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The Luftwaffe of early 43 was good. But the decline in quality and quantity of pilots and material was rapid and by mid 44 the LW was only a shadow of its past glory. By end of 43, when P-51s came into the theater the RAF and P-47s had made quite some dents into LW.
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I love this recurring meme; the poor
jagdewaffe in the West being run ragged by huge numbers of Spitfires and P-47s nibbling at the fringes of European airspace and fighting desperately to stem the tide of thousands of B-17s and B-24s that were striking at Germany itself and implying that this was the case
immediately after the United States entered the war.
I’m not familiar with the numbers of Spits on the Channel, but the best figures I can get for their reach is about 90 miles (145 km) past the French coast, and that was only in certain areas where France and England were fairly close. In terms of attrition, they were a minor concern to the LW; they could largely be avoided or ignored. A P-47C/D with a single belly tank (the twin wing pylons of the late D models didn’t become available until late spring of 1944) could have an effective combat range out to the edges of German airspace, and it took the USAAF about six months to develop that capability after the P-47 was introduced to operations (March, 1943).
The P-47 was introduced early spring of 1943 and it was still a developmental aircraft in many ways; mechanical and radio aborts were fairly common well into the fall of that year, and it was quickly established that the Thunderbolt was not competitive at altitudes below 20,000 ft. Additionally, of the three 8th AF fighter groups, only the 56th FG had had any previous time in the type; the more combat seasoned 4th FG had previously flown Spitfires under British control and the 78th was stripped of its P-38s and most of its pilots to supply the Torch/N. African campaign—it was mainly a shell of senior officers and newly trained pilots dropped into modern fighters right out of the gate. The 4th lost a good number of experienced pilots and leaders who were sent to other AAF units to provide combat experience and leadership (and dilute the RAF mindset they had). Basically, two of the three fighter groups in England started operations in the P-47 already resentful and shorthanded.
For most of the summer and early fall of 1943, these three groups of roughly 45 aircraft each could field a maximum effort of maybe 110-120 fighters to escort (in shifts) a fairly limited number of B-17s over (mainly) France, and they were getting their asses
kicked. The Germans were destroying aircraft and killing or capturing trained aircrew about as quickly as we could build or train them & get them across the Atlantic most of that year.
In the case of bombers and crews they were taking them out even faster than (less experienced) new ones could be brought in for most of 1943.
In fact, there was a great deal of discussion of at least suspending the daylight bombing effort entirely by mid-October of that year, in order to finally gather up a big enough force to overwhelm the German defenses (although without effective fighter escorts past the German border, it might have simply led to even greater losses to no benefit). During that fall and early winter of 1943, about five or six new fighter groups joined the 8th AF, but their participation in combat operations were limited by the ‘breaking in period’ required partly because production of USAAF first-line fighters had not reached the point where they could be used for advanced training, which meant that
the first time the newly trained pilots actually got meaningful time in the fighter model they would be fighting in was after they had arrived in England and partly because they still had to be trained and briefed on the latest tactics and radio procedures in the theater.
That breaking in period was extended by truly atrocious weather that fall, which slowed their progress and led to several fatalities in training while the original three groups not only continued their combat operations, but ‘loaned’ key personnel to the new groups to train and evaluate them.
8th AF combat operations during the period from mid-October ’43 until mid-February of ’44 were spotty and erratic due to the weather and the ongoing debate about which direction the bombing campaign would take;
Escort To Berlin, the combat diary of the 4th FG, shows just over 40 missions for the group (often squadron sized or less) during that 123 day period, making contact less than half the time, and barely breaking even in terms of victories and combat losses (add in operational casualties, and they were losing, and
badly). Only the 56th FG was enjoying a measure of success at that time; the 78th and the 4th were probably still sulking over being stuck with the P-47 and all the key personnel they’d had stolen from them to stock other groups in England, Italy and the Pacific.
Meanwhile, the poor LW was busily patting itself on the back and painting victory bars and pictures of Iron Crosses on their tail fins, ignoring the fact that the Battle of the Atlantic had been lost by the U-boats and that now the steadily increasing production of the US factories and training bases could be brought to England without losing a meaningful percentage first. They thought that they had already won the Battle of Germany, and their leadership simply didn’t believe that reports of the P-51 equipped with a Merlin 60 series engine could a) have the range to escort the bombers over Germany or b) be effective even if it did. Morale at Christmas of 1943 was very good, and confidence was high. Most fighter pilots were more concerned about what Goerring might do to them than what the Americans would do.
Certainly there had been some attrition, but they were winning and doing so easily. There had been sightings of P-38s, but these were poorly flown by half-frozen, half-trained pilots in limited numbers, and the Lightning was never well thought of by the pilots of the Luftwaffe unless they were shot down or nearly got shot down by one (and some not even then, like Galland). It had good range, but it was a twin, and it was an article of faith that twins couldn’t compete with single engine fighters. The P-47 was sometimes dangerous up high, but it was short legged and useless below 6500m, where any extended fight was likely to end.
A German fighter pilot stationed in the West at the end of 1943 was well trained, well rested and confidant; he had more combat experience, proven leaders in every unit, excellent aircraft, reliable weapons, good tactical doctrine, and an extensive early warning and ground control system. He probably would have thought himself in a better position than the Tommies were over southern England in the summer of 1940. There were lots of Tommies and Americans, it was true, but they could be avoided most of the time and once the bombers got past the French border, they were alone and practically sitting ducks. More victory bars and fancier medals for the tail fin display were on the horizon, and once they finally learned that the Fatherland was not to be trifled with, they would come to terms with Germany and maybe even join in on the destruction of the Soviet Union.
That's both sides of the story; 1943 was a very good year to be a German fighter pilot, and most of them thought that there was no end in sight for their continued dominance over their own airspace. At the start of 1944, the Germans were convinced that they had everything well in hand in the West. They certainly made no efforts to increase training schedules or the number of fighter units in the West until the situation became a crises.
cheers
horseback