Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[Glider]

Originally Posted by PipsPriller on Jul 12 2004 at [url
http://www.allaboutwarfare.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=230&st=0&start=0][/url]
The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

As mentioned before the first units started using 100 Octane in February not March. Document Attached.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use.

The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

As before this section I do fundamentally disagree with. In December 1939 stocks of 100 Octane were 202,000 tons, by May 1940 stocks were 294,000 tons and by August 1940 stocks were at 404,000 tons (documents are attached). We know that in June – August the average consumption was 10,000 tons a month (document attached).
The question I suggest we need to ask is If you have what is in effect a two and a half year stockpile, is this a strain, let alone a great strain on the stockpile. In my opinion it isn’t a strain at all, it’s barely noticeable

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The British War Cabinet didn’t discuss 100 Octane at all in May and as a result no decisions were made. I spent a day in the NA going through all the papers for the meetings, the meeting notes and the actions resulting, and Fuel of any kind was not discussed. I should add that in May 1940 the War Cabinet met almost daily and it was a huge amount of paper, literally hundreds of sheets making it impossible to copy and post. Clearly as this wasn't discussed there were no actons or decisions made along this line.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels.

The first part is correct, the first shipment from the middle East did arrive in August, however the rest is misleading. Numerous other tankers arrived from others parts of the world between May and August and stocks continued to increase . On July 11th stocks of 100 Octane were 343,000 tons as specified in the Narrow Margin page 87 (document attached).

With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

This is clearly wrong In August 1940 permission was given for all commands to use 100 Octane in Operational aircraft. (Document attached)

Given that large quantities were not available until late August, the volume of usage/week of 87 Octane must be far higher than that quoted for 100 Octane.

Given that FC were using 100 Octane and the bombers plus the rest of the RAF were using 87 Octane I would expect 87 Octane use to be higher.

It's from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance.

It was quite an interesting paper actually, even though i found it to be a very dry subject.

Now if someone could produce this and its supporting inforation then we would be in a good position.

I should point out that all my comments are supported by original documentation. The posting isn't supported by anything.

If the people working on the code base there scenario's on Pips posting as above, they have only themselves to blame if the adverse comments arrive.

[Seadog]

Originally Posted by Glider

On the contrary there are a number of papers, book, both technical and historical that mention that the RAF was equipped with 100 Octane for the BOB.

However There is nothing published anywhere that says that there was a fuel shortage, that they were forced to use 87 octane on operaions. All Kurfurst has posted is a pre war paper that said 18 squadrons of fighters and 2 squadrons of twin engined bombers. Plus an unsubstantiated posting from an Australian which
a) is riddled with errors.
b) is not supported by anything
c) that no one (not even Kurfurst) has seen
d) whee the archives that are supposed to hold it do not recognise.


Now the point of this was to ensure the people who are involved in the coding of the flight simulation were aware that if they followed the ideas put forward by Kurfurst were leaving themselves wide open for adverse comments.

I believe the case put foward for the use of 100 Octane in FC by all the units is a strong case, not perfect but strong.

We have
a) the pre war intention, of 18 + 2 squadrons
b) the preparation in Dec 1939 for the issues to the FC command stations in two stages initially the First Instance (covering all the Operational Bases and those that were identified at that time that would become operational) and the second tranch (The Non Operational bases). This paper outlines the conditions to be met (stocks to be in place) before it can be used.
c) the request from the Chief of the Air Staff simple and without limitation for fighter units and Blenheim units to start using the 100 Octane. The Chief of the Air Staff doesn't ask permission from the Oil Committee which is headed up by a senior but junior to him Air Force Officer. In the the British Armed Forces orders from senior officers were and are still today, requests.
d) The Oil Committee getting this underway. The Magic 'Certain' word comes up at this stage. Do I wish he hadn't written certain, of course, but I believe that it will refer to the first instance i.e. the operational stations not all the stations in Fighter Command. But Please note, I knew that information would casue confusion and I could have left it out, but I didn't I gave all the information that I had to the forum.
d) A very clear path that shows without any ambiguity that all Blenheim units in No 2 Group had 100 Octane
e) Confusion in Fighter Command about the changes needed and the sorting out of those questions (Mr Tweedie)
f) The completion of the task by the oil committee and the note of thanks on the job done.

