Hurricane & Spitfire control characteristics

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Glider

Oberleutnant Ulrich Steinhilper of III/JG 52 wrote of the difficulties new pilots found operating the Me 109's propeller:

We began our climb almost immediately after take-off and he was constantly using the radio to ask us to slow down so that he could keep up. It was obvious that he wasn't manipulating the pitch control with the skill of the more seasoned pilots to produce the same power as our machines. We tried to tell him what to do on the radio but to no avail. Eventually, about half way across the Channel at 4,000 metres Kühle told him to leave the formation and return to base. 119

Leutnant Erich Bodendiek, II/JG 53 engaged in a 18 September combat which demonstrated that the Me 109's propeller could be troublesome:

I was not flying my usual plane but, as I was the Technischer Offizier, I had to fly a plane with a new automatic propeller just to test it. That was my bad luck, having that bloody plane on that day for the first time because that 'automatic thing' turned that angle of the propeller so that an average speed was always maintained and not a kmh more! That meant trouble when starting and trouble at high altitude as the plane was nearly always unmanoeuvrable and swaggered through the air like a pregnant duck.

Nice copy paste job from spitliarperformance.

However, the above pilot accounts describes the early manual propellor pitch system of the 109E, and this was superseded already in late 1939 by a fully automatic (CSP) system, which governed propellor pitch with a single lever system, and made tinkering with engine controls unnecessary. I am sure a number of early aircraft still had manual propellor pitch early in the Battle, especially those which converted to 109E early and still had early production machines, but the situation was hardly worse than in Fighter Command, where fighters for some time had to struggle with inefficient 2-pitch propellors.

German pilots were instructed to make full advantage of this disadvantage of RAF pilots:
http://kurfurst.org/Tactical_trials/...g_Aug1940.html

The Spitfire and partly the Hurricane have two-pitch propellers. Climbing away with the Bf 109 and Bf 110 must be done with the best climbing speed or even higher speeds of about 280 – 300 km/h. On aircraft with two-pitch propellers with low blade angle the engine will experience a very high over-revolution, and on the other
hand with high blade angle high boost pressure – therefore in other words, performance loss.

The trend of system automatization was carried over to the 109F-K, which had additional automatic system (oil and coolant radiators). Much like the Fw 190, engine controls were automatic and relived the pilot of additional workload, in contrast of British aircraft, where RPM, boost needed the pilots attention, as well as setting the mixture to the correct position.

The British described and acknowledged the advantages offered by a fully automated system as follows:

10. The Me.109F, altough very similiar in appearance to the Me.109E is much superior in all-round performance. The fact that the airscrew is fully automatic, and the oil and coolant temperatures thermostatically controlled, helps to make the aircraft a simple fighting machine, as the only things then occupying the pilot's attention in combat are his throttle, flying controls and guns.

It remained a constant theme of envy in their later reports as well. British 109G evaluation:
http://kurfurst.org/Tactical_trials/...ts.html#sumres

7. The cockpit is simple. A number of technical controls such as regulation of oxygen flow, adjustment of coolant radiator and oil radiator flaps and airscrew pitch control have been made automatic and need no attention from the pilot. The pilot is then able to give more attention to fighting tactics, teamwork, navigation and practical flying.

8. The shortcomings of the aeroplane are, the weakness of the ailerons at high diving speeds, the weakness of the undercarriage, the stiffness of the tail trimming gear at high speeds, and skittishness during landing and take off.

Recommendations.

9. The small size of the 109G remains a prime reason for its good performance. It is recommended that British aeroplanes should be designed to be small, but that skittishness on the ground should be prevented by having a nosewheel undercart.

10. British cockpits should be freed of auxiliary technical controls which need the attention of the pilot, and the regulation of oxygen flow, adjustment of coolant and oil radiator flaps and airscrew pitch should be controlled by reliable automatics.

It should be noted that this view is supported by the Jugoslav airforce who had both Hurricanes and Me109E fighters. They had problems with the propeller and found the Me109 a difficult plane to get the best out of. In the end pilots due to fly the Me109 first spent time on a Hurricane squadron as it was an easier aircraft to fly before moving to the Me109.

