Mitsubishi Stuka and Thunderbolt

[RPS69]

Originally Posted by Pursuivant

Even so, the U.S. practice of heavily armed bombers flying in close formation didn't work so well unless they had fighter escort. U.S. attempts at unescorted missions deep into Europe were disastrous and forced a temporary halt to U.S. bombing raids while the generals figured out a different strategy.

The British learned this lesson earlier and told the Americans, but the Americans wouldn't listen. Without extremely long-ranged fighters like the P-47, P-51 and P-38 to escort their bombers, the British had to revert to night bombing.

That "classical" aproach to the bombers self protecting capacity is not that fair at all. If germans tried to take down american bombers as any other single flying aircraft, they will probably got serious losses. Even if they look dumb on holywood films, they played smart with their resources, and instead of making extremely daring attacks on bombers, by single engined fighters, they picked them with heavy two engined fighters and with long range devices. Those bombers forced to fall back, were then to be finished by single engined fighters.

So, the doctrine wasn`t that wrong, it just generated new tactics, and new weapons that made this doctrine obsolete. Actually US bombers faired fairly well at he begining. Germans just happened to readjust faster than expected. When escorts started coming with the bomber formations, single engined fighters were not as goood as the bi-motors on the bomber killing task, but will have some chance against escorts, where bi-motors would have none.

[MiloMorai]

Combat sorties flown in the ETO, http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t119.htm

1943
Jun - 2,107 - 1,268 (airborne - effective)
Jul - 2,829 - 1,743
Aug - 2,265 - 1,850
Sep - 3,259 - 2,457
Oct - 2,831 - 2,117
Nov - 4,157 - 2,581
Dec - 5,973 - 4,937

1944
Jan - 6,367 - 5,027
Feb - 9,884 - 7,512

As can be seen there was a dip in Oct '43 but there was a steady increase in the number of sorties flown.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by MiloMorai

Combat sorties flown in the ETO, http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t119.htm

1943
Jun - 2,107 - 1,268 (airborne - effective)
Jul - 2,829 - 1,743
Aug - 2,265 - 1,850
Sep - 3,259 - 2,457
Oct - 2,831 - 2,117
Nov - 4,157 - 2,581
Dec - 5,973 - 4,937

1944
Jan - 6,367 - 5,027
Feb - 9,884 - 7,512

As can be seen there was a dip in Oct '43 but there was a steady increase in the number of sorties flown.

Good info, but most of those sorties between October and January reflect the enormous increase of groups (both Bomb and Fighter) added to the 8th AF that became possible once the U-Boat threat had been beaten in the summer of 1943; a lot of acclimatization to radio and ground control procedures, plus re-familiarization with their aircraft after at least a month of travel (or for some fighter groups, familiarization with entirely new fighter types), and constant drill on the latest formations, tactics and the requirement for precise timing and navigation to coordinate rendezvous with escorts. Most of these groups would do their initial 3-5 missions over relatively 'safe' targets, not too close to German airspace, and well within range of their escorts.

cheers

horseback

[horseback]

A potentially useful source of information and insight into USAAF flexible gunnery training:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/...index.html#TOC

ARMY AIR FORCES HISTORICAL STUDIES No. 31

FLEXIBLE GUNNERY TRAINING IN THE AAF

I've read about the first 25 pages or so, and it should give a pretty good account of training problems and methods for the Army Air Forces' efforts during the war.

cheers

horseback

[horseback]

That "classical" aproach to the bombers self protecting capacity is not that fair at all. If Germans tried to take down American bombers as any other single flying aircraft, they will probably got serious losses. Even if they look dumb on Hollywood films, they played smart with their resources, and instead of making extremely daring attacks on bombers, by single engined fighters, they picked them with heavy two engined fighters and with long range devices. Those bombers forced to fall back, were then to be finished by single engined fighters.

This ignores the fact that the Luftwaffe had already demonstrated that they had heavily armed, long range heavy fighters like the Bf 110 and the Ju-88C, and had demonstrated that they were particularly useful against bombers, long before anyone came up with underwing rocket canisters. In fact, we could consider the American P-38 the ultimate WWII expression of the twin engine, high speed bomber destroyer concept (it was originally built to USAAF requirements for an interceptor rather than for a fighter), and the American bomber generals were certainly well aware of the Lightning’s capabilities, and the basic military principal that if you can do it, chances are very good that the enemy can do it too.

So, the doctrine wasn`t that wrong, it just generated new tactics, and new weapons that made this doctrine obsolete. Actually US bombers faired fairly well at he begining. Germans just happened to readjust faster than expected. When escorts started coming with the bomber formations, single engined fighters were not as good as the bi-motors on the bomber killing task, but will have some chance against escorts, where bi-motors would have none.

I would agree that the high altitude massed formation heavy daylight bomber doctrine would have worked very well against Bf 109E-1s over a Germany without an early warning radar system, but those days were long past by the time the 8th Air Force even arrived in England in 1942.

