In their own words...

[bobbysocks]

since its a russian theme day...

Boris Safonov's "British Show".

The most well-known Russian fighter ace during the first period of the war, was the young Boris Safonov, flying with 72 SAP (Composite Aviation Regiment) in the Murmansk area in the far North.

Before his death on 30 May 1942, Safonov had scored 17 victories, of which at least 8 can be verified by Luftwaffe loss records. During his last combat, he was credited with another 3 kills - bringing his total to 20 (according to his flight book; higher figures are given in various Russian publications). What makes his achievement remarkable is that 14 of these victories were achieved during the three first months of the war, while Safonov was flying an I-16 "Ishak" fighter, far inferior to the German Messerschmitt 109s.

During the RAF fighter pilots' stay in this area in the fall of 1941, Boris Safonov gave the RAF pilots an impressive show of combat skill. In September 1941, the Air Force of the Soviet Northern Fleet was reinforced with thirty-nine British Hawker "Hurricane" fighters of Wing Commander H. N. G. Ramsbottom-Isherwood´s 151 Wing, including Nos. 81 and 143 Squadron. Twenty-four were flown to Murmansk and fifteen to Arkhangelsk. The British were eager to revenge themselves for their humiliating defeat in the air over the same area on 30 June 1941, when German fighters had shot down 15 British aircraft sent out from the carriers "Victorious" and "Furious" - without a single German loss.

On September 12, the twenty-four "Hurricanes" bound for Murmansk took off from the aircraft carrier Argus in the Barents Sea . That same afternoon, the British pilots of 81 Squadron flew a combat mission over the front lines. They bounced five Messerschmitt 109s escorting a Henschel 126. In the ensuing action, the Messerschmitt-pilot Leutnant Eckhard von der Lühe and the Hurricane-pilot Sergeant Smith were both shot down and killed. (The British pilots claimed to have shot down three Bf 109s plus the Hs 126. During the following five weeks, the RAF pilots took part in several combats, claiming 16 confirmed victories, 4 "probables" and 7 damaged enemy aircraft - a high over-claim - for the loss of only 2 "Hurricanes".)

But at the hands of an expert, the old I-16 was still to be reckoned with, as Boris Safonov would show the British guests. On 6 September 1941, the Luftwaffe had raided 72 SAP´s airfield. Safonov and four other I-16s met the attackers in the air, claiming two Ju 87s shot down. Clashing with the escorting Bf 109s, A. Kovalienko had been credited with one kill while another '109' was 'shared' between Safonov and Maksimovich. According to the Russian report, a third Messerschmitt crashed into the ground while chasing the agile Ishaks. None of these claims can be verified in the loss tables of JG 5 (which by all means not necessarily are complete).

Three days after the arrival of the British - 15 September 1941 - Safonov decided to demonstrate his abilities. This was to become Safonov´s most successful day: A Schwarm of Messerschmitt 110s from 1.(Z)/JG 77 was out on an escort mission for the "Stukas" of Hauptmann Arnulf Blasig´s IV.(St.)/LG 1, attacking Soviet ground troops in the Zapadnaya Litsa region. Leutnant Heinz-Horst Hoffmann, the pilot in one of the Bf 110s, spotted a lone I-16 below. Hoffmann was one of the veterans of the Zerstörerstaffel, with three victories to his credit. Without hesitating, he put the nose of his twin-engine fighter down to make an attack. He didn´t realize the trap until too late. A dark green I-16 with the bold inscription "Smert fashistam!" ("Death to the fascists!") painted in two-feet-high white letters on the side of the fuselage came shooting down from above. It was Boris Safonov´s "White 11". Hoffmann´s Bf 110 was hit in an engine. The plane made a roll and went down from low altitude, exploding on impact three miles west of Zapadnaya Litsa. Having scored his 12th victory, Safonov turned against the "Stukas". One of them went down in flames, Safonov´s 13th victory. Shortly afterwards, the Russian ace caught a third German plane, Hs 126, and shot it down as well. On the following day, Boris Safonov received the highest Soviet award, the Golden Star - the token of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

As the British pilots left for home, the Hurricanes were naturally handed over to 72 SAP. With a better outfit, the Soviet fighter pilots were able to inflict growing losses upon the small Luftwaffe forces on the "Polar Front". Marking the end of 1941, Boris Safonov claimed one Messerschmitt 109 on 17 December and one He 111H-5 (piloted by Unteroffizier Engelbert Roithmayer of 1./KG 26) on 31 December, flying a "Hurricane" fighter.

[bobbysocks]

Pokryshkin's Falcon

Alexander Fiodorowitch Klubov was born in 1918, in the small country-village of Jerunovo, in the Wolgograd region. His father was Fiodor Ivanovitch, a country worker, who nonetheless was a sailor on the battleship "Aurora", and thus was a witness of the great shot - the signal that began the Bolshevist Revolution of 1917. After graduating ground school, young Alexander arrived in Leningrad, where he worked as a turner in an industrial plant named "Bolshevist". He joined the Soviet Aeroclub, and after basic training, decided to make aviation his life. In 1939, Klubov volunteered to Military Aviation School, and after finishing training, was promoted to the rank of Leutnant. That promotion came just before "Barbarossa" the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

In August of 1942, Klubov entered front-line duty as a fighter pilot. In one of very hard battles over Mozdok, his I-153 suffered heavy hits. The plane caught fire, and Klubov was forced to bail out, but not before flames had badly burned his face and hands. Despite many weeks in the hospital, Klubov's skin remained scarred. In the autumn of 1942, Klubov was awarded the Red Flag Medal. By early 1943 he returned to front line duty with the 16 GvIAP, commanded by famous Alexander Pokryshkin . The unit entered battle 9 April 1943 and by the end of that month, had been in 28 air battles, in which Soviet pilots downed 79 aircraft of the following types: 14 Bf 109E, 12 Bf 109F, 45 Bf 109G, 2 FW 190, 4 Ju 88, 1 Do 217, and 1 Ju 87. The most successful pilots of this period were: Cpt. A. I. Pokryshkin - 10 Bf 109, Sen. Lt. V. I. Fadieyev - 12 Bf 109 and Sen. Lt. G.A. Rechkalov - 7 Bf 109 + 1 Ju 88. Under Pokryshkin's leadership and with daily exposure to heavy combat, the young pilots got a lot of experience (or died...).

The following is an excerpt from Alexander Pokryshkin's book "The Sky of War", devoted to young Soviet pilots. This is an episode during the fierce Battle of Kuban in the summer of 1943, when the 16th GvIAP flew P-39 D Airacobras.

""...They flew their sorties without interruption, with heroism and battled with great skill. Klubov, Trofimov, Sukhov, Lukianov, and Zherdiev. Not long ago, they were new and inexperienced. Now they lead big formations and successfully fulfill combat missions in extremely difficult conditions. Especially distinguishing himself with courage and total control of his aircraft, was Alexander Klubov. He was calm, and a little phlegmatic on the ground, but in the air he totally changed. He was brave, determined, and full of initiative. Klubov did not wait for the enemy, he tried to find him. He had the special "spirit" of a fighter pilot.

One day, we got very nervous about Klubov. It was sunset, his flying limit had surely been reached, but Klubov had not returned from a reconnaissance mission. Following my radio call, he simply replied: "I am in combat!" After that, the radio went silent. I was worried that something could be wrong.

Suddenly his aircraft appeared, having been so long awaited by us. But he flew in a very odd way. He flew down, then rapidly climbed again. It was obvious that his steering system was damaged and only his will and excellent piloting kept his plane in the air. I ordered him, by radio, to bail out, but he did not hear me. His radio was damaged.

When his fighter began the landing maneuver, I was really terrified. I was sure, that his "swinging" flight would end with a ground crash. But Klubov kept the machine in control and landed successfully without his landing gear down. Aviators, standing on the runway, rapidly ran to help him, but Klubov climbed as calm as ever out of his cockpit. He walked around his plane, wondering over all the many bullet holes and said to his aircraft, "You fought very well, my friend!"

Klubov said nothing about his duel with six Messerschmitts, nor that he had shot down two of them."
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Alexander Klubov, was twice (on 13 April 1943, and then posthumously, on 27 June 1945) awarded the highest military award of the USSR, the Golden Star, as a Hero of the Soviet Union. He flew 457 sorties and took part in 95 air combats. He scored 31 personal victories and another 19 were claimed as 'group' kills. On 10 October 1944 (some sources say on 1 November 1944), Klubov was killed in the crash landing on the Jezowe airfield (25 km from Stalowa Wola, Poland). It was a training flight in the new La-7 fighter, and there was a malfunction of the plane's hydraulic system.

[bobbysocks]

Piotr Kozachenko - F.J. Beerenbrock´s defeater (?).

Piotr Kozachenko was born in 1914, in the small village of Korostienie in the Ukraine. When he was 20 years old, he attended the Flight Training School. After ending his training, he was ordered to an Aviation Regiment. As a volunteer, he joined the Chinese forces against Japan. During fights over the Uchan Provence he downed 11 enemy planes. In 1938, he was awarded the Order of the Red Flag. In 1939-40, he flew over the Karelia area and achieved 4 aerial kills.

On 22 June 1941, the first day of the war with Germany, Major Kozachenko and his group of I-153 aircraft of the 249th Fighter Regiment (249 IAP) flew ground attacks against German forces at Lubera city (near Zytomierz). On the next day, a group of seven I-153's, under his command, intercepted 12 Heinkel He 112 B fighters of the Rumanian FARR´s Flotila 1 Vinatoare attempting to raid the Bolgard airfield. Kozachenko shot down the He 112 piloted by Adj.Av. A. Codnet, where after his group returned to base without losses. Commanded by Captain Alexander Ivanovich Halutin, the 249 was credited with 25 aerial victories for the loss of 10 planes and six pilots from June to October 1941 (when the unit was withdrawn from combat to be re-equipped with the LaGG-3).

On 10 July 1941 Kozachenko and his group of fourteen I-153 aircraft of the 249th Fighter Regiment (249 IAP) flew ground attacks against German forces on the road from Lubera to Krasnopol' (Zytomierz region). On 14 July Kozachenko's group of five I-153 destroyed enemy headquarters near Shurupovka village ( Vinnitsa region ), and on the next day, a group of seven I-153's, under his command, intercepted 12 Heinkel He 113 (really Bf 109F, possibly from JG3). Kozachenko shot down the He 113 near Kazatin, whereafter his group returned to base without losses. (from 1941 God. Yugo-Zapadniy front : vospominaniya, ocherki. Lvov, 1970 - Year 1941. South-West front : memoirs, essays. L'vov, 1970 - via Yuri V.Shakhov - thanks!) Note: the describe of the same (probably) combat against Heinkel fighters appeard twice and with different dates - depending from source.

In 1942, this regiment flew over the Caucasus - Kerch front area. On 1 February 1942, a formation of six LaGG-3 fighters led by Kozachenko spotted a group of 15 Messerschmitt Bf 110s. Catching the Germans in an unfavorable position, the Soviets downed 5 of the twin-engined fighters. During a strike on Mineralniye Airfield a few days later, Kozachenko shot down a Bf 109. Shortly afterwards, Kozachenko and six other pilots of the Fighter Regiment's 7 fighters blew 8 Junkers Ju 52s out of the sky in one combat. Being promoted as commander of the 249th IAP, Major Piotr Kozacheko received the Golden Star of a Hero of the Soviet Union on 6 May 1943.

At this time, his regiment was instructed to organize "free hunting missions" on German Ju 52 transport aircraft. During one of these "free hunts", Kozachenko was seriously injured. He was hit in his left arm and stomach. He was able to return to base, but after landing he remained in the cockpit until his comrades helped him out. He was admitted to hospital for some weeks.

