Bug 174 on 12lbs boost. Review please.

[Seadog]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

It is a little more complicated than that seadog. The RAF correctly plans for their logistical train to be interupted by the enemy.

Therefore, they correctly plan to emplace several weeks supply at the aerodrome, supply the emergency fields the aircraft might have to land at, and keep several more weeks of fuel dispursed around the log train earmarked for that unit.

If you just plan to have enough fuel on hand for what you are going to fly, then you will be in real trouble when the enemy bombs your airfield storage tanks, shoots your trucks up on the road, or hits the railyard. You will be out of the game in one enemy attack.

Read the logistical plan if they had to supply the 4 squadrons in France. That is the amount of fuel in the system earmarked for those squadrons to fly for just ONE WEEK.

If they want to continue to fly operationally and resupply their unit after an enemy attack, the RAF is planning to have some 8 weeks worth of fuel on the ground and available at short notice.

Don't you think that makes sense given the fact the Luftwaffe was targeting the airfields during the BoB?

So when you do your simplistic calculation for one week of flying, keep in mind, there is 8 weeks of fuel required to be available for that one week in the air.

Fuel available is not fuel consumed.

The document also assumed 154 gals per Hurricane sortie, which is exactly twice the actual figure, since tank capacity was 97 gals, and aircraft will not land with empty tanks. Actual consumption will be 1/2 what the document states, for the 3840 sorties which it estimates will be flown and that works out to 950 tons

The document correctly assumes that a squadron of Hurricanes would fly about 1 sortie/day per aircraft

In the UK every airbase is providing a reserve for every other base, unlike France where a number of bases had to be stocked in expectation of rapid movement between bases, and the expectation that a base might be used briefly, but intensely.

However, the document certainly confirms 100% 100 octane use by Hurricane squadrons in France.

This document states the daily consumption per squadron as 1870gals for 24 sorties or 77.9 gals/sortie:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.pdf

so this works out to 180 tons/month/squadron based upon 24 sorties/day.

[NZtyphoon]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

It is a little more complicated than that seadog. The RAF correctly plans for their logistical train to be interupted by the enemy.

Therefore, they correctly plan to emplace several weeks supply at the aerodrome, supply the emergency fields the aircraft might have to land at, and keep several more weeks of fuel dispursed around the log train earmarked for that unit.

If you just plan to have enough fuel on hand for what you are going to fly, then you will be in real trouble when the enemy bombs your airfield storage tanks, shoots your trucks up on the road, or hits the railyard. You will be out of the game in one enemy attack.

Read the logistical plan if they had to supply the 4 squadrons in France. That is the amount of fuel in the system earmarked for those squadrons to fly for just ONE WEEK.

If they want to continue to fly operationally and resupply their unit after an enemy attack, the RAF is planning to have some 8 weeks worth of fuel on the ground and available at short notice.

Don't you think that makes sense given the fact the Luftwaffe was targeting the airfields during the BoB?

So when you do your simplistic calculation for one week of flying, keep in mind, there is 8 weeks of fuel required to be available for that one week in the air.

Not forgetting that Crumpp has previously stated that "Making the conclusion Hurricanes were using 100 Octane in the Battle of France based off some logistical projections for future war is amatuerish and clumsey. It is a paper tiger. That document is a calculation of projected needs written on 7 May 1940. The British Expeditionary Force was on the Beaches of Dunkirk 18 days later.

How much of those calculation and projections for future war do you really think became ground reality in 18 days? "
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthr...213#post416213

A lot of nonsense, of course but just a reflection of how much Crumpp tries to twist things to suit his own POV.

