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| FM/DM threads Everything about FM/DM in CoD |
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#1
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Alex Henshaw said about the "Skew Gear problem" that you strangley ignored "In any other situation this problem would have grounded the fleet, but because of the circumstances they couldn't. It was war and we just got on with it" He knew that at any moment he was testing Spitfires there was a chance it would happen to him. It did on 11 occasions. What happened happened. Now you're telling me you know more about it than he does. That sums you up. Anyway it's irrelevant, the 87 octane reference is there because they used it for OTU's, so they had to put it in the notes, apparently it's the law. So what's your main argument about the non use of 100 oct in frontline squadrons during the BoB? EDIT: Sorry to those who thought this thread had died... I'm not going away. Go and read one of raaaids threads instead Last edited by winny; 04-27-2012 at 07:50 PM. |
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#2
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I'm still very interested in seeing proof for use of 87 octane fuel in operational units. I'll keep checking the topic as long as it is alive.
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#3
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#4
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Sorry, I've not found any operational use of 87 octane in Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants beyond spring 1940. There is quite a lot of documentation available on 100 octane use for Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants during the Battle of France, the Dunkirk evacuation and the Battle of Britain, however, to be found throughout this thread. The best I can offer is operational Lysanders and Battles using 87 octane during May 1940 - see links below. Sorry, but the Hurricanes were using 100 octane by then - also see links. H.Q. A.A.S.F. 7 May 1940. Reserve Stocks of Aviation Fuel, Bombs and S.A.A. - Policy H.Q. R.A.F. Component, 10 May 1940. Petrol and Oil requirements for R.A.F. Component on 15th May 1940. |
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#5
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You are confusing a projection with what is one hand. |
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#6
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Crumpp, why not present your full argument instead of the ridiculous nit picking of every minor detail, including just making stuff up without checking?
Go on, do it. Next post. You're now clinging on to the pilot's notes.. is that it? So hit me with the one bit of evidence thats so compelling that you still think FC were not using 100 oct during BoB Or are we still doing this because you think that because your're an expert in flying/engineering, that just makes whatever you say right...? I can go back through this thread and prove that there are lots of things that you've said that are simply wrong. You show me your argument and then I (or one of the others) will show you ours. I get the feeling you long since stopped arguing the point and are just arguing the man.. Why? What's your motivation? Last edited by winny; 04-28-2012 at 01:04 PM. |
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#7
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Context, timeline...lol, sure no problem, we'll start with these:
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Emergency +12 lbs./sq. in. Boost Operation: Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6. ![]() These documents relating to fuel requirments of the the Advanced Air Stiking Force and the Air Component, both in France during May 1940, give some idea of consumption, stocks, and how fuel requirements were calculated. As can be seen the Hurricanes used 100 octane, the Blenheim used a mix, while the Battle and Lysander used 87 octane, as did any transport, liason, visiting types etc. ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() To underscore the above documentation of Hurricanes using 100 octane fuel in France please note the following: S/L J. O. W. Oliver, 85 Squadron, 10 May 1940 ![]() P/O John Bushell, 151 Squadron, 18 May 1940 ![]() S/L E. M. Donaldon, 151 Sqdn., 18 May 1940 F/O Paul Richey, 1 Squadron, 11 May 1940 ![]() F/O E. J. Kain, 73 Squadron, 14 May 1940 ![]() P/O D. W. A. Stones, 79 Squadron, 14 May 1940 ![]() Sgt. R. C. Wilkinson, 3 Squadron, 14 may 1940 ![]() P/O R. P. Beamont, 87 Squadron, 15 May 1940 ![]() P/O F. B. Sutton, 56 Squadron, 18 May 1940 ![]() F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 18 May 1940 ![]() F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 18 May 1940 F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 19 May 1940 F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 19 May 1940 ![]() Sgt. L. H. B. Pearce, 79 Squadron, 20 May 1940 ![]() Sgt. J. C. Harrison, 229 Squadron, 28 May 1940 ![]() P/O C. M. Simpson, 229 Squadron, 29 May 1940 ![]() P/O K. B. McGlashan, 245 Squadron, 28 May 1940
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#8
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Great post lane
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#9
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Even if we took every shred of evidence you have as gospel, it is not all operational units. That is the claim being made. The RAF had not converted to 100 Octane even in July 1940. There is not any 100 Octane in any quantity at the airfields until that then. That is the big logistical constraint noted in the very first memo you post. You have a handful of Hurricane squadrons, most of them taken from sources that belong alongside "First and the Last" by Adolf Galland. I have no doubts in May of 1940, the RAF was heavily into Phase IV testing. You have an order to convert with a huge logisitical constraint placed upon it. Fuel has to be at every airfield in quantity to support operations before any aircraft are converted. You also are using a projected calculation of fuel needs required to fight a future war that did not occur. Estabilishment is a logisitical term for quantity authorized. It has nothing to do with supplies on hand or available fuel. Here is estabilishment vs strength for RAF personnel: http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/...03-10c.54882.h When I get my computer back and get off this laptop, I can post the Estabilishment vs Strength for the RAF in the Battle of Britain. Lastly, the Operating Notes is definative. It is part of the aircraft airworthiness and is followed as instructed. The Notes on the Merlin Engine clearly documents when all operational units converted to 100 Octane. You can call me every name in the book, post whatever cartoon's you like but it does not change that fact. Last edited by Crumpp; 04-29-2012 at 01:21 AM. |
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#10
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- in fact provide documentation that proves anything you say: Provide documentation that the RAF used hardly any 100 Octane fuel throughout 1940. Provide documentation proving that 56,000 tons of 100 Octane fuel consumed between July and October 1940 was not "consumed" but was in fact put back into reserves without being consumed. Provide documentation that the RAF authorised 16 squadrons only to use 100 octane fuel and provide documentation to prove when this happened, apart from using a pre-war planning paper as a crutch for your lame theories. Provide documentation showing how the RAF ensured that only individual aircraft within squadrons were allowed to use 100 Octane fuel, and provide documentation showing how this was done. Provide documentation showing that the RAF did not use 100 Octane fuel during the Battle of France. Provide documentation showing that the RAF used 87 Octane fuel for its frontline Merlin engined fighters during the Battle of Britain. Provide documentation that the RAF stuck to its pre-war target of reserves of 800,000 tons of 100 Octane fuel no matter what. Provide documentation proving that it took 2 1/2 years from the start of WW2 for the Rolls-Royce Merlin II & III series to be approved and modified for 100 Octane and +12 lbs boost. Provide documentation proving that Rolls-Royce had not already modified and tested Merlin engines to use 100 Octane fuel between 1938 and 1939. Provide documentation that historians such as A A Rubbra, who helped design the Merlin and Alec Harvey-Bailey who had access to Rolls-Royce records were wrong when they wrote that the Merlin II and III were using 100 octane fuel in early 1940. I presume you categorise them as enthusiastic amateurs? Because you know that you're right and everybody else is wrong you should have all of the evidence you need at hand and ready to post asap. Last edited by NZtyphoon; 04-28-2012 at 11:23 AM. |
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