Interesting, this seems to be in contrast with what I have read. Do you have a quote etc? It would be interesting to see these views as well.

The following is an excerpt from a Yugoslavian pilot, who probably had a fairly good insight, as they Yugo airforce operated a wild mix of airplanes - P-47s, Hurris, Spits, 109Gs, Yak 3 etc.

»The main shortage of Jak 3 was its obsolete technique. Its cockpit was spartan, everything had to do be done manually. Particular problem was when you had to get air compressor into its second gear when rapidly changing altitude. In such situations engine is not receiving the right mixture of air and fuel and is loosing power, so you had to be very concentrated in doing it all synchronized and in exact moment. The same applies for the oil cooler which was adjusted with an mechanical wheel, during the dive the cooler had to be closed and during the climb opened as the engine needed more air. All of it was automatio on the Messerschmitt. In Jak 3, throttle handle and the propeler pitch handle were beside each other and you had to move them simultaneously, so all the time you pulled the throttle you had to think about the pitch. So imagine when you are in a midst of a combat, chasing and being chased, turning the wheels, setting the handles, adjusting the pitch, setting the gunsight and at the same time manouvring and trying to hit your enemy. Messerschmitt had it all automatic.

Messerschmitt had leading edge slots to prevent it from stalling and Jak stalled even on highest speed. In sharp turns Messerschmitt provoked a black-out and that was not possible with the Jak since he would stall. On other hand Jak easily came out of the spin and Messerschmitt stalled slowly but when it did it was hard to get it out due to small command surfaces which would become »shaded«. Therefore it was neccessary to give a hard contra with the food pedals, full gas or sometimes to lower the gear. Messerschmitt had the electrical loading of weapons, and Jak mechanical, I remember how it clicked.
In all, Jak 3 had marvelous flying performance and excellent manouvrebility, it was invented for peacetime flying and aerobatics, but you had to have »a hand« for it. On other hand Messerschmitt was much more simple to fly, especially in air combat, of course once you learned to cope its small rudder on take-off and landing.«

As for the stalling qualities, the 109 had very good ones. See Karl Baur:

Word came from the Luftwaffe out of Antwerp early in the spring of 1943 that many pilots had experienced spin problems with the Me109 G and had to bail out. Numerous airplanes had been lost. Karl Baur's first reaction: "This is almost a foolproof airplane. How do these guys accomplish that?" The Me 109 had a relatively high wing loading (32.2 lb/sq ft) and therefore stalled readily under heavy G forces but the stall was gentle and the aircraft exhibited good control under G forces. If the stick was eased forward the aircraft immediately unstalled with no tendency to flick over on its back and spin. While not totally spin proof it took a fairly ham fisted pilot to get into trouble in the Me 109.

It took Karl several nerve wracking flights before he was able to get a Me 109 into a spin. Finally, after he had tried every possible dog fight maneuver, he had it figured out. It was during those split seconds before going into a vertical dive that it was possible to get this airplane to spin. Only rough flying inexperienced pilots were able to do it. Karl's solution to the problem was very simple. He advised: "Drop the landing gear boys, and the spin will end immediately." The dropped landing gear would appear to lower the airspeed and reduce the severity of the yaw (the movement around the normal axis of the aircraft, i.e. direction stability). Once the aircraft is not spinning (yawning) around its center of gravity the aircraft being in a nose down attitude accelerates and becomes unstalled.

The US opinion on 109G-6: http://kurfurst.org/Tactical_trials/..._US_EB102.html

f. Stalls and Stall Warning.

Automatic Handly-Page type slots are provided on the outboard leading edges of the wing. They extend at about 240 KPH indicated. The airplane`s stall characteristics are good with little tendency to fall off on either wing. No specific stall checks were made but it is believed the stall with wheels down and full flaps is about 150 KPH indicated.

The British also agreed (RAE report of 1940, quoted above):

When doing tight turns with the Me.109 leading at speeds between 90 m.p.h. and 220 m.p.h. the Spitfires and Hurricanes had little difficult in keeping on the tail of the Me. 109. During these turns the amount of normal g recorded on the Me. 109 was between 2½ and 4 g. The aircraft stalled if the turn was tightened to give more than 4 g at speeds below about 200 m.p.h. The slots opened at about ½ g before the stall, and whilst opening caused the ailerons to snatch ; this upset the pilot's sighting immediately and caused him to lose ground. When the slots were fully open the aircraft could be turned quite steadily until very near the stall. If the stick was then pulled back a little more the aircraft suddenly shuddered, and either tended to come out of the turn or dropped its wing further, oscillating meanwhile in pitch and roll and rapidly losing height ; the aircraft immediately unstalled if the stick was eased forward. Even in a very tight turn the stall was quite gentle, with no tendency for the aircraft to suddenly flick over on to its back and spin. The Spitfires and Hurricanes could follow the Me.109 round during the stalled turns without themselves showing any signs of stalling.

Please note however that the 'suddenly flick over on to its back and spin' is how the Spitfire stalled, altough its stall speed was lower, once the stall occured, it was very violent.

and also of interest:

When the Me.109 was following the Hurricane or Spitfire, it was found that our aircraft turned inside the Me.109 without difficulty when flown by determined pilots who were not afraid to pull their aircraft round hard in a tight turn. In a surprisingly large number of cases, however, the Me. 109 succeeded in keeping on the tail of the Spitfire or Hurricane during these turning tests, merely [b]because our Pilots would not tighten up the turn suficiently from fear of stalling and spinning.

The good stalling characteristics of the Bf 109E did not escape the French either, who have tested the very same plane, Bf 109 E-3 WNr 1304. it against the D.520 and found:

B - Maneuvrability in combat

The D.520, in close combat evolutions (maneuvres) seems to stall more than the Messerschmidt 109, holding on the air by his wing-slats. The stall of the D520 is very brutal and start always to the left; it is indeed serious in the combat to the right, the Dewoitine 520 pilot making almost a full roll; as result, the combat should ALWAYS be started to the left, at least if the choice of the turn direction is possible.

It would seem to me that the more benign stalling characteristics of the 109 as opposed to the Spitfire (or Yak 3, D.520) consisted a definite advantage in turning combat, as it gave 109 pilots had the confidence to fly near the stall and get the maximum out of the aircraft.

The RAE also found the 109's elevators to be heavy: "Throughout the speed range the elevator is heavier than that of the Hurricane or Spitfire, but up to 250 m.p.h. this is not objected to, since it is very responsive. Above 250 m.p.h. the elevator becomes definitely too heavy for comfort, and between 300 m.p.h. and 400 m.p.h. is so heavy that manoeurvability in the looping plane is seriously restricted; when diving at 400 m.p.h. a pilot, pulling with all his strength, cannot put on enough "g" to black himself out if trimmed in the dive." 106

Again, nice copy paste job of a selective quote. The problem is again that diving the 109 by trimming it into the dive is against the diving instructions the 109 pilots notes, which specifically tell the pilots not to trim in dive and instead keep the aircraft diving angle by pushing the stick forward.

The RAE actually wrote: http://kurfurst.org/Tactical_trials/...ls/Morgan.html

4.5. High-Speed Dive. – The aircraft was dived at 370 m.p.h. and all three controls were in turn given a slight displacement and then released. No vibration, flutter or " snaking " developed.

If the elevator is trimmed for level flight at full throttle, a moderately large push is necessary to hold the aircraft in the dive, and there is a temptation to wind the trimmer forward. If this is done, recovery is very difficult unless the trimmer is first wound back again, owing to the excessive heaviness of the elevator at high speeds.

At 370 m.p.h. a considerable amount of pressure is needed on the left rudder bar to hold the aircraft straight, and if the rudder is displaced in either direction and released, the aircraft eventually banks and turns to the right. Small rudder displacements, sufficient to yaw the nose about 10 deg., give rise to no appreciable nose-down pitching moment. Large rudder displace-ments do cause the nose to pitch down, but as the rudder is very heavy at 370 m.p.h. they would not normally be used.


