BBC James Holland - Battle of Britain

[ATAG_Dutch]

The only reason Stuka losses were that low is because they were withdrawn from the Battle after being knocked down like proverbial flies on I think only two occasions. Similar reason for 'only' 229 Bf110's, as they weren't up to the job of a dedicated fighter, compared to 533 Bf109's, which were shot down by the terribly inferior Spitfires and Hurricanes with their so tiny as to be insignificant .303 'peashooters'.

However, most comparisons of losses tend to be inaccurate, as people rarely count overall losses on the British side. If we count total losses on both sides, including British bomber losses, the statistics become closer again.

I can't agree with the 'when Fighter Command was on its knees' bit though. This is another propaganda ploy. Fighter Command was never 'on its knees' as evidenced by the deployment of the 'Big Wings' from 12 Group on Sept 15th, and the massive psychological impact this had on the German crews. This was when they discovered they'd been getting nowhere, and the RAF was as strong as ever, contrary to their intelligence reports. At no point was any airfield out of commission for more than a day, although one airfield was abandoned as it was too close to France for the aircraft to get to altitude.

At the end of the Battle, Fighter Command had more available fighters and pilots than at the start. It was Park's tactic of sending them up squadron by squadron in rotation that gave the impression of small numbers. This tactic gave the RAF a highly 'target rich' environment to fight in.
The Luftwaffe certainly weren't as strong at the end as they were at the beginning, as their manufacturing and training output couldn't keep pace with their losses. Britain out-produced Germany in both these areas.
The fact that British aircraft were easier to fly well probably also helped in speeding up delivery of pilots to the front.

It's impossible to 'overrate' Dowding, or Park for that matter.
Dowding devised the most comprehensive and efficient air defence network in the world.
Park put it to excellent use. Its principles are still in use today.

As it happens, Park then went on to face Kesselring again in Malta, and he beat him there too.

Originally Posted by Dutch_851

The only reason Stuka losses were that low is because they were withdrawn from the Battle after being knocked down like proverbial flies on I think only two occasions. Similar reason for 'only' 229 Bf110's, as they weren't up to the job of a dedicated fighter, compared to 533 Bf109's, which were shot down by the terribly inferior Spitfires and Hurricanes with their so tiny as to be insignificant .303 'peashooters'.

dude, do not insist on this aspect: the Germans shot down some 601 Hurricanes and 357 Spitfires (which makes a total of 958 planes more or less). So, despite the tactical advantage of flying over its own territory, the RAF lost almost twice the number of fighters that the Germans did.. even if they lost the same number of planes it would have been a tactical failure for the RAF, considering their territorial advantage.

However, most comparisons of losses tend to be inaccurate, as people rarely count overall losses on the British side. If we count total losses on both sides, including British bomber losses, the statistics become closer again.

in addition to the aforementioned fighters, the RAF lost some 53 Blenheims and 76 other planes. Statistics are more accurate nowadays, the Luftwaffe lost circa 1600 planes, the RAF circa 1000.

I can't agree with the 'when Fighter Command was on its knees' bit though. This is another propaganda ploy. Fighter Command was never 'on its knees' as evidenced by the deployment of the 'Big Wings' from 12 Group on Sept 15th, and the massive psychological impact this had on the German crews. This was when they discovered they'd been getting nowhere, and the RAF was as strong as ever, contrary to their intelligence reports. At no point was any airfield out of commission for more than a day, although one airfield was abandoned as it was too close to France for the aircraft to get to altitude.

there were not enough pilots man, that is a known fact. The truth is that if the Fighter Command didn't get a break they would have found very hard to keep their planes in the air, simply because the pilot syllabus wasn't fast enough.

At the end of the Battle, Fighter Command had more available fighters and pilots than at the start. It was Park's tactic of sending them up squadron by squadron in rotation that gave the impression of small numbers. This tactic gave the RAF a highly 'target rich' environment to fight in.
The Luftwaffe certainly weren't as strong at the end as they were at the beginning, as their manufacturing and training output couldn't keep pace with their losses. Britain out-produced Germany in both these areas.
The fact that British aircraft were easier to fly well probably also helped in speeding up delivery of pilots to the front.

This is a common misconception: the Germans had already committed a huge number of planes for the Battle of Britain, they started it with the intended number of planes that they wanted, and then had to concentrate their resources on other industrial productions, hence the lower number of planes produced during the Battle of Britain; the British had to change pace and start building planes to catch up with the war. The numbers of planes produced per se doesn't really give any valuable perspective to the battle.