The US bombers fared well at the beginning because the JGs had never fired at such big targets before, and because they if anything over-respected the defensive fire from the gunners. It didn’t take them long to figure out how to estimate the range or re-set their convergences and recognize that for all the tracers flying past their ears that they were rarely hit before they could do serious damage and veered away. Even so, they recognized that being hit was a serious thing and when they were hit, they returned to base (unlike certain ai routines I could mention). If anything, the early confusion and hesitancy by the German fighters served to sucker the bomber groups into overconfidence and the early fiascoes over Germany before they had adequate numbers according to their own doctrines, much less adequate fighter escorts.

By that time, the Germans had said to themselves, “Hey, we have all these zerstörers and trained aircrew for them; they may not be very useful against enemy fighters, but they will be deadly to viermots. Let’s kick some Yankee air pirate ass.”

The reality was that long after the bomber generals’ doctrine was nullified, the bloody-minded commitment to ever bigger formations continued for reasons of ‘face’; if you look at what happened every time an unescorted US heavy bomber formation was detected and attacked by single engine fighters, the casualty figures were heavily in favor of the fighters, period. Luftwaffe Over Germany authors Caldwell & Muller reported several instances late in 1944 where bomber formations would miss their rendezvous with their escorts and were caught by even ‘light’ fighter formations of Bf 109Gs without gun pods and were decimated while the fighters got away with much fewer losses—and this was with the supposedly less capable ‘new growth’ generation of LW fighter pilots.

In any case, being hit by defensive fire is more a matter of the numbers of guns being fired in your direction than it is any one (or five) gunner's accuracy or skill. The closer you get, the more gunner skill enters into the equation, but individual accuracy did not become a factor unless the range was very short (as in under 150m) and the speed difference and angles were minimal.

cheers

horseback

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by horseback

The closer you get, the more gunner skill enters into the equation, but individual accuracy did not become a factor unless the range was very short (as in under 150m) and the speed difference and angles were minimal.

This squares with my attempts at air gunnery in IL2 - and that's ignoring all the other factors that make real gunnery difficult.

Citing that book you mentioned, I think that these are the "money quotes," at least for U.S. bomber turrets equipped with 0.50 caliber MG.

"In reply to those who felt that firing should begin at a range of 1,200 yards, although the aircraft was not in a position to make an attack, he claimed that tests conducted at the University of New Mexico and reports from theaters of action indicated that the .50-caliber machine gun could not be fired accurately at a distance beyond 600 yards. It was also pointed out that reports and experiments indicated that computing sights then in use on B-17's and B-24's were not accurate under combat conditions. It was believed by some, however, that the General Electric Computing Sight used on the B-29 incorporated "all known principles and should give very accurate results."

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/...-4.html#page66

Also:

"during 1942 gunnery students had to became familiar with six different types of iron ring sights and four varieties of optical sights." The same authority has given the following excellent description of the relative speed system of sighting, which was the first scientific system:

The gunner was taught to use the following sequence of action in sightings: (1) recognize the enemy ship, (2) estimate the range with 600 yards as the critical distance for opening fire, (3) estimate the difference in speed between his ship and the enemy ship by holding the sight stationary for one second, (4) compute the lead according to a definite table which he had memorized, and (5) open fire. Under combat conditions there was usually no target in sight by the time the student had gone through this involved system of computing the lead."

"Another experiment was the use of tracer as an aid to sighting. This had been tried during World War I, but had been abandoned because it gave the gunner the impression he was hitting the target when he was not, and because flight speeds were then slow enough to allow the use of an alternative system of sighting. It was believed, however, that the increased flight speeds during the present war made its use practicable, provided it was used in conjunction with other sighting systems."

"Approximately one year after this time Headquarters AAF indicated to the Commanding General of the Fourth Air Force that not more than 10 per cent of the ammunition used by an aerial gunner would be loaded with tracer and that it should be fired during the final training phase. It was claimed that when gunners resorted to tracer they depended upon it entirely,and to the complete neglect of their gun sights. After students were proficient as a result of training, they might explore the possibilities and proper use of tracer."

"Tests at the Kingman Army Air Field in the fall of 1943 suggested in a practical way the defects in tracer firing. One of these tests involved the use of an AT-23 for towing a target at high speed and a B-17 for air-to-air firing against the target. The tam plane did all of the maneuvering. The experiment produced poor results, for "in every case the individual whose tracer appeared to be piercing the target and who might be considered to have high scores received no hits on the target, and in every ease the individuals whose tracer appeared not to pierce the target were in all cases the individuals who received hits on the target."

"It is claimed that tracer, if its illusion is controlled, has distinct advantages. It makes possible visual checking of harmonization of guns and sights, and indicates whether there is proper lead in deflection shooting. However, the student "must realize that he sees the light, not the bullet; and he must realize that light does not give the same effect of distance as a bullet. For example, a bullet half the size of another bullet is twice as far away. But a light half the size of another equal light, is not twice as far away; in fact, when it is twice as far away, it is only a quarter the size of the other." (Emphasis mine)

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/...AFHS-31-4.html


So, add to all the other woes of realistic gunnery the fact that tracers produce an optical illusion that makes the gunner think that he has proper lead on his target when he does not!