In the summer of 1944, he returned to duty in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, commanding the 163rd IAP. With this unit, he saw action in the skies over the encircled German troops near Minsk. His Regiment operated as part of the Soviet 4th Air Army on the 2nd White Russian Front. Frequently, his regiment was ordered to cover special versions of the Petlyakov Pe-2 during very important Reconnaissance missions. These Pe-2 reconnaissance crews put great faith in Kozachenko's cover, and named him "Daddy" (in Russian - "Bat´ka"). In March 1945, the 2nd White Russian Front fought near Gdansk and Gdynia. On 18 March 1945, "Daddy" Kozachenko was killed in an aerial combat while escorting reconnaissance Pe-2's. The last words heard from him in the radio, were "I'm hit, going for a 'Taran'!" (air-to-air ramming). This same day, as Kozachenko was killed, Hauptmann Joachim Brendel, the 189-victory ace in III./JG 51, claimed 3 victories over East Prussia...

Kozachenko flew 227 combat missions and downed 12 German planes. He was awarded the Soviet Hero Title, and four times was awarded the Order of the Red Flag. He also received the Alexander Nevski medal and many other awards.

According to my sources, there is information that Kozatchenko probably, on 9 November 1942, shot down a well know German ace - Oberfeldwebel Franz-Josef Beerenbrock (who had over 100 kills). Here is the story:


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"One day, a group of fighters, commanded by Kozachenko, escorted a single Petlyakov Pe-2 on a photo reconnaissance mission. The German AAA was very intensive. But suddenly the Flak held its fire. German fighters were approaching. The enemy showed great determination to destroy the reconnaissance plane, but the Soviet fighters managed to keep the Pe-2 safe. The Pe-2 could make a second reconnaissance run, and a third run, but during the fourth photography run, one Fw 190 came up close behind the Pe-2. Flying at the same speed as the bomber-reconnaissance aircraft, the Fw 190 opened fire. The Pe-2 crew was caught by surprise and the radio operator was killed. A large hole, about the size of a man's head was blown open in the cockpit. Kozacheko was very close, and he saw many markings on the Fw190's fuselage, especially an indian with a bow near the cockpit. "This is a German ace from Mölder's Regiment" Kozatchenko thought. He was so close that he even could see the German ace smiling. The German's smile did not last long, however. "Daddy´s" fire was completely devastating and the German plane plummeted downwards. After a few seconds, Kozachenko saw the Fw 190 explode as it crashed into the ground. The Pe-2 was damaged, but able to return to base. Having taken some very important photos, the Pe-2 crew received personal thanks from the C-in-C of the 2nd White Russian Front, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. After the war, German POW Captain Gabel (of the "3rd Mölders Squadron") informed the Soviet intellegence that on the same day as Kozachenko had scored this victory, the excellent German ace Beerenbrock was posted as missing."


Note: There are some oddities surrounding Kozachenko´s supposed downing of Franz-Josef Beerenbrock: First, Beerenbrock (who certainly belonged to JG 51 "Mölders") never flew a Fw 190, but a Bf 109. And secondly, the 2nd White Russian Front had not been up yet by the time as Beerenbrock was shot down. Either, this is due to a printing mistake in the Russian report (indeed very common in all war reports); or there remains the alternative that it was not Beerenbrock, but another ace of JG 51, that was shot down by Kozachenko.

[bobbysocks]

Admiral Nimitz Arrives At Pearl Harbor - Dec. 25, 1941

" I was privileged to be one of the pilots that flew Adm. Nimitz from San Diego to Pearl Harbor on Christmas Day, 1941, about two weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Adm. Nimitz was to relieve Adm. Husband Kimmel and take over the badly wounded Pacific Fleet. We took off from San Diego in the early evening of 24 Dec in a PB2Y-2, Coronado, BuNo. 1635. The Coronado
was a 4 engine seaplane, a big brother of the PBY Catalina. My log book shows the flight took 17.2 hours and we arrived at Pearl Harbor about mid morning of Christmas day, 1941. Upon arriving at Pearl, we invited Adm. Nimitz up to the flight deck and asked him if he would like to observe the damage and destruction inflicted by the Japs. He eagerly accepted. We made
wide circles over Pearl Harbor as well as Hickham Field. He was seated in the left hand pilot's seat for purposes of this observation and he just kept shaking his head and clucking his tongue. God knows what was going through his mind but if it was anything like what was going through ours it was: "Those dirty bastards! Somehow, someway, we are going to make them pay!" We were looking at the West Virginia, the California, the Utah, the Arizona, all crumpled hulks. We were looking at skeletons of what were once hangars and flight lines filled with the junk of what were once military planes. The carnage was sickening.

And with all of this on his mind, what was Adm. Nimitz' demeanor as he disembarked to take on this great responsibility? He took the time to shake the hand of every member of the crew and thank them for a comfortable flight and apologized to each for having taken them from their families
on Christmas Day! What a giant of a man. What a great leader to take over the Pacific Fleet! Why do I write this now? Two reasons: First, because I feel proud that we were able to deliver the right man to the right place at the right time. And second, I said I was one of the pilots on that flight.

The others were:
Lt. Bowen F. McLeod, USNA '30,
Ens. Ross C. Barney,
Ens. Thomas Robinson,
Ens. Frank L. DeLorenzo (all ex-aviation cadets)
and Warrant Machinist Clarence L. Pearson.
So why DO I write this now? Because of those five, I am the only one still living and I am 84 years old. Tomorrow might be too late!March 28, 1999 Frank DeLorenzo,
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Although he flew Nimitz to Pearl Harbor in the four engine PB2Y Coronado
on Christmas day, they had actually tried to take him there the day before.
Christmas Eve, Delo took the PB2Y out in very rough windy weather. As he tried to turn the flying boat into the wind, the wind was so strong that the plane dipped to one side as he tried to make the turn. Delo looked out the window and saw a prop start to beat the water and knew he should not continue to try to get the plane turned into the wind. They aborted this afternoon attempt to fly due to the weather, and took the plane back to shore. Perhaps at this point they should have taken the plane ashore, but someone decided to keep them in the water. Delo and Ross Barney had to stay up all night, keeping the engines running. They were unsure of the weather and afraid the bow line might separate. So the two of them
had to sit there all night, periodically revving the engines. In the morning, the weather abated and Delo was able to go home and get some rest. That afternoon, Delo and the crew of that PB2Y Coronado were able to take off and make the sixteen hour flight to Pearl Harbor. I must think that at this point in the war, they must have had some concerns about running
into trouble on the way there. We had just been in the war two and a half weeks, a war we were unprepared for. Who knew what trouble might be in the way of their flight to Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, Delo and the crew did their duty conveying Admiral Nimitz to Pearl Harbor to relieve Admiral Pye (who had relieved Kimmel) and take over the command of the Pacific Fleet.
They arrived at Pearl Harbor the following morning. I asked Delo if there were any smoke or flames still burning from the attack and he said the fires were all extinguished. However when they landed in Pearl Harbor, the harbor itself was covered with six inches of oil. It was a mess. After landing, Nimitz thanked the crew and asked about his cruise chest being brought ashore.
A Lt. Commander (whose name is intentionally not mentioned herein out of respect to the dead and his family) told Nimitz there is no way we can get the cruise chest out before the plane is brought ashore. An ensign, Tommy Robinson, took the cruise chest out the tunnel hatch and placed it in a dingy.
He soon had the chest ashore, which embarrassed the Lt. Commander after he had just Nimitz it could not be done.

[bobbysocks]

Remembrance of a Rear-Seater

by CAPT N. J.”Dusty” Kleiss, USN-Ret

27 April 2007

Tracy Lewis asked the Roundtable if it could give her more information about her great uncle Thurman Randolf Swindell, AOM1/c, who was KIA in the Battle of Midway. Tracy is interested in knowing this man not only as a relative, but because she is taking a history class in college and must have a paper about a famous person of WWII. The Roundtable passed Tracy's request to me to determine if I could give any additional information other than that given to her by the Roundtable.

I first met Thurman Swindell in the fall of 1941, when I was given a collateral duty as Education Officer of Scouting Six. One of my first assignments was scoring the official (closely secured) tests for enlisted personnel to meet qualifications to a higher rating. One of the first official tests I examined was for determining the necessary qualifications of moving from 2/c to 1/c status. There were only two enlisted men of Scouting Six who met possible advancement to that difficult promotion. Meeting official tests was not enough. The contenders also had to score on petty officer ratings, approval from their division officer, their executive officer...and they had to obtain approval of Chief Myers. Gaining approval from Chief Myers was about as difficult in reaching Mount Everest without stopping for breath.

Chief Myers, with a small crew, could repair a shot-up plane brought in on an afternoon and have it ready for flying at 0400 next morning; that was after replacing a wing or a tail and checking all items including the compass. If the plane was beyond repair, he would hoist it onto the overhead and bring down a new one and make certain that everything worked. Then he would repaint the plane and put in all markings and insignia. He would do everything except replacing an engine. That chore was left to Chief Dodge. Before the Pearl Harbor attack, Chief Myers’ hair was black. A few months later it was totally gray.

My little black book shows that Swindell made 3.54 on the official exam, 3.8 on petty officer ability, good ratings from all commissioned officers, and an OK from Chief Myers. That was the highest rating ever given by Myers. In contrast, the other applicant for possible advancement to first class made 3.1 on the official exam, a 3.2 rating for petty officer ability, and was not recommended for advancement by the division officer, the executive officer or by Chief Myers.

Now let me give some indication of what an AOM1/c [Aviation Ordnanceman First Class] was expected to do, and how he must train those under him. On the night of 7 December 1941, our Torpedo Squadron Six and five of us in SBDs (carrying hydrofluoric acid for TBD smoke screen), and some F4F fighters searched late into the night to hit Japanese carriers. We couldn't find any. Those F4F fighters were shot down by our people on Pearl Harbor. We SBDs landed on our ship ahead of the TBDs. One new TBD pilot, who had never landed on a carrier at night, made a rough landing. The torpedo broke loose, its propeller started twirling, meaning that it was armed and needed only a little bump on the nose to explode. "Slim" Townsend, the flight deck officer, saw it coming towards him at high speed. Slim jumped on it like a bucking bronco, steered it away from the island, and stopped it. Two ordnance men ran to it, disarmed it in two or three seconds, and helped place it on a cart, out of the way, allowing the next plane to land without circling.

Swindell was not on any SBD of those 7 December 1941 flights. He and his crew were too busy putting depth charges, bombs and ammunition on aircraft. On 20 February 1942, AOM2/c Swindell flew with ENS M. A. Merrill in 6-S-19 on our attack against Wake Island, which had been captured by the Japanese. We sunk one ship in the harbor and damaged another ship as we made a "dog leg" heading back to our Enterprise. (We never went directly back to our ship because that would show the enemy our position.) We were tearing that ship apart, using left over ammunition, when a U.S. cruiser several miles away saw what was happening. She fired one salvo, sinking that ship. Only four Japanese survived. We captured them, interrogated them, and made them the first Japanese prisoners of war. Lots of damage was done to Wake Island from our dive bombers and from shells from our cruisers.

On 4 March 1942 Swindell flew with ENS Merrill in 6-S-3, making an attack on Marcus Island. Based on heavy cloud cover and many AA batteries aiming at us, it was hard to tell how much damage was inflicted on their hangars, storehouses, and oil and gasoline tanks. One thing we knew for certain: we clobbered their radio station. We heard Tokyo repeatedly calling Marcus to answer. They continued for the next 24 hours. Marcus never replied.

