Is this your 1942 manual for the Mk I Spitfire or some other paper that I have missed?

I hardly think 100 Octane was critical to victory.

The RAF won because they fought every day and they had a logistical system they allowed them to replace their losses.

That same logistical system, the Civilian Repair Organization combined with some very good pre-war planning in manufacture, allowed them to increase their numerical superiority during the battle.

So while the RAF took heavier losses in air to air combat compared to the Luftwaffe, they replaced those losses at a faster rate and were able to move from numerical parity in Single Engine fighters to numerical superiority during the battle.

The raf took heavier losses? Didnt know that. I thought they had to shoot them down at a better rate than 2-1 to win

Don't think so
After a quick search I found this. I'm sure there are other sources. From my understanding Britain had more of a problem replacing pilots than planes. Still they did have the home ground advantage.

http://cz-raf.hyperlink.cz/BoB/stat.html

I think what Crumpp is getting at is purely fighter vs fighter, in which he is correct.

Of course this is ridiculous as the only opposition for the Luftwaffe was RAF fighters, but the RAF had bombers to shoot down as well.

Air superiority is only important so your airforce can inflict damage on the ground after all, and was the German goal for an invasion....

But he has to show that the Luftwaffe were superior somehow.

Numerical parity?

Aug 13 1940
Jafu 2 and 3 had 891 Bf109s while 11 Group had maybe 440 (22 sqd x 20 a/c) Spitfires/Hurricanes.

440 spits and hurris against 891 whine 'o' 9's.....i call that a parity :)

On the 13th August 1940 at 09.00 hrs Fighter Command had the following servicable fighters in the UK

■Blenheim - 71
■Spitfire - 226
■Hurricane - 353
■Defiant - 26
■Gladiator - 2

People get hung up about numbers of aircraft but as has been stated pilots are much more important. It takes a lot longer to train a pilot than build an aircraft and you cannot just up the production.

For the Luftwaffe Pilots were if anything a bigger problem than for the RAF.

On the 29th June the Luftwaffe had 856 servicable single engine fighters and 906 pilots ready for duty
On the 29th September the Luftwaffe had 712 servicable single engined fighters and 676 pilots ready for duty

On the 29th September the RAF had the following servicable fighters:-

■Blenheim - 59
■Spitfire - 227
■Hurricane - 387
■Defiant - 16
■Gladiator - 8

The earliest numbers I have for the ARF servicability are for the 17th July

■Blenheim - 67
■Spitfire - 237
■Hurricane - 331
■Defiant - 20


So if your comparing 109's against Spits and Hurricanes the RAF broadly speaking retained their strength whereas the 109's were reduced significantly and without the 109 the air war couldn't be won

Yes the RAF took heavier losses than the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe consistantly won the aerial engagements but each loss the RAF inflicted added up in the big picture.

The RAF logistical system was able to maintain and replace their losses while the Luftwaffe's system was not.

Both airforces had pilot shortages before the battle even began.

The basic difference in the two logistical systems was who was responsible for repairs.

The Luftwaffe Jadgegeschwaders TO was responsible for each aircraft in the unit. When it was damaged, he had to see to its repair with his unit assigned maintenance personnel. If it required organizational level maintenance, then the airframe was sent off but still remained on that Geschwader's books. The unit was down an airframe until it came back repaired or was stricken off and replaced.

The Squadrons in the RAF did not own the airframe. Squadron maintenance personnel performed for the most part only basic maintenance and mission configuration changes. The RAF had an organization called the Civilian Repair Organization. Basically every airplane repair facility in the United Kingdom was pressed into service repairing RAF aircraft and was made responsible under Air Ministry supervision for the airframes. They also ran the ASU or Aircraft Supply Units which were storage facilities located on British airfields that housed the airframes that were ready for issue.

As an aircraft was damaged and could not be repaired for the next flight, it would be pushed to the side and the CRO would take responsibility of it. They would issue a servicable aircraft and repair the damaged one putting it back in the ASU when repairs were completed.

This translated into the RAF being able to keep their units at a much higher strength throughout the course of the battle despite their higher loss rate.

The logistical genius of the CRO/ASU combined with some good pre-war planning on the industrial side so that the United Kingdom exceeded its aircraft production goals in single engine fighters and outproduced the German 2:1. The serviceability rates of the RAF actually rose during the battle to 98% while the Luftwaffe's servicability rates steadily declined.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...g=content;col1

Total losses of aircraft in the Battle of Britain


Month----------------RAF------Luftwaffe
July (from10th)------90--------165
August--------------399-------612
September-----------416------ 554
October-------------182------- 321
Total----------------1087----- 1652

this (posted by someone above, dont know if its accurate) shows that the germans took considerably heavier losses, or am i missing the point entirely here :confused: