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| FM/DM threads Everything about FM/DM in CoD |
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#1
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Which is why I said..
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__________________
Theres a reason for instrumenting a plane for test..
That being a pilots's 'perception' of what is going on can be very different from what is 'actually' going on. |
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#2
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In actual service condition, the aircraft did not achieve its design goal of laminar flow. Thorough testing would have revealed this but wartime expediency did not. One of the consequences of designing an aircraft under such short notice. |
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#3
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~S~ Alle
Interesting reading. I have only one gripe. Hispano Buchan. A Spit engine in a 109. It makes me cry. I love the 109. In my younger days, watching the film 'Battle of Britain', I kept looking at the 109 and thinking, somethings wrong, badly wrong. My Dad pointed out to me that they had Spitfire engines in them. Ouch! I thought! I believe they did the same with the He 111 which was also used in the film. Ta. Happy Hunting |
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#4
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Well, I agree that the Luftwaffe were not always outnumbered 100% of the time. But the whole point of Big Week was to exhaust, attrit and otherwise destroy the Luftwaffe in preparation for the D-Day landings and I'll maintain that Allied air superiority was the norm. Allied numbers were very very high during this period. For example, during one of the Berlin raids, they sent 800 escort fighters. While the Luftwaffe may have achieved local superiority in some cases, this would have been the exception, not the rule. By February of 1944 the LW was feeling the effects of chronic fuel shortages, and the situation only got worse from there. There's a report I don't have a link to, made by Galland in April of 1944 that was published in Caldwell and Muller's book. In the report he states that in the preceding 4 months the Luftwaffe had lost more than 1000 pilots. He goes on to state that in nearly every engagement his fighters are outnumbered by more than 6:1. The Germans experimented with "Big Wing" formations like the RAF had done earlier in the war, and while it was successful in some cases, they soon learned just how hard it is to get a Big Wing together when dealing with fuel shortages and inexperienced pilots. By June, the Luftwaffe had been rendered ineffective over North-Western France and the Allies enjoyed air superiority for the duration of the D-Day landings. |
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#5
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Feb 25 1944, Mission 235, final Big Week mission - 268 B-17s are dispatched to aviation industry targets at Augsburg and the industrial area at Stuttgart, 196 hit Augsburg and targets of opportunity and 50 hit Stuttgart - 267 of 290 B-17s hit aviation industry targets at Regensburg and targets of opportunity At the end of May 1944, the Germans had ~400,000 metric tons of aviation fuel more than they did in Feb 1944. - 172 of 196 B-24s hit aviation industry targets at Furth and targets of opportunity - Escort is provided by 73 P-38s, 687 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 139 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s These targets were beyond the range of the P-47s so only the 212 P-38s and P-51s could do the escorting and would be split among the 3 target areas. At the end of May 1944, the Germans had ~400,000 metric tons of aviation fuel more than they did in Feb 1944. |
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