Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[Osprey]

Didn't see the airfields. Yes, 501 were @ Kenley for a couple of weeks but spent most of the time @ Gravesend giving Jerry a black eye.

[fruitbat]

What about the squadrons at Hornchurch, Northolt and North Weald.....

Also sector airfields in 11 group.

i can see quite a few squadrons missing from those charts.

[Al Schlageter]

Originally Posted by fruitbat

What about the squadrons at Hornchurch, Northolt and North Weald.....

Also sector airfields in 11 group.

i can see quite a few squadrons missing from those charts.

Did you go to the link?

[fruitbat]

Originally Posted by Al Schlageter

Did you go to the link?

ahh, just wondered why you copy/pasted those!

By the way Osprey, i love the specs of your computer, if only i had the money

[NZtyphoon]

Question: How much fuel was needed to fly all defensive sorties flown by FC during the battle?

The Battle of Britain T.C.G. James: 51,364 sorties, day & night from July 10 through Sept 30: Hooton’s Eagle in Flames, Table 2, FC flew Sep 23-29: 4,825 defensive sorties Sep 30 – Oct 6: 1,782 defensive sorties.

Total = 57,971 sorties

1 imperial gallon of 100 Octane = 7.1 pounds ("Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith the official British war history on the oil and petroleum industry during WW2 page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"):

1 ton of 100 octane = 2,240 lbs divided by 7.1 = 315.5 imp gal

Fuel Capacities:

Defiant I = 97 imp gal
Hurricane I = 90 imp gal
Spitfire I & II = 84 imp gal
Total 271 imp gal

divided by 3 = 90.3 imp gal

315.5 divided by 90.3 = 3.5 fuel loads per ton of fuel

57,971 divided by 3.5
Answer: 16,563 tons of fuel

Crumpp likes to talk about shelf life and fuel being returned to depots etc: total 100 Octane fuel issued between July 11 and October 31 = 62,000 tons:

fuel consumed = 51,000 tons - 16,563 tons = 34,437 tons available for other purposes.

Now why, Eugene, would FC bother using 87 Octane fuel for half its frontline fighters? Hmmm? Can you give us some good, tangible reasoning bolstered by a modicum of evidence that this is the way things were done?
Pleeease?

Originally Posted by fruitbat

ahh, just wondered why you copy/pasted those!

By the way Osprey, i love the specs of your computer, if only i had the money

Here's mine http://oldcomputers.net/amiga1000.html I can play COD but very slowly.

[NZtyphoon]

Question: How much fuel was needed to fly all defensive sorties flown by FC during the battle? (revised - previous posting included Hooton Sep 23-29: 4,825 defensive sorties, which are already included in James' figures)

The Battle of Britain T.C.G. James: 51,364 sorties, day & night July 10 - Sept 30: Hooton’s Eagle in Flames Sep 30 – Oct 6: 1,782 defensive sorties.

Total = 53,146 sorties to October 6

1 imperial gallon of 100 Octane = 7.1 pounds ("Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith the official British war history on the oil and petroleum industry during WW2 page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"):

1 ton of 100 octane = 2,240 lbs divided by 7.1 = 315.5 imp gal

Fuel Capacities:

Defiant I = 97 imp gal
Hurricane I = 90 imp gal
Spitfire I & II = 84 imp gal
Total 271 imp gal

divided by 3 = 90.3 imp gal

315.5 divided by 90.3 = 3.5 fuel loads per ton of fuel

53,146 divided by 3.5
Answer: 15,184 tons of fuel

total 100 Octane fuel issued between July 11 and October 31 = 62,000 tons:

fuel consumed = 51,000 tons - 16,563 tons = 35,816 tons available for other purposes.

The only engines cleared to use 100 Octane fuel were Merlin II, II, X(? Flight 1938 article), XII and Bristol Mercury XV.

1) Was 100 octane fuel available to Fighter Command? Yes

2) Was there enough 100 octane fuel available to cover all sorties flown by Fighter Command during the battle? Yes

3) Was enough 100 Octane fuel distributed and used throughout the battle to allow Fighter Command to fly all 53,146 sorties from July to 6 October? Yes, with more than enough left over to allow Blenheim IVs of Bomber Command and Coastal Command to operate, and more than enough to allow for secondary duties.

Can anyone explain what happened to all that fuel if only half of FCs frontline fighters were allowed to use it?

[winny]

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

Can anyone explain what happened to all that fuel if only half of FCs frontline fighters were allowed to use it?

I knew the Fighter pilots were putting in their cars, I just didn't realise how much!

Or maybe they were drinking it?

[Crumpp]

What about the squadrons at Hornchurch, Northolt and North Weald.....

Also sector airfields in 11 group.

i can see quite a few squadrons missing from those charts.

Those charts are not correct. If you need me too I will post the RAF's order of battle showing all the squadrons dispositions at various times. In the span of a few weeks, ALL of the squadrons in 11 Group had rotated out.

It actually was one of Dowdings more unpopular decisions to maintain such a vigorous rotation schedule. Many commanders felt it took experienced guys away from the fight and increased the casualty rate by placing inexperienced pilots in their place.

[Crumpp]

NZTyphoon, Once again.....

In the pursuit of gamers proving 100/150 grade was the standard fuel of the RAF, documents were produced that showed hundreds of thousand of tons of the fuel being moved around various stations and brought into the RAF logistical system in anticipation of the fuel being adopted.

The operational use turned out to be extremely limited and for a very short period of time before it was withdrawn from service.

You cannot look at fuel stocks to determine the extent of operational use. Logistics is there to answer the question, "Do we have enough to use?"

They do not answer the question, "Can we use this fuel?"....that is the operational side of the house!

[NZtyphoon]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

NZTyphoon, Once again.....

In the pursuit of gamers proving 100/150 grade was the standard fuel of the RAF, documents were produced that showed hundreds of thousand of tons of the fuel being moved around various stations and brought into the RAF logistical system in anticipation of the fuel being adopted.

The operational use turned out to be extremely limited and for a very short period of time before it was withdrawn from service.

You cannot look at fuel stocks to determine the extent of operational use. Logistics is there to answer the question, "Do we have enough to use?"

They do not answer the question, "Can we use this fuel?"....that is the operational side of the house!

This is just too ridiculous to be true!!!

So, genius, explain exactly what happened to 51,000 tons of 100 octane fuel and provide some evidence for your claims. E-v-i-d-e-n-c-e! Is that so hard?