The Bf 109 manual says, that before dive, the trim is to be left in neutral position, so during recovery, they simply need to release the stick into neutral position, and trimming position will assist the recovery from dive, which is then easy and fairly tight turns are possible.

See AFDU tactical trials of Bf 109F-2 - this time they operated to aircraft correctly, with the controls trimmed for level flight. http://kurfurst.org/Tactical_trials/...S906_AFDU.html

7. No manoeuvrability trials were carried out against other aircraft but the Me.109F was dived up to 420 m.p.h., I.A.S., with controls trimmed for level flight and it was found that altough the elevators had become heavy and the ailerons had stiffened up appreciably, fairly tight turns were still possible.

In short, your quote tells us nothing that if the aircraft is operated against the prescribed manner - ie. trimming it into the dive instead against regulations. An analogue case is the Spitfire trimmed for level flight before entering the dive, against regulations. It had to be operated the opposite way, as the Spitfire manual tells the pilot to trim into the dive, otherwise blacking out or breaking the wings in dive due to pulling excessive 'g' with the over-sensitive elevator control is the likely outcome.

[Robo.]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

However, the above pilot accounts describes the early manual propellor pitch system of the 109E, and this was superseded already in late 1939 by a fully automatic (CSP) system, which governed propellor pitch with a single lever system, and made tinkering with engine controls unnecessary. I am sure a number of early aircraft still had manual propellor pitch early in the Battle, especially those which converted to 109E early and still had early production machines, but the situation was hardly worse than in Fighter Command, where fighters for some time had to struggle with inefficient 2-pitch propellors.

Negative, both pilot accounts are relevant to the 1940 scenario and Battle of Britain. In Steinhilper's case, this happened in September 1940. Same practice is being described in his book on 27. October - the day he got shot down.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Nice copy paste job from spitliarperformance.

Nothing wrong with cutting and pasting original quotes, I have done the ame from your site.

However, the above pilot accounts describes the early manual propellor pitch system of the 109E, and this was superseded already in late 1939 by a fully automatic (CSP) system, which governed propellor pitch with a single lever system, and made tinkering with engine controls unnecessary. I am sure a number of early aircraft still had manual propellor pitch early in the Battle, especially those which converted to 109E early and still had early production machines, but the situation was hardly worse than in Fighter Command, where fighters for some time had to struggle with inefficient 2-pitch propellors.

I don't disagree but the RAF had switched to CSP by July 1940 I think and its clear that the Luftwaffe were still using older versions much later. The interesting question is how many 109's were still using the old props.

edit
All Spitfires were converted by 20 July, All Hurricane Units by 16th August

German pilots were instructed to make full advantage of this disadvantage of RAF pilots:
http://kurfurst.org/Tactical_trials/...g_Aug1940.html

The Spitfire and partly the Hurricane have two-pitch propellers. Climbing away with the Bf 109 and Bf 110 must be done with the best climbing speed or even higher speeds of about 280 – 300 km/h. On aircraft with two-pitch propellers with low blade angle the engine will experience a very high over-revolution, and on the other
hand with high blade angle high boost pressure – therefore in other words, performance loss.

I don't disagree with this either but would point out that the RAF witched to CSP very quickly and the above comment is of limited use.

The rest of your posting I deleted as it had nothing to do with the 109E. As you know better than I the 109F was a very different machine.

However what wasn't a cut and paste was the reference to the Yugoslav air force that supported the view that the 109 was a more difficult aircraft to fly, not a simple machine.

What often happens re the BOB is when people think it started, the UK more or les go from soon after the evacuation of Dunkirk, when do you consider the battle have really started.

Its worth noting that Leutnant Erich Bodendiek, II/JG 53 engaged in a 18 September combat did note that the CSP was a new one presumably the other aircraft were still using old ones

[Robo.]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

here was nothing fancy about it, but it had the all things you need in war. Easy production, easy maintaince, simple flying. Plus a package of guns and speed to catch up with the target. Really, nothing more is needed imho. A fighter is just a gun platform.

