Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Al Schlageter

So tell me Barbi, which fighter squadrons that were based on airfields on the CloD map were only using 87 octane fuel.

Well I guess http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...8&postcount=43 already covered that question.

"Based on the current evidence (feel free to add new sources showing 100 octane at the said airfield during the Battle and I'll update the list) shows that 100 octane aviation spirit was supplied to

8 out of 19 Sector Airfields
9 out of 32 Fighter Airfields (however 7 of the 32 functioning as satellite airfield for rotation etc., with no Sqn permanently based there)."

Which follows that appearantly 11 Sector Airfields and 23 Fighter airfields show no evidence at all that they have been supplied by anything else but the standard 87 octane. Of course even in the rest of the airfields its rather difficult to find out from what time is there any evidence to 100 octane fuel supply - for some airfields we have for example combat reports from October 1940, and they may or may not have been supplied with 100 octane earlier.

In 11 Group, 87 octane airfields apparently include, at the current level of evidence

RAF Debden.

RAF Debden was home to the Debden Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 85 Squadron from 22 May 1940
No 17 Squadron from 19 June 1940
No 257 Squadron from 15 August 1940
No 601 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 111 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 17 Squadron from 2 September 1940
No 25 Squadron from 8 October 1940

RAF Detling.

Detling was one of the 11 Group satellite airfields used by units on a day-to-day basis as required, often flights or squadrons would detach to such an airfield in the morning and return to their main operating and maintenance base in the evening.

RAF Eastchurch.

RAF Eastchurch was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 266 Squadron from 12 August 1940

RAF Ford.

RAF Ford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 23 Squadron from 12 September 1940

RAF Gosport.

Gosport was, along with Lee-on-Solent, one of the Royal Navy's airfields used in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. Royal Navy fighters were permanently based there, and occasionally RAF units were detached, using the airfield in the same way as a satellite or relief landing ground.

RAF Hendon.

RAF Hendon was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 257 Squadron from 17 May 1940
No 504 Squadron from 5 September 1940

RAF Lee on Solent.

Lee on Solent was, along with Gosport, one of the Royal Navy's airfields used in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. Royal Navy fighters were permanently based there, and occasionally RAF units were detached, using the airfield in the same way as a satellite or relief landing ground.

RAF Lympne.

Lympne was one of the 11 Group satellite airfields used by units on a day-to-day basis as required, often flights or squadrons would detach to such an airfield in the morning and return to their main operating and maintenance base in the evening. Due to the extreme forward position of this site it was under constant threat of attack and was not permanently manned during the Battle by any one Squadron.

RAF Manston.

RAF Manston was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 604 Squadron from 15 May 1940
No 600 Squadron from 20 June 1940

RAF Martlesham.

RAF Martlesham was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 25 Squadron from 19 June 1940
No 257 Squadron from 5 September 1940
No 17 Squadron from 8 October 1940

RAF Stapleford.

RAF Stapleford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 151 Squadron from 29 August 1940
No 46 Squadron from 1 September 1940

RAF Thorney Island.

RAF Thorney Island was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 236 Squadron from 4 July 1940


RAF West Malling.

RAF West Malling was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 141 Squadron from 12 July 1940
No 66 Squadron from 30 October 1940


In 10 Group, 87 octane airfields apparently include, at the current level of evidence>

RAF Filton.

RAF Filton was home to the Filton Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 504 Squadron from 26 September 1940


RAF Boscombe Down.

RAF Boscombe Down was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 249 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 56 Squadron from 1 September 1940

RAF Colerne.

RAF Colerne was used as a satellite and relief airfield for Middle Wallop during the Battle, units rotated in and out of the station on a daily basis.

RAF Exeter.

RAF Exeter was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 213 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 87 Squadron from 5 July 1940
No 601 Squadron from 7 September 1940

RAF Pembrey.

RAF Pembrey was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 92 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 79 Squadron from 8 September 1940

RAF Roborough.

RAF Roborough was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 247 Squadron from 1 August 1940

RAF St Eval.

