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#581
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![]() ![]() The Merlin tested in the Hurricane ran for 8 1/2 hours on 100 Octane fuel at 12 pounds boost, but the test was terminated after 49.5 hours by a glycol leak into one cylinder. The document goes on to note that this problem was rectified by modifying the cylinder head joints, a modification which was retrofitted to earlier Merlins and would have been incorporated into later Merlins. ( paras 4 & 6) "It will be noted from the Service reports that an approximate increase in speed, due to the use of emergency 12 lbs. boost, of 28/34 m.p.h. is obtained depending on the altitude flown up to 10,000 feet." (para 8.) This most likely applys to both the Hurricane and Spitfire. Gleed, below, 19 May 1940, notes an increase of 30 mph for his Hurricane. "The modifications to the boost control cut out to limit the maximum boost to 12 lbs. sq. in are simple and in hand (otherwise full throttle would give about 17 lbs. sq. in.)" para 9. Last edited by NZtyphoon; 03-16-2012 at 02:23 AM. |
#582
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I thought Kurfurst had "only a passing interest" in the RAF?
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#583
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As Barbi and Eugene are so positive that 87 octane fuel was still in widespread use by RAF FC, they should have no trouble listing the squadrons, and the bases they flew from, that were still using 87 octane fuel late in the BoB. As for Barbi's comment of fuel consumption, he is no doubt referring to the useless garbage graph (no source for the data points ever given) he posted earlier in this thread. Useless garbage because the consumption of 87 octane fuel includes that other RAF Commands (Coastal, Bomber, Training et al). Quote:
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#584
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He does until the mediocre aircraft of the RAF put the boot to his uber Luftwaffe. I don't understand his objection to 100 octane fueled Spitfires and Hurricanes during the BoB as this give him a good excuse for the failure/defeat of the Luftwaffe in achieving air superiority over southern England. As it now stands, it was inferior fighters which did the job.
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#585
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I am most sure than this number is far from insignificant. I ll be not surprise if a large number of German fighter simply did not come home because fuel and not because they were shot down. The spitfire were not so succesfull against the 109s in other theaters. At mediterranean and Afrika the allied resources are bigger. And the RAF suffered heavy loses in Afrika and Malta. The failure of the Luftwaffe in this scenarios was mainly because they were outnumbered and low of fuel. And they performed very well. And the spitfire was there. |
#586
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(July-October 1940) Data from “The Narrow Margin”, cleaned up by Robert Herrick http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/See..._LW_Losses.htm |
#587
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What is considered inside "operational" and "non-operational" loses?
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#588
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Non-operational would be a test flight, a training flight or a transfer flight.
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#589
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#590
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Browse back the thread. I hve alrdy discussed this point and listed the source (RR history book).
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