WW1 Paved the Way for the Battle of Britain.

[Kongo-Otto]

Originally Posted by ElAurens

The fact remains that the Luftwaffe lost a lot of aircraft, both in Poland and in the Battle of France, that seriously degraded their abilities.

Add the losses between the time of Dunkirk and the "start" of the BoB in August and it is clear that the Luftwaffe could not sustain a campaign to "take" Great Britain. It's laugable to think that they could.

The mistakes made by Hitler, Goering and the OKL only added to the issue.

The Luftwaffe was a very young service. There was no depth of experience in their officer corps, unlike the RAF, which is of course the world's oldest independent air force.

Like most of the German High Command, they suffered from strategic blindness. Too concerned with tactics and not enough with logistics.

The Kriegsmarine "laughable"
The Luftwaffe just a bunch on incompetent loons.
The whole Army probably just Feldwebels like Schultz was.
Well with such a bunch of really incompetent guys we gave you a pretty good fight for almost 6 years.

[JimmyBlonde]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

From: The Luftwaffe in the Polish Campaign in 1939, by General der Flieger Wilhelm Speidel.

Please excuse my my derision but I'd be about as apt to believe Herr Spiedels' assessment of the facts as I would the 1940 Telegraphs' claims for RAF aerial victories.

If you're going to cite a source then at least find one who doesn't have a vested interest in the issue and doesn't stem from one of the most notoriously censored and propagandist regimes to have ever existed.

I'm not saying that the Luftwaffe was laughable, just pointing out that they didn't enjoy the superiority which they are often misconceived as having. They were fortunate in being spared a prolonged campaign by some very poor French leadership and some very excellent Wehrmacht soldiering. The Luftwaffe fared quite indifferently considering their advantages and the facts reflect this if you care to examine them.

That said I'm out of this topic, check out the book I posted if you would like to read about some exceptional German airmanship.

[609_Huetz]

I'd be very careful with the country bashing or country praising.

The unpleasant truth is, with the experiences gained in Spain, Poland, Norway and France, the Luftwaffe was as prepared as they could possibly be, despite the losses in previous campaigns. In addition, they had the abolute advantage in numbers and what's much more important the initiative.

What spoiled it for Hitler, Goering, etc. were three factors:

a.) The abysmal intelligence service of the OKL. Their CO Oberst Beppo Schmidt reported on 19.July 1940 that the 110 and the 109 were both much superior to anything the RAF could and would field during the upcoming campaign. In addition, his report doesn't underestimate the effect of radar, it didn't even mention it!

b.) British Air Defense and Early Warning Systems. While the Few had to face desperate odds as far as numbers go, just imagine what would have happened if they had to fill slots on standing patrols 24/7 during the BoB. The sophisticated combined system of OC and Radar was indeed a dealbreaker for Goerings praised (and overrated) Luftwaffe.

c.) Strategical/Tactical Errors. Intially, the Germans did pick their targets well in accordance of their goals for the campaign (radar, airfields, etc.), however they did not learn from their mistakes during the inital stages and grossly underestimated the true strength of the RAF. During the early days of September 1940, Goering and Kesselring both overconfidently claimed that the RAF is on it's knees and that it's time to deal the final blow, this time to the people of Britian. While losses remained high on both sides, that was the final and capital error in Germany's strategy. One can only imagine what could have happened if it (thank god) wasn't for Hitler's and Goering's stupidity. Here's personell loss percentages for both sides during the BoB (Fighter Command and Jagdwaffe):

RAF: July 10%
August 26%
September 28%

LW: July 11%
August 15%
September 23%

An interesting aspect worth mentioning is also how little was learned from the experiences in the BoB during the later stages of the war within the RAF and the USAAF. Both thought long range fighter escort unneccesary and attributed German losses to poor discipline, inadequate equipment and low combat altitude. Two attacks on Schweinfurt in '43 had to proove them wrong.

If you want to do some good reading on the subject, I'd recommend Williamson Murray's "War in the Air 1914-45" for starters, that goes a long way further than just comparing numbers, but also elaborates on the doctrines of the mid-war years that led to what was happening in those fateful months of 1940.

Let's also not forget that this should be about history, not about which country is better or worse than the other.

[MB_Avro_UK]

Anyway.... back on topic


Here's a picture of my WW1 Royal Flying Corps pilot's helmet and goggles. Also shown is my RFC Mark V Omega cockpit watch, the pilot's Log Book I mentioned earlier and a .303 bullet casing found at Stow Maries airfield.



The WW1 German raids exposed the British vulnerability to air attack. Things were changed by 1940.

But did the Germans learn anything from their WW1 experiences against the British defences?


Best Regards,
MB_Avro

[baronWastelan]

Considering the technology and the objectives were vastly different from 1st war to the 2nd, the Germans would have been well served forgetting the WWI experiences. Unfortunately for the LW, WWI experiences were 99% of Goering's knowledge.

[ATAG_Dutch]

Originally Posted by baronWastelan

Considering the technology and the objectives were vastly different from 1st war to the 2nd, the Germans would have been well served forgetting the WWI experiences. Unfortunately for the LW, WWI experiences were 99% of Goering's knowledge.

Yes that's quite correct.

The decimation of the Luftwaffe in 1940 had nothing to do with the British having the most comprehensive air defence system ever conceived.

Or that Britain had a more efficient training and manufacturing output.

Or that the British believed in giving the pilots a rest as opposed to making them fly until they died.

It was all the fat git's fault.

By the way, there was nothing unfortunate about it, unless you believe the world would be better off under nazi rule.

[ATAG_Dutch]

Good God, everything you just said is so wrong on so many counts I can't begin.

No offence!

Just realised that someone's being reeeeally sarcy. Result. You got me!

One should keep in mind that BoB was the FIRST ever attempt for an oversea invasion with air power playing a role, afaik. There was NO precedent to learn from and learning was by doing it. And it was obviously a very difficult task. And it was done against a defense system that was by its time unique and extremely efficient.

WW1 was a complete different story and the raids had a completely different task.

[winny]

Originally Posted by ElAurens

"Of all Germany's possible enemies, Britain is the most dangerous." - Oberst Beppo Schmid

That's about the only thing he got right.. He was a huge reason why the LW was so badly let down by it's commanders.

[BadAim]

Originally Posted by MB_Avro_UK

Anyway.... back on topic


Here's a picture of my WW1 Royal Flying Corps pilot's helmet and goggles. Also shown is my RFC Mark V Omega cockpit watch, the pilot's Log Book I mentioned earlier and a .303 bullet casing found at Stow Maries airfield.



The WW1 German raids exposed the British vulnerability to air attack. Things were changed by 1940.

But did the Germans learn anything from their WW1 experiences against the British defences?


Best Regards,
MB_Avro

I think most of the worlds airforces learned the wrong lessons, from both perspectives on both sides. Nearly all had some form of "the bomber will always get through" doctrine in operation during the interwar years and we know how well that worked out for everyone. For the most part the tactics that were used during WWII were more or less stumbled upon through a mixture of expediency and necessity, and the farsightedness of a few individuals who were in the right place at the right time.

I think that pretty much all of the players were keenly aware of their (and their potential enemies) vulnerabilities to airpower. They just, for the most part didn't see how it would work out.