So, there was enough 100 Octane stored in France to supply all Hurricanes and Blenheims with 8 weeks worth of fuel. As can be seen in just one WOPR (33rd 23 April 1940) there was 7,600 tons of 100 Octane fuel in the only logical location West of Suez ie; France


It also means that the RAF provided all of its frontline Merlin engine FC squadrons in France with 100 Octane in May 1940, which make's Crumpp's continued assertions that only 16 squadrons of its frontline fighter squadrons in Britain were supplied look very suspect. 192,151,000 gallons or 61,000 tons was used between June-end October

Originally Posted by robtek

When i read 192151000 gallons for 150 days for about 700 fighters at about 75 gallons/h i calculate 24,2h flight time a day. Confusing!

Originally Posted by Al Schlageter

150 days?

10 July – 31 October 1940 = 114 days

More than enough to supply all frontline FC fighters with plenty to spare.

So tell us again Crumpp, how did the RAF ensure that just a few squadrons used 100 Octane, while the rest went without? How was this allocated?

What were the logistical arrangements used toe ensure only 16 squadrons used 100 octane.

How were the pilots briefed "Sorry chaps X Y and Z squadrons get the 100 Octane today, the rest of you stick with 87"?

How about Crumpp provide some documentary evidence showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 87 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle. He has been asked time and time again but has provided nothing.

[robtek]

If "west of suez" means the bef in france, why are then 3 quarters of the aviation fuel not 100 octane?

Somehow that doesn't make sense when there were only fighters using 100 octane.

[CaptainDoggles]

Hi guys. I've just got back from my trip to the 1940's where I had a nice cup of tea with Hugh Dowding. Nice guy. Later on, the two of us met up with Churchill and went to the strip club.

He says that this is a generally irreconcilable issue since more detailed records were not being kept (it was a war, after all. Poor bloke seemed quite stressed).

He says that we should have all the different fuels (100 octane, 87 octane, c3, b4, etc) modeled in our game, and that if a particular mission builder wants to pit 87-octane spitfires against Fw 190-D9s, then that's their choice.

He also says that wasting so much energy arguing over what exact percentage of his units were using which fuel is very silly.

That ought to settle things, I think.

[Osprey]

Keep going Crumpp. Everytime you open your mouth another piece of your credibility disappears.

This isn't a 'Rocky' movie, you're getting beaten up bad and the fight is over, they'll be no Hollywood comeback versus Creed and Drago.

[Seadog]

Originally Posted by robtek

If "west of suez" means the bef in france, why are then 3 quarters of the aviation fuel not 100 octane?

Somehow that doesn't make sense when there were only fighters using 100 octane.

Read page 3:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.pdf
note that only 100 octane is specified for the Hurricanes.
and then read:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o.../AASF-Fuel.pdf

and note that only 100 octane is specified for the Hurricanes.

[Glider]

Tell me Crumpp do you read your evidence before posting it?

Originally Posted by Crumpp

It is a little more complicated than that seadog. The RAF correctly plans for their logistical train to be interupted by the enemy.

Therefore, they correctly plan to emplace several weeks supply at the aerodrome, supply the emergency fields the aircraft might have to land at, and keep several more weeks of fuel dispursed around the log train earmarked for that unit..

The paper clearly states one week supply of fuel to be at the aerodrome enough for 480 sorties. The rest are reserves in different types of store, Advanced, Forward and Base Areas

If you just plan to have enough fuel on hand for what you are going to fly, then you will be in real trouble when the enemy bombs your airfield storage tanks, shoots your trucks up on the road, or hits the railyard. You will be out of the game in one enemy attack..

There in much bigger trouble if they follow your idea and have it all up front

Read the logistical plan if they had to supply the 4 squadrons in France. That is the amount of fuel in the system earmarked for those squadrons to fly for just ONE WEEK..

Yes I agree with you its always a good idea to read the logisitical plan.

Its one week supply on the aerodrome (480 sorties) and a further two weeks supply in the forward dump including the additional reserve (1360 sorties).

The stocks in the Advanced Base and Main Base areas give an additional 8 weeks of fuel (2 at the advanced base and 6 at the main base) at a rate of 120 sorties per week per squadron.

So the logistical plan is for eleven weeks of flying not one.