RAF St Eval was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 222 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 236 Squadron from 8 August 1940
No 238 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 222 Squadron from 11 September 1940

[NZtyphoon]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Indeed. I don't think anybody has doubts that 100 octane was used in a number of FC's - and also BC's Squadrons., as a number of Blenheim Squadrons (3 or 4 I believe), were also issued with the fuel. Which is why NYTyphoons 'calculations' are flawed and be considered at best for their entertainment value, as he ignores all bombers with many times the consumption and requirement of a fighter squadron, as well as training, moving flights and engine manufacturer demands, which are are simply ignored.

Note what I said:
NB: Not all aircraft returned with empty tanks and RAF policy was to refill each aircraft as soon as possible after landing, or each evening or early morning, to avoid vapour traps.

Blenheims were the only other aircraft known to have used 100 Octane fuel, albeit only in their outer wing fuel tanks, making things complicated for the poor pilots. (Warner, The Bristol Blenheim:A Complete History 2nd ed, page 100.)

Merlin III & XIIs could still use 87 octane fuel, hence training flights and other secondary flight duties, such as delivery, ferry flights, etc could use 87 octane fuel instead of 100.

Other aircraft known to have been using 100 Octane fuel were a small number of Beaufighters and PR Spitfires.

Westland Whirlwinds still used, and continued to use 87 Octane right through their operational lives.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

But the evidence to somewhat sensational claim that 100 octane was the only fuel issued is still sorely lacking and is directly contradicted by a number of primary and secondary sources....

Nor did I say anywhere only 100 Octane fuel was issued. And where are KF's primary and secondary sources? The main primary sources "presented" by KF are a mysterious Australian/Beaverbrook paper which no-one apart from KF and "Pip" can find (The Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it), and some pre-war planning papers.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

The trend shown in the consumption of 87 octane and 100 octane fuel is, however intererting. It is clear that about 2/3s of the fuel consumed during the Battle was 87 octane (by all Commands) and 1/3 consumed was 100 octane (by Fighter and Bomber Commands).

All KF is saying is that large numbers of aircraft in other commands were using 87 Octane. Big deal.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Checking the trend lines of operational (combat) Fighter sorties and 87 octane consumption during the Battle is interesting. When Fighter Command flew a lot of sorties, 87 octane issues also increased, when Fighter Command flew less of sorties, 87 octane demands decreased, with some delay of course. I think the conclusion is quite obvious.

Yup, there were things like training flights, delivery flights, ferry flights and other second-line duties which naturally increased at times when the frontline units were operating more intensively.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Another interesting trend is that 87 octane issues suddenly plummeted during early october, while 100 octane issues increased. This is in line with Pips summary of the Australian paper, which notes that Fighter Command only switched completely over to 100 octane in the late automn 1940.

Meaning FC switched to 100 Octane fuel for secondary as well as frontline duties? Seeing as no-one else apart from KF and "Pip" has seen this paper, and it is missing from the Australian National Archives I guess we have to take his word for it...

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Its also completely in line with what an unquestionably reputable secondary source, Morgan nad Shacklady's ultimate Spitfire book, 'Spitfire: The History' notes about the initial uncertainity of 100 octane shipments (as all 100 octane had to be imported from overseas).

Convoys started operating in September 1939; the most important were the HX convoys which sailed from Halifax to (mainly) Liverpool. The first - HX.1 - sailed on 16 September 1939. Referring to http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html
The HX convoys incorporated cargo ships, some of which carried aviation fuel, and tankers: many of the latter had sailed from refineries in the West Indies and America. The BHX series sailed from Bermuda, starting in May 1940 (BHX.41), and joined the main HX convoys in Halifax. Some of the tankers from the HX convoys diverted to French ports, enough to supply the RAF fighters in France.

From the HX series of convoys alone (HX 11, 13, 31, 33-35, 40, 43, 49, 55, 57-59, 64-68, 70, 73, 76) 44 tankers carrying AVGAS arrived in British or French ports; one tanker was destroyed by a mine in the Bristol channel. This contradicts the assertion in Shacklady and Morgan that ...large numbers of tankers were sunk by German submarines...

Another reputable secondary source is "Oil" by Payton-Smith which, as noted, is the official war history. He notes that "...in the summer of 1940 there was a surplus of these ships (tankers) because of the incorporation into the British merchant marine of tanker fleets from countries over-run by Germany." pp. 128–130.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

It also refers to the fact that RAF was intending to initially equip 16 fighter Squadrons and 2 bomber Squadrons with 100 octane, which is again underlined by the memo of the Fuel Commitee's meeting, noting that the selected fighter Squadrons and Blenheim Squadrons have been converted, the memo of which was summarized in a 'doctored' textus on Mike William's site to further the site's agenda.