And, mind you, this is 1944. By then, the U.S. had been at war for about 2 years and they'd produced whole classes of gunners whose training was useless. (This squares with 8th Air Force doctrine of immediately retraining gunners who were direct from training schools in the States. I thought that this was just "advanced training," but it might be that the guys in the 8th Air Force actually had a clue that gunnery schools were teaching their students incorrect methods of engaging targets.)

One possible fix for TD is to make Rookie gunners basically useless and Average gunners only slightly useful. Only Veteran or Ace gunners should be anything like a threat.

[Pursuivant]

Good empirical data here (reminiscences by veterans):

http://forum.armyairforces.com/Lared...43-m50398.aspx

Takeaway:

Gunners were mostly trained to deal with fighters attacking via "pursuit curves" (e.g., rear and rear beam attacks), which might account for the greater number of victories claimed by U.S. tailgunners and top gunners.

2% hits vs. a sleeve target towed was considered acceptable air-to-air gunnery standard.

Gunners were trained to shoot no more than 20 round bursts. Guns could be damaged by longer bursts, or "cook-off" could result in unwanted firing which might hit friendly aircraft.

Bullets could be deflected by aircraft slipstream (further reducing accuracy for anything but tail guns fired directly to the rear).

[JtD]

Originally Posted by Pursuivant

One possible fix for TD is to make Rookie gunners basically useless and Average gunners only slightly useful. Only Veteran or Ace gunners should be anything like a threat.

In solo flight, I attacked a formation of two flights of four rookie G4M each from dead 6, 10 times, in an F6F-3. I tried to maintain a position at their 6 at a distance between 500 and 700 m. I shot down 20, and got hit exactly 8 times, 3 times one flight, once in five flights, not at all in four flights. One of the hits was a 20mm hit, the rest came from the light machine guns. I always returned to base no problem.

To sum it up, the gunners were basically useless.
---
Got curious about how gunners will do when faced with proper tactics - so I engaged the same two flights in head on passes and shot down all eight of them without getting hit at all. Will probably not always work like that, but four kills for every hit received in return appears conservative.

I don't know what's "too good" about that abysmal performance.

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by RPS69

If germans tried to take down american bombers as any other single flying aircraft, they will probably got serious losses. Even if they look dumb on holywood films, they played smart with their resources, and instead of making extremely daring attacks on bombers, by single engined fighters, they picked them with heavy two engined fighters and with long range devices. Those bombers forced to fall back, were then to be finished by single engined fighters.

Basically correct. And, the Luftwaffe commanders weren't stupid, just overmatched. (As an aside, it's interesting to read Adolf Galland's memoir from the 1960s, originally written for a German audience, where he claims that he was trying to get all the planes and pilots he could get to defend Germany. Of course, that strategy would have completely deprived the German army of air support, especially on the Russian Front.)

But, the German strategy of heavy fighters was countered by long-ranged U.S. single-engined fighters which could easily defeat twin-engined fighters loaded with aerial mortars, bombs or cannon gondolas.

And, once the Americans were able to get drop-tank equipped P-47 and P-51 over German in sufficient numbers, the end was inevitable. Arguably, the most important invention in the American bomber offensive was the humble waxed-paper 110-gallon drop tank!

It all goes to show that ultimately, WW2 wasn't about individual heroism or vision, it boiled down to bloody attrition and economics. Big economy + large population (e.g., the U.S. and the British Commonwealth) meant that you came through the war in pretty good shape (overall - the UK itself got hurt quite badly). Big population but smaller economy (e.g., China or Russia) means that your country survived, but a shocking number of your people didn't. Middling population and/or economy (e.g., Italy, France, Germany, Japan, Poland) meant that your country was defeated.

[RPS69]

Originally Posted by Pursuivant

Basically correct. And, the Luftwaffe commanders weren't stupid, just overmatched.

(As an aside, it's interesting to read Adolf Galland's memoir from the 1960s, originally written for a German audience, where he claims that he was trying to get all the planes and pilots he could get to defend Germany. Of course, that strategy would have completely deprived the German army of air support, especially on the Russian Front.)

Just for your knowledge, that was what actually they were FORCED to do...

It all goes to show that ultimately, WW2 wasn't about individual heroism or vision, it boiled down to bloody attrition and economics. Big economy + large population (e.g., the U.S. and the British Commonwealth) meant that you came through the war in pretty good shape (overall - the UK itself got hurt quite badly). Big population but smaller economy (e.g., China or Russia) means that your country survived, but a shocking number of your people didn't. Middling population and/or economy (e.g., Italy, France, Germany, Japan, Poland) meant that your country was defeated.

Your perception of economics is funny, I may agree with part of it, but on the outcome, surelly not.