If they want to continue to fly operationally and resupply their unit after an enemy attack, the RAF is planning to have some 8 weeks worth of fuel on the ground and available at short notice.

Don't you think that makes sense given the fact the Luftwaffe was targeting the airfields during the BoB?

So when you do your simplistic calculation for one week of flying, keep in mind, there is 8 weeks of fuel required to be available for that one week in the air.

This is I am afraid total bull. Apart from the obvious fact that the paper covers 11 weeks of fuel and not 8 and there is three weeks of fuel available at or near the station, not one to assume that the RAF plan to lose 8 times to enemy action compared to what it uses in the air is rubbish. In the worse case scenario and all the one week supply of fuel at a station is destroyed in one go, which is unlikely as they were not all stored in the same place, the advanced stocks had a further 2 weeks supply of fuel.
Unless of course you can support your theory?

Its worth remembering that the RAF didn't lose any 100 octane in the BOB despite heavy attacks on the bases. If there is one thing the RAF knew about it was how to take care of its fuel.

Finally this paper has nothing to do with consumption reports, its an interesting diversion of the type you I admit are very good at. This is a plan not a report on consumption

Which of course reminds me, where did you support your other assertion about the complete transfer of FC in May 1941.
If you cannot support it then we will have to ignore it.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

It also means that the RAF provided all of its frontline Merlin engine FC squadrons in France with 100 Octane in May 1940, which make's Crumpp's continued assertions that only 16 squadrons of its frontline fighter squadrons in Britain were supplied look very suspect.

I love Jeff's attempts at logical thinking.

'All of its frontline Merlin engine FC squadrons in France' - now how many FC Squadrons were in France flying Hurricane's, like about SIX (depending on when you look at it, but when stocking was made, only six were there)?

How excactly does the fact that about six Hurricane Squadrons were supplied with 100 octane in France make it 'very suspect' (Jeff loves big words ) that Britain had only 16 squadrons of its frontline fighter squadrons supplied with 100 octane? (which is BTW documented as opposed to Jeff's fantasies).

I really, really try to understand his emulation of logical thinking. He basically says:

Statement A is 6 Sqns. in France using 100 octane
Statement B is 16 Sqns in total is using 100 octane
Statement A and B rule out each other...

How about Crumpp provide some documentary evidence showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 87 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle. He has been asked time and time again but has provided nothing.

Likewise, you have been asked to provide some documentary evidence showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 100 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle.

You have been asked time and time again but has provided nothing.

Problem is, the burden of proof is on you. Which is why just about anybody with a brain is unconvinced of your claims and have noted that your documentation is way insufficient to make the conclusions you are trying to make.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Problem is, the burden of proof is on you. Which is why just about anybody with a brain is unconvinced of your claims and have noted that your documentation is way insufficient to make the conclusions you are trying to make.

This as you know is rubbish. If you and I were to each submit a research paper on our opposing views I would be able to quote a mass of published works from different historians, participants in the battle, official papers, prime sources of data, publications from engineers, combat reports, station reports and others to support my case.
You would be limited in the extreame. Little more than an over emphasised minute from one meeting, an operating manual for an engine that had been out of production some time before the BOB and not a lot more

Now I agree that doesn't automatically mean that I am right, but the burden of proof is on you to support your case with facts not theories.

I have said many times that the case for is a strong one not a perfect one but its a heck of a lot better than he case that you have

[Osprey]

Kurfurst must be very envious of the massive supporting evidence of 100 octane use by FC. Funny how he doesn't need even a fraction of this level of direct evidence and records to convinced himself that the Germans were using 100 octane though. One photo of a destroyed 109 is enough for him and it unquestionable from then on - Germany must have had it in abundance and were using it from day 1.

What a fanboy.

And Crumpp, I reckon he only passes tests and exams because he grinds down the examining board. Probably failed his PPL but battered them into passing him because they had actual lives - it's like Chinese water torture.