This memo was a planning paper from 16 March 1939 , based on a pre-war assumption that US supplies would be denied to Britain in wartime, limiting the numbers of front-line units able to use the fuel.

In "Oil" (Official Second WW history) Payton-Smith said:

"By 1939...The prospects of securing sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel in addition to the 87-octane petrol required for non-operational flying looked doubtful...(he goes on to state on page 57)...It was true that by 1939 it seemed increasingly unlikely that American supplies would be withheld. But to have accepted anything less than absolute certainty, to have depended on the goodwill of foreign suppliers to meet the essential needs of the Royal Air Force, would have been a radical break with traditions that had governed British oil policy since long before the First World War."

Meaning that the pre-war planning papers quoted by KF were being conservative in their estimates, as per a long held tradition.
Payton-Smith went on to say:

"...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared; production of the new fuel in the US, and in other parts of the world, increased more quickly than expected with the adoption of new refining techniques." pp. 259-260

Interesting how KF resorts to pre-war planning documents to say what happened up to 16 months later, during the Battle of Britain, yet cannot provide primary documentation to prove that the situations discussed up to two years earlier actually eventuated in 1940. And his assertions about "doctored" documents when his own documentation is so shoddy and questionable?

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Also of interest that the RAF wished to build up a reserve of 800 000 tons for precaution, which couldn't be met in 1940.

Proving nothing really, except that in wartime pre-war plans can change. There was still more than enough 100 Octane fuel consumed by FC, and some Blenheims during the Battle to allow all operational sorties to be flown on this fuel alone.

Interesting to note that Merlin engines using 100 Octane fuel were being built in 1938, as well as C.P propellers

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%203453.html

[lane]

Hi NZtyphoon:

One small correction if I may regarding the Westland Whirlwind:

[Glider]

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

Note what I said:
Nor did I say anywhere only 100 Octane fuel was issued. And where are KF's primary and secondary sources? The main primary sources "presented" by KF are a mysterious Australian/Beaverbrook paper which no-one apart from KF and "Pip" can find (The Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it), and some pre-war planning papers.

Small alteration. KF has never found or when I last heard, even looked for this paper. The reason he gave for not looking was that he doesn't live in Australia and he was too busy.

Posting 92 in attached thread
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/avi...a-20108-7.html

PS Its worth noting that the key to this Pips was a decision made by the War Cabinet to stop roll out of 100 octane. Earlier in this thread I did give KF the file nos for the War Cabinet minutes to look at on line, so he could confirm the Pips theory. I would be interested to see if he has done this easy, available and free basic check and let us know what it said.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

Blenheims were the only other aircraft known to have used 100 Octane fuel, albeit only in their outer wing fuel tanks, making things complicated for the poor pilots. (Warner, The Bristol Blenheim:A Complete History 2nd ed, page 100.)

This seems mighty unlikely during the 1940 timeframe given that it seems the two (or three) Blenheim Stations identified earlier were only supposed to be supplied with 100 octane. If there is no 87 octane in the Station just 100 octane, how they are supposed to tank up from both? This may have been true earlier, but certainly not in these Stations concerned.

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

Merlin III & XIIs could still use 87 octane fuel, hence training flights and other secondary flight duties, such as delivery, ferry flights, etc could use 87 octane fuel instead of 100.[/i]

As well as operational Squadrons on combat missions of course.

Other aircraft known to have been using 100 Octane fuel were a small number of Beaufighters and PR Spitfires.

Source?

Nor did I say anywhere only 100 Octane fuel was issued.

Grand, then we agree that Fighter Command used both 87 and 100 octane fuel for its operational fighters.

And where are KF's primary and secondary sources? The main primary sources "presented" by KF are a mysterious Australian/Beaverbrook paper which no-one apart from KF and "Pip" can find (The Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it), and some pre-war planning papers.

I think you do disservice to your already marginal credibility by pretending things anyone can check by reading the thread.

