What a load of BS.

Total losses of aircraft in the Battle of Britain

Assuming these are correct, haven't checked from my books

Month----------------RAF------Luftwaffe
July (from10th)------90--------165
August--------------399-------612
September-----------416------ 554
October-------------182------- 321
Total----------------1087----- 1652

The RAF did loose more fighters than the Luftwaffe, but not more planes.

So much for consistently winning the aerial engagements.

Or do bombers not count.......

The air must be very thin where Crumpp is....the guy is just not right in the head.

Yes, classic symptoms of oxygen starvation!

I just finished reading Stainhilper's 'Spitfire on my tail' again and he thinks otherwise. :grin:

No, it was the other way around, that's why they lost this 'Battle of Britain'.

To be fair to Crumpp he is correct about the British having a better production and repair set up so the RAF were never in any real danger of running out of aircraft.

However the RAF were training more pilots than the Luftwaffe which enabled them to maintain the numbrs. No one is trying to pretend that the mid 1940 training of the RAF was up to pre war standards but then again neither was the Luftwaffe training.
The RAF trained 300 pilots a year in 1935, by August 1940 they were training 7,000 pilots a year. You do not get that size of increase without problems and shortages of everything, training aircraft, trainers, airfields take your pick. I do not know the numbers for the Luftwaffe but would expect them to also suffer shortages as they would also be ramping up whilst fighting a major campaign

Basically the RAF were better prepared infrastructure wise that the Luftwaffe (including fuel)

I totally disagree with his assertion that the Luftwaffe consistantly won the air battles. If he could support that with numbers lost compared to actual kills it would be interesting. Or he could explain why so many bomber raids were turned back before reaching the target, a lot got through but a lot didn't.

My understanding was that the appalling losses inflicted by the Luftwaffe on RAF Bomber Command was instrumental in switching to night bombing, and the subsequent development of the various navigation aids such as Oboe, GEE, H2S, etc.

Partly true. There is no doubt that the RAF switched its heavy long range bombers to night raids although a number of daylight raids continued all through the war. The RAF always had a strong interest in night raids for instance I don't think the Whitley was ever used on a daylight raid, but it is true to say that the losses forced a switch to night raids. However No 2 Group concentrated on daylight raids all through the war. I cannot think of any raids that did not get to the target, no doubt some didn't but the vast majority did.

But we are talking about the BOB. If the Germans according to Crumpp won the vast majority of the engagements, why were a number of the raids turned back.

Also, the mauling that the Luftwaffe bombers had during BoB (during the air battles that the Luftwaffe consistently won:rolleyes:), was why they to switched to night bombing too, ever heard of the Blitz?

Next Crumpp will be telling us that the Luftwaffe won the BofB...:rolleyes:

So essentially Crumpp has been trying to tell us - over several threads and in interminable detail - that logistically the RAF was not able to provide sufficient 100 octane fuel to allow all frontline, single-engined fighters to operate using the fuel, yet was able to ensure an adequate supply of fighters, both through the factories and through the CRO/ASU repair organisations.

I would think that an organisation which had the logistical genius to plan pre-war for high production rates, and set up proper repair facilities in wartime, also had the nouse to provide all of its frontline units with the best available fuel, contrary to Crumpp's stated beliefs.