Just curious about the P-51 FM

[JtD]

Just pointing out silly double standards. I'm pretty sure horseback thinks that 400% turnover in US units are brutal, yet when a Luftwaffe unit suffers the same losses, without even achieving any of its objectives, it is "winning the war easily".

When Hitler got hold of the spear of destiny, he thought he'd be invincible. But this turns Stalingrad into a victory just as much as wrong assessments by a few Luftwaffe members turn 1943 into a year of victory for the Luftwaffe.

Eventually, I don't even think it's silly, it's clearly beyond silly. Probably intentionally posting nonsense in order to provoke arguments. And I am idiot enough to fall for it...

---

For those interested in history and maybe not yet knowing everything - I recommend to browse the USAAF statistical digest. In particular, related to how the Luftwaffe did not easily win the air war in the West in 1943, number of (heavy bomber) sorties by month or tonnage of bombs dropped (by heavy bombers) by month. It is glaringly obvious that by the end of 1943, the USAF flew more sorties and dropped more bombs than any time before. And where the entire(!) German fighter force remained near constant at around 1500 total for most of 1943, the 8th AF alone grew from a force fielding a few hundred aircraft to a force approaching 2000 aircraft.

[jameson]

From here: http://acepilots.com/planes/b17.html

As the heavy bomber demands of the North African campaign eased in the winter of 1942-43, the air war in Northwest Europe accelerated. On January 27, 1943, for the first time, American bombers hit inside of Germany itself, the submarine facilities at Wilhelmshaven.

A turning point was reached on April 17, when 115 Flying Fortresses bombed the Focke-Wulfe factory in Bremen. As if defending its nest, the Luftwaffe struck hard, knocking down sixteen B-17's (a 15 percent loss rate - on a single mission!). Soon, ten-to-fifteen percent losses became the norm, as the Luftwaffe improved their tactics, in particular by attacking the B-17's head on. Thus the famous phrase "Bandits at twelve o'clock high!"

But the Eighth continued grimly on, throughout 1943, next targeting ball-bearing production, considered a vital weak point in aviation manufacturing. On the 17th of August, a large force of 376 bombers raided Schweinfurt and Regensburg. Sixty bombers, with six hundred aircrew, didn't come back. 16 percent losses. At that rate, the Eighth Air Force could not continue. When B-17G's began to arrive in August and September, the forward machine guns in their chin turrets helped a little. The appalling wastage continued:

September 6 - Over 400 bombers attacked the Stuttgart ball-bearing plant; 45 were lost.
October 14 - Schweinfurt again. 291 B-17's went out; 60 went down.
January 11, 1944 - German aircraft industry targets. 600 Flying Fortresses were sent out. Because of bad weather, only 238 reached Germany; 60 were shot down.

[jameson]

By way of comparison, see here: http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm regarding luftwaffe losses. In these discussions only aircraft losses are discussed, of more relevence from the German viewpoint would be pilot losses, or at least of experienced and well trained ones, and the inability of the Luftwaffe to replace them.

[MaxGunz]

All sides knew about when and where they lost their aces, the ones that really counted. How about use experts as a gauge of overall effectiveness? The data on aces should be solid, shouldn't it?

[horseback]

Originally Posted by JtD

Just pointing out silly double standards. I'm pretty sure horseback thinks that 400% turnover in US units are brutal, yet when a Luftwaffe unit suffers the same losses, without even achieving any of its objectives, it is "winning the war easily".

When Hitler got hold of the spear of destiny, he thought he'd be invincible. But this turns Stalingrad into a victory just as much as wrong assessments by a few Luftwaffe members turn 1943 into a year of victory for the Luftwaffe.

Eventually, I don't even think it's silly, it's clearly beyond silly. Probably intentionally posting nonsense in order to provoke arguments. And I am idiot enough to fall for it...

---

For those interested in history and maybe not yet knowing everything - I recommend to browse the USAAF statistical digest. In particular, related to how the Luftwaffe did not easily win the air war in the West in 1943, number of (heavy bomber) sorties by month or tonnage of bombs dropped (by heavy bombers) by month. It is glaringly obvious that by the end of 1943, the USAF flew more sorties and dropped more bombs than any time before. And where the entire(!) German fighter force remained near constant at around 1500 total for most of 1943, the 8th AF alone grew from a force fielding a few hundred aircraft to a force approaching 2000 aircraft.

You appear to miss the point that your original post on the subject made a big deal out of Luftwaffe JG loss rates: 400% casualties over a 39 month period, implying that their 'suffering' was unique, unusual and/or unfair. Military aviation has always been a very hazardous job, even in peacetime; people entering that profession (especially in the 1930s) went in with their eyes open and knew quite well that they would lose friends or even die themselves--it is the nature of the job. The tradeoff was that pilots and aircrew were expected to be in combat for relatively short times once or twice a day, and lived in relative comfort (to foot soldiers) the rest of the time.

My responses were intended to illustrate that those losses were neither unique or disabling; for example, the 4th FG took over 200 casualties in its first two years of operations (Sept '42 -Sept '44), which is very close to 400% (and the wastage of aircraft was significantly higher). They remained quite effective throughout hostilities. That the bomb groups were able to increase their 'tonnage' (with embarrassingly poor accuracy) throughout the course of 1943 only illustrates the willingness of the Army Air Force command structure to throw more young men into the fire for minimal return, coupled with the steady increase in sheer output of the training commands and the industrial effort back in the States, not that the campaign was gaining any traction that they could detect.

In terms of military usefulness and probability of success for the 8th AF's 1943 bombing campaign, I'm inclined to think of the 'Charge of the Light Brigade' in Crimea or Pickett's charge at Gettysburg in the mid-19th century. In retrospect, it was mostly an empty gesture, and a very costly one. It turns out that the 'bomber barons' who dominated the USAAF's strategic thinking in the 1930s were horribly wrong about many key concepts, and that fighter-centric theoreticians like Claire Chennault were horribly right.

But no one on either side knew half of the things we know today; certainly not enough to pick out the relevant facts and trends that would lead to victory. It is not fair to judge their actions or beliefs on the basis of 20/20 hindsight, and it hinders our own understanding of what was going on or why.

cheers

horseback

[JtD]

Originally Posted by horseback

You appear to miss the point that your original post on the subject made a big deal out of Luftwaffe JG loss rates: 400% casualties over a 39 month period, implying that their 'suffering' was unique, unusual and/or unfair...

Right, point me to it. I was merely putting your "winning easily" into the proper perspective - i.e. it being nonsense - and have stated nothing else ever since.

Since 1939, until the end of 1943, the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe had suffered about 800% losses, meaning every unit was completely wiped out and replaced 8 times. About 3 times in 1943 alone. Pilot losses were nearly half of that.

[KG26_Alpha]

Ok can you all use PM for your attrition rate discussion and let the thread get back on topic thanks.

[KG26_Alpha]

Off topic threads deleted .......................

Start a new thread please, all related posts will be moved to it to clean this one up.