I am afraid I have posted the 87 and 100 octane fuel consumption during the Battle, which is a primary source, the May 18 decision that explicitly says that 100 octane is not issued to all Fighter Squadrons, as well as the earlier decision in agreement that the plans were for 16 fighter and 2 bomber Squadrons, by September 1940. Of course the sour in your mouth about the other pre-war papers is that they note that British 100 octane fuel programme was fueled by fear that the Germans could much more easily produce great quantities via their synthetic process.

And yes I have also made reference to the paper Pips found, and yes you are lying when you say that "the Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it", and not for the first time.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst
The trend shown in the consumption of 87 octane and 100 octane fuel is, however intererting. It is clear that about 2/3s of the fuel consumed during the Battle was 87 octane (by all Commands) and 1/3 consumed was 100 octane (by Fighter and Bomber Commands).

All KF is saying is that large numbers of aircraft in other commands were using 87 Octane. Big deal.[/QUOTE]

You seem to have reading comprehension problems when you believe that when I write ALL commands I meant OTHER commands. But I agree, its not a big deal, everyone else but you seemed to get it.

Yup, there were things like training flights, delivery flights, ferry flights and other second-line duties which naturally increased at times when the frontline units were operating more intensively.

'Naturally'. Really? Whenever the RAF was battling the Luftwaffe in a frenzy, it automatically meant that suddenly bomber command flew more sorties, training units flew 10 times as much, and coastal command was flying more sorties too?

Or did Spitfires after landing at a fighter base quickly drain their tanks of 100 octane, refill with 87 octane to fly training flights, move between airfields, and then drained the tanks of 87 octane and refilled again with 100 octane?

If this happened, they surely made a big fuss in 1940 just to support some silly-ass speculation of a Spitfire-fan in 2012 didn't they.

Meaning FC switched to 100 Octane fuel for secondary as well as frontline duties? Seeing as no-one else apart from KF and "Pip" has seen this paper, and it is missing from the Australian National Archives I guess we have to take his word for it...

Or we should take the word of you, who has just lied that its 'missing' from the ANArchives...

[QUOTE][QUOTE]Originally Posted by Kurfürst
Its also completely in line with what an unquestionably reputable secondary source, Morgan nad Shacklady's ultimate Spitfire book, 'Spitfire: The History' notes about the initial uncertainity of 100 octane shipments (as all 100 octane had to be imported from overseas).

Convoys started operating in September 1939; the most important were the HX convoys which sailed from Halifax to (mainly) Liverpool. The first - HX.1 - sailed on 16 September 1939. Referring to http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html
The HX convoys incorporated cargo ships, some of which carried aviation fuel, and tankers: many of the latter had sailed from refineries in the West Indies and America. The BHX series sailed from Bermuda, starting in May 1940 (BHX.41), and joined the main HX convoys in Halifax. Some of the tankers from the HX convoys diverted to French ports, enough to supply the RAF fighters in France.

From the HX series of convoys alone (HX 11, 13, 31, 33-35, 40, 43, 49, 55, 57-59, 64-68, 70, 73, 76) 44 tankers carrying AVGAS arrived in British or French ports; one tanker was destroyed by a mine in the Bristol channel. This contradicts the assertion in Shacklady and Morgan that ...large numbers of tankers were sunk by German submarines...

No, its just your spin on it.

Morgan nad Shacklady writes of concerning tanker losses, while you write of tanker losses in convoys (obviously a lot of them weren't travelling in one), and then further limited your 'research' to the HX convoys (obviously again not all tankers went through HX convoys), and then even further limited to scope to 'tankers carrying AVGAS' (obviously again a tanker capacity lost is a tanker lost - if it also carried some kind of fuel it was even worse, but a tanker sunk with ballast en route to America was just as painful for shipping space as a tanker lost inbound to Britain).

This is how tanker losses suddenly became 'tanker losses carrying avgas while travelling in convoys in the HX series convoys'. Its a classic straw-man argument.

Now, anyone who searches back in this thread will find the actual figures for British / Allied tanker losses in the period, they were quite serious indeed, iirc several hundred thousends of GRT worth. Mines, torpedo planes and bombers, uboots all took their toll. I don't bother to post them again.

Another reputable secondary source is "Oil" by Payton-Smith which, as noted, is the official war history. He notes that "...in the summer of 1940 there was a surplus of these ships (tankers) because of the incorporation into the British merchant marine of tanker fleets from countries over-run by Germany." pp. 128–130.

I believe Morgan and Shacklady are quite aware of Payton-Smith's book.

What seems to be at odds is Payton-Smith and Morgan-Shacklady, but your humble - and rather untrustworthy - interpretation and quoting of Payton-Smith vs. Payton-Smith's interpretation by rather distinguished British aviation historians.

This memo was a planning paper from 16 March 1939 , based on a pre-war assumption that US supplies would be denied to Britain in wartime, limiting the numbers of front-line units able to use the fuel.

I agree. So is there ANY documented evidence that it was amended? Anything at all?

In "Oil" (Official Second WW history) Payton-Smith said:

"By 1939...The prospects of securing sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel in addition to the 87-octane petrol required for non-operational flying looked doubtful...(he goes on to state on page 57)...It was true that by 1939 it seemed increasingly unlikely that American supplies would be withheld. But to have accepted anything less than absolute certainty, to have depended on the goodwill of foreign suppliers to meet the essential needs of the Royal Air Force, would have been a radical break with traditions that had governed British oil policy since long before the First World War."

Meaning that the pre-war planning papers quoted by KF were being conservative in their estimates, as per a long held tradition.

Payton-Smith went on to say:

"...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared; production of the new fuel in the US, and in other parts of the world, increased more quickly than expected with the adoption of new refining techniques." pp. 259-260

Can you explain to me how Payton-Smith speaks one thing on page 59. - about the 1939 situation, when the British evidently seeked 'absolute certainity 'went on to say' on page 259-260

To me it seems you are cherry picking quotes out of the context and putting them together from two hundred page apart.

For example, what is the context "...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared on pg. 259? Does the second quote it even remotely related to 1939-1940, or you just frankensteined them together?

Interesting how KF resorts to pre-war planning documents to say what happened up to 16 months later, during the Battle of Britain, yet cannot provide primary documentation to prove that the
situations discussed up to two years earlier actually eventuated in 1940.

No, actually evidence was provided that the 1939 papers speak of partially converting Fighter and Bomber Command to 100 octane, and all the 1940 papers supplied so far also speak of partially converting Fighter and Bomber Command to 100 octane.

The March 1939 papers speak of 16 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons, the May 1940 papers speak of the fighter and bomber squadrons 'concerned'.

Not a single paper could be found or supplied that would say that or hint that all of Fighter Command is to be converted to 100 octane fuel.

Its quite clear to any reasonable man.

Proving nothing really, except that in wartime pre-war plans can change. There was still more than enough 100 Octane fuel consumed by FC, and some Blenheims during the Battle to allow all operational sorties to be flown on this fuel alone.

Of course pre-war plans can change. But did they?

Interesting to note that Merlin engines using 100 Octane fuel were being built in 1938, as well as C.P propellers

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%203453.html

Yes, though I would not necessarily equate 'quoting figures on the Rolls-Royce stand for the Merlin R.M. 2M rated on 100 octane fuel' to 'being built'. While Rolls-Royce was quoting figures, DB 601 powered Heinkels and Bfs using 100 octane were setting records anyway. :p

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

Convoys started operating in September 1939; the most important were the HX convoys which sailed from Halifax to (mainly) Liverpool. The first - HX.1 - sailed on 16 September 1939. Referring to http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html
The HX convoys incorporated cargo ships, some of which carried aviation fuel, and tankers: many of the latter had sailed from refineries in the West Indies and America. The BHX series sailed from Bermuda, starting in May 1940 (BHX.41), and joined the main HX convoys in Halifax. Some of the tankers from the HX convoys diverted to French ports, enough to supply the RAF fighters in France.

From the HX series of convoys alone (HX 11, 13, 31, 33-35, 40, 43, 49, 55, 57-59, 64-68, 70, 73, 76) 44 tankers carrying AVGAS arrived in British or French ports; one tanker was destroyed by a mine in the Bristol channel. This contradicts the assertion in Shacklady and Morgan that ...large numbers of tankers were sunk by German submarines...

Well let's see now the reality.