It's impossible to 'overrate' Dowding, or Park for that matter.
Dowding devised the most comprehensive and efficient air defence network in the world.
Park put it to excellent use. Its principles are still in use today.

As it happens, Park then went on to face Kesselring again in Malta, and he beat him there too.

I haven't put Dowding and Park on the same level: the former was an old fashioned but charismatic leader who gained popularity with the Battle of Britain (but bear in mind that his "brilliant intuition" was a simple consequence of the entry in service of the Radar system), and unfortunately he wasn't as successful when it came to night fighting issues.. Park was indeed a brilliant tactician, and IMHO is the man that made a real difference in the development of the RAF.

[Blackdog_kt]

Originally Posted by dduff442

It's funny how the 'when plucky little Britain stood alone' story has come to dominate all interpretations of the battle from either side's perspective.

Victory in the air was just the first step in a succession of feats -- each of increasing difficulty -- Germany needed to pull off in order to secure victory. Britain would not have thrown it's last resources into defending the SE or even defending London. The fighter Sqns would have been withdrawn and rebuilt if the BoB started to go wrong.

At that point, Hitler would have had the choice of gambling on a cross-channel attack (i.e. over 20+ miles of unsheltered atlantic waters), but without any navy to secure the sea lanes. One brief experiment was conducted with the landing barges... in daylight and with less than encouraging results.

Swarming across the channel en masse in darkness in their boats designed for inland waterways would have been an entirely different matter. Eisenhower had the most accurate weather forecast ever made in his hands when he ordered D-Day. Without similar information, Germany could have gotten lucky or it could have suffered an appalling fiasco.

Whether German air-landings would have resembled Eben Emael or Crete is anybody's guess but if they weren't much more like the former than the latter then all Germany's chances would have ended.

An German airhead on British soil would have been a deadly threat to Britain so at that point Fighter Command might have been expected to re-emerge with all the strength it could muster.

Cuisers and destroyers would have roamed the channel at night and, if they failed to cut German supplies, a BB could have been sacrificed on an end-run. Recalling the impact of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau etc. on convoys will illustrate the stupefying violence these machines could bring to bear on undefended merchants.

Five or six divisions would probably have defeated Britain's available field forces but you can't occupy a country the size of Britain with 5 Divisions. This was unfortunate for Hitler because sustaining even this force for a brief period was the absolute limit of Germany's logistical capabilities.

I'm Irish and, as Danes or Dutch or Portugese etc will tell you, there are few things as irritating as coming from a small country with a large neighbour possessing an assured sense of its own grandeur. Odd then, that this story is inverted when talking about the Battle of Britain. The prospect of invasion was one to be interpreted as an opportunity rather than as a risk.

Having talked up Germany's victories all through the summer of '40, Hitler was a victim of the expectations he had generated. If he didn't clinch it that year, however, he'd be left in exactly the same position as Napoleon: facing an adversary with unassailable naval power, a global trading network, ample supplies of everything Germany didn't have (oil, nickel, manganese, tungsten, rubber etc), willing to sustain the conflict literally for as long as necessary and able to do so for the foreseeable future. All exactly as in 1800-1812.

This wouldn't have been enough to secure an Allied victory, but Germany would never have known peace on its frontiers and sooner or later other powers would have joined the fight.

dduff

That's actually a very well thought out and accurate post. Maybe the main consideration in achieving air superiority was the ability to protect or cripple the royal navy (depending on which side one came from). I know for a fact that the reason my county's government chose to side with the allies and suffer 4 years of brutal occupation, resulting in losing 10% of its total polulation to reasons ranging from reprisals to hunger, was that the people in charge simply thought "this is a world war fought over long distances, navies will play a big part and the UK has the best navy of them all'.

Greece was ruled by a dictatorship when Mussolini's ambassador in Athens delivered the ultimatum, asking for free passage and occupation of certain strategic territories. The Greek dictator at the time was closer ideologically to the fascists of Italy and Germany, plus the local royal family was of Danish/German descent and prone to side with the axis. In fact, they tried that in WWI as well, the end result was that pro-allied politicians formed a separate government in the north and nothern Greece was with the allies, while southern Greece was pro-central powers and Athens got occupied by the allied fleet.

The reason both the king and the dictator decided to oppose the axis was two-fold. First of all, the Greek people always root for the underdog and dislike the aggressor, so any attempt to join the axis would have been met by intense resistance from the inside. Second, they were expecting Britain to exhaust their enemies through naval power and blockades, especially since they were suspecting the US would either join the war itself (which it did) or put its industrial power to use in "propping up" Britain when things would get tough through lend-lease.

To make it short i think that even if the luftwaffe had achieved complete air superiority in southern UK, even a suicide run by the royal navy could have wrought terrible losses on the German invasion fleet and either thwart the landings altogether, or diminish numbers so much that ground troops on British soil would be able to hold their ground and achieve a stalemate or more. Maybe 90% of the royal navy units operating in the area would be sunk, but if the RAF had kept some reserves to buy them time and provide air cover they would be able to do substantial damage to the German invasion fleet.
Of course, if the RAF was totally depleted by that point and the warships operated with no cover at all, it would be a totally different story.

Overall, this is a pretty good discussion with lots of opposing, yet well argued points. Well done everybody

[proton45]

I have rather enjoyed "The South Coast Trail"...

[ATAG_Dutch]

I was so wound up by your post I laid this out very badly by answering your points within the quote. Apologies.

Originally Posted by Sternjaeger

dude, do not insist on this aspect: the Germans shot down some 601 Hurricanes and 357 Spitfires (which makes a total of 958 planes more or less). So, despite the tactical advantage of flying over its own territory, the RAF lost almost twice the number of fighters that the Germans did.. even if they lost the same number of planes it would have been a tactical failure for the RAF, considering their territorial advantage.

The RAF were concentrating on attacking bombers. The idea that the Battle was all about fighter v fighter encounters is a bit shortsighted. Also, you do not include the Bf110 fighters in your figures. This brings the fighter tally closer at 762 German fighter losses.

in addition to the aforementioned fighters, the RAF lost some 53 Blenheims and 76 other planes. Statistics are more accurate nowadays, the Luftwaffe lost circa 1600 planes, the RAF circa 1000.

The RAF lost 1088 according to your figures, so Britain also won the battle of attrition. The losses in trained German aircrew were far greater than 1600, as the RAF concentrated on the bombers.

there were not enough pilots man, that is a known fact. The truth is that if the Fighter Command didn't get a break they would have found very hard to keep their planes in the air, simply because the pilot syllabus wasn't fast enough.

There were not enough pilots to give the RAF a numerical advantage over the Germans, hence needing to achieve a kill ratio of roughly 2 to 1 to be assured of success.
Your version of 'truth' relies on the 'what if' scenario of Germany maintaining their attacks on airfields. What ifs aren't truth. See previous post on impact on airfields.

This is a common misconception: the Germans had already committed a huge number of planes for the Battle of Britain, they started it with the intended number of planes that they wanted, and then had to concentrate their resources on other industrial productions, hence the lower number of planes produced during the Battle of Britain; the British had to change pace and start building planes to catch up with the war. The numbers of planes produced per se doesn't really give any valuable perspective to the battle.

So the fact that the RAF had more aircraft and pilots at the end of the Battle than at the beginning, whereas the Germans had far less also proves nothing?!

I haven't put Dowding and Park on the same level: the former was an old fashioned but charismatic leader who gained popularity with the Battle of Britain (but bear in mind that his "brilliant intuition" was a simple consequence of the entry in service of the Radar system), and unfortunately he wasn't as successful when it came to night fighting issues.. Park was indeed a brilliant tactician, and IMHO is the man that made a real difference in the development of the RAF.

Actually, it was Dowding who instigated the development of airborne radar in the night fighting Beaufighters. Many people thought he was mad.

Sorry Stern, but you really do have to conduct some more in depth research. And not just those works produced by people who've made a career of debunking the propaganda mythology.
I'm not the sort of person who likes to make essay length posts, or I'd tell you myself, but read up a bit more.
Dowding coordinated RDF with the observer corps and telephone and teleprinter services, together with the command/group/sector/airfield/squadron information loop. He took every available development to form a cohesive whole that no-one else in the world had thought of. Calling this a coincidence is just ill-informed and provocative.
He was not old fashioned, but revolutionary and very modern. He wasn't 'charismatic', his nickname was 'Stuffy', and he wasn't well liked. Neither did he gain popularity. He and Park were both moved out of their jobs soon after the Battle due to internal RAF political machinations, and neither of these men were mentioned in the official government pamphlet published soon after the Battle.

This misunderstanding of two men's characters and contributions in itself reveals profound misinformation, which by inference shows the remainder of your arguments to be less than credible at best.