A photograph of 13 May 1942 has a caption showing that Swindell was now AOM1/c. Apparently a vacancy had opened for that petty officer slot. Almost always a slot opened only when the previous recipient was lost in battle.

On the morning of 4 June1942, Swindell flew with ENS J. Q. Roberts. I watched them dive on the Kaga, two planes ahead of me. They were in the fifth plane to dive. I never saw them again. I was too busy aiming my bombs on the Kaga. The official battle report states, "forced landing near Kaga." Neither Roberts nor Swindell were ever found. All available evidence indicates that their plane was shot down by AA gunfire.

It took only four hits, only seconds apart, to demolish the Kaga. Each of us carried a 500-pound bomb and two 100-pound incendiaries. Additional hits were made, but many SBDs had to select other targets because flames and smoke obscured the carrier. The Battle of Midway was won in less than five minutes. That's all the time it took to make three of the best Japanese carriers into balls of flame.

It might be noted that only the very best people occupied the rear seat of our SBDs in battle. Don Hoff, of Fresno, California, who was a Radioman 3/c at that time, assures me that AOM1/c Swindell had flown numerous previous flights. He was an expert in gunnery, and was capable of operating all the numerous radio equipment in our SBDs. That included knowing how to operate the new YE-ZB homing equipment. Not all SBD plane crews from other carriers were able to operate the new YE-ZB homing system. They landed on the ocean. Fortunately, most of those crews were picked up at the end of the battle.

Statistics show that our dive bombers were the best in the world and they sunk more Japanese military ships than any other method, including attacks by submarines and surface ships. That great method paid a high price. More than half of our original Scouting Six crews were lost in the first six months of WW II. Just imagine sitting on the back seat of an SBD during combat. You would face to the rear, holding twin .30 caliber machine guns, scanning the sky for Zeros, ready to shoot them down before they shoot you. Then, suddenly, you are plunged downward vertically at 250 miles per hour, pushing downward on your seat with a force of one ton at eight "G’s" after the pilot has dropped his bomb. Then you must be ready to aim at more Zeros. Then the pilot tells you to go on the air, or switch to the homing frequency, or give hand signals to nearby crews in Morse code. All of this requires securing the guns, reaching forward, changing radio coils, and moving dials accurately and quickly.

We pilots always received medals when our airplane and crew did something important. The enlisted man in the back seat was rarely mentioned. I would have been killed long ago had it not been for the skills of my RM3/c, John Snowden. As Educational Officer, I had selected him before other pilots noticed his abilities. He scored number one in all categories for promotion, the highest ever recorded in my little black book.

[bobbysocks]

Captain N.J. "Dusty" Kleiss

MIDWAY!

Prior to the Battle of Midway our only "200 mile out and 200 mile back" searches relied on dead reckoning, using wind information, and revising wind changes by watching ocean waves using the Beaufort Scale. Just before the Battle ofMidway we had YE-ZB line of sight electronics equipment. When we were up 4 miles high we could locate the carrier more than a hundred miles away.

After taking some Marine airplanes to Wake Island early December 1941, we encountered a terrific storm as we headed back to Pearl Harbor. One destroyer broke a seam, and we were one day late arriving into Pearl Harbor. Had we arrived on time at our berth Fox Nine, on 6 December 1941, WW2 History would have been different. The ENTERPR1SE would have gone down with the battleships. The Japanese would have made more scheduled attacks, destroying ammunition depots, fuel depots and repair facilities. Also there would have been no early raids in the Pacific, no Jimmy Doolittle Raid and no victory in the Battle of Midway.

Because we were a day late, were carrying full loads of service ammunition and were declared to be at war, (As stated in this 28 November order in my LogBook, the ENTERPR1SE pilots tangled with the Japanese before the Japanese attack,tangled with them during the attack, and chased them as they ran for home that night. All this is recorded in THESE PAMPHLETS written by Dr. Cressman, a retired Navy historian.)

Many historians report that FUJITSU, the Japanese Air F orce Commander, sulked in his cabin for a month afterwards because he was not allowed to make additional attacks. On the other hand the Japanese Admiral was told that radar pictures indicated that 59 aircraft were headed his way and he decided to scram for home. But enough of previous history.

The Battle of Midway foundation started in the code room of Admiral Nimitz's headquarters in Honolulu. His experts had broken the latest Japanese code, knew that a giant armada was being assembled in total secrecy, but couldn't figure out the code word designated for the United States target.

The code breakers guessed that Midway Island might be the target but they weren't at all sure. Admiral Nimitz gave them a go-ahead to have a fake, unclassified signal sent from Midway Island. It said that the fresh water distilling system was out of commission and fresh water supplies were running low.

The Japanese bought this garbage and reported, in their new code, that target X was running short of fresh water. Midway Island was definitely the target. At that point in time, the ENTERPR1SE was dropping off planes and pilots at Efate Island. The Battle of the Coral Sea was in progress. We arrived there just as the battle ended.

The United States won, but the old LEXINGTON was sunk and the YORKTOWN barely made it afloat to get back to Pearl Harbor. The repair facility said that her repairs would take several months. Admiral Nimitz said the YORKTOWN had to be repaired as best as could be accomplished in a days.

Like the ENTERPRISE, the YORKTOWN was to lie in ambush for the midway attack. The movie named the "Battle ofMidway" depicted the YORKTOWN pilots singing and playing guitars to pump up their spirits for the forthcoming battle. As a matter of fact the YORKTOWN pilots were trying to get a little badly needed hours of sleep, and the ship's crew ere trying to get some things working. Our Captain Murray outlined our ambush strategy, and said that the Japanese would make a feint attack on Dutch Harbor, Alaska, intending that we would send all our forces there. The one thing he didn't tell us was the Japanese were sending 189 ships and we were ambushing with ___.They had eight of their aircraft carriers and we had the HORNET, the ENTERPRISE and the battle damaged YORKTOWN.

Vice Admiral "Bull" Halsey was unable to go with us. He was hospitalized with hives. Our shipmates revered him. Ensign Tom Eversole and his torpedo bomber plane got lost in fog and bad weather enroute to attack Wake Island. Halsey turned his entire fleet around, found the rubber raft of Eversole and crew, and clobbered Wake Island a day later than scheduled.

Halsey chose Admiral Spruance to replace him. Spruance was not an aviator, but he matched exactly Halsey's evaluation of risk philosophies. He knew the abilities and limitations of carriers and the abilities and limitation of other ships. Admiral Kimmel, by contrast, understood neither.

Halsey knew that our cruisers had only 8 inch guns and the Japanese had some 18 inch guns. Both the US and the Japanese signed the Washington Conference Treaty. We trashed our 18 inch guns, the Japanese built theirs. As Will Rogers said, "America never lost a war or won a peace conference. "

On 3 June 1942 we waited in ambush. All pilots were ready for take-off on a minutes notice. Later in the day we were told that an Air Force pilot had reported, "Enemy sighted. Main body", nothing further. Finally we pilots were told to get a few hours of sleep and get a hasty breakfast. Next day our ready room speaker reported that a PBY pilot flying through clouds had spotted a number of aircraft carriers below him. He calmly reported Latitude, Longitude and course and speed of the enemy. Later some pilots would also argue whether he added, "Please notify next of kin." Somehow the PBY was not observed by the Japs.

We immediately launched our dive bombers at 0945. LCDR McClusky headed the Air Group with Lt. Earl Gallaher just behind him. I led the next section to the right of Earl. We had 16 SBD's.

Just behind and below us were 15 SBD'S led by LT. Dick Best. Thirty-one ENTERPRISE planes in all. A similar number was launched from the YORKTOWN and from the HORNET.

Shortly after we took off, a scout from Midway reported that the Japanese carriers had reversed course. Now they were coming closer to the ENTERPRISE instead of going farther away.

The TBD torpedo planes were now within range. They were launched immediately from our three carriers. Hopefully these slower aircraft, with a closer target distance, would arrive just as our dive bombers made their attacks. Strict Radio Silence kept our dive bombers from learning about the new location and direction of the enemy.

Now let us think about things as Admiral Yamamoto, head of the armada, saw them. The Midway Island attack would be a piece of cake. The easy capture of this important base would cause the United States to sue for peace. His plan had worked perfectly and he had taken every precaution. His huge armada had travelled farther north than normal sea lanes. No submarines had detected him. Midway was unaware, and ill-prepared for an attack. The side attack of Dutch Harbor would surely send U.S. forces to head directly there. He would ambush and slaughter them.

As he expected, our U.S. Midway scouts finally detected his main body forces. All U.S. forces would go there. His undetected four best carriers a safe distance away, could wreck Midway at will. Then his battleships would clobber what was left, and his 5,000 troops from his transports would come in. Admiral Naguma, in charge of the Japanese carriers, had taken every precaution. He didn't think that any U.S. carriers were present, but to make sure he sent his scout planes 360 degrees for all possibiltties. One scout in one sector was delayed a couple of hours. Engine trouble. The other scouts returned to Naguma assuring him that no U.S. ships were present. The flustered, hurried, remaining scout, covering this missing sector, flew directly over the cloud cover on top of our aircraft carriers. He reported to Naguma that no U.S. Ships were present.

Nagurna wasn't worried even if U.S. carriers were present. He had his best carriers and his best pilots with him. His aircraft torpedoes were vastly better than ours. Our torpedoes would malfunction if dropped higher than a hundred feet or dropped at a speed faster than 100 knots. Ours had a tiny explosive warhead. Japanese torpedoes worked well when dropped from 200 feet and at speeds up to 200 knots. They also had a deadlier war head.

His carrier pilots bombed Midway exactly as planned. They told him that they severely damaged the installation and they had encountered little oppostion. Still Nagumo had that sixth-sense feeling that all was not well. Some SBD's and TBF's had been sighted. Were they coming from Midway? He ordered his planes loaded with torpedoes and carrier-type bombs.

No sooner than this was accomplished than his scouts reported that the U.S. Air Force was bombing his transports. Urgent help was needed to bomb Midway a second time to keep B 17's from using Midway. The combat loads of his carrier planes were removed, and exchanged for bombs to make holes in runways. No sooner was this accomplished than a Japanese scout reported finding our ENTERPRISE and YORKTOWN carriers. Japanese planes were again reloaded with torpedoes and different type bombs. Bombs and ammo were stacked everywhere.

In the midst of all this confusion, all three squadrons of U.S. torpedo planes arrived. Japanes fighter planes slaughtered them. All TBD's had attempted to drop their torpedos. Only a handful of torpedo planes escaped. No torpedo hit any carrier.

The Japanese had learned from the Battle of the Coral Sea that our torpedoes could only speed at 31 knots. Jap carriers moved at 30 knots, so they just sped away from torpedoes being launched. Our loaded TBD's could only fly at 100 knots. Jap fighters easily picked them off as the TBD's tried to get ahead of the carrier.

Now fast track to our SBD's. McClusky found an empty ocean where the enemy carriers were supposed to be. He figured that the Japanese must have reversed course. Soon he saw a destroyer going at high speed. This had to be a picket ship going to catch up with his fleet.

Suddenly we saw the KAGA, the AKAGI and the SORYU almost below us, in an open stretch of clouds.

"Earl and I will take the one on the right. Dick, you take the one on the left."

We went into eschelon formation. McClusky and his two wing men dived first, then Gallaher and two wingmen, then me and then the rest of Scouting Six, all heading for the KAGA. Dick Best and Bombing Six dived for the AKAGI. The YORKTOWN dive bombers dived for the SORYU.

The situation was a carrier pilot's dream. No anti-aircraft, all three carriers heading straight into the wind. Two fighters were above us, but they were not making an attack.

