Mitsubishi Stuka and Thunderbolt

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by horseback

In the cash poor Depression era US Army Air Corps, big bombers offered a lot of bang for the taxpayers' buck (and they looked quite impressive).

Speaking of big and impressive Depression Era bombers, in a magic world where we could have everything we wanted from a combat flight sim, I'd love to see the XB-19 modeled.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_XB-19

Underpowered and slow, but decent payload, excellent range for the era and, of course, lots of guns.

Originally Posted by horseback

A lot of the men who were generals in 1942 made their marks in the early-mid 1930s as advocates of this strategy before the development of radar made locating the bomber formations a lot less chancy, and fighter aircraft became not only as fast and high flying as the big bombers, but much more so.

Of course, this is a very American (and USAAF) point of view. The USN, Luftwaffe, VVS, RAF, Reggia Aeronautica, IJN and IJAAF all made different decisions regarding "the next war" in the 1930s.

In all cases, however, their decisions for medium or heavy bombers included adding a number of dedicated gunners, often in positions where the gun had a very limited fields of view and arcs of fire. And, one of the things that IL2 has taught me is just how freaking useless a flexible gun with limited arc of fire and field of view is.

But, as you point out, the thing that really blindsided the military strategists of the 1930s (when the major combatants were designing the air forces that would be used during WW2) was the invention of radar. The argument that "the bomber will always get through" falls short if you have a device that can detect the bombers as they take off and form up!

It even messes up decisions about where to place guns. Most bomber designs assumed that fighters would fall into a stern chase and would be attacking from below as they rose to intercept. So, lots of guns were placed to guard the plane's belly and rear.

But, with radar, fighters could position themselves ahead and above the bomber formation, so at least some of the U.S. heavy bombers had to be hastily redesigned with heavier guns to the front of the plane.

[RPS69]

Germans admited that gunners were there to improve the moral of the crew, not for achieving any brilliant results. They were there to bring the idea that they were not just flying pigeons.

The difference with B17's were the closed box formation. For the fighter groups, it was like attacking a ground position with heavy AA fire, without armored aircraft. The way they found to combat this situation, was to break the box formation to pick less riscky targets. The under wing mortars, were used to this purpose, (badly represented in game, because bomber crews got excelent morals allways!) they were fired in the general direction of the bomber formations to generate confusion and panic, but getting a direct hit was just a special bonus, and not an expected result.

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by RPS69

Germans admited that gunners were there to improve the moral of the crew, not for achieving any brilliant results. They were there to bring the idea that they were not just flying pigeons.

I think that was the case for a lot of gunners who also had other jobs, like the flight engineer, navigator and bombardier on the U.S. heavy bombers. Being able to shoot back rather than just sit there and take it was probably a morale boost.

Additionally, all those gunners served as extra eyes, not just to look out for fighters or flak, but also for station-keeping in formation.

Originally Posted by RPS69

The difference with B17's were the closed box formation.

Actually, all the U.S. heavy bombers.

Originally Posted by RPS69

For the fighter groups, it was like attacking a ground position with heavy AA fire, without armored aircraft.

Even so, the U.S. practice of heavily armed bombers flying in close formation didn't work so well unless they had fighter escort. U.S. attempts at unescorted missions deep into Europe were disastrous and forced a temporary halt to U.S. bombing raids while the generals figured out a different strategy.

The British learned this lesson earlier and told the Americans, but the Americans wouldn't listen. Without extremely long-ranged fighters like the P-47, P-51 and P-38 to escort their bombers, the British had to revert to night bombing.

Originally Posted by RPS69

The way they found to combat this situation, was to break the box formation to pick less risky targets.

Yep. Of course, German squadron tactics in the game don't follow Luftwaffe doctrine at all. There's no attempt whatsoever to "break the box" and then detail a flight or section to deal with the cripples.

Likewise, U.S. heavies don't try to maintain formation (like several cripples banding together to form a slower formation), nor do U.S. fighters attempt to protect cripples as opposed to the rest of the formation.

[MiloMorai]

The American bombing never stopped, they just didn't bomb anything that was outside escort range.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by MiloMorai

The American bombing never stopped, they just didn't bomb anything that was outside escort range.

