell anyone but I rather like the English, the british sense of humour, football, a world empire there is a lot to admire, why they even drink beer unlike those effete southerners with there poncy wine,why even the royal family is German.

Wilhelm keitel. Well mein Fuhrer perhaps they will now see sense, make peace and then we can sort out our easern problem afterall Churchill is a well known bolshovic hater.

Adolf Hitler. WINSTON CHURCHILL that is my problem, That fat alcoholic syphalitic jew lover is our problem. well lets see if he is shouting defiance when my panzers overrun his undefended country. Fetch me von Rundstedt.

Ah my dear Gerd how are you and how are my fine wehrmacht boys, not to tired I hope ?

Von Rundstedt. Nein mein Fuhrer. After a few days for rest and recovery the boys will be in fine fettle and ready to do mein Fuhrers bidding, and if I may say on a personal note mein Fuhrer im rather looking forward to going to the south of France and grabbing all the best bits before that jackal Mussolini joins the war and grabs them for himself.

Adolf Hitler. Actually Im not thinking south of France im thinking...

V.R. (interupting) But mein Fuhrer, we agreed it will take three months to move our armies east and by then it will be autumn, we cannot possibly sort our eastern problem before spring 1941 !

A.H. Nein, nein,nein. You will invade England and teach these tommies that I am not a Fuhrer to be messed with. The glorious wehrmacht will write another annal in history that will be remembered for a thousand years. We will be masters of not only europe, but the world. It is our destiny. Once England is bent to our will the eastern problem will be seen in a whole new light trust me.

V.R. But mein Fuhrer, there is an obstacle to our plans for world domination,the channel.

A.H. Bah its hardly a sea, more a mere ditch, hardly an obstacle at all

V.R. still mein fuhrer it is technically a sea therefore the navy must ensure that I can land my troops safely, otherwise I cannot guarantee the success of the operation, however IF my boys get ashore you can be assured we will give those tommies a good licking.

A.H Very well, Fetch me Erich Raeder

Erich, you have seen what my wonderfull wehmacht boys have achieved I have spent an absolute fortune building your nice navy and im sure your itching to show me what it can do.

E.R Indeed mein Fuhrer, I am certain that within 18 months we can bring the Britishers to there knees begging for peace and to be left alone. Why even as we speak Doenitzs U boat boys are sinking British ships at will and a nation as well as an army marches on its stomach. without supplies the Britishers are finished. They alone resist us, they have no allies and there colonies are to far away to be of any help whatsoever.

A.H. Eighteen months ! EIGHTEEN MONTHS ! We dont have eighteen f**king months, You will sail into the channel, deposit my army on the shores of England and this war will be over in eighteen days ! That is an order from your Fuhrer do you understand !

E.R. As you order mein Fuhrer, however I must point out that the british have a powerful navy and we can expect considerable losses that would hamper or even defeat our invasion unless...

A.H. Unless ?

E.R. Well mein Fuhrer, um er, well unless we can achieve air superiority over the channel that is. If we have air superiority then im sure we can land our armies, in fact im certain of it.

A.H. I have never heard such defeatist claptrap, I ought have you all shot. Fetch me Hermann Goring and get out of my sight im going for a piss.

At this point Hitler exited the room, however a whispered conversation between ER and GvonR was overheard by our agent.

E.R. What madness is this ? I cant possibly land your armies in england without suffering immense losses. but If I had said that it would have been cutains for me, XXXX what the hell are we to do ?

G.R. I know my dear Erich, it is madness but if I had refused to agree I would have had a "heart attack" and that blue eyed boy Rommel would probably get my job, that ambitious little XXXX would do anything for a promotion, I will have to watch him, however Im going to send him to some strategic backwater as soon as its possible.
As for this England Invasion we have only one hope.

E.R. And what is that ?

G.R. Dont worry Erich, Now we are relying on the luftwaffe and fat Hermann is bound to make a ballsup of it. We can sleep soundly in our beds, and so I suspect can the English, this invasion will never happen.

[ATAG_Dutch]

Superb :)

Not the full story for sure, but certainly a credible half of it.

[ChicoMick]

"Verdammit" Brilliant Lmao !

Yeah, probably a lot of truth in that, very good

[Kurfürst]

"Verdammit" Brilliant Lmao !

Yeah, probably a lot of truth in that, very good

+1. Pretty much sums up the whole story, and what was going in the heads on the German side of the Channel..

[baronWastelan]

How do you conclude something you haven't started yet?

I think Hitler thought they might as well 'have a go' at Britain, I agree that He didn't show any real interest in the UK. He had no involvement in the planning of Sealion, which was very unusual because he was involved in the planning of every other major offensive.

His main target was always the Russians.

However it's easy to say in hindsight, are you saying that if the RAF had been 'defeated in 4 days' that Hitler would not have continued the offensive?

It's pretty obvious that he never really wanted to go to war with Britain (at least not in 1939).Paradoxically, he knew the longer Britain held out the more the possibility of the US getting involved increased. And he was well ware of what that would mean.

He just bit off more than he could chew. It's a recurring theme from 1941 onwards.

Hitler was very afraid of the USA grabbing huge chunks of Britain's empire if the British gov't were to cease functioning. He did not want to take over the British empire for the same reasons he didn't take over all of France and her colonies and Navy. The more one studies it, the more it seems that Hitler's brain was hard-wired not to invade England. It is clear that already as early as July 1940, Hitler convinced himself the invasion of Russia was the key to neutralizing the British, this was the deranged game of chess that he was playing in his mind. It's in Halder's diary, after the OKW meeting of 31 July: "With Russia smashed, Britain's last hope would be shattered."