Interesting option, but you're describing a Hawker Hurricane in here

Of course I am joking, but that's how FC has seen it in 1938. 109 was definitely not simple flying, it was very sophisticated and deadly machine if used right. The problem was that to excell in it, lots of experience was needed. And with its pilots, the Luftwaffe was losing this experience. One of the reasons why Britain won the Battle and worn out Luftwaffe.

[Sandstone]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

That's my impression as well. The 109 was simplicity itself, like the T-34. There was nothing fancy about it, but it had the all things you need in war. Easy production, easy maintaince, simple flying. Plus a package of guns and speed to catch up with the target. Really, nothing more is needed imho. A fighter is just a gun platform.

I can't really agree with this. The Bf-109 was a typical late 1930s design in whch significant compromises were made that ultimately affected its performance as a weapon for the Luftwaffe. Its principle weaknesses were:

1. Small size required a narrow track undercarriage. Fine for a peace-time airforce when pilots can be trained at leisure. Not a good idea when pilot training is reduced under war-time conditions.

2. Poor visibility. The aircraft structure was not capable of being adapted to the excellent bubble canopies used on later Allied types.

3. Limited range, restricting it to use an interceptor with limited success as an escort fighter. This would not have been a problem if the Luftwaffe had a good, long-range single-engined escort fighter, but they were unable to produce one.

4. Limited size prevented the wings carrying large/heavy internal weapons. All other fighter aircraft moved towards batteries of wing mounted guns (and particularly cannons). The Bf-109 couldn't do this. Latter versions of the aircraft were effectively reliant on a single cannon at a time when other interceptors were moving towards quad-mounts of 20 mm or 30 mm cannons.

5. Not designed for mass production (here, the analogy with the T-34 is particularly wide of the mark). The Bf-109 was designed to be produced by a skilled workforce. However, as the war progressed the German aviation industry lost men from the workforce who were withdrawn to bolster the front lines. They were replaced with significant volumes of slave labour where the intention was as much to kill the workforce through overwork and poor treatment as to produce aircraft. The skilled workers were thus replaced with "Jewish housewives and teenage girls picked up from places like Auschwitz". As a result, productivity was poor, those directing production became hopelessly morally compromised and aircraft were delivered to a poor standard by a reluctant, unskilled workforce who on occasion would sabotage their own products.

Overall, the Bf-109 was a good design for a peace-time late 1930s airforce. It was poorly suited to the war of national survival that the fascists actually initiated. It was unsuitable for low-hours pilots, it was overly complicated compared to other designs and in the face of actual German production capabilities, it had limited potential for development (because no realistic development could overcome some of the poor design decisions made early in its design cycle) and because the German aircraft industry in any event was unable to move to effective mass production and so was greatly out-produced by its opponents.

By the end of the war, fighter aircraft were becoming larger, able to be flown by relatively inexperienced pilots, had good visibility and often carried batteries of cannon. The Bf-109 had none of these things.

This isn't to say it was a bad aircraft and it still remained a dangerous opponent until the end of the war, but it was typical of the generation of fighters like the Hurricane, Spitfire and P-40 that the Allied nations replaced or complemented with better types as the war progressed. The Luftwaffe's inability to replace the Bf-109 says more about its disasterous R&D and procurement policies than it does about the strengths of the Bf-109.

[fruitbat]

Originally Posted by Sandstone

The Luftwaffe's inability to replace the Bf-109 says more about its disasterous R&D and procurement policies than it does about the strengths of the Bf-109.

Quoted for truth.....

[VO101_Tom]

Originally Posted by Sandstone

I can't really agree with this. The Bf-109 was a typical late 1930s design in whch significant compromises were made that ultimately affected its performance as a weapon for the Luftwaffe. Its principle weaknesses were:...

Not bad for an average or obsolete aircraft that shot down so many enemies do not you think?

This analysis only shows that you hate as much of the 109, as some people here.