Technically correct; there were, however, 'pauses' during the periods in summer of 1943 and later, when losses made big formation missions difficult for a few weeks. The winter of '43-'44 was also pretty bad, weather-wise, which also created week-long gaps in large-scale operations. Bombing over France had a limited effect on the German war effort; in fact it could be argued that the Germans did a poor job of integrating the industries and economies of their conquered territories and folding them into their own.

The tempo of operations slowed markedly after Second Schweinfurt in early October '43, due to weather, bringing new fighter and bomber units up to speed and the changes in command at 8th AF, and didn't pick back up until Big Week, which began in mid February of 1944.

Another note on an earlier post; the B-24 was a lot harder to keep in close formation than the B-17, and Liberator groups suffered accordingly. Its superior range, speed and payload made it a valuable patrol bomber and more useful in the Pacific, but it was not well thought of in the ETO, and there were fewer B-24s in the 8th AF's order of battle as a result. Fortresses required a lot less attention and physical effort to keep close formation at all altitudes than most heavy bombers of the era, which allowed a greater degree of mutual support (meaning that more gunners could fire their guns in the general direction of an attacker).

cheers

horseback

[Woke Up Dead]

When the PZL P-11c was introduced to the original IL-2 game, it came with a write-up that had some interesting info about how the plane's wing mounted guns were designed to fire beyond the range of bombers' guns. You can read the whole document here: http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...ient=firefox-a

Here is the most relevant part, highlights are mine:

The gun pairs have separate triggers since they can never be fired usefully at the same time. The wing guns may be fired by pressing the second trigger. There is no "all guns together" mode.

No one publishes documents concerning their war fighting doctrine at the time and classified documents tend to be destroyed when countries are overrun. With hindsight it is not too hard to work out the doctrine though. During WW1 it had become clear that the effective range of single hand manipulated rear guns was very low. Certainly less than 100 meters. The Poles were clearly trying to evolve stand off tactics for use by their fighters against the large formations of Soviet bombers which they were built to destroy. In the thirties most of these had mobile defensive mounts which were hardly superior to those of WW1. The best probably had an effective range of no more than 200 meters. The elevated wing guns in the P-11c could be used for stand off attacks from the rear arc from a range of perhaps 300 meters. Ideally engaging from very slightly below and at the same speed.

The P-11c wing guns had no convergence but at 300 meters their cones of dispersion were large and had merged anyway. The idea was to create a shotgun effect. The sight is ignored when firing the wing guns. Tracer is used to spray the intended straight and level formation target from safe stand off range. Any Soviet fighters which could not be avoided by using the superior speed of the gull winged monoplanes would be engaged at close quarters with nose guns only.

If this does not sound like a winning strategy imagine what the real pilots thought. They wanted four gun fighters with all guns harmonized. They never got them. The wing mounts although outboard of the shoulder were an integral part of the shoulder construction of the unusual gull wing design and apparently could not be altered. Only about sixty of the 175 P-11cs delivered to the Polish Air Force ever had the wing guns fitted. The rest just had the nose guns. Stories that this was because there was a shortage of guns lasting for years were just a cover up for a halfhearted implementation of the doctrine.

A decade later the Luftwaffe barely made stand off attacks work with much greater firepower and high quality reflector sights. The doctrine was correct of course, and two decade after the P-11c entered service guided missiles finally made stand off fighter attacks against bombers a practical reality. The P-11c pioneered the concept though and so this release models the four gun fighters with all their strengths and weaknesses. Just remember to obtain a firing solution for the nose guns using the sight and a firing solution for the wing guns using tracer only. Never fire both at the same time.

The Poles were smart enough to expect the Soviets to use the same tactics. Even in 1936 all the mobile mounts in the P-23B Karas were semi rigid with hydraulic power assistance to train the mounts. This significantly increased their effective range compared to most other mobile manually trained mounts of the day.

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by horseback

Bombing over France had a limited effect on the German war effort; in fact it could be argued that the Germans did a poor job of integrating the industries and economies of their conquered territories and folding them into their own.

That might have been more due to bad targeting decisions by the USAAF. Especially during early 1943, the U.S. was under a lot of pressure by the Brits to do something about the u-boats which were a mortal threat to Great Britain's existence. So, the U.S. wasted a lot of effort on bomb-proof u-boat pens at Brest and Lorient. Later, they took a lot of casualties for not a whole lot of effect bombing u-boat production centers at Kiel. It wasn't until the middle of 1944, when the USAAF figured out that POL assets were the perfect target, that the U.S. bombing offensive had any real strategic impact other than just destroying a lot of buildings.

