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#1
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Quote:
In my opinion, we should deal with Nazis Generals words with the same suspicion we apply to Soviet top brass. After the war, surviving German commanders explained their defeats as a consequence of Hitler’s mistakes, of Goring incompetence, of Russian numerical superiority, of American industrial might and so on. It’s human and understandable, but sometimes misleading. |
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#2
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You're making it too easy for yourself, Furio. The collected war diary of OKW is out there, I have it, and it makes very clear that Sea Lion was nothing but a bluff, a threat to force Britain into caving in. The Wehrmacht as a whole didn't have the means of staging an invasion of the british isles at any time. It doesn't matter how well or how badly the Luftwaffe operated (it did not operate well in the BoB - it never bothered to coordinate its own efforts at all, it never called for a conference of all senior officers to lay down rules and prioritize targets) because the other parts of the Wehrmacht couldn't do what such an operation would have required of them. It was all a big bluster, because Hitler never wanted to see his forces "wasted" in an operation against the UK. He already spoke about a campaign against the USSR as early as June 1940 - before the BoB even had begun! This alone should be an indicator where Hitler's true interests were (and where they weren't).
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#3
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Are you saying that Battle of Britain was fought for nothing, and that a Luftwaffe victory wouldn’t have changed anything on the war outcome?
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#4
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I don't want to speculate what a defeat would have caused for the RAF, but I am absolutely convinced that Hitler would never have ordered Sea Lion to be started, because the Kriegsmarine had repeatedly and resolutely protested against any ideas of the Heer for a landing operation. The ships available would - perhaps, the KM leadership was sceptical even of that (!) - have been enough for landing a small unit (something around a division or so) in the Pas de Calais area, but the KM was absolutely convinced it wouldn't be able to supply even such small a force over an extended timeframe, let alone transport the tanks and heavy weapons across the channel. The Heer instead planned for a Channel crossing 250 kilometers wide, with two full Army Groups!
There are several indicators for the bluff character of the whole affair - namely the total lack of coordination between the Wehrmacht's branches and within the branches themselves, the total lack of communication between Hitler and the commanding officers of Heer, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine plus the steady (and sometimes quite fierce) arguments between OKW, OKH and OKM about the operation as a whole. If you add that Hitler revealed his true focus (the USSR) even before the Luftwaffe had begun to bomb Britain in earnest the impression of being nothing but bluff and bluster increases even more. |
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#5
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With skies cleared of RAF fighters, all UK cities would have been at the mercy of German bombers, even in daylight. I don’t dare to say that Churchill would have surrendered, but certainly he would have been forced to negotiate a compromise. And yes, this would have changed the course of the war. My opinion, of course. |
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#6
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There just wouldn´t have been enough planes and pilots to put pressure to England when Barbarossa started!
The raf fighter command would have been revived when the pressure was gone.
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#7
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Respectfully, I disagree.
An eventual Luftwaffe victory couldn’t come after the end of 1940, six months before Barbarossa. At that point, United Kingdom would have been without any reasonable mean to continue fighting: no fighters for the RAF, no tanks and guns for the army, already lost in France. A compromise would have been inevitable. In my opinion. |
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