The Bf 109's full metal structure (wing and control surfaces as well), hydraulic retractable landing gear, leading edge slats, freely adjustable flap was a revolutionary aircraft design in the late 30's. Combined with a perfect agility and small dimensions made the 109 one of the best war machines. And the war developments held there.
The late war "Erla" canopy provided a perfect view backwards (of course not in the IL-2 game) with perfect armor. The "Rüstsatze" supplements designed to increase range and weapons. Did not have enough weapons? The Mk108 is nothing? I'm sure, 3 MK 108 can handle any Bomber. Against fighters, the single Mk108 is more than enough (one of the survived RHAF Ace said once: "it was not a fair weapon. The enemy planes falling apart if you hit once).


ps. Who are you? New guy here, or one of the banned friends?

[Sandstone]

Originally Posted by VO101_Tom

Not bad for an average or obsolete aircraft that shot down so many enemies do not you think?

This analysis only shows that you hate as much of the 109, as some people here.

It was by no means a bad aircraft, but it was far from perfect and by the war's end the Allies were fielding superior aircraft and German aircraft procurement and production was in a poor state as a result of bad decision making. This isn't a controversial opinion.

I actually rather like the Bf-109. It had an interesting history, looked cool and the various versions showed invention and originality in the development of the basic airframe. I would also level many similar criticisms at the Spitfire (narrow track U/C, overly-complex wing construction, poor armament on the early versions etc).

It's an odd thing about some flight simmers that they feel they have to pick sides in WWII and defend the reputation of aircraft from 70 years ago. For myself, I'm just interested in history and in aviation.

PS - nice welcome!

[NZtyphoon]

Originally Posted by VO101_Tom

This analysis only shows that you hate as much of the 109, as some people here.

Well, considering that the one who started this thread shows a real hatred of the Spitfire and loads his posts with expressions like "Spitliarforum", "It remained a constant theme of envy in their later reports as well." - as if objective flight reports written 70 years ago reflect his personal prejudices - and generally acts as though it was lucky the Spitfire actually flew at all, it's a little rich to be objecting to those who defend the aircraft as "109 haters".

As it happens I don't agree with some of Sandstone's comments; for example, the 109 was better designed for mass production than the Spitfire - witness the problems involved in getting the Spitfire into production at all. The 109 had a much better modular construction, its engine was far easier to remove and access for servicing etc etc...

Fact is that both were fine fighters, given that both were designed and built only 30 odd years after the Wright flyer; each had their weaknesses, but there are a lot of grateful pilots who owe their lives to both the 109 and Spitfire and both deserve to be right up there with the best aircraft of their generation.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Sandstone

I can't really agree with this. The Bf-109 was a typical late 1930s design in whch significant compromises were made that ultimately affected its performance as a weapon for the Luftwaffe. Its principle weaknesses were:

1. Small size required a narrow track undercarriage. Fine for a peace-time airforce when pilots can be trained at leisure. Not a good idea when pilot training is reduced under war-time conditions.

Hi Sandstone,

I have disagree on this. The narrow undercarriage was not a result of the small airframe size, but a result of two factors: 1, Messerschmitt credo was to keep the airframe the lightest possible, and wings light, so the main load bearing element would be the fuselage, not the wing. Thus the wing had to take less stress and could be lightened. 2, It was seen beneficial from production and maintaince so that the wings could be quickly replaced without removing etc. the undercarriage.

The narrow undercarriage itself did not contribute much to the ground looping tendencies of the plane, these were related to other design features, not related to airframe size: the geometry (toe-in) of the undercarriage and the relative rearward CoG of the airframe.

2. Poor visibility. The aircraft structure was not capable of being adapted to the excellent bubble canopies used on later Allied types.

True, a bubble canopy would have offered better vision, but I doubt it would have been impossible to do. The British seem to have little problem of fitting one to the Spitfire (or the US with the P-47/-51), which had a similiar razorback fuselage/canopy arrangement as the 109. It would have required a change in fuselage shape (production delays) and likely the same stability problems as encountered on the Spit / 51. The vision was only restricted to rear, after the introduction of the pilot's steel headpiece, but since this was fixed in late 1942 by the introduction of the transparent Galland headpiece, the vision to the rear was again acceptable.