As to the ability of the Nazis to integrate conquered economies into their own, blame it on very short time frame (just a couple of years), deliberate sabotage and heel-dragging by the conquered peoples, and, of course, the savage Nazi ideology which justified slave labor and genocide. The latter element was a particularly big factor in Poland and the Ukraine.

Originally Posted by horseback

The tempo of operations slowed markedly after Second Schweinfurt in early October '43, due to weather, bringing new fighter and bomber units up to speed and the changes in command at 8th AF, and didn't pick back up until Big Week, which began in mid February of 1944.

This was the period I was thinking of in my previous post.

Originally Posted by horseback

Another note on an earlier post; the B-24 was a lot harder to keep in close formation than the B-17, and Liberator groups suffered accordingly.

Additionally, it's ceiling wasn't as good and the B-24 didn't have quite the same reputation for ruggedness that the B-17 did. Luftwaffe pilots knew these things and choose their targets accordingly. B-17 crews sardonically remarked that the best escort they could have was a squadron of B-24s as low squadron. (Low and rear squadrons in group formations suffered disproportionately in any case.)

[RPS69]

Originally Posted by Pursuivant

Even so, the U.S. practice of heavily armed bombers flying in close formation didn't work so well unless they had fighter escort. U.S. attempts at unescorted missions deep into Europe were disastrous and forced a temporary halt to U.S. bombing raids while the generals figured out a different strategy.

The British learned this lesson earlier and told the Americans, but the Americans wouldn't listen. Without extremely long-ranged fighters like the P-47, P-51 and P-38 to escort their bombers, the British had to revert to night bombing.

That "classical" aproach to the bombers self protecting capacity is not that fair at all. If germans tried to take down american bombers as any other single flying aircraft, they will probably got serious losses. Even if they look dumb on holywood films, they played smart with their resources, and instead of making extremely daring attacks on bombers, by single engined fighters, they picked them with heavy two engined fighters and with long range devices. Those bombers forced to fall back, were then to be finished by single engined fighters.

So, the doctrine wasn`t that wrong, it just generated new tactics, and new weapons that made this doctrine obsolete. Actually US bombers faired fairly well at he begining. Germans just happened to readjust faster than expected. When escorts started coming with the bomber formations, single engined fighters were not as goood as the bi-motors on the bomber killing task, but will have some chance against escorts, where bi-motors would have none.

[MiloMorai]

Combat sorties flown in the ETO, http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t119.htm

1943
Jun - 2,107 - 1,268 (airborne - effective)
Jul - 2,829 - 1,743
Aug - 2,265 - 1,850
Sep - 3,259 - 2,457
Oct - 2,831 - 2,117
Nov - 4,157 - 2,581
Dec - 5,973 - 4,937

1944
Jan - 6,367 - 5,027
Feb - 9,884 - 7,512

As can be seen there was a dip in Oct '43 but there was a steady increase in the number of sorties flown.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by MiloMorai

Combat sorties flown in the ETO, http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t119.htm

1943
Jun - 2,107 - 1,268 (airborne - effective)
Jul - 2,829 - 1,743
Aug - 2,265 - 1,850
Sep - 3,259 - 2,457
Oct - 2,831 - 2,117
Nov - 4,157 - 2,581
Dec - 5,973 - 4,937

1944
Jan - 6,367 - 5,027
Feb - 9,884 - 7,512

As can be seen there was a dip in Oct '43 but there was a steady increase in the number of sorties flown.

Good info, but most of those sorties between October and January reflect the enormous increase of groups (both Bomb and Fighter) added to the 8th AF that became possible once the U-Boat threat had been beaten in the summer of 1943; a lot of acclimatization to radio and ground control procedures, plus re-familiarization with their aircraft after at least a month of travel (or for some fighter groups, familiarization with entirely new fighter types), and constant drill on the latest formations, tactics and the requirement for precise timing and navigation to coordinate rendezvous with escorts. Most of these groups would do their initial 3-5 missions over relatively 'safe' targets, not too close to German airspace, and well within range of their escorts.

cheers

horseback