Note that was all done by May. Even if there was a slight delay the BOB didn't start in anger until a few months later so time was on their side.

g) Finally we have in August permission given to use 100 Octane in all the commands.

All the above supported by consumption details, stock supplies, a good cross section of squadron notes, station notes and other documentation.

As I said earlier, is it a perfect case no, but its a strong one with a lot of documentation to support it.

What documentation have you got to say that 87 Octane was used in Operational missions during the BOB. None.

Some people doubt that all units didn't have 100 octane, so prove it, find any book, any article, any pilots notes or other station record that says that.

I will review Pps posting again with supporting docs as that seems to be key to the anti 100 Octane Brigade and then leave you to it. I can add nothing more.

I completely agree with you.

[winny]

I think there's a way to prove the majority of bases were converted, but it'll be time consuming.

Cross reference the combat reports from the battle mentioning 12lb boost, with the squadron involved, to the movements of that squadron for that date. ie. where were they, a: stationed? and b: where they scrambled from? (not always the same station).

In the past I counted at least 30 squadrons refering to 12lb boost in combat reports between May - July 1940.. That's nearly half of all FC's squadrons.
Add that to the fact that there were only around 30-32 'operational' stations being used at the time, and the rotation system, it would suggest widespread use of 100 octane.


Also does anyone know if you could actually run a converted Merlin on 87 oct?

If it was a case of just swithcing fuels then why the modification to the engine?

[Glider]

Originally Posted by winny

I think there's a way to prove the majority of bases were converted, but it'll be time consuming.

Cross reference the combat reports from the battle mentioning 12lb boost, with the squadron involved, to the movements of that squadron for that date. ie. where were they, a: stationed? and b: where they scrambled from? (not always the same station).

In the past I counted at least 30 squadrons refering to 12lb boost in combat reports between May - July 1940.. That's nearly half of all FC's squadrons.
Add that to the fact that there were only around 30-32 'operational' stations being used at the time, and the rotation system, it would suggest widespread use of 100 octane.


Also does anyone know if you could actually run a converted Merlin on 87 oct?

If it was a case of just swithcing fuels then why the modification to the engine?

Only a selection of squadrons were looked into so before you do this you would have to check every squadrons papers. You would also have to check every station for the fuel, a huge operation.
This is why I call the case a strong case but not a perfect case. The case for the limited use of 87 octane isn't supported by anything, making it a very weak case. They only have Pips posting which I have challenged with supporting documentation.
I would suggest that those who believe in the limited use of 100 octane should be asked to support that view. If they believe that Pips posting is the correct version of events then they need to support it and disprove the original documents that have been posted.

A converted Merlin could run on 87 octane but the performance would obviously be less. In a similar manner, a non converted merlin would run on 100 octane, but to get the performance gain, you need the fuel and the conversion

[TomcatViP]

Originally Posted by Bobb4

100% agree with you. But can someone quote in game stats supporting this. It is all good and well this entire theoretical debate goes on but if the developers are not being told X should actually be Y and Y should include input from Z...
Nothing will ever be changed. I doubt whether a Russian developer is going to wade through 20 to 30 pages of a thread to figure out what the end result is.
I am 100% for 100 Octane but the developers need it in a simplified form and with documents to back up why the change needs to be made.
They could maybe just introduce field-modified 100 Octane Spitfire 1’s and 1a ‘s and have the Spitfire 2 already with 100 Octane as an example. Again this will leave the choice to the purists when mission building.
I doubt even Kurfürst can argue against that.

Ok but then can we hve a <CFS friendly> and a <COD as advertised> buttons added as well


I don't understand the spit lover that are arguing for 100oct when the Spit FM makes her Zip Zapping the air like a cartoon rubber ball

[lane]

Originally Posted by Glider

As mentioned before the first units started using 100 Octane in February not March. Document Attached.