Tanker losses to all causes, I have gathered a total of 78(!!) tankers were sunk by mine, U-boot (typically), aircraft and raiders, between September 1939 and November 1940. About 90% of them were British, though there are a couple of Swedish, Dutch, French etc. tankers

I have them by name, date, cause of loss, route, cargo, tonnage and so on. For example indeed one tanker that went through Halifax, Inverdagle (9456 tons) was sunk by mines laid by the submarine U 34, with 12 500 tons of avgas - about a month worth consumption of 100 octane, though I am not sure what grade it actually carried - on the 16 January 1940.

The first one was Regent Tiger, with about 15 000 tons of oil products, five days after Britain declared war on Germany. The worst blow was possibly the sinking of 13 000 ton San Fernando by the fabled U-47 on the 21 June 1940 (U-43 got another one on the same day). This one alone carried 18 000 tons of oil product that never reached Liverpool.

Alltogether 558,260 GRT of tankers went to Davy Jones locker, by the end of November 1940, along with 385,957 tons of oil product. Half of that, ca. 243 000 GRT worth of tankers were sunk by the end May 1940.

Fuel oil was the greatest loss, 116 000 tons of it went down with tankers (luckily, no green peace back then). Avgas seems quite untypical as a load, but in the end it didn't really matter, because if a tanker sunk with diesel oil, or even empty, the next one had to haul about its cargo again.

Tanker losses were serious, unfortunately.

[Al Schlageter]

Vessel Pdt. Tons Built Cargo Notes

SC 21
AMSCO (Br) 72 4,627 1920 Crude Oil

SC3
NOREG (Nor) 43 7,605 1931 Fuel Oil

SC4
SUDERHOLM (Nor) 73 4,908 1917 Fuel Oil
WOENSDRECHT (Du) 52 4,668 1926 Avgas RETURNED

SC5
WOENSDRECHT (Du) 81 4,668 1926 Avgas

SC6
STANMOUNT (Br) 43 4,468 1914 Crude Oil

SC9
GLOXINIA (Br) 61 3,336 1920 Lub Oil

SC14
SOLSTEN (Nor) 42 5,379 1929 Petrol

SC15
TAHCHEE (Br) 52 6,508 1914 Fuel Oil

The above are ships in SC convoys carrying petro gargoes for 1939 and 1940

The below are ships in HX convoys carrying petro cargoes just in 1939.

HX
LANGUEDOC (Fr) * 9,512 1937 crude oil Le Havre

HX3
ONTARIOLITE (Br) 63 8,889 1925 crude oil Le Havre

HX4
ELONA (Br) 61 6,192 1936 lub oil

HX5
SAN ERNESTO (Br) 51 8,078 1939 petrol
VACLITE (Br) 32 5,026 1928 lub oil

HX6
CADILLAC (Br) 72 12,062 1917 PETROL
D L HARPER (Br) 54 12,223 1933 CRUDE OIL
DARONIA (Br) 47 8,139 1939 PETROL
ECLIPSE (Br) 62 9,767 1931 CRUDE OIL HAVRE
F J WOLFE (Pan) 53 12,190 1932 CRUDE OIL
FRANCHE-COMTE (Br) 75 9,314 1936 PETROL BORDEAUX
LUSTROUS (Br) 95 6,156 1927 CRUDE OIL PAUILLAC
NARRAGANSETT (Br) 45 10,389 1936 PETROL
PEDER BOGEN (Br) 91 9,741 1925 DIESO
PENELOPE (Pan) 66 6,559 1925 CRUDE OIL RETURNED
ROBERT F HAND (Br) 94 12,197 1933 PARAFFIN
SAN CALISTO (Br) 81 8,010 1937 PARAFFIN
SCOTTISH HEATHER (Br) 63 7,087 1928 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
VOCO (Br) 23 5,090 1925 LUB OIL

HX7
EL MIRLO (Br) 42 8,092 1930 CRUDE OIL
HORN SHELL (Br) 81 8,272 1931 FUEL OIL
REGINOLITE (Br) 73 9,069 1926 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
SARANAC (Br) 23 12,049 1918 PETROL
ROCAS (Br) 63 7,406 1927 FUEL OIL

