Quote:
Originally Posted by Kurfürst
Well let's see now the reality.
Tanker losses to all causes, I have gathered a total of 78(!!) tankers were sunk by mine, U-boot (typically), aircraft and raiders, between September 1939 and November 1940. About 90% of them were British, though there are a couple of Swedish, Dutch, French etc. tankers
I have them by name, date, cause of loss, route, cargo, tonnage and so on. For example indeed one tanker that went through Halifax, Inverdagle (9456 tons) was sunk by mines laid by the submarine U 34, with 12 500 tons of avgas - about a month worth consumption of 100 octane, though I am not sure what grade it actually carried - on the 16 January 1940....
Alltogether 558,260 GRT of tankers went to Davy Jones locker, by the end of November 1940, along with 385,957 tons of oil product. Half of that, ca. 243 000 GRT worth of tankers were sunk by the end May 1940.
Fuel oil was the greatest loss, 116 000 tons of it went down with tankers (luckily, no green peace back then). Avgas seems quite untypical as a load, but in the end it didn't really matter, because if a tanker sunk with diesel oil, or even empty, the next one had to haul about its cargo again.
Tanker losses were serious, unfortunately.
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33rd Weekly Report Oil Position 23 April 1940 showing out of 242 Norwegian tankers 119 had been bought under Allied control, with 18 heading to Allied ports and the other 93 in neutral ports, or heading into neutral ports, the 119 brought under Allied control more than making up for the total tanker loss for the entire war period September 1939 to November 1940:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Kurfürst
So disprove the statement of Pips. Since you misrepresent his position, I put it forward to you in its originality:
This is from a researcher, researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.
The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.
The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.
By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.
Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.
The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.
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"The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel"
1st Monthly Oil Position Report July 1940 ( Dated 6 August 1940)
Table from 1st Monthly Oil Report July 1940: Consumption: Read in conjunction with attachment 1:
Table from 1st Monthly Report July 1940; Stocks dropped by 15,000 tons April-May then increased by 12,000 tons to June:
Table from 33rd Weekly Oil Position Report 23 April 1940 showing 100 Octane fuel being stockpiled in the UK and overseas; "West of Suez" - France springs to mind.
Oil Position 5th Monthly Report November 1940:
