Actually the question of a german invasion is not simple in any of the details involved. Of course everything we say here benefits from hindsight and knowledge of historical facts none of the people involved could have had at that time.
Please excuse the lengthy blabber. It's just a number of points I'd like to raise ... Under no circumstances I claim to have the holy grail nor do I claim to claim to have a complete picture. I'm just an amateur as well.
1.) In an environment where the operations of No 11 and to some degree No 10 Group were considerably hampered or if the RAF infrastructure in the Southeast was becoming unusable then the RAF's ability to counter Luftwaffe operations would be seriously impeded. First it would loose valuable airfields within easy striking distance of the main landing area. Secondly a breakdown of No 11's air defense system would not only lengthen response times from No 12 or No 10's fighters, which would give the Luftwaffe pretty much air supremacy over the coastline and enable their Stukas to pound ground forces at will (with RAF fighter probably showing up far too late), but it will also make guidance towards the german formations pretty problematic. Without the sector controllers at Biggin, Kenley etc the british command would have a lot more troubles gaining an accurate picture of the situation to begin with and gaining it in time to be useful. Without the overall command exerted by the sector rooms the engagements would turn into a wild brawl and given the german numerical superiority the RAF would probably bleed dry in a short time, pilots and machines would suffer from growing fatigue and a lack of proper maintenance (which was also one of the major facets of the sector airfields). Lower and lower readiness numbers would be the result and would increase the speed of the viscious circle the RAF would find itself in.
2.) If Word War 2 made one thing abundantly clear then it's the supremacy of the aircraft over the naval surface units. Pretty much everywhere the aircraft (if operating in sufficient numbers, with the correct weapons and with crews sufficiently trained - or as in some cases a large enough dose of dumb luck) finished engagements with enemy surface fleets as victor (see
Bismarck,
Price of Wales,
Yamato, the ops at Crete etc etc). Under circumstances as described above the Luftwaffe would simply pound the harbor installations on the southern coast both to sink the surface units moored there during the day as well as to damage or destroy the harbor installations, piers, cranes, docks, ammunition depots etc. To operate warships need fuel and ammunition and if neither can be loaded because these goods are destroyed or the means to load them are no longer functional ... The Luftwaffe did have a fripping seven Gruppen of Ju 87 Stukas available for a direct assault on naval units. Even if untrained their sheer number would probably either overwhelm or wear down fleet ops after a while.
The second trump card the germans would have in this situation are the narrow waters of the Channel. It doesn't only limit the potential operational area but it also allows the massive use of mine fields which would not only endanger any vessel trying to enter the crucial area but also allow the Kriegsmarine to concentrate its meager forces for the more important tasks. Because of the german air supremacy RN ops would be confined to the hours of darkness which hampers mine clearing (which is limited to the darkness whereas the germans can lay mines day and night at their leisure). If the RN chose to operate in bright light it would find itself under constant attack which, even if failing to cause damage, would eat up ammunition on a grand scale which would hit the important destroyers and cruisers hard.
3.) While I have my doubts about the actual landing and the sea transport situation I am very much doubtful if the British Army could have taken on even a small german force (two or three divisions initially, to be reinforced by mobile formations soon after) in the field once it had passed a certain point. And to exploit the initial weakness of the landing the British Army would have needed excellent Command and Control facilities, quick reaction times both of forces and commanders ... and on top of it all mobile forces. But the British Army wasn't having any of that in 1940, in fact the Wehrmacht always considered them to be rather slow and methodic (Monty turned that into a form of art
). It had lost most of its best equipment on the continent, its best formations were still in extremely bad shape, it was almost devoid of battle-worthy tanks, it suffered from an acute shortage of motor transportation, AT guns, artillery and ammunition (to make matters even worse). As a result its numerically strength meant little when the essential mobility, support and logistics weren't there.
IIRC the only armored formation in somewhat battleworthy state was 1st Armored which translates into one good shot at the german lodging - after that it had little more than static infantry to man static defense lines ... and the Wehrmacht had made short work of static lines a lot more formidable than anything the Brits could put up in France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
04-07-2011, 07:52 PM
Hybrid Mode