3. Limited range, restricting it to use an interceptor with limited success as an escort fighter. This would not have been a problem if the Luftwaffe had a good, long-range single-engined escort fighter, but they were unable to produce one.

I guess the definition of 'limited range' is depends on the operational requirements.

While the 109E had indeed limited range (660 km), adding droptanks extended this range to ca 1300 km, and the engine and airframe improvements of the 109F-K increased this to 1600km. The K's rear tank could be used as an extra fuel tank, increasing internal capacity by 25%, so I guess the K could get as far as 1800-2000 km. While not as good as the Mustang, I would say this was more than sufficient for German operational needs. If it would be really needed, I would guess the internal capacity could have been increased further.

4. Limited size prevented the wings carrying large/heavy internal weapons. All other fighter aircraft moved towards batteries of wing mounted guns (and particularly cannons). The Bf-109 couldn't do this. Latter versions of the aircraft were effectively reliant on a single cannon at a time when other interceptors were moving towards quad-mounts of 20 mm or 30 mm cannons.

Nope, the 109 was quite capable of carrying heavy armament (3x20 + 2x13mm) with gondola attachments. Contrary to popular belief, these were not any more degrading to perfomance than internal installations, as the details of Spitfire/ Fw 190 installations I have examined show. Drag and weight costs were identical.

The airframe was also quite capable of carrying them inside the wings, see 109K-6 - K-14, which could carry an MK 108 (or MG 151) in each wing, or post-war Spanish versions of the 109G, which carried a Hispano in each wing. However the Germans typically favoured fuselage armament for the advantages in concentrated firepower it offered. With the 109 (or any other aircraft with H-P slats) the usable space within the wing for armament installation was also rather limited, since the slats covered much of the wing, while the wheel bay took up the roots. Any gun installation was only possible between the one or two section confined between these two.

Quad 20mm is of course probably the most ideal armament for a WW2 fighter, but you really have to ask yourself wheter these planes (Fw 190, Typhoon/Tempest) could offer the same climb or turn performance as the 109. The answer is no.. and with extra armament, the 109 was definietely not worse than any of these.

Also, you describe as if there was a movement towards wing mounted guns, as if things were evolving that way. There was no such thing, whenever possible, everyone went to fuselage mounted guns, because of the obvious advantages: more space for ammo, better concentration and effectiveness of fire. The only designs that went for wing guns were those which's engine installations did not permit enough guns to be mounted in the fuselage - Merlins, Allisons could not take engine cannons, which is why the Spitfire always had wing mounted guns only, as the supercharger was mounted behind the engine and was in the way, the Sabre was quite simply too big, and radials rule out the thing completely, apart from some smaller cowl guns.

5. Not designed for mass production (here, the analogy with the T-34 is particularly wide of the mark). The Bf-109 was designed to be produced by a skilled workforce. However, as the war progressed the German aviation industry lost men from the workforce who were withdrawn to bolster the front lines. They were replaced with significant volumes of slave labour where the intention was as much to kill the workforce through overwork and poor treatment as to produce aircraft. The skilled workers were thus replaced with "Jewish housewives and teenage girls picked up from places like Auschwitz". As a result, productivity was poor, those directing production became hopelessly morally compromised and aircraft were delivered to a poor standard by a reluctant, unskilled workforce who on occasion would sabotage their own products.

I have to strongly disagree on this one. The 109 was indeed designed for mass production, by the merit of smart design, enabled by smartly designed generous tolerances.

I direct you to the French report on the 109E they have captured, it strongly contradicts any thesis of the need for a skilled workforce.

Also, this analogue with the He 162:

I posted here because I saw someone claim that the Bf-109 was the aircraft equivalent of the T-34 tank. But as far as I can see, this is the exact opposite of the truth. Interestingly, the Germans did try to develop a cheap fighter aircraft that could be mass produced by unskilled labour using non-strategic materials and so might be a better analogue of the T-34. This was the Heinkel-162 jet fighter. It was cheap, used a wooden airframe, could be built by unskilled and slave labour and was supposed to be easy to fly and operate. The unit cost was ~ 75,000 RM, compared to ~ 144,000 RM for a Ta-152 or ~ 150,000 RM for an Me-262. Of course, it was a disaster because the industry was attempting something far beyond its abilities.

