Quote:
Originally Posted by Crumpp
The RAF logistical system was able to maintain and replace their losses while the Luftwaffe's system was not.
Both airforces had pilot shortages before the battle even began.
The basic difference in the two logistical systems was who was responsible for repairs.
The Luftwaffe Jadgegeschwaders TO was responsible for each aircraft in the unit. When it was damaged, he had to see to its repair with his unit assigned maintenance personnel. If it required organizational level maintenance, then the airframe was sent off but still remained on that Geschwader's books. The unit was down an airframe until it came back repaired or was stricken off and replaced.
The logistical genius of the CRO/ASU combined with some good pre-war planning on the industrial side so that the United Kingdom exceeded its aircraft production goals in single engine fighters and outproduced the German 2:1. The serviceability rates of the RAF actually rose during the battle to 98% while the Luftwaffe's servicability rates steadily declined.
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So essentially Crumpp has been trying to tell us - over several threads and in interminable detail - that logistically the RAF was not able to provide sufficient 100 octane fuel to allow all frontline, single-engined fighters to operate using the fuel, yet was able to ensure an adequate supply of fighters, both through the factories and through the CRO/ASU repair organisations.
I would think that an organisation which had the logistical genius to plan pre-war for high production rates, and set up proper repair facilities in wartime, also had the nouse to provide all of its frontline units with the best available fuel, contrary to Crumpp's stated beliefs.