Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[bongodriver]

It is a fact that in July 1940, all of FC was not using 100 Octane.

non-operational and training units prob used 87 octane while the 100 was diverted to the operational units, simple solution and nobody is wrong.

[Crumpp]

100LL for example has a specification by convention. It also has a defence specification for NATO as it is in the supply inventory.

•ASTM D910 in the US
•DEFENCE STANDARD 91/90 in the rest of the world.

http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarti...ontentId=57723

All approved aviation fuels must recieve a full specification from the aviation authority in place by convention. 100 Octane is no different and the provisional specification has already been posted in this thread.


That being said.......

This is yet more meaningless technobabble

If you have not picked up on it, I pretty much ignore you NzTyphoon.

If you learn how things work in aviaton, you will be far more successful in interpreting original documentation.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

The first plant to be able to produce 100 Octane fuel cheaply and quantity did not come into operation until right before the war started. There was a shortage of 100/130 grade through most of the war that is discussed in Allied Oil Committee meetings. Specifically it is mentioned in a 1944 meeting on adopting a higher octane grade as a limitation to the production of the more powerful fuel. The refineries cannot meet the current requirements and have never been able to meet them with the exception of a few short months in 1943. Therefore they do not want to devote any refinery capability to production other than the amount required for testing purposes.

There was no shortage of 100 Octane in the UK until May 1944. Find any quote to support your theory that there was a shortage of 100 Octane in the UK during the BOB.

That shortage of 100 Octane is why domestically, the United States used 91 Grade CONUS and the RAF used 87 grade for non-operational purposes for most of the war. 100 grade was in short supply and reserved for operations.

US engines were not designed for 100 octane in 1940 also the main reason for the RAF using 87 octane for non operational purposes was cost. That is a recurrent theme in a number of the papers. Bomber Command wanted all thier stations to have 100 octane 100% but they were turned down on cost. You did reead the papers didn't you?

Glider, the document you post from December 1938 very clearly states that all stations will recieve an adequet supply of 100 Octane before the first aircraft is converted. If stations were not getting fuel then that is proof the operational adoption did not occur until all stations had it. Think about it, it just makes sense. You cannot easily switch fuels back and forth. If you add a lower knock limited performance fuel to the tanks, you must use lower operating limits or you will experience detonation which can end a flight very quickly.

This is the kind of thing that undermines the credibility of the posters in this thread.

All one needs to do is look the immaturity exhibited in this thread. Do you really think the evidence has been sifted through with a mature outlook and placed in context? I certainly don't think so at all. More effort has been devoted to finding cartoons and taking opinion polls than looking objectively at the evidence.

Actually on the whole I do think the case for the use has been presented well, with a wealth of original documentation. Just look at what you have just posted. No evidence just a lot of assumptions. Everything I have posted is supported by documents, if you belive that certain = 16 squadrons then support it, its as simple as that.
I agree with that 1938 paper but why do you ignore the dec 1939 paper that said that fuel reserves were sufficient and that the roll out could commence? I believe that its this blatent dismissal of original documents that undermines any debate.

If you are going to use logistical documents, then you better have a good understanding of the logistical system and how the accounting process works. One should understand things like "Estabilishment vs Strength", how a fuel becomes specified, how does the testing process work, and what are the constraints.

I have a very good understanding as to logistics, I also know the meaning of current or actual establishment and authorised establishment they differ.

Show me any document that says 1940 is for testing, another example of a theory and nothing to support it.

[Seadog]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Glider, the document you post from December 1938 very clearly states that all stations will recieve an adequet supply of 100 Octane before the first aircraft is converted. If stations were not getting fuel then that is proof the operational adoption did not occur until all stations had it. Think about it, it just makes sense. You cannot easily switch fuels back and forth. If you add a lower knock limited performance fuel to the tanks, you must use lower operating limits or you will experience detonation which can end a flight very quickly.

Ok, so you're saying that for even one aircraft to have 100 octane, then all airfields must have 100 octane...

YOU HAVE JUST PROVEN OUR CASE!!!

WE KNOW THAT RAF FC HAD FAR MORE THAN ONE HURRICANE/SPITFIRE USING 100 OCTANE AT THE START OF THE BoFB.

THEREFORE ALL AIRCRAFT MUST HAVE BEEN CONVERTED!

