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#461
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Just a short reply WRT naval forces:
1.) The forces near the invasion zone - which were light forces, destroyers and a handful of light cruisers - would be among the priority targets for the Luftwaffe if the necessary air superiority had been established. And that is before the "invasion fleet" raises anchors. Besides there is more than one way to take warships out of the equation. Damage them, damage or destroy the infrastructure they rely on (piers, cranes, ammo and fuel depots) and they won't be more than a heap of metal. Had the Luftwaffe won air superiority the big harbors of Southern England would have seen very heavy attacks (i.e. Portsmouth or Southampton). 2.) The Royal Navy was stretched thin across the globe due to the necessities of the Empire, the italian navy in the Mediterranean Sea and the need to escort convois across the Atlantic. The Home Fleet was based at Scapa Flow and a number of cruiser and destroyer flotillas along the Eastern Coast. Getting them to the area of operations does take time, a group of heavy ships coming from Scapa will take up to a day to reach the combat zone. Which means there will be no heavy cruisers or battleships opposing the initial landings. Additionally the Channel was a narrow theater, rather easily controlled with light forces, recon planes, submarines and - the real trump card the Kriegsmarine had - mines. Large ships are best suited for large sea areas. They need space to maneuver ... which was just not there in the Channel. 3.) Battleships and the likes are political weapons. Regardless of their firepower, their protection or their speed there was always a political element in their use. Wilhelm II left the High Seas Fleet in their harbors since he feared losses more. The Japanese left Musashi and Yamato at home until it was too late for them to make a useful contribution. I think the british government would think hard and long about employing its valuable battleships and battlecruisers in these narrow waters, where the risk of losing them is very high while the potential gains are at least questionable. These ships represent a nation's prestige in naval affairs, losing them for nothing would be a serious blow. I'm not saying a potential invasion would have worked for sure. I am saying we're talking about very muddy waters here and it's simply impossible to tell what exactly could have happened and how that could have effected other decisions. |
#462
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Not posting this to prove any kind of point, but found an interesting link here;
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/U...UK-RN-I-4.html Couldn't find a similar link to a simple tally of Kriegsmarine strength. Anyone post one please? Cheers. 'By the 31st of August all ships of the Home Fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, had taken up or were proceeding to their war stations. The organisation and disposition of the fleet was as follows: At Scapa Flow in the Orkneys: 2nd Battle Squadron Nelson, Rodney, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign, Ramillies. Battle Cruiser Squadron Hood and Repulse. Aircraft Carrier Ark Royal. 18th Cruiser Squadron Aurora, Sheffield, Edinburgh, Belfast. 12th Cruiser Squadron Effingham, Emerald, Cardiff, Dunedin. 7th Cruiser Squadron Diomede, Dragon, Calypso, Caledon. 6th and 8th Destroyer Flotillas Seventeen destroyers. 1st Minesweeping Flotilla Seven fleet minesweepers. At Rosyth: Aircraft Carrier Furious At Dundee: 2nd Submarine Flotilla Depot ship Forth and ten boats. At Blyth: 6th Submarine Flotilla Depot ship Titania and six boats. In addition to the foregoing ships and units under Admiral Forbes' command the following forces were stationed in home waters:-- In the Humber: 2nd Cruiser Squadron Southampton and Glasgow. 7th Destroyer Flotilla Nine destroyers. At Portland: Battleships Resolution and Revenge. Aircraft Carriers Courageous and Hermes. Cruisers Ceres, Caradoc, Cairo (A.A. cruiser.) 18th Destroyer Flotilla Nine destroyers.' I make that about 90 ships/boats in total. |
#463
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"The number and strength of our surface units is so small compared to the British fleet that they can only show how to die in honor - even when operating with full effort."
-- Großadmiral Erich Raeder, September 3, 1939 http://ww2total.com/WW2/History/Orde...ember-1939.htm Last edited by Al Schlageter; 09-22-2011 at 02:05 PM. |
#464
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yep, considering the losses sustained during the Norway campaign as well, the Kriegsmarine was in no state to face the Royal Navy, save for the u-boote, which could have still used with success in such a peculiar bit of sea, and being very close to their bases, they would have operated quick and effectively.
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#465
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I was also thinking how fantastic it would be if one day using some sort of online computer sim, maybe even CoD, the invasion could actually be attempted virtually, complete with Naval forces etc. ![]() What a cracking fantasy! |
#466
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The weakness of the Kriegsmarine is not really relevant in that equation. Every sane person would know that such an operation would have to substiture naval power with air power ... The Kriegsmarine had only three factors to contribute (besides providing the transport vessels): torpedos (from E-Boats and submarines), destroyers (plus a few cruisers) and most importantly mines.
EDIT: I think it's a gross misconception just to count the british capital ships and park them in the middle of the Channel. Such a concentration of force is unwieldy and would have serious trouble maneuvering. And maneuver they'd have to ... to evade the hail of bombs. Damage would most certainly accumulate over time and at some point they'd have to withdraw - even if they'd just run out of ammo (which would be a lot sooner for the important destroyers and light cruisers). Last edited by csThor; 09-22-2011 at 02:30 PM. |
#467
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True enough but the Kreigsmarine were very concerned about the strength and ability of the RN(if I remember rightly). I would like to know what the RN planed to do in the event of an invasion fleet setting out and what losses they expected and were prepared to take. I think that the general opinion of the Navys at that time was it was hard to sink a ship using aircraft. Billy Mitchell proved otherwise but the USN wasnt impressed.
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#468
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No surprise. Few Admirals would be happy to admit that their expensive toys were suddenly vulnerable to aircraft.
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#469
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The only figure I can find is during the Norway campaign @ 30. Last edited by ATAG_Dutch; 09-22-2011 at 02:51 PM. |
#470
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