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Old 11-21-2012, 11:53 AM
lonewulf lonewulf is offline
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Quote:
Originally Posted by *Buzzsaw* View Post
Gonna have to disagree with you. Ludendorff's "Kaiserschlact" attacks of Spring 1918 used none of the concept of deep penetration and attack on rear objectives which were characteristic of German armoured doctrine in WWII. Yes, the Stossstruppen used infiltration techniques on a tactical level which involved bypassing strongpoints instead of assaulting them, but there was no combined arms with tanks, the Germans barely had any tanks available. And Ludendorff did not know how to exploit his initial successes, he had no plan to feed reserves through the holes he created, and get into the Allied rear areas. In fact, the Allied commanders in WWI were much better at exploiting success than the Germans, they managed to break the conflict out into open countryside out of the trenches by October of 1918 in their counter-offensive.



Gonna have to disagree with you again. Ironically the Wehrmacht under Adolf Hitler, a totalitarian dictator who insisted on complete obedience to his wishes, was actually the most democratic institution in Nazi Germany. Initiative in this new German army was encouraged on all levels, junior Wehrmacht officers, even NCO's were encouraged to take decisions which in other armies, such as the French and British, would be referred upwards in the chain of command, hence causing delays and failures to exploit opportunities. Some of the greatest successes the Germans achieved were as a result of junior commanders following this spirit of initiative, and ignoring the directions of their superiors. In the Battle of France, both Guderian and Rommel ignored Hitler's and their superior's orders to stop short after crossing the Meuse, and instead drove forwards at a relentless pace because they knew they had the French on the run. Only the Americans developed a Officer corps which was capable of showing the same level of initiative in the junior levels. There was not a lot of "National Socialist" fervour in the Wehrmacht, to the contrary, it was the largest source of opposition to Hitler once he started to run into trouble. Yes, Hitler did create an elite body of troops in the SS Panzertruppen, who were committed Nazis, but surprisingly, if you look at their combat record, they were no more effective, in many cases worse, than the standard Wehrmacht Panzer divisions. The Divisions with the best record in the German army were the 116th Panzer Division, and the 2nd Panzer Division. Look at the Battle of the Ardennes. The 6th Panzer Army under SS General Seip Dietrich, all SS Divisions, failed in its breakout attempt, despite much better equipment. The Wehrmacht Panzer divisions in the 5th Panzer Army, under Wehrmacht General Manteuffel were the ones who actually broke out through the American lines and made the deepest penetration. Unfortunately for them, and fortunately for the rest of us, the lead Panzer Divisions ran out of fuel just short of the Meuse river and were surrounded and slaughtered by one of the US Army's best Tank commanders, Ernest Harmon of the 2nd Armoured division. Contrary to the myths perpetuated by the Patton cheerleading section, this was the real critical moment of the Battle not the relief of Bastogne.



Again, you are ignoring the facts. In the case of Poland, the Polish had only 45 tanks, which were obsolete R35's. In fact, by far the majority of the French tank forces were comprised of these same obsolete Renault R35 tanks dating from 1933. These had weak armour, a low velocity inaccurate 37mm gun designed for fighting infantry, and were not a match for the Panzer II's high velocity 20mm, which were the majority of the German tank force. The 20mm on the Panzer II could penetrate the R35's turret at 100 meters, the 37mm on the R35 could not penetrate the Panzer. The Panzer II was a fine tank, quite fast and maneuverable for its time, it had a top speed of 40km/hr compared to 20 km/hr for the R35. In addition, almost all French tanks had no radios, which meant the tanks could not work in concert, and their commanders had to load and fire as well as call out maneuver commands, something which did not work in practice. Imagine leaning out your turret and waving a flag to try to get the remainder of your tank platoon to follow a direction... Yes, there were some Char B's and Somua S-35's, but they were the minority, the next most numerous French Tank was the Hotchkiss H35, which was as slow as the R35, and had the same poor gun, with weaker armour, which was notorious for bad manufacturing and weak spots which were easily penetrated. The most numerous British tank was the Mk VIA, which was very much inferior to the Panzer II, having weak armour and a MG as armament. There were very few Matildas.

And the French airforce was not a match for the Germans, they had nowhere near the same number of Squadrons in the air, their infrastructure could not support the number of aircraft they had in reserve. Also the Morane 406, the most numerous French fighter was simply not a match for the 109E. Only the Curtis H75 and Dewoitine 520 were a match and the 520 was manufactured in small numbers while the Curtiss was an American import. (Curtiss H-75's shot down more German aircraft than any other French manned fighter)

I think we're essentially arguing around the margins here but maybe I’m just not explaining myself very well. All of the principles employed by the Germans in their assault on France and the Low countries were known to the western allies prior to 1940. Most of the combined arms principles used in the course of the German assault had in fact been pioneered in WW 1 or well before. Tank tactics, the concept of armoured thrusts and breakthroughs etc were international concepts by the 1920s and 30s and certainly not the exclusive preserve of the German Army. The Germans essentially continued where they had left off at the end of in WW 1 and with further refinements employed these same tactics again in 1939-40. But crucially, it was not beyond the powers of the French to stop them. German supply lines, which were strung out along a very narrow front were highly vulnerable and at absolute breaking point and sometimes beyond breaking point during the German drive for the coast. However, the French failed to seize the initiative and exploit this glaring weakness. French leadership utterly failed at the critical moment. It was this failure rather than the introduction of new unheralded tactical innovations that secured a German victory. And yes, I agree about the greater abundance of initiative among German officers and NCOs during critical moments during the assault, but what has this to do with Blitzkrieg? If anything it simply reinforces my point that even if the Germans were making use of unheard of tactical innovations during the assault (they weren't), they could only take the invaders so far, and on numerous occasions, the assault would have stalled or failed had it not been for the willingness of small units and in some cases individuals to undertake extraordinary feats of arms to ensure its success.
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