MClusky and his two wingmen missed. Earl Gallaher's 500 pound bomb hit squarely on a plane starting its take-off. His two 100 pound incendaries hit just beside it. Immediately the whole pack of planes at the stern were in flames 50 feet high.

I couldn't see the bombs landing from the next two planes, but flames had spread. to the middle of the ship. My bombs landed exactly on the big red circle forward of the bridge. Seconds later the flames were 100 feet high. Walter Lord later learned from the Japanese that my bomb splashed a gasoline cart, throwing its flaming contents into the KAGA's bridge.

A fighter attacked us as I pulled out of my dive. John Snowden, my gunner, disposed of him in five seconds. A second fighter came at us. John disposed of him. Then it was a survival to escape anti-aircraft fire while passing near a dozen ships until I'd reached ten miles toward Midway.

Ten minutes after the attack I saw a large explosion amidship on the KAGA. Rockets of flame, pieces of steel bolted upward to about three or four thousand feet high.

Dick Best's squadron had bombed the The KAGA and the YORKTOWN bombers hit the SORYU. Both were burning fiercely

The KAGA then sent up a huge brown cloud of smoke. I could no longer see the ship and presumed it was sunk. The other two fires were visible 30 miles away. As directed, I headed 40 miles toward Midway before heading to our carrier. As I climbed slowly up to cloud level I saw a Jap fighter heading at me. I headed directly at him and he ducked away into a cloud.

Then I saw a Bombing Six plane land in the sea and the crew getting their rubber raft. I marked their position

Then on my left a few miles away I saw several dozen planes from the HIRYU flying at high speed toward our carriers. I'd glimpsed this 4th carrier, about 20 miles away, during my dive.

I had used every trick I knew to get every mile out of each drop of gas. The ENTERPRISE saw me coming, headed into the wind. I landed on the carrier without circling. I landed with five gallons of gas. We had launched 16 SBD's. Eight made it back

As soon as our SBD's were loaded and gassed, we took off for the HIRYU. Before I got back to the Big E, the Japanese from the HIRYO had exploded torpedoes on the YORKTOWN, setting her temporarily on fire and causing her to be abandoned. Her airplanes landed on the ENTERPRISE and HORNET .

We added these additional YORKTOWN SBD's to our group, making a total of 24 planes for our second attack and headed for the HIRYU. None of the HORNET's dive bombers were with us becase they were not able to find the enemy carriers.

Our second attack was different. Lots of fighters everyhere. Four of them attacked the plane ahead. Adkins, the radioman-gunner started aiming at them. Somehow his twin machine gun broke loose. He shot down the first fighter holding the twin machine guns like a shotgun. The three other three fighters ran away. Previously Adkins needed help to carry this weapon.

Gallaher was first to dive. He and the next pilot missed because the HIRYO made a tight semi-circle. The third pilot made a hit directly in the center of the flight deck. Mine landed on the same spot. More hits were made. Explosions and flames appeared but they were mild as compared with the damage witnessed on the KAGA and the other carriers.

We launched 24 planes for this attack. We lost none of them.

During the middle of the night Nagurna sent out a message to his fleet to take Midway regardless of all cost. Meantime a U.S. submarine reported seeing a silhouette of a Jap Carrier. It could by the damaged HIRYU or maybe a 5th carrier.

Admiral Spruance wasn't about to trade 8" guns against 18" guns in a night battle. He also might encounter an unknown Jap carrier. By daylight it became obvious that the entire armada had headed for home.

Why Naguma changed his mind is uncertain. It might have been the report he received from an interpreter who had drawn information of Ensign O'Flaherty and Peter Gaido, lst Class Machinist Mate of our Scouting Six squadron. Their SBD had been forced down. They were rescued from their rubber raft by the Japanese. They knew they would be questioned, and had time to set their stories straight. Neither had even seen Midway.

Independently, under death threats, they had to describe the fortifications of Midway. Each told about the hundreds of five inch guns that ringed Midway, the dozens of PBY's there, the thousands of Marines there and all the extra reenforcements. The Japanese sent the information to the Naguma, killed both of them, and dumped their bodies in the ocean.

At dawn we found only an empty ocean, The Japanese had headed hell-bent for home.

On the fifth of June we could only catch up with a small cruiser at dusk. She did everything right. We scored no hits. She shot down one of our planes. On the sixth of June we caught up with the battle cruiser MIKUMI and sank it. Her picture is in my log book, with its few survivors on its stern, just before she sank. Some destroyers were badly damaged.

The HORNET dive bombers found some more large cruisers, sinking at least one. Then we could no longer chase the Japanese. The destroyers were bone dry. We were ready to head for Dutch Harbor to give them some help, but we were told that the Japanese had left, and no help was needed. So we headed back to Pearl Harbor for a beer.

And now I will mention the REAL heroes of the Battle of Midway.

The Marine pilots who flew our discarded, shot-up SBD's attacking the Jap carriers. Of the entire squadron, only one pilot survived.

Of the TBF pilots from Midway, only one survived.

The Air Force B-17 pilots like Dave Hassimer, of Air Force Village I who scouted the Japanese foces and engaged in combat with their planes, bombed transports, and made our dive bombing attacks possible. They let us sneak in the back door and do the mischief.

Let us not forget the valient torpedo crews who unflinchedly gave their lives to give a great shot at the laps. Also let us pray for the dive bomber crews who knew they had no chance of reaching our carrier.

Remember also the shipboard crews of the YORKTOWN and the ENTERPRISE who did their work perfectly.

Particular kudo's go for the boiler-tenders of the ENTERPRISE, who totally rebricked her boilers with the ship underway. A hot, dangerous operation. One I'd never heard of before. They gave us 30 knots of speed which helped us dodge a submarine torpedo. It passed astern 50 feet behind the ship.

We, the survivors, had the easy part. The tough ones are the wives and family members who lost everything.

[bobbysocks]

In the Rear Seat at Midway and Santa Cruz

by ATC Richard T. Woodson, USN-Ret

Born Into a Navy Family

I was born on Nov. 24, 1920 in Paterson, NJ to Russell M. and Eileen Nellie (neé Ring) Woodson. My father was a chief radioman in the U.S. Navy. We moved to Philadelphia in 1924, but my father was soon transferred to Guam in the Marianas Islands. After he found housing for us (a corrugated iron shack in Merico), my mother, older sister, and I took the train cross-country to San Francisco, got aboard the USS Gold Star and sailed to Guam. After a few months at Merico, my dad found a much nicer residence for us in Agaña.

We left Guam in February 1927 and came back on the USS Henderson through the Panama Canal. We arrived a month later in New York City where there was approximately two feet of snow at the time. We then went to Fire Island on Long Island, which had a lifeguard station with high-speed boats to get the rum runners, a lighthouse station and its crew, and a USN radio direction finder’s station where my dad was in charge. Due to the fact there was no school there, he requested a humanitarian transfer and we ended up in Amagansett, Long Island, NY. I started first grade there in 1927.

Late in 1928 my father was transferred to the Philadelphia Navy Yard to a destroyer and we moved to Philadelphia where I attended St. Agatha’s School. My dad retired from the Navy in 1930 and we moved to Pittsburgh, then Cleveland, Ohio; Idaho Falls, Idaho; Miles City, Montana; and finally to Denver, Colorado where I finished my education in 1939 at East Denver High School.

Aviation Radioman

I joined the National Guard while still in school. While in the Guard, I applied for Annapolis but was not accepted. In December 1939 I joined the Navy (without being discharged from the National Guard) and went to boot camp at San Diego. My friend Doan Watson reported at the National Guard roll call that I had joined the Navy. After boot camp I went to aviation radio school on North Island NAS, and graduated in June 1940, I believe. I went aboard the USS Manley, DD-74, for transfer to the Panama Canal Zone. I arrived at Cocosolo about one and a half weeks later and was assigned to a PBY squadron, VP-32, in Panama.

I stayed with VP-32 until August 1941 when I was assigned to the commissioning of the USS Hornet Air Group. I was posted to VS-8, a dive bomber squadron. We flew SBC4s. We had our shakedown cruise in the Caribbean, went back to Norfolk (we were there on December 7, 1941) and finally went to San Diego around March 1942 where we changed our SBC4s to used SBD3s. We went from San Diego to San Francisco where we picked up Jimmy Doolittle and his 16 B25s and sailed for Tokyo. We launched the B25s for their raid on Japan on April 18, 1942 and returned to Pearl Harbor.

Four Sorties at Midway

We went to Midway. I flew four times during the battle: the morning of June 4th with pilot Don Kirkpatrick, the evening of the 4th with Al Woods (his rear seat man was missing so I volunteered to fly), and the evening of the 5th and the morning flight of the 6th with Kirkpatrick. We made attacks at all times except the morning of June 4th, which was an abortion for Hornet air group. We never found the Japanese on that run. Torpedo Squadron 8 found the Japanese, however, but they were all shot down with one survivor, George Gay. My friend Ronnie Fisher was killed in that raid. I wrote to a girl he had been corresponding with to let her know about Ronnie. We continued writing to each other and she later became my wife.

I was injured at Midway, but not seriously. After we landed I mentioned to a friend that it really hurts when you wear your helmet for a long time. He asked, “what’s all that blood?” I took my helmet off and he got some pliers and pulled a half-inch piece of shrapnel from under my left ear. I didn’t know about Purple Hearts and knew there was another flight that day that I didn’t want to miss, so I never reported that injury.

Visiting the Cannibals

We returned to Pearl Harbor and then left for the South Pacific and the Coral Sea. We were to be joined by the Saratoga approximately the end of August, but it was hit by a torpedo. My pilot, Kirkpatrick, and I saw the oil slick while on the lookout for Japanese submarines. The Saratoga had a 20 by 26 foot hole in its starboard bow and was returned to the states.

The Wasp then joined us and on September 15th was hit by torpedoes and caught fire. Ten of our planes took off from the Hornet and flew to Espiritu Santo so the Wasp’s planes could land aboard. Five dive bombers were sent ahead of the ship on a search mission for Japanese subs and were then to go on to Espiritu Santo. Five of us in SBDs ran out of fuel and ditched near Pentecost Island in the New Hebrides. One pilot, Tipas, didn’t have a radioman since he had about five cases of liquor in his back seat to possibly sell on the island. He took a different route and crashed on another island in the area.

We spent about four days on the island and were finally rescued by PBYs. All of the islands were inhabited by cannibals—friendly, we hoped. We got back aboard the Hornet and our next mission was on October 5th when we (four fighters and 12 to 14 dive bombers) attacked Rekata Bay in the morning and Guadalcanal later that day. Rekata Bay was a seaplane base that we helped destroy.

Life and Death in the Santa Cruz Islands

On October 15, 1942 we hit Bougainville in an early morning raid, and on October 26th we fought at the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in the Solomons campaign. As Kirkpatrick and I pulled out of our dive after dropping our bomb, we found we were joined by four Japanese Zeros, two starboard and one to port several hundred yards away, plus one behind and below only about 25 yards away. We were 50 feet above the water and making evasive moves, but we were shot in the tip of the wing and rudder. The Zero behind and below us shot me with a 20 mm. cannon shell that came up between my feet and destroyed my radio transmitter and another that went through my left knee and left side, taking out part of my cockpit. That shot slewed me around which put my guns toward the port side of our plane. I shot his wing off and watched him crash. We were so close that, if he had lived, I could have recognized him if I saw him on the street. He was my third unconfirmed kill that day.

We made it back aboard the Enterprise since the Hornet had been sunk. We were the next to last plane able to land on the Enterprise. A crewmember was heard to say, “look, that plane’s bleeding!” It was from my wounds. Our plane was so damaged that it was shoved over the side.

I had surgery two days later. When we pulled into Noumea, New Caledonia, I was transferred to the Solace, a hospital ship. The Solace had to go back to Guadalcanal so the injured were transferred to the Lurline, a passenger ship, and I ended up in San Diego in December at Balboa Naval Hospital. I was finally allowed to go on liberty in February and met my future wife for the first time.

Into the Atlantic

I spent five months in the hospital at Balboa and was released in April 1943. I had orders to CASU 5 (Carrier Aircraft Service Unit) which I didn’t want and reported instead to Commander, Fleet Air West Coast for an assignment. I finally found a dive bomber squadron (SBD-4s or -5s) that I was qualified for and went to VC-58, then forming at Sand Point Naval Air Station in Washington. We changed to TBF-1s and after training we went to San Diego, were fitted with rocket rails, went across country to Quonset Point, and finally down to Norfolk where we got aboard the CVE USS Block Island. We made one trip with four destroyer escorts to Casablanca and back which took about six weeks. We dropped sonic buoys after German submarines submerged but didn’t make any attacks.

My pilot, LCDR McCroskey, died in a night field carrier landing practice accident at East Field. I started flying with LT Helmuth E. Horner on the USS Guadalcanal on the next trip. In the middle of April 1944 we contacted a submarine on radar, made an attack and hit it with two depth charges that destroyed the ballast tanks. It couldn’t submerge and they abandoned ship. All 58 or so crewmembers survived and were brought aboard ship.

About two nights later (we flew five nights out of six, launching at 2330 and recovering at 0400) we caught another submarine on the surface. It submerged while we were making a run on it and we dropped a sonic mine, a “hot dog,” which went off and destroyed the submarine. We recovered seven or eight survivors.

Patrol Bomber Aircrew

The Guadalcanal returned to the states and Horner and I went out next time on the USS Wake Island. We didn’t see anything on that trip. We returned to Norfolk where I got orders to flight school at Pre-Flight Training in Iowa City, Iowa. Before reporting for pre-flight training, I married Betty Lou Mathes in Long Beach, CA. I then went to the University of Iowa for pre-flight school. I got out of there in June 1945 and went to Memphis, TN for primary training. I was in primary training when the war ended and we stopped flying for several weeks while the authorities figured out what to do with us enlisted pilots. They basically ended up purging us from the program.

I went from there to electronics school at Dearborn, Michigan at the Ford Factory. Mr. Ford wanted his property back since the war was over so the school was transferred to Great Lakes Naval Training Center. I left there and went to Annapolis. While there, I got my private pilot’s license. I spent a year at Annapolis and then was transferred to VPMS-1 in Bermuda. When I reported to Norfolk, I found out that VPMS-1 was being decommissioned and I ended up in VPML-8, the first P2V squadron formed at Quonset Point. I went there in July 1947.

I took a discharge from service in October 1947 in order to get on the west coast where my wife and newborn daughter were living at the time. I reenlisted a month later in VP-42 at San Diego, a PBM squadron. In September 1948 we left San Diego and went to Tsingtao China. We spent seven and a half months in Tsingtao, came back from there and were decommissioned. From there I went to VA-195 at Alameda Naval Air Station. I spent about four months there, then requested a transfer to VC-5 at Moffett Field. I got the transfer around September 1949 and stayed in VC-5 until June 1954.

Around April 1950, while with VC-5, I was in one of three crews that flew a P2V off the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Navy wanted to get into the atom bomb race. This was a test run to see if a P2V could possibly carry an atom bomb for a long distance. I flew with Fillmore B. Gilkeson non-stop for 24.5 hours. We had to maintain a true air speed of 200 knots and climb to 10,000 feet in order to drop the bomb. In that trip we passed over Cuba, bombed (simulated) the Panama Canal, and returned to Moffett Field non-stop, a trip of approximately 5,000 miles.

Down to Earth At Last

I left VC-5 in 1954 and took orders for shore duty at Pt. Mugu, CA. I stayed at Pt. Mugu for two years and in July 1956 received orders to the Naval Air Technical Training Center ATV School. After finishing there I went to Jacksonville, FL to VFP-62. I retired from active duty in August 1959 and returned to California where my wife and I had bought a house. I completed my service with a Silver Star, three Air Medals, two Letters of Commendation and one Purple Heart.

I went to work for Naval Air Missile Test Center at Pt. Mugu in November 1959. I worked there on several different projects, Gorgon Five and so on, until 1976 at which time I retired with a total of about 37 years of federal service. I had a TV shop in the meantime and ran it until 1983 when my wholesaler closed down. Without a source of parts I decided to give up that work. I played golf with a group of friends most of the time, did crossword puzzles, etc. My wife and I had four children. They are now all married and live in California. I have one grandson, three granddaughters and two step-granddaughters.

My wife passed away on June 4, 2001 from ALS (Lou Gherig’s Disease). I’ve been living by myself with my two cats since that time in the same house we bought in 1954. And that’s about all I have to say.

[bobbysocks]

Interrogation Nav 16, Commander Masatake Okumiya

12 Oct 1945

Biography

OKUMIYA, Masatake, Commander, I.J.N.

OKUMIYA was experienced, intelligent and logical. His professional interest and enthusiasm were combined with accuracy, frankness and a knowledge of detail which made him an excellent source of information. He was for 14 years a commissioned officer in the regular Navy, served for the last 12 years as a naval aviator logging 2,000 hours of flight time. After 2 years service on a light cruiser and destroyer, he learned to fly. Thereafter he served in carrier air groups, on board carriers, and on carrier air staffs.

Division Officer, YOKOSUKA Air Group 1939-1941
Aviation Instructor, KASUMIGAURA Air Station 1941-1942
Air Staff Officer, 4th and 2nd Air Flotilla 1942-1944
Air Staff Officer, Naval General Staff July 1944-October 1945
Air Staff Officer, Ryujo ALEUTIANS June 1942
Air Operation Officer Staff, 2nd Flying Squadron RABAUL August 1942-February 1944
Air Intelligence Office, Japanese Naval Historical Research Department TOKYO August 1945


Interrogation

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 16
USSBS NO. 75
BATTLE OF EASTERN SOLOMONS, 23-25 AUGUST 1945
BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ, 26 OCTOBER 1942
SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN, 1942-1943

TOKYO
12 October 1945

Interrogation of: Commander OKUMIYA, Masatake, IJN, Class 1927, I.J.N.A. On Air Staff and Commander RABAUL Air Group 1942 - 1943.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Commander T. H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

SANTA CRUZ: Composition of Japanese Second and Third Fleets, which were operating just north of the SOLOMONS to (1) support Japanese landing on GUADALCANAL, 13-23 October 1942, and (2) to intercept U.S. troop convoys to GUADALCANAL and U. S. Carrier Task Force. In carrier duel on 26 October, SHOKAKU, ZUIHO and CHIKUMA were damaged. Heavy Japanese air losses contributed to weakening defense of SOLOMONS.

SOLOMONS: GUADALCANAL an intermediate step in southern movement. Main action in SOLOMONS Campaign considered (1) GUADALCANAL (2) MUNDA (3) VELLA LAVELLA (4) EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY. Inability to hold SOLOMONS attributed to U.S. Navy sea and air action in SOLOMONS Area and lack of landing barges. Heavy-bomber raid on airfield more effective than carrier raid. Carrier raid most effective on aircraft and shipping. RABAUL and TRUK neutralized due to inability to supply. Employment of submarines to supply isolated garrisons considered poor policy. Mining of RABAUL a deterrent to submarine supply operation. Aircraft pilot reports of damage inflicted on enemy always optimistic and only used for newspaper publicity. Staff planning used pessimistic estimate.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Do you know how the RYUJO was sunk in the battle of 23-25 August 1942?
A. It was by carrier dive-bomber and torpedo planes about 25 August. The SHOKOKU, ZUIKAKU and RYUJO were in the SOLOMONS at this time. About the 24th, the carrier RYUJO, the heavy cruiser TONE, and 3 DDs were attacked near GUADALCANAL. They didn't know the source of the dive-bombers and torpedo planes but they were carrier type and came from the direction of GUADALCANAL. Perhaps one destroyer was also sunk.

Q. Are you familiar with the Battle off SANTA CRUZ, 25-26 October 1942?
A. I was there and am familiar with it. I was on the Air Staff of the 2nd Flying Squadron.

Q. What ships were involved?
A. Composition of Japanese Fleet at SANTA CRUZ, 25-26 October. 1942

Second Fleet Vice Admiral KONDO, N., Commander in Chief
1 (CV) JUNYO 2nd Flying Squadron
2 (BB) KONGO, HARUNA 3rd Flying Squadron
4 (CA) ATAGO, TAKAO, CHOKAI, MAYA 4th Flying Squadron
2 (CA) MYOKO, HAGURO
1 (CL) JINTSU (?)
12 (DDs)

Third Fleet Vice Admiral NAGUMO, C., Commander in Chief, and commanding whole fleet.
3 (CVs) SHOKAKU (F), ZUIKAKU, ZUIHO 1st Flying Squadron
2 (BBs) HIEI, KIRISHIMA 11th Squadron
2 (CAs) SUZUYA, KUMANO 7th Squadron
2 (CAs) TONE, CHIKUMA 8th Squadron
1 (CL)
12(DDs)

[See Annex A]

Q. Was the HIYO in the action?
A. No. HIYO had engine trouble at TRUK. The JUNYO was alone in Second Fleet, but I don't believe it was near enough to get in any action.

Q. Did any of the pilots and planes that survived the Battle of MIDWAY come down into the SOLOMONS?
A. In the MIDWAY Battle there were a great many survivors. Because our pilots were in the air when carrier sank, they were rescued by destroyers. Most of the MIDWAY flyers were put on the carriers SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU and RYUJO. The pilots left from MIDWAY were familiar with carrier operations so put them on these carriers.

Q. What was the mission of the Task Force that was operating in that area?
A. It was a support for the landing operations on GUADALCANAL, scheduled for between 13th and 23rd October.

Q. Did the action of the SANTA CRUZ Battle have any effect upon the landing date?
A. I heard landing was completed on the 25th but that the results were not as successful as expected.

Q. Did that action have any effect on the 14 November night battle?
A. No. The Task Force went back to TRUK on 30 October after SANTA CRUZ Battle, reorganized, then came the 14 November action. Do not know if it affected the plans. Only the 2nd Flying Squadron's planes engaged at SANTA CRUZ, so they had planes during the time of the November action.

Q. What carriers were damaged at SANTA CRUZ?
A. SHOKAKU received four bomb hits on port side amidships and two at the after elevator. The ZUIHO received one bomb hit near the after elevator. The cruiser CHIKUMA got five bomb hits. The destroyer TERUTSUKI got a near miss by a United States flying boat about midnight after the battle. When TERUTSUKI was bombed, the Japanese knew American planes were near the fleet so the Japanese carriers continued to retire northward. Some cruisers and battleships stayed near scene of battle and saw your carrier burning. I saw it from the air. They proceeded to Truk.

Q. Do you know how long after sunrise the first hits were made?
A. The ZUIKAKU was hit about two hours after daylight, about 0830. The SHOKAKU was hit later, about 40 minutes after the raid of Japanese airplanes had departed.

Q. Were any airplanes aboard the carrier when hit?
A. No, all off in attack group except about 16 planes in the fighter cover.

Q. Did those planes come back to the SHOKAKU later?
A. No, they couldn't land on board. They went to the ZUIKAKU and ZUIHO.

Q. How many planes did the aircraft carrier normally carry?
A.

SHOKAKU ZUIKAKU ZUIHO JUNYO
VF 27 27 21 18
VB 27 18 18
VT 18 18 6 9
72 63 27 45

About 2/3 were lost. Total lost about 100.

Q. How many planes were involved in the operation from the carriers?
A. About 176. There were three waves. They all went out in the first wave; fewer planes in the second raid, about 60; then in the third wave about 30.

Q. Was the MYOKO or TONE hit by bombs?
A. I think not, but there were near misses. I am not certain. An awful lot of torpedoes came but no hits. In my opinion it was a heavy attack.

Q. Were any horizontal-bombers involved in this attack?
A. About ten B-24s, but the Japanese fighters drove them away so were not attacked. Late at night we received a torpedo attack from possibly, a B-24, but we were able to avoid it by evasive action.

Q. Where did the damaged ships go?
A. All went to TRUK. Then the SHOKAKU, ZUIHO and CHIKUMA returned to JAPAN for repair. It took about 3-4 months to repair the SHOKAKU.

Q. Were any other cruisers or battleships hit?
A. I didn't hear that they were.

Q. When did you receive first information of our carrier Task Force?
A. When south of the GILBERTS, north of HEBRIDES. The Japanese headquarters at TRUK knew of a convoy of transports and battleships approaching GUADALCANAL from the southeast about the middle of October. They believed United States Navy convoy would be about lat. 14°S, 191°E on chart, south of GUADALCANAL. The Japanese carrier force didn't think so since they knew our search planes from GILBERTS had sighted an American carrier approaching from the east. Japanese carrier force was supposed to attack south convoy but hesitated to do so. Because of radio silence this information was not sent to TRUK. Communication difficulties. TRUK did not know of American carriers. So the Second and Third Fleets waited north of GUADALCANAL while your carriers approached. Our carriers were familiar with position of your carrier force the entire time although TRUK did not have the information regarding position of our carrier force. Our force hesitated about how far south to go. The thing that decided it was your approach. One of our scout planes, scouting on bearing 098°T, saw your carrier force in the morning of the 26th. He was supposed to scout 260 miles southeast and 100 miles north.

Q. Did you have submarines in the vicinity?
A. I think they were farther south.

Q. Did you have any report that your planes had damaged or sunk our carriers?
A. There was a report from the planes that an ENTERPRISE class carrier was hit, maybe two. The reports did not come in clearly. We were sure that one was sunk because we saw it, but we didn't get complete reports on the second carrier. Became less certain while waiting for reports that did not come in.

Q. Were any of your pilots instructed to carry out suicide attacks on our carriers?
A. No orders were given; but two of them, on their own initiative, did so. The commander of one wing was one of those that made a suicide dive-bombing attack.

Q. You say a large formation of bombers attacked in the afternoon of the 26th, but no hits were made; is that correct?
A. The statement is correct.

Q. Did the Second and Third Flying Fleets come down the night of the 26th to pursue our ships?
A. Some of our fast ships approached scene of battle but turned back when your burning carrier was sighted.

Q. What were the plans for establishing bases in the SOLOMONS? Where were your principal bases to be located?
A. RABAUL was principal base. GUADALCANAL was an intermediate step for going south.

Q. What interrupted the completion of that plan?
A. I think that sea and air force of the United States Navy. The fact that Americans landed and were able to hold at GUADALCANAL.

Q. While the Americans held GUADALCANAL, were Japanese naval pilots or Army pilots employed in the raids at GUADALCANAL?
A. Almost entirely naval. Few scout planes of the Army. Attacking was done by Navy planes. Navy personnel came first and were land-based. After the sinking of the RYUJO, they added more Navy to them. They also came to BUKA in September.

Q. Why were the reinforcements of GUADALCANAL sent down in small units instead of one mass attack?
A. Didn't have enough landing barges to make a landing. The main point of difficulty in our landing operations was the lack of landing barges. Boats and destroyers were used for landings. But we didn't have enough barges to begin with. Had plenty of big ships but not enough landing craft. Damage from American planes made it worse.

Q. What battles did you consider the principal action in that SOLOMONS Campaign?
A. We considered it all the same thing, but most important was GUADALCANAL, MUNDA, VELLA LAVELLA, EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay.

Q. Did the bombing of the SOLOMONS airfield effect operations?
A. They got our field completely at MUNDA. We had about 20 planes there which did a very good job in the first battle; but when they landed one day to refuel, they were done in by American fighters. Because of bombing and strafing we couldn't repair or develop the field afterwards. We had only one site at MUNDA. We could only use KOLOMBANGARA for communication. I was at BUIN the toughest part of the time. At BUIN, at the beginning, the Americans used too small bombs. Even at the worst we were still able in the early days to continue to use the field because the bombs used were too small.

Q. What type planes dropped the bombs?
A. B-24, B-25, B-17, and dive-bombers. From August 1943 the big bombers came over from [RUSSELL Islands]. Some times we received five attacks in one day. Because of the damage of BUIN at the end of August 1943, we alternated between BALLALE and BUKA; and by September despite building of an auxiliary field, at BUIN, the BOUGANVILLE Area became impractical for air operations. All planes and personnel retired to RABAUL. After the fighter planes had left BUIN, all resupply was practically impossible.

Q. Did the ground troops remain on BOUGAINVILLE?
A. Yes, the troops brought from GUADALCANAL went up to BOUGAINVILLE Island from all the SOLOMON ISLANDS. Remaining infantry troops gathered at BUIN.

Q. How did they travel between the islands?
A. January 1943 by destroyer. They evacuated GUADALCANAL with 20 destroyers. MUNDA, RENDOVA and VELLA LAVELLA troops were also evacuated by destroyer. The closer islands were evacuated by submarine and very small boats.

Q. Do you know about any losses of any ships; for instance, KINUGASA and KIRISHIMA?
A. In November the HIEI (BB) received a PT boat torpedo, damaged rudder and after completing circumnavigation of SAVO Island, was bombarded by an American destroyer or cruiser. A Japanese destroyer contributed to sinking the HIEI. Also she received damage from American destroyer and cruiser bombardment and by bombing from American planes. KIRISHIMA also sunk.

Q. Did the HIEI go on to GUADALCANAL to continue bombardment even though damaged?
A. Before she sank she was still shooting. The KIRISHIMA was sunk due west of SAVO Island. Due to no air support the cruiser YURA was also sunk about 25 October. It was near RABAUL, I think.

Q. Following the loss of the SOLOMONS Chain what were your new plans?
A. After the loss of the SOLOMON ISLANDS, the Americans were able to attack RABAUL with all types of planes. Because we had difficulty in supplying RABAUL, we took all the planes out of RABAUL to TRUK, about 21 February 1944. Following the first carrier Task Force attack upon TRUK, about 17 February 1944 by the Americans, the airplane losses were heavy; so we flew all but six planes to TRUK for reinforcements. Later about June or July, five or six planes at a time were flown from TRUK to KAVIENG and the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS. In August and September 1943 I was engaged in flight training near SINGAPORE, therefore I did not know what happened in the SOLOMONS at that time. I am not sure of any other plans but I think we were looking for some other area in which to make a defense.

Q. What happened to ground personnel at RABAUL and TRUK?
A. A good many had to stay. As many as possible were taken out by planes, flying boats and submarines to PALAU and DAVAO. A lot of them were killed by American bombing operations at RABAUL. Many aircraft maintenance personnel killed from that reason. Later operations were hampered because too many skilled personnel stuck at RABAUL unable to get out.

Q. What type of bombing do you consider the most effective?
A. B-24s were most effective on land bases. Because our fields were few, it was the size of bombs that did the harm. Little ones didn't do much harm. The number of crashes attempting to land on damaged fields was very great after B-24 raids. In a place like RABAUL where there were many fields, big bombs were not such a determining factor because we could land on an auxiliary field. Bombing effectiveness depends upon the target. The main thing that bothered us in operation was having several fields hit at the same time, leaving nothing to be used as auxiliary. Carrier planes on a small island with small targets or against ships were most dangerous. In an isolated place like TRUK with its many fields, carrier planes were most feared due to accuracy and repeated attacks. Whereas the heavy-bombers could only come one flight a day, carrier planes would keep coming all day for several days. Carrier planes always destroyed many of our planes and shipping which could not be easily replaced, whereas heavy-bombers mostly damaged airfields which were repairable. Also some supplies.

Q. Was the shipping in RABAUL Harbor damaged by bombing?
A. The big bombers did very little damage but the dive-bombers did whatever damage was done to the shipping. There were many ships sunk in the harbor by dive-bombers.

Q. Were we wise in attacking the RABAUL airfields?
A. Most distressing thing for us in a place like RABAUL was to have the shipping bombed. However, that depends on the target. The worst was attacking the shipping approaching RABAUL full of supplies.

Q. Were the American night bombing attacks effective on your shore bases?
A. The men became fatigued. Cut down fighting power. Didn't hit much.

Q. Were you present at any ports where American planes mined the harbors?
A. I was at RABAUL when that was done. At first they were not much of a nuisance and damage was minor. Later they were serious because they interfered with the supply submarines coming in.

Q. Do you know why submarines were used to supply instead of attack?
A. The use of submarines was not well done. Due to the loss of air control and shipping, the great length of supply lines committed our submarines to a policy of supply. The point is that there was no area fully consolidated enough to take care of itself. None of the points were self dependent. The use of submarines came from high authority, but I think the Army insisted upon their use.

Q. Do you know if airplanes were scouting for submarines which sank the WASP in September 1942?
A. I don't know much about that. I was on my way home, but plans were for that. In practice, communication between them was very bad.

Q. In early March 1943, our air forces pressed an attack on a large Japanese convoy in the BISMARK SEA. Do you know what losses the Japanese sustained?
A. It is being made upon FEAF report. If you will excuse me I would rather not talk about it until later.

Q. In the two battles of KULA Gulf, 6 and 13 July 1943, what were the losses?
A. Four destroyers were sunk, but I was at RABAUL. Didn't hear full details. The main thing that showed up for us was our bad radar.

Q. When was the radar first used on the airplanes?
A. First on planes at the beginning of 1943. After MIDWAY first on ships.

Q. When was the first on shore?
A. Little before July 1942. They were experimenting with it before the war.

Q. Did you have any plans to go back to BOUGAINVILLE after withdrawing?
A. No, We couldn't supply it.

Q. What were your duties in September-October 1945?
A. Came back to the Navy General Staff on 20 August last year, on action reports, current operations.

Q. What damage was thought inflicted on the United States Third Fleet off FORMOSA, on 14, 15 October?
A. Not very accurate reports. Most of the reports were from flight personnel who couldn't see very well. They said they thought they had caused damage to or sunk ten carriers. We thought back in the office that they probably had done serious damage to only four. Pilots report optimistically. We put that stuff in the paper. We thought in the office, and made plans accordingly, that the damage inflicted was less and that they had only seriously damaged four or five carriers.

Q. Did you feel that you had seriously affected American strength?
A. We took the pessimistic view when making plans, but made public the optimistic reports.

Q. Did you receive any information about American damage through radio despatches?
A. Yes. During operations, some of the ships we thought had been sunk began sending out radio, signals, so we knew they were not sunk.

Q. Was this done by traffic analysis, breakdown of code signs, or breakdown of the message?
A. We figured that certain very valuable ships have a particular wave length, and therefore we learned what the wave lengths were. When communicating with your own planes, we figured out what carrier it was.

[bobbysocks]

Interrogation Nav 6, Captain Mitsuo Fuchida

18 Oct 1945

Biography
FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Captain, I.J.N.

FUCHIDA served 25 years in the regular Navy. An aviator with 3000 hours in the air, FUCHIDA aboard Akagi, was in command of the air groups of CarDiv 1 from August 1941 until July 1942. Wounded during the Battle of MIDWAY, he was hospitalized for approximately one year, then in June 1943 senior staff officer, 1st Air Fleet at KANOYA, and, subsequently, when 1st Air Fleet moved to the MARIANAS, at TINIAN. In April 1944, FUCHIDA transferred to OYODO as Staff Officer (Air Operations) of Combined Fleet. When Fleet Headquarters moved ashore to HIYOSHI in September 1944 he continued as Staff Officer (Air Operations) until the end of the war. FUCHIDA answered questions frankly and carefully. He was considered one of the most lucrative sources of information and a reliable witness.

Commanding Officer, Air Group CarDiv I August 1941-July 1942
Hospitalized August 1942-May 1943
Senior Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet June 1943-March 1944
Staff Officer (Air Operations), Combined Fleet April 1944-August 1945

Interrogation
INTERROGATION NAV NO. 6
USSBS NO. 40
THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
THE KAMIKAZE CORPS IN PHILIPPINES AND OKINAWA

TOKYO
18 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, IJN, a naval aviator since 1928. As air group commander of the AKAGI he led the attacks on PEARL HARBOR, DARWIN and CEYLON. In April 1944 he became Air Staff Officer to CinC Combined Fleet and held that post for the duration of the war.

Interrogated by: Lt. Comdr. R. P. Aiken, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: Col. Philip Cole, AUS; Captain W. Pardae, AUS; Lt. Robert Garred, USNR.

Summary:

Captain FUCHIDA discussed the attack on PEARL HARBOR, and the organization of the Kamikaze Corps during the PHILIPPINE Campaign. He also furnished information relating to suicide attacks during the OKINAWA Campaign, and Japanese Naval and Army Air Forces plans to resist an invasion of JAPAN proper.

Transcript:

Q. What was your status during the PEARL HARBOR attack?
A. I was an air observer.

Q. How many and what types of aircraft were used in the attack?
A. A total of 350. In the first wave:

50 High level KATES
40 VTB KATES
50 Dive-Bombers VALS
50 VF ZEKES

In the second wave:

50 High level KATES
80 Dive-Bombers VALS
40 VF ZEKES

Q. How many aircraft were lost; failed to return to their carriers?
A. 29 in all. 9 VF in the first wave and 15 dive-bombers and 5 VTB in the second wave.

Q. Which units of the fleet participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack?
A.

BBs HIEI, KIRISHIMA.
CVs AKAGI, KAGA, SORYU, HIRYU, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU.
CAs TONE, CHIKUMA.
CL NAGARA.
DDs 20 (large type).

Q. How many aircraft were employed as Combat Air Patrol over the PEARL HARBOR attack force?
A. 50 VF from CVs plus 12 float planes from the BBs, CAs and CL. These were in addition to the 350 planes used in the actual attack at PEARL HARBOR.

Q. How many CAP were on station at a time?
A. about 1/3 of the 50 aircraft were airborne at a time.

Q. Any losses from CAP, either VF or float planes?
A. None.

Q. Any additional planes employed as ASP?
A. None, VF served as ASP as well as CAP.

Q. How many pilots were lost in the attack?
A. A total of 29-none were recovered from the 29 aircraft that failed to return.

Philippine Kamikaze Operations

Q. Were the CV Air Groups, that left the EMPIRE in October, 1944 being sent to the PHILIPPINES for Kamikaze action?
A. No. Part of the 601 Air Group was embarked in October 1944. From the remainder of the Air Group pilot personnel, 30 VF pilots were selected in November 1944 for Kamikaze operations and were sent to LUZON, to join the 201 Air Group.

Q. Were any of the 601 Air Group, embarked on carriers in October 1944, being sent to the PHILIPPINES defense as Kamikaze pilots?
A. No.

Q. How were the 30 fighter pilots selected for Kamikaze operations?
A. They were all volunteers.

Q. How did they rank in flying experience with the other pilots in the Air Group?
A. They were the best.

Q. Regarding Japanese plans for the defense of the homeland against Allied landings, how were Kamikaze aircraft to be employed?
A. According to plans, all Kamikaze planes were to be expended when Allied forced attempted landings on KYUSHU.

Q. Were any kamikaze planes to be held back for the defense of the KANTO PLAIN area?
A. On paper, all aircraft (both Army and navy combat and trainer types) were to be used to resist Allied operations against KYUSHU. Actually, I believe that some Army Air Units would have been held back to repel an invasion of the KANTO PLAIN.

Q. At OKINAWA, what was the ratio of ships hit to aircraft expended in kamikaze attacks?
A. I think about 1/6 of the total aircraft used hit their target.

Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were expended during the OKINAWA operations?
A. About 900 in all.

500 Navy Aircraft from JAPAN
300 Army Aircraft from JAPAN
50 Navy Aircraft from FORMOSA
50 Army Aircraft from FORMOSA

These figures are approximations.

Q. Of the 900 that were expended in the OKINAWA Area, how many hit their target?
A. Although it was widely publicized that 400 had been successful, I think that 200 would be more accurate figure.

Q. What percentage of hits did the JNAF expect in the KETSU Operation?
A. We expected about the same percentage as during the OKINAWA operation.

Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were to be used during KETSU Operations by JNAF?
A. 2500, of which 500 were combat aircraft and 2000 were trainers. We had about 2500 remaining combat aircraft which would be used during KETSU Operations for search, night torpedo, and air cover.

Q. What were the plans for the use of Kamikaze aircraft during KETSU Operations?
A. 500 suicide planes were to be expended during the initial Allied landing attempt. This force would be supplemented by other kamikaze units brought in from SHIKOKU, SW HONSHU, Central HONSHU, TOKYO Area, and HOKKAIDO.

Q. How were JNAF Kamikaze aircraft deployed throughout the Empire?
A.

500 in KYUSHU
500 in SW HONSHU
500 in TOKYO Area
300 in HOKKAIDO
200 in SHIKOKU.

Q. What was the size and deployment of the JAAF Kamikaze Force?
A. Approximately the same as the JNAF. 2500 aircraft deployed similarly.

[bobbysocks]

