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#41
11-19-2007, 07:39 PM
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May thought the biggest disadvantage the French faced was their appallingly bad communications net. They were not able to get actionable intelligence in time to react to the fast moving German motorized units. This communication trouble went all the way down to the tactical level---the French aircraft often lacked radios, and French tanks often lacked radios---thus, they were unable to be as flexible as the Germans.
If my memory is correct, I believe Gamelin's headquarters did not have a single radio. THE BLITZKRIEG MYTH by John Mosier has the most on the critique of Gort. 
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#42
11-19-2007, 10:28 PM
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True, and when on May 12th the headquarters received the report of a Potez 637 of II/33 about an heavy motorized force crossing the Ardennes forest, they didn't believe it. When a second plane later confirmed it (observer Lt. Chery, a tank officer) , they still didn't believe it, since Ardennes were inviolable to tanks in the French military doctrine. Anyway, many modern planes were thrown into the fire of the battle, often without adequate cover or preparation: Bloch 175, Breguet 693, Bloch 174 flown by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Douglas DB7, CR 714, D.520, LéO 451, Amiot 354, Arsenal Vg-33, ... A little unexplored universe. Regards, Insuber
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#43
11-20-2007, 05:29 AM
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May's fascinating argument is that, had the Germans not been incredibly lucky and thrown a punch right where the French were least able to react effectively, the ponderous French system probably would have worked. His argument is simple, the German victory was not inevitable, but was a culmination of a "perfect storm" of factors conspiring to exaggerate the French systemic weaknesses, and exaggerate the effectiveness of the German thrust, which was scaring the wits out of the German higher headquarters as much as the Allied. In so many words, the Germans "got lucky" and hit the French right in the solar plexus putting them on the mat so fast even they were astonished. Mosier adds to this: the French confusion was turned to defeat by the defection of the British Army at Dunkirk. Had the British turned around and violently struck the thin Panzer corridor to the sea, the encirclement would have been broken. This has been the stuff of military college staff problems for decades. What all this means for us is that it is a lively, fascinating subject which has been ignored shamefully.
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#44
11-20-2007, 09:09 AM
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The following is based on reading History of WWII, Liddell Hart; Blitzkrieg, Len Deighton and Atlas of WWII, Peter Young. The main breakthrough was made on the junction of the French 9th and 2nd Armies. The German panzer units crossed the R. Meuse between 12th and 15th May. At this time the only armoured units in position to offer an immediate response were French. They had three armoured divisions in the area. The 3rd Div was ordered to attack on 15th but in fact never hindered the German advance in any effective way. The 1st Div faced Rommel's advance at Morville but on the 15th were tactically defeated in a combined air and armour assault which opened the way for Rommel's advance. On the morning of the 15th Churchill was being advised by the French Prime Minister Reynaud that "We are beaten, we have lost the battle". On the evening of the 15th the 2nd Div was over run and destroyed by the German advance as it was forming up to advance. On 17th a hastily assembled armoured force under De Gaulle attacked at Montcornet, but was tactically defeated by air attack before it could come to grips with the German columns. Meanwhile the British units, which included only one armoured division, and represented only 11% of the armoured forces of the allies, was still being drawn back from Belguim and was not in position to intervene. On 17th Gamelin was replaced as Commander in Chief by Weygand, who was then in Syria. This was to result in total inertia in the allied command until Weygand had started to pick up the reins three days later. On 20th Weygand was still visiting and consulting and had yet to take any positive action. The British supply route was through Cherbourg and le Havre so time was lost reconfiguring supply lines which were cut when the Germans captured Boulogne on the 20th. While this was going on the British fell back to Arras, establishing this as a new supply hub and prepared for a counterattack towards the south. This attack took place on 21st/22nd but there was no coordinated action by other allied forces coming north. The French 1st Army was supposed to have added 2 infantry divisions to the attack but this contribution was not in place in time to be effective. Coordinated action had been agreed with Gamelin but his removal had hindered this agreement. The British attack failed due to lack of resources and inadequate intelligence information. From this point on the British no longer had an effective armoured force with which to attack and were forced into defence. On 24th Weygand complained that "the British had fallen back 25 miles without agreement! whilst the French troops were moving up from the south and gaining ground". The picture painted by Weygand appears to be a myth. There is no evidence that French forces had made any effective advances from the south, and in the meantime the British forces were still holding defensive positions around Douai and Vallencienes. The decision by Gort to fall back on Dunkirk was taken on 25th May and approved by the British war cabinet on 26th. The decision was taken on the basis that there was no prospect whatsoever of any French advance from the south within the foreseeable future. No preparations for an attack were in hand. The British actually landed additional troops in an attempt to hold Calais, Boulougne having already fallen, but Calais was over run on 27th May. Royal Navy destroyers who brought the troops into Calais became embroiled in direct line of sight action with German ground forces who were moving in on the harbour at the time. The fresh troops were landed under fire. The myth began to be developed by Weygand that the collapse was somehow due to Gorts decision to withdraw. There seems to be no facts to support this. No serious attempts were made after 17th May to attack from the south over the R Somme and even though the Germans had established a number of bridgeheads over the Somme even the bridgeheads were not seriously threatened, despite their vunerability. What is likely is that if Gort had not fallen back on Dunkirk then the BEF would have been cut off and forced to surrender, as was large parts of the French 1st Army at Lille. The failure to evacuate the BEF and significant numbers of French troops would have probably resulted in the British goverment sueing for peace, and the history of the world as we know it would have been rewritten.