As before this section I do fundamentally disagree with. In December 1939 stocks of 100 Octane were 202,000 tons, by May 1940 stocks were 294,000 tons and by August 1940 stocks were at 404,000 tons (documents are attached). We know that in June – August the average consumption was 10,000 tons a month (document attached).
The question I suggest we need to ask is If you have what is in effect a two and a half year stockpile, is this a strain, let alone a great strain on the stockpile. In my opinion it isn’t a strain at all, it’s barely noticeable

The British War Cabinet didn’t discuss 100 Octane at all in May and as a result no decisions were made. I spent a day in the NA going through all the papers for the meetings, the meeting notes and the actions resulting, and Fuel of any kind was not discussed. I should add that in May 1940 the War Cabinet met almost daily and it was a huge amount of paper, literally hundreds of sheets making it impossible to copy and post. Clearly as this wasn't discussed there were no actons or decisions made along this line.

The first part is correct, the first shipment from the middle East did arrive in August, however the rest is misleading. Numerous other tankers arrived from others parts of the world between May and August and stocks continued to increase . On July 11th stocks of 100 Octane were 343,000 tons as specified in the Narrow Margin page 87 (document attached).

This is clearly wrong In August 1940 permission was given for all commands to use 100 Octane in Operational aircraft. (Document attached)

Given that FC were using 100 Octane and the bombers plus the rest of the RAF were using 87 Octane I would expect 87 Octane use to be higher.

Now if someone could produce this and its supporting inforation then we would be in a good position.

I should point out that all my comments are supported by original documentation. The posting isn't supported by anything.

If the people working on the code base there scenario's on Pips posting as above, they have only themselves to blame if the adverse comments arrive.

Good post Glider. Amongst the odd things in that supposed Australian mystery document, this sentence struck me as rather off the mark: "This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude". This just doesn’t make sense when all the documentation available shows an increase in maximum boost from +6.25 to +12 with the Merlin III. That’s just a bloody obvious error. Dr. Alfred Price wrote that "The higher octane fuel allowed an increase in supercharger boost from +6 lbs to +12 lbs, without risk of detonation that would damage the engine. […] The emergency power setting increased maximum speed by 25 mph at sea level and 34 mph at 10,000 ft. It also improved the fighter’s climbing performance between sea level and full-throttle altitude" (see attached scan). The RAF’s old History page pretty much said the same thing.

[Crumpp]

"This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude". This just doesn’t make sense when all the documentation available shows an increase in maximum boost from +6.25 to +12 with the Merlin III.

If you read in the July 1940 POH for the Spitfire II, it clearly lists 100 Octane as the fuel and that +12lbs is a Take Off rating and +9lbs is an Emergency rating limited for 5 minutes.

[Kurfürst]

Mike (this time using the handle lane) already knows that for years, in fact he has seen the papers showing the early rating of +9 for All out level, but hey, he was never afraid of posting manipulating BS in order to push an agenda under various new logins..

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Glider

On the contrary there are a number of papers, book, both technical and historical that mention that the RAF was equipped with 100 Octane for the BOB.

Indeed. There are a number of papers, book, both technical and historical that mention that the Spitfire I was equipped with only four machine guns. I think we should 'correct' the current error in the sim that it has eight.

Originally Posted by Glider

However There is nothing published anywhere that says that there was a fuel shortage, that they were forced to use 87 octane on operaions. All Kurfurst has posted is a pre war paper that said 18 squadrons of fighters and 2 squadrons of twin engined bombers.

That is a lie. Excerpts from Spitfire the History, by far the most reliable Spitfire source was posted and it says that there were supply problems due to tanker sinkings by U boots.

Originally Posted by Glider

Plus an unsubstantiated posting from an Australian which
a) is riddled with errors.
b) is not supported by anything
c) that no one (not even Kurfurst) has seen
d) whee the archives that are supposed to hold it do not recognise.

Again, lies.

The paper is not riddled with errors.
It is supported by your own documentation
- 18 May 1940 paper showing only select units using 100 octane,
- fuel consumption papers showing large scale conversion did not start until late September,
- early operating Limits of Merlin III XII (+9 except for take off)
Pips seen it and gave reference to it.
The archieves recognise the paper, they have told you loud and clear that you have not asked for the paper with proper description.

So stop lying. Its showing desperation and dishonesty.

Originally Posted by Glider

Now the point of this was to ensure the people who are involved in the coding of the flight simulation were aware that if they followed the ideas put forward by Kurfurst were leaving themselves wide open for adverse comments.

The comments are not wide. Its you and another fanatic partisan arguing everyone else.

I believe the case put foward for the use of 100 Octane in FC by all the units is a strong case, not perfect but strong.