It was on December 6, 1952, that Zenji Abe finally consented to tell his side of the story about Pearl Harbor. He began by quoting a Japanese proverb: 'The defeated should not talk about the battle.' He then added, 'I can only say that I fought as I was trained in those times.' What follows is his account.
In April 1941, I was in command of a bomber company on board the carrier Akagi. There were nine bombers in my company. All the airplanes of six carriers were assembled in several aerodomes at Kyushu, and we trained hard every day and night, without rest.
The bombers dived in at an angle of 50 to 60 degrees and released their bombs on the target at an altitude of 400 meters. Our target was a naval vessel that attempted to escape from us, and each plane used eight practice bombs on the vessel. We had some bombers that dived into the sea due to their pilots' severe exhaustion, caused by excess training.
Zero fighters (Mitsubishi A6M2s) were busy with dogfighting exercises and target practice. Three-seat attack bombers (Nakajima B5N2s) had the exercise of level bombing in formation at the height of 3,000 meters and of torpedo bombing at extremely low level.
As a navy lieutenant and a company commander, I trained my men–not knowing what we were training for–paying the greatest attention to their achievement in precision bombing. My company had various duties in our training, but when we attacked and bombed ships, even if we were bombing for five hours, and our bombs did not hit the ships, our training was considered worthless and we would have to bomb more. When I think of the hard training of the torpedo planes that flew every day over Kagoshima City, almost touching the rooftops and having the practice of dropping torpedoes at low altitude, I must conclude that our higher command headquarters had already begun to plan the raid for Pearl Harbor.
It soon proved true. The proficiency of the crewmen for each type of airplane had reached its required standard, and many combined exercises had been practiced. One day in October, all of the officers above the grade of company commander in our task force were assembled at the Kasanohara Aerodrome in the southern part of Kyushu. Commander Minoru Genda, the operation staff officer, came into the conference room and without formality opened the curtain on the front wall to reveal models of Pearl Harbor and Oahu Island, constructed on the full space of the wall.
For a few moments, he explained the plan of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Then Rear Adm. Munetaka Sakamaki, who had just returned from Germany, reported the progress of war by the German air force. All this was only confided to the officers who would lead the attack, and all was kept in the highest degree of secrecy.
When I was authorized to have a few days' leave in November, I called my wife to Kagoshima, fearing that it might be the last time I would see her. Cheerfully, I sent her and our 6-month-old baby to her native place, without informing her about the coming war.
Now aircraft were being stowed aboard the carriers. One day before leaving Kyushu from Kunashiri Island, our last assembling point, a party was held in a restaurant in Kagoshima. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, commander in chief of the task force, exchanged cups of wine with each of the officers, shaking hands with them. I thought that I perceived the sparkle of a tear in his eye.
Our six carriers left for the assembly point at Hitokappu Bay, each followed by a destroyer. Some passed through the Sea of Japan, while the others went around the Pacific coast. Our departure was covered by training planes from several airfields in Kyushu, which continued to broadcast radio waves similar to those made by our carrier planes while exercising, in order to camouflage the sudden change in them when we left.
From November 19-22, all ships of the task force of the Hawaiian operation concluded their assembly in Hitokappu Bay. They were: our unit under Admiral Nagumo, composed of the six carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku, with the mission of carrying out the air attack on Pearl Harbor and military installations on Oahu; the covering unit, made up of the light cruiser Abukuma and nine destroyers under Rear Adm. Sentaro Omori; the supporting unit, consisting of the battleships Hiei and Kirishima and the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma under Rear Adm. Gunichi Mikawa; the scouting unit of three submarines under Captain Kijiro Imaizumi; the Midway Island attack unit of three destroyers under Captain Yojin Konishi; and the supply unit of eight tankers under Captain Kyokuto Maru.
During the few days we stayed at Hitokappu Bay, the final consultations were held. At 6 a.m. on November 26, we departed Hitokappu Bay, passing eastward through the stormy North Pacific Ocean, keeping away from the merchant ship routes–secrecy was important.
But still it was not yet decided to commence hostilities at that time–merely to deploy for war. Nagumo's fleet was advancing on the staging area at 42 degrees north, 170 degrees west.
On December 2, the combined fleet received a telegraphed message that war would break out on December 8 (Tokyo time). Therefore Nagumo's fleet continued its advance and speeded up to 24 knots. At 7 a.m. on December 7, we rapidly approached Oahu.
Before dawn the next day, December 8, Nagumo's fleet was 200 miles north of Oahu and sent out the first wave of the air attack force at 1:30 a.m.–30 minutes before sunrise. The second wave took off about one hour later. The entire assault force of 354 aircraft was commanded by Mitsuo Fuchida
'The fate of the Empire rests on this battle. Let everyone do his duty.' This was the famous signal that Admiral Heihachiro Togo hoisted on his flagship, Mikasa, at the Battle of Tsushima Strait during the Russo-Japanese War, 36 years before. Now, right above my head, the same signal snapped in the wind at the tip of the mast of our flagship, Akagi.
The wind was competing with the roar of the plane engines warming up. First away from the carrier were nine Zero fighters, led by Lt. Cmdr. Shigeru Itaya. The planes were guided by hand lamps in the dark. They moved one by one into position and took off into the black sky.
Next, Commander Fuchida took off, closely followed by his 14 attack bombers, and then Lt. Cmdr. Juji Murata's 12 torpedo planes. The radio operator-observers could be seen waving their rising sun headbands (specially prepared for this day) in response to the farewell of the ship's crew. In each pilot's mind as well as in the minds of the crewmen, both those remaining behind and those on the planes, was the thought: 'With this one torpedo, this one bomb, if God wills.' All were united in a common purpose.
From the other five carriers, planes were taking off and falling into formation while gaining altitude, circling the task force. When they were formed up, they set their course south.
All the carriers were anthills of activity. Planes were lifted from the hangars and readied for the takeoff of the second wave, which was to follow the first by one hour. From the Akagi there were nine Zero fighters under Lieutenant Saburo Shindo and the 18 bombers, of which I led the second company.
My men were standing in a row. Their eyes were bright and eager and their mouths firm. Such was the extent of their training that I only ordered 'Go ahead,' knowing that they would do all that should be done, even under unexpected circumstances.
I went to my plane, and from the pilot seat I tested the voice tube to my observer, Warrant Officer Chiaki Saito. I then examined my instruments very carefully.
The ship was rolling and pitching, but not enough to cause me any concern. I felt as if it were just another routine exercise.
The carriers were now turning into the wind. We took off across the bow, one by one, as the first wave had done. We circled to my left and formed up while gaining altitude in the lightening sky. Our wave was led by Lt. Cmdr. Shigekazu Shimazaki and was made up of 35 fighters and 78 bombers under Lt. Cmdr. Takashige Egusa. My own unit, Assault Group 11, was led by Lieutenant Takehiko Chihaya, who was in the observer-gunner's position on the lead dive bomber. As junior buntaicho (squad leader), I led the rear company within the group.
Our 167 airplanes turned south, with the fighters covering the sides, one hour after the first wave. The weather was not so good. A 10-odd-kilometer wind was blowing from the northeast, and the sea was rough.
As we flew, I thought many thoughts. If we could not find the carriers, our secondary targets would be cruisers. I wondered if the special midget submarines had arrived in the harbor. They were to wait until the air attack started. Could we ask a man to have patience like this? I worried that one of our bombs would be dropped by mistake on their back.
I don't know how long I meditated, but I was suddenly aroused by Warrant Officer Saito's voice. From the back seat, Saito let me know that he had caught a radio signal.
Commander Fuchida had given the signal to attack. It was 3:19 a.m., December 8, Tokyo time and 7:49 a.m., December 7, Honolulu time.
I looked back and my planes were following me as steadily as if I were their father. I was assured that all of them had heard and understood that radio signal.
I waited for what seemed millions of hours for the next radio signal. It was really only several minutes later that Warrant Officer Saito called through the voice tube, 'Sir, the surprise attack was successful.' Saito was an excellent man and also quite an expert as an observer and radio operator. He had much experience in battle. He was killed the following year, but he always acted in any critical time as if he were playing a game.
He was calm, as usual, at this historic moment. I, on the other hand, was a little nervous. I took deep breaths and tested my guns. I checked the fuel, altitude meter and all apparatus once more–speed was 125 knots, altitude 4,000 meters. Everything was OK. I test-fired my machine gun, and it chattered eagerly.
The formations in front of me flew on majestically as if nothing could stop them. I was filled with impatience. What would Pearl Harbor look like? Would the island of Oahu look like the map I had studied? My eyes strained toward the horizon through breaks in the clouds.
Finally, a white line appeared, breaking the smooth edge where water meets the sky. Above the white line of the breakers was a blue-violet color. 'There is Oahu,' I informed Saito through the voice tube, trying to keep my voice calm. I approached the island with a mixture of dreadful fear and fascination. I felt it was the 'devil's island' of Japanese legend. I wondered if aerial battles had already started above the island. Our formation, led by Commander Shimazaki, continued on a 180-degree bearing.
The scattered clouds gradually decreased, and I could see a part of the devil's island clearly. As we crowded the shoreline, a group of black puffs of smoke appeared to our right front, and then another group appeared quite near our formation–about 200 in all. Anti-aircraft fire! Except for scattered shots in China, it was the first time I had experienced that. I watched the puffs come closer and closer. The thought flashed across my mind that perhaps our surprise attack was not a surprise at all. Would we be successful? I felt awful.
We passed Kahuku Point on our right. Commander Shimazaki had just changed our direction. Then I spotted Kaneohe Air Base just as had been planned. This was just like an exercise. Everything was all right. My nervousness went away. I became calm and steady.
We had not met the fighter resistance we had expected, and our own fighters had broken formation to attack the airfields. Commander Shimazaki gave the signal to attack and then peeled out of the formation, leading the main part of his group to strike Hickam Field. The rest of his group attacked Kaneohe Air Base and Ford Island. Our bombing altitude was 400 meters, below the cloud bank. In spite of this extremely low altitude and severe anti-aircraft fire, our group did not lose so many planes, although 29 of us were hit and crashed.
Our 78 bombers turned to the right, and led by Egusa, approached Pearl Harbor from the east. At the head of my bombers, I brought up the rear of the formation. Our altitude was 4,000 meters at the time, and beneath the clouds ahead I could see Pearl Harbor. Dive bombers were swooping downward to the attack.
Above the city of Honolulu, the companies successively speeded up and went into their attack formations. I checked my bombing equipment and slid the canopy over the cockpit. I could not see well due to the smoke, but as I drew nearer, I made out a line of battleships on the near side of Ford Island. Some were covered by smoke, and others were spouting great brown waves of oil from their sides. Their decks and superstructures danced with the flashes of anti-aircraft guns that all seemed to be pointed at me. I caught sight of another formation of bombers diving below on our right, and I no longer felt alone. One by one they dived until the last had gone into his dive, and then it was our turn.
I banked as a signal to my men and headed down. From the ground, thousands of tracer bullets soared upward, seeming to gain speed as they passed close by my plane. My altitude was 3,000 meters and my speed 200 knots. I applied my air brake and took the cover off my bombsight. I was diving at about a 50-degree angle. There were no aircraft carriers in the harbor, so I decided to attack a cruiser.
Ford Island was ablaze, and a heavy pall of smoke hung in the morning air. With my eyes glued to the bombsight, it seemed that fiery candy-colored bullets were being funneled directly into my eye, but seemingly at the last moment they whizzed by the sides of my plane. My other eight bombers were following close behind me in a straight line.
I caught my target, a big cruiser, squarely in the middle of the range scale of my sight. Warrant Officer Saito began to call the altitude. A strong northeast wind was blowing the plane to the left. I corrected for the drift as the target drew nearer and nearer until it almost filled my sight. 'Six hundred meters,' Saito called. 'Ready…release!'
I released my bomb and at the same time pulled back on the stick. I almost blacked out for a moment, but I pulled out at 50 meters to the sound of Saito's voice in the voice tube. My observer was excitedly calling out the results of our bombing. 'Formation leader short. Second plane short. Third plane hit! Adjustment correct. Second echelon successful!' I was later able to identify our target as an Omaha-class light cruiser–Raleigh.


The entire attack lasted about two hours. I saw only the part in which the second wave participated. Later, upon our return, I heard the story of the first wave from Commander Fuchida's own lips.


As the first wave approached Pearl Harbor, a faint haze of kitchen smoke from houses preparing breakfast hung over the water. It was a peaceful scene. Fuchida was observing through his field glasses, and as the wave drew nearer, the basket and tripod masts of the battleships Nevada, Arizona, Tennessee, West Virginia, Oklahoma, California and Maryland appeared through the haze. Every battleship of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was in the harbor. There were no aircraft carriers, but Fuchida smiled at the luck that fate had given him. He gave the order for attack formation and led his own formation around the west side of Oahu and over Barbers Point. This point had strong anti-aircraft installations, but not a shot was fired.
As he drew near to the fleet, nobody stirred. Everyone appeared sound asleep. Confident of the success of his mission and in obedience to his instructions, he radioed, 'Our surprise attack is successful.'
This signal was picked up by our flagship, Akagi, and relayed to the war council in Tokyo and to Nagato, the flagship of the combined fleet in Hiroshima. Upon receipt of this message, the signal was sent to waiting units poised to attack Malaya, Hong Kong, Guam, Wake and other targets.
Soon after Fuchida sent his message, black smoke rose above Hickam Field and then Ford Island. This showed that the dive-bomber attack had started. In the distance, Hoiler Field was also covered with heavy black smoke.
From his post as commander of the attack and leader of the level-bombing group, Fuchida saw a water spout and then another and another appear beside the group of warships. That indicated that the submarine torpedo attack was underway.
He gave the attack order to his formation to begin bombing. Suddenly, intense anti-aircraft fire burst in front of his formation. The bursts were first ahead but then adjusted to burst among the planes of his group. Most of the fire came from the ships, but some came from anti-aircraft positions on shore.
He expressed his admiration for the enemy's ability to react to an attack and fight back so quickly after the raid started. The anti-aircraft fire became more and more accurate. Suddenly, Fuchida's plane shuddered violently and fell off into a slip. He later found that one of his control cables had been almost shot away. Nevertheless, he put his planes into attack formation to hit Diamond Head. As they came about, a red and black tower of fire, almost 1,000 meters in height, rose from the battleship Arizona on the east side of Ford Island. The explosion was so violent that it rocked the planes across the harbor. He signaled his bombers to hit Maryland again, and the battle became more and more severe. By the time the second wave arrived, the battle was at its height.
After two hours we broke contact and returned to our carriers, arriving at 8:30 a.m. Our overall losses were nine fighters, 15 dive bombers, five torpedo bombers and 54 men killed in action. We had destroyed the main power of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. We missed our main objective, the aircraft carriers, since they were at sea, but Admiral Nagumo considered us to have accomplished our mission.
I was still in a dazed and dreamy state when I returned to my quarters. I entered the tiny room and began to remove my flying clothes. In the center of my otherwise clean desk lay the envelope containing my will, addressed to my father. Suddenly, my spirits lifted. It was good to be alive.
At 9 a.m. the fleet turned northwest, and we headed for home. The raid was over. We had accomplished our mission. The war was on.
I have been asked by many American officers why we did not follow up our advantage and invade Hawaii. I was in no position to know the strategic plans, but I suppose no one expected our raid to be so successful. Also, it would have been very difficult to supply and support an invasion force over such a long distance. As we Japanese know, even a few Americans can put up a very strong resistance, and I think it would have been a very hard job.
I have told of the Pearl Harbor raid and my part in it from my own experience. Today, thanks to American generosity and understanding, Japan is beginning its history as a free democratic nation. When I graduated from the National Police Reserve and reported to my first assignment, it was on December 8, 1951. At the time, even I did not realize the significance of the day. Those persons who lost husbands and fathers and sons, of course, can never forget that day, and I am afraid that even this small story is like opening an old wound. I pray from the bottom of my heart for those who were killed in action and their bereaved families.
I once explained the meaning of the word samurai to an American. The words are written with two Chinese characters. The first means'stop enemy's sword,' and the second means 'gentleman.' So you see, actually there is nothing aggressive in the samurai spirit; it is the same as your American defense.
The late Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who commanded the force that struck Pearl Harbor, was strongly opposed to war with the United States. He knew America, and although opposed to war, he was also a loyal naval officer. When he came aboard the flagship Akagi, he told us: 'If we go to war with the United States, you will have to face the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Its commander, Admiral Kimmel, is an extremely able officer, selected for his post over many older officers. It will be very difficult to overcome him.'
Two days after we attacked Pearl Harbor, we were listening to the American radio in the command compartment of the Akagi. Admiral Nagumo was in the room. When I told him that Admiral Husband Kimmel had been relieved because of our attack, he was very sympathetic and said he was very sorry for him.

There was no ill feeling or hate before the war against the United States. Why did we make such a mistake? No more Pearl Harbors and no more Hiroshimas should be the watchword for those who believe in peace.


I hereby again pray for those who lost their lives at Pearl Harbor…with all my heart.