Rudell's claims could be easilly asumed as over the line.
But even on 10% they are impressive.

On the number of missions flown, you really got a spot when you differentiated the mission duration beteween the german and the allied sides.
There was an example of this on the osprey book about the Hs123.
Through the battle of France, they report this plane as being the first type to stop a tank charge using only air power.
There was a french column heading for the airbase where they were stationed, and they proceeded to harass and attack this column of french tanks until they retreated. I don't remember if there were any kind of tank losses there, but the point is that the planes landed and take off more than once in a single day. Something not unussual on the german side.
Why the French quited the attack, the book asumes it was because of the 123's. But only God knows what really happened over there.

Its quite easy to stop tanks. A near miss can easily cause significant damage to tracks, especially with larger bombs. Hs-123s were slow planes, where the pilot had more time to aim than in a Ju-87, so they could aim their bombs more precisely. This way, even SC 50 can be effective in stopping tanks (not destroying, thats enitrely out of question)

I share this point of view, but it was disregarded by fellow forum posters upward in the thread.

I agree with you.

At Peleliu, Corsairs probably flew the shortest bombing missions ever. The target was less than two miles away from airfield, and pilots hadn’t even time to retract landing gear. So what we would need is not missions number, but mission duration, hard to get, I think. Then enemy opposition should be factored, even harder to do reliably.

You’re right. There are a lot of things we didn’t consider, and a lot more we simply don’t know. Then there are all the things we can only make educated guess about. My guess is that a tank moving on the battlefield is a small and difficult target, even for a near-missing bomb, and slow speed never helped any plane to survive.
I think we are talking too much about weapons effectiveness. On paper, Russian PTAB hollow charge bombs were a fearsome weapon, being dropped by the hundreds. However, not enough German tanks were destroyed by air attack to prove this lethality (or so available numbers suggest).
My educated guess is that, regardless of weapons, WWII era attack airplanes were largely inadequate for anti-tank warfare.

They were fearsome weapons in practice too. But not against tanks. It was a devastating weapon against truck convoys, but was nearly impossible to hit tanks with them. Still, it was incredibly effective: Destroying a supply convoy was far more important than destroying a few tanks.

You can sort of figure out mission duration by number of sorties in a day, and, of course, distance from home airfield to the front lines.

Pilot logs contain all that information, but we almost never get to see them.

Degree of opposition could be inferred from maintenance logs - which record damaged and missing aircraft. But, I'm not sure that such data exists anymore.

There was another point that may have helped Mr Rudell while flying the 87G.

When your side is deffending, you get a target rich environment, and... early warning!

This same early warning isn't available to the attacking side, unless they deploy a ridiculous amount of fighters all along the front line, like on the western side. With also a far stretch front line than on the eastern front.
He should be very unlucky just to pick the few freie jagds missions developed by the russians before 1944, on the wider front of the war.

He stopped flying the 87G after this wasn't healthy anymore.

Also, tanks damaged on an aborted penetration, may end being destroyed by their own crews.
Say, He got extremely lucky, killed the column commander, and the rest just fled from combat, putting their vehicles on fire. Rudell destroyed a whole tank column... who knows!

War isn't just some simple hell, it is a very bureaucratic, and chaotic hell!

LW fighter force in Eastern Front in 1944-45 was cut down to bare minimum. Priorities were clear: home defence first, the rest secondary.

If this is true, then the reverse should be true also. Russians gained air superiority for RAF and USAAF during the previous year, exactly when the bomber offensive was risking failure. And it was 1,943 the decisive year for the outcome of war. In 1,944, war was already lost for Germany, regardless LW shifting from East to West, North to South or whatever. In my opinion.