HX8
ADELLEN (Br) 83 7,984 1930 FUEL OIL
COWRIE (Br) 52 8,197 1931 DIESO, FUEL OIL
HEINRICH VON REIDEMANN (Pan) 83 11,020 1930 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
LUXOR (Br) 74 6,554 1930 AVGAS LE HAVRE
MIRALDA (Br) 51 8,013 1936 DIESO, CRUDE OIL
PELLICULA (Br) 54 6,254 1936 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
PERSEPHONE (Pan) 64 8,426 1925 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
PRESIDENT SERGENT (Fr) 72 5,344 1923 CRUDE OIL DUNKIRK
SAN CONRADO (Br) 34 7,982 1936 PARAFFIN
SAN FLORENTINO (Br) 24 12,842 1919 FUEL OIL
VICTOLITE (Br) 53 11,410 1928 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE

HX9
ARLETTA (Br) 22 4,870 1925 PETROL
CERINTHUS (Br) 42 3,878 1930 LUB OIL
CHARLES PRATT (Pan) 94 8,982 1916 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
CONCH (Br) 63 8,376 1931 PETROL
DILOMA (Br) 34 8,146 1939 PETROL, PARAFFIN
HARRY G SEIDEL (Pan) 83 10,354 1930 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
REGENT PANTHER (Br) 61 9,556 1937 PETROL
SAN ADOLFO (Br) 64 7,365 1935 FUEL OIL
SAN CIRILO (Br) 62 8,012 1937 PETROL
SAN FABIAN (Br) 71 13,031 1922 FUEL OIL
SAN TIBURCIO (Br) 33 5,995 1921 GAS OIL
SAN UBALDO (Br) 23 5,999 1921 FUEL OIL
VENETIA (Br) 73 5,728 1927 PETROL

HX10
BRITISH WORKMAN (Br) 82 6,994 1922 PARAFFIN
C O STILLMAN (Pan) 72 13,006 1928 CRUDE OIL
CARONI RIVER (Br) 64 7,807 1928 DIESO
CLIONA (Br) 93 8,375 1931 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
GOLD SHELL (Br) 74 8,208 1931 CRUDE OIL
LUNULA (Br) 12 6,363 1927 AVGAS
AN GASPAR (Br) 21 12,910 1921 FUEL OIL
SCOTTISH CHIEF (Br) 94 7,006 1928 CRUDE OIL PAUILLAC
VANCOLITE (Br) 83 11,404 1928 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
VICTOR ROSS (Br) 63 12,247 1933 FUEL OIL LE HAVRE

HX11
ALDERSDALE (Br) 83 8,402 1937 FUEL OIL
ATHELVISCOUNT (Br) 65 8,882 1929 FUEL OIL
BRITISH UNION (Br) 92 6,987 1927 FUEL OIL
CASPIA (Br) 52 6,018 1928 PETROL
COMANCHEE (Br) 71 6,837 1936 LUB OIL
EL GRILLO (Br) 93 7,264 1922 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
COTTISH MAIDEN (Br) 95 6,993 1921 CRUDE OIL DONGES
ARAND (Br) 53 6,023 1927 AVGAS

HX12
ARNDALE (Br) 34 8,296 1937 FUEL OIL
ATHELCHIEF (Br) 94 10,000 1939 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
ATHELPRINCESS (Br) 81 8,882 1929 CRUDE OIL DUNKIRK
FREDERICK S FALES (Br) 64 10,525 1939 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
GEORGE H JONES (Pan) 53 6,914 1919 CRUDE OIL
JAMES McGEE (Pan) 84 9,859 1917 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
MACTRA (Br) 74 6,193 1936 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
MONTROLITE (Br) 63 11,309 1926 CRUDE OIL
SAN FELIX (Br) 73 13,037 1921 FUEL OIL

HX13
BEACONHILL (Pan) 42 6,941 1919 AVGAS
CHAMA (Br) 73 8,077 1938 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
ERODONA (Br) 74 6,207 1937 LUB OIL
AN ELISEO (Br) 43 8,042 1939 GAS OIL
SAN FERNANDO (Br) 64 13,056 1919 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
SAN GERARDO (Br) 32 12,915 1929 FUEL OIL
SCHUYLKILL (Br) 52 8,965 1928 PETROL
SOCONY (Br) 63 4,404 1936 AVGAS
SOLARIUM (Br) 44 6,239 1936 PETROL
W C TEAGLE (Br) 62 9,552 1917 CRUDE OIL SOUTHAMPTON

from http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html