[Glider]

Personally I am still waiting for a common sense reply to my previous quite simple and obvious questions. Crumpp responce (as they were not replies) can be summed up as follows :-

a) a shortage of fuel
If there was no shortage then there would be no need to reduce the roll out
There was apparantly a shortage in 1944 and was mentioned by the Allied Oil Committee meetigs Unfortunately we are talking about 1940 not 1944 and the Allied Oil Committee had nothing to do with the BOB. So I am still waiting for any sign of a shortage in the BOB

b) of 16 squadrons
Which squadrons or if you go down the it was 16 squadrons at any one time
All I got was a ticking off for lowering the credibility of the thread and a comment about a pre war paper. Crumpp puts himself forward as an expert on Logistics and would presumably agree that if you have a target to supply 16 FC squadrons, you need to decide where to send the fuel. All I and others have asked him is, Which 16 squadrons

c) of which squadrons or bases
This brings the difficult questions
i) If 100 octane was in short supply when did Drem a small satellite station in Scotland have 100 octane when the priority stations in the South East didn't
ii) At one point in the BOB Duxford had the big wing of five squadrons. Are you really saying that almost a fifth of the RAF supply was in one 12 group station?.
These are I think logical questions. If there was a shortage then did these decisions make sense?. Putting his Logistical hat on again if the theory is that only 16 squadrons used 100 octane at any one time then someone had to decide which stations had the fuel, all I am asking is which stations? also who made the decision?

d) why this isn't mentioned in any official document, book, history
Simple request, why in the most documented air battle in history has no one picked this important factor up. Support your theory with some supporting documentation, not an off the wall conspiracy theory
Again no attempt to adress the question which was quite clear. The best he came up with was establishment vs strength where his definiton is wrong, and a lecture that adaquate supplies had to be at a station before they can use it, something I agree with. The problem is that he ignores later papers saying supplies are adaquate and the roll out can commence.

e) of the process in delivering the fuel
As there is no mention of a any limitation in the distribution of 100 octane fuel in the Oil Committee papers who distributed it

Again a complete failure to reply to the question. As a logistic expert I am sure Crumpp will agree that having decided to issue the fuel you need to agree how to deploy it.The Oil COpmmittee were responsible for the purchase, storage and distribution of fuel. There is no mention of any distribution to FC after May 1940, anywhere. As they didn't do any further distirbution of fuel after May 1940, then as a Logistic expert he must be interested in who did?
I did get a lecture about Units concerned. Its my belief that units concerned means the units that hadn't already been converted. I admit the evidence isn't 100% airtight but
We have the authority to proceed in Dec 1939,
We have papers from Dec 1939 saying which stations should be issued with the fuel In the First Instance,
We know that at the time (Dec 1939) this was for all stations equipped and going to be equipped with Hurricanes and Spitfires.
We know that delivery is prioritised as being operational units and that training units will not get 100 Octane
We know how the fuel was to be distributed, ie as 87 Octane was used up it would be replaced by 100 octane.
We know that in addition to those stations identified in December as being first instance it was used in France and Norway.
We know it started to be used in combat in February.
We know that there was a request in March for Blenhiems and fighters to use 100 Octane.
We know that All No 2 Group were issued with 100 Octane and we know that the process for delivery to FC changed to actively removing it from FC stations speeding up the roll out for those stations.
We know that in May 1940 the Oil Committee considered that change of FC to 100 octane to be complete.


Putting the Logistical Hat on again its interesting to look at the Basic Logistical details we know for the two cases
For the roll out to FC we know
a) Who made the decision
b) That testing was complete in 1939
c) Which stations were to have it issued to IN THE FIRST INSTANCE
d) How it was to be rolled out
e) That the Oil Committee considered the roll out to be complete in May
Note - all the above is supported by official original records held in the NA

For the 16 FC squadrons + 2 Bomber squadrons
a) We don't know who made the decision to continue with this program once war started
b) We don't know that phase IV testing was on going in 1940
c) We don't know which squadrons or which stations were supposed to have the 100 Octane
d) We don't know how it was to be rolled out
e) If this theory is correct, We don't know when the rest of FC had 100 Octane issued
f) We do know that the limit of 2 squadrons of Bombers mentioned in this paper was disregarded, which must question why the fighter limit is supposed to be maintained
None of these is supported by original papers. The best that can be said is that they depend on wild interpretations of some documents while ignoring others

As I said at the start the case for 100% roll out isn't perfect, but its a lot stronger than the case for 16 Fighter squadrons and 2 bomber squadrons

[pstyle]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Pstyle,

I was refering to fact a military fuel must carry a specification approved by that organization.

It will not become the standard fuel without a full specification. The completion of the specification IS the process of adoption. A provisional specification gets it into the system so it can be tested.

Understand?

I don't care if its "standard", I only care how widely it was used.
My point is that "standard" or "specification" are not perfect measures of use.

Understand?

[winny]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Pstyle,

I was refering to fact a military fuel must carry a specification approved by that organization.

It will not become the standard fuel without a full specification. The completion of the specification IS the process of adoption. A provisional specification gets it into the system so it can be tested.

Understand?

And where is your evidience that this was policy? Or the paperwork saying that it had happened, that makes you so sure?

And what is 100 octane doing in the pilot's notes if it wasn't 'specified'?

[bongodriver]

I think Crumpp is just finding it difficult to believe the world used to run without extreme beaurocracy.