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#45
11-20-2007, 09:55 AM
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Interesting thread, without the benefit of reading May it seems he is placing the blame on Gort because he made the decision to retreat to the Channel ports rather than the non-decisions that the French were making. Given that later in the war, units that were cut off and without orders continuing to fight proved to be the bane of armoured break throughs he might have a point.
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#46
11-20-2007, 10:09 AM
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Well, to be honest, all three of those sources are less-than-rigorously-researched popular histories, rather stale, and, frankly, British. Interestingly, one of the best views of the HQ-level of the Battle of France is British---Major-General Sir Edward Spears who was the Cabinet liaison to the French high command. His picture of the dithering of Gort in the crucial days of May is less-than-flattering---see his fascinating ASSIGNMENT TO CATASTROPHE.
Gort's one rather pathetic stab at smashing the German cordon, sending two seriously understrength battalions of infantry tanks with a smattering of infantry nearly did the job---it did frighten the Germans badly before they defeated the push with artillery. If he had mounted a serious counterattack to regain contact with the French south of the cordon, who knows what might have happened.
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#47
11-20-2007, 11:24 AM
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Can you say which of the facts are wrong? Spears view of Gort "dithering" is an opinion not a fact. Does Spears say on what facts his opinion is based? To describe the attack by the BEF at Arras as "a pathetic stab" is perhaps a little unreasonable. Bear in mind that the tanks had already travelled 120miles on tracks to reach Arras and that to successfully assemble there at all under the constant watch of the Luftwaffe is no mean feat. The British had 16 MkII Matildas with 2pdr guns and a further 58 MkI's armed only with machine guns. There were also about 60 French Somua light tanks. What they lacked was proper infantry support. This was supposed to have been provided by the French 1st Army but the 2 inf divisions expected had not arrived by 2:30pm when the decision was made to attack without them. This attack should have been part of a simultaneous assault from the south. Gamelin had issued orders to this effect on the 19th (Instruction No 12) but when Weygand took over he cancelled the orders to the French units while he assessed the situation. Although subsequently he still claimed to be planning such a joint attack there appears to be no evidence that the forces in the south were ever in position to attack. After making initial gains against the German armour the BEF units were stopped by anti-tank guns, including 88's. Had the infantry been present these would probably have been overcome. It seems unreasonable to seek to blame the BEF for the collapse of the allied defence, when they only provided a small percentage of the forces present. The breakthrough was on the front covered by the French 1st, 9th and 2nd armies, and it was separation between these three French units which resulted in the collapse. The 1st Army, 9th Army and 2nd Army should have been able to close the gap without calling on the BEF whose initial position was on the left flank of the 1st Army, well north of the breakthrough point.  Was there a strategic reserve? If so where and why was it not brought into action? The French 10th and 6th Armies start arriving fresh on the Somme. How were they equipped? Why were these fresh units not used offensively? The BEF seems to have shown considerable mobility by pulling back and moving onto the right flank of the 1st Army to launch the attack. But where was the infantry from the 1st Army which should have been in the attack at Arras? --- and what was the 9th Army doing. It should have been closing the gap with the 1st Army which it had allowed to open up. What was the 2nd Army doing to close the gap with the 9th? Whilst all this was going on what was Weygand doing? What steps was he taking to close the gap which had opened up between the 1st, 9th and 2nd? The BEF meanwhile was maintaining contact with both the Belgian Army on its left flank and the 1st Army on its right flank, despite great pressure the front held together here. The only failure seems to have been the inability of the 1st, 9th and 2nd armies to maintain the line. What efforts did the 1st, 9th and 2nd Armies make to close up after 17th May? These three units should have been able to close the gap and trap the German panzer units. If three French Armies are unable to stand against the German onslaught why is it considered reasonable that a single British army should be able to do that. It is likely that it never had any chance of success without French support but that support was not in place at the right time. PS Bearing in mind where we are writing -- Any comments on the air war? PPS The 16th May situation map seen above would make a good blueprint for a BoF Add On map. Roughly 1/3rd of the map will already be done for BoB. All the key areas are covered. Rotterdam down to just north of Paris and west to the mouth of the R Somme. Quite a compact battlefield, relatively speaking. Includes all the key bridges which were subject of air attack and goes deep enough to facilitate semi-strategic bombing missions.
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#49
11-21-2007, 02:33 PM
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I'm not sure if I would give Spears opinion more weight than others. If he was mainly at the French HQ then he may have suffered from lack of information and misinformation in the same way that the French High Command seems to have done. Sometimes being too close to the action prevents you seeing the bigger picture with the correct perspective. He may also have been influenced by personal relationships which he had built up with some of the French senior officers which would influence the way in which he reported events. He had been there too long to be considered dispassionate. Anyway -- I will try and remain open minded. 
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