Quote:
Originally Posted by K_Freddie
This is the key to escaping the Zero... Chinnault's Tigers were doing this before Pearl Harbour in P40's... just that back home they didn't know how to read combat reports.
The Zero had limited top speed (around 390 kph) for maneuverability in the rolling axis, where it's ailerons locked due to compressibility. The wing profile that gave it's high maneuverability at low speeds, suddenly had big limitations at high speed.
The Allies learned about this very quickly and used the high speed roll to escape or out-maneuver the Zero.
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Freddy, Freddy, Freddy. You are being unfair to people who didn't even have digital watches, much less cell phones and internet porn.
How do you think that combat reports made their way back to the US from Rangoon, and from the US to carriers at sea? (and this is just based on the assumption that detailed reports were made at the time and sent to--most likely--USAAF Headquarters). Back in 1942, there was
nothing even remotely like the instant communications we enjoy today; Burma was literally the backside of nowhere, and telegraph was the fastest form of communication available assuming that British commanders on the scene were willing to pass on tactical observations to a foreign power from what they considered a bunch of Yank mercenaries. Chances are that any reports were relayed through the US embassy in Chunking, and hand carried up the chain, again, assuming that the ambassador had the space in his couriers' bags at any given time.
At best, the reports from the pilots and their commander made it back to Washington in a month or two, and then you have to keep in mind that the USAAF was run by the bomber boys who had very little use for Chennault and his fighter doctrines (which was why he had to retire early in the first place). Were it not for the sensationalist press reports, his combat evaluations might never have been read at all.
NONE of the Allies seem to have been reading even their own combat reports in 1941-42; even though some RAF squadrons in England were reportedly flying finger four combat formations in early 1941 across the Channel, other squadrons in the Med and Far East continued to fly vics and strings well into 1943 (and paying the price in blood).
It seems like everyone was forced to figure things out for themselves; the USN's Thach had experimented with formations of two pairs in late fall of 1941 in San Diego based on what almost everyone at the time considered ridiculous reports about Japanese fighters whose performance equaled the best the Western Powers had, and possessed of unGodly maneuverability besides. Apparently, he had the time to kill since he was ashore prepping a new fighter squadron with the F4F-3, which was coming in in dribs and drabs, and had less than ideal performance compared to contemporary land based fighters.
Chennault, whose reports
may have been what prompted Thach's experiments, adapted tactics best suited to the Hawk 81s he was expecting from Lend Lease to China. Those tactics wouldn't have worked as well for Wildcats, whose speed and acceleration were less exhilarating than the Hawks', but did possess better forward vision and sufficient maneuverability to take advantage of the deflection shooting that USN aviators trained for.
Meanwhile, in Java and then Northern Australia, the survivors flying P-40Es had learned their lessons the hard way and compared notes. None of these people had an opportunity to learn from each others' experiences until much later in the war if not after. When Chennault's 23rd FG finally got razorback Merlin Mustangs in mid-'44, his guys never got the memo about the guns jamming due to wing flexing, and they never figured out a fix beyond getting the D-models to replace the A/B/C models that never quite replaced the P-40Ms and Ns in China.
The Zero's ailerons got a lot heavier very quickly over 200 kts indicated, but it wasn't compressibility (and the shock waves it produced), it was just the tradeoff for having those big ailerons that worked so well at what the IJN considered combat speeds, below 200kts. At the higher speeds air resistance on those large control surfaces was more pronounced and the leverage you could generate on the stick was not so great, particularly for the much shorter average Japanese of the day. Allied fighters were almost all better in this regard, and since few of them could accelerate like the lighter Japanese models, they were already entering expected combat zones at higher than cruise speeds anyway. The relative advantages of staying fast were soon noted, as you pointed out.
cheers
horseback