Compared to the 'cheap' He 162 unit cost of ~ 75.000,- RM, you might find it interesting that the unit cost of the 109E-3, produced by Erla was 59.000,- RM in 1940, but kept decreasing during the war, as the 109F brought further simplifications to production. F-4s produced by Erla were produced at a unit cost of 50.400,- RM, while 109G were reduced to about 43-45 000 RM. G-10, G-14, K-4 were produced at 43.700 RM at the war's end.

Also of interesting are the ridiculusly low man hours required for production compared to any other type. The 109E was produced at 5400 man hours in 1940 (compare to 10 000 hours for the Hurricane and 15 000 hours for the Spitfire...),but by the war's end a 109G/K was produced in just 1600 hours while a Fw 190 required about 3100 hours. On avarage it seems that a 109 could be produced at about 2/3 the man hours required through the war. IIRC the Mustang, even with the peacetime conditions and mass production techniques in the

The very simple reason why the 109 was not replaced is that nobody could come up with a fighter with the same qualities, while also being as cheap as the 109. The Germans for example considered some of the Italian types, but those required about 3 times the labour to produce one. And a choice between one similiar or slightly superior design or three 109s is a very simple one to make.

Overall, the Bf-109 was a good design for a peace-time late 1930s airforce. It was poorly suited to the war of national survival that the fascists actually initiated. It was unsuitable for low-hours pilots, it was overly complicated compared to other designs and in the face of actual German production capabilities, it had limited potential for development (because no realistic development could overcome some of the poor design decisions made early in its design cycle) and because the German aircraft industry in any event was unable to move to effective mass production and so was greatly out-produced by its opponents.

The 109 had some design limitations I agree, but for the task it was conceived these were not restricting and was aduquate until the arrival of the jets. Its own domestic rival, the Fw 190 while heavier, was also of very small size. It traded some qualities of the 109 (high altitude performance, horizontal manouverability and climb performance) for extra load carrying capability and ruggedness. The two designs complemented each other but neither could - or did - replace the other.

As for mass production - the 109 was the most produced fighter in history.. so what are you talking about..? I think you'd also find that the WNF plant erected during the war strongly implemented mass production techniques (conveyor line production etc.)

By the end of the war, fighter aircraft were becoming larger, able to be flown by relatively inexperienced pilots, had good visibility and often carried batteries of cannon. The Bf-109 had none of these things.

True, but the coin had two sides, larger airframes could not offer the same performance or be as cost effective either. For the very same reason the Spitfire was not replaced by the overall more advanced Tempest, the 109 was not replaced by the 190. It had qualities that could not be found elsewhere.

This isn't to say it was a bad aircraft and it still remained a dangerous opponent until the end of the war, but it was typical of the generation of fighters like the Hurricane, Spitfire and P-40 that the Allied nations replaced or complemented with better types as the war progressed. The Luftwaffe's inability to replace the Bf-109 says more about its disasterous R&D and procurement policies than it does about the strengths of the Bf-109.

I would not mention the P-40 or Hurricane in the same generation. The Hurricane was an obsolate transitional airframe, and the P-40 was clearly a dead-end. Simply too large which curtailed its performance, without offering anything worthwhile in exchange. And unlike those designs, the 109 had room to grow, exactly because the basic recipe of a light, cheap and clean airframe with benign flying characteristics tolerant for pilot errors, was made right in the beginning. This ensured that with any given powerplant, maximum performance was obtained.

The Spitfire had similar performance through the war - and similar limitations - but as far as production techniques go, it was half a generation behind the 109. I do not think the 109 could be replaced by any other type. Certainly not one as dirt cheap as it was, and I doubt that overall superior qualities could be achieved. If you think so, I'd like to hear what type you believe had these qualities.