You said it rightly - it is your belief.

We have
a) the pre war intention, of 18 + 2 squadrons
b) the preparation in Dec 1939 for the issues to the FC command stations in two stages initially the First Instance (covering all the Operational Bases and those that were identified at that time that would become operational) and the second tranch (The Non Operational bases). This paper outlines the conditions to be met (stocks to be in place) before it can be used.
c) the request from the Chief of the Air Staff simple and without limitation for fighter units and Blenheim units to start using the 100 Octane. The Chief of the Air Staff doesn't ask permission from the Oil Committee which is headed up by a senior but junior to him Air Force Officer. In the the British Armed Forces orders from senior officers were and are still today, requests.
d) The Oil Committee getting this underway. The Magic 'Certain' word comes up at this stage. Do I wish he hadn't written certain, of course, but I believe that it will refer to the first instance i.e. the operational stations not all the stations in Fighter Command. But Please note, I knew that information would casue confusion and I could have left it out, but I didn't I gave all the information that I had to the forum.
d) A very clear path that shows without any ambiguity that all Blenheim units in No 2 Group had 100 Octane
e) Confusion in Fighter Command about the changes needed and the sorting out of those questions (Mr Tweedie)
f) The completion of the task by the oil committee and the note of thanks on the job done.ote that was all done by May. Even if there was a slight delay the BOB didn't start in anger until a few months later so time was on their side.
g) Finally we have in August permission given to use 100 Octane in all the commands.

re:

a, It actually say 18 + 2 Squadrons, until September 1940. Also that 800 000 tons of reserves need to be accumulated. In spring 1940 there were but 220 000 tons accumulated. Target was not met, period.
b, The document you speak of is a simply assessement of requirement. It mentions 21 Stations (out of ca. 60 operational in BoB).
Can you explain how these 21 Stations of December 1939 magically got 60 by July 1940? You have absolutely no evidence to that, in fact, you haven't find anything to prove your thesis.
c, It doesn't mention anywhere 'without limitation'. This is simply made up by you.
d, Given the lenght of discussion attached to it, you simply lie that the word certain only appeared in early 1940. It was present in all documents dealing with the subject. I've dealt with this in my earlier post, you've seen it, so stop lying.
e, You've got that right. Question arises though - if FC command did not even get the basics yet in spring of 1940, how would they plan for complete changeover - of which there's no sign yet in the papers..
f, All that was done by May is noting that select units were cleared for 100 octane used. You have admitted that nothing changed afterwards, it remained in use with select units.
g, Fuel consumption papers show the actual conversion process did not start until late September 1940.

All the above supported by consumption details, stock supplies, a good cross section of squadron notes, station notes and other documentation.

You have misquoted several papers as shown above and left out conviniently parts that did not fit your thesis.

As I said earlier, is it a perfect case no, but its a strong one with a lot of documentation to support it.

There is a case for select units being equipped in May 1940 with 100 octane fuel. There is no evidence for anything more.

YOU CANNOT DANCE AROUND THAT FACT, I am sorry.

What documentation have you got to say that 87 Octane was used in Operational missions during the BOB. None.

You keep asking that question, you keep answer, then you keep asking again. Who are you trying to bull here? Do you think if you ask the same question, all the uneasy evidence that were posted will just go away? Do you think that if you resort to Goebbels like tactics, repeating the same falsehood again and again, people will believe what you say? Is that the idea, David?

Can we say the complete file of these meetings, David? Why are you holding them back so fiercely? I think this is the best question in thread.

Some people doubt that all units didn't have 100 octane, so prove it, find any book, any article, any pilots story or other station record that says that.

It was already done. You own papers prove that 100 octane was issued to select units/stations. So what are you keeping arguing?

I will review Pps posting again with supporting docs as that seems to be key to the anti 100 Octane Brigade and then leave you to it. I can add nothing more.

Let me summarize what you have posted so far.

That as of May 18 1940, select Fighter and Bomber stations were supplied with 100 octane.
Despite numerous request, you have refused to show what has happened after May 1940, when Pips showed that the conversion stopped.
That in early August 1940 100 octane use was authorized for all aircraft.
That this wasn't even started to be implemented until late September 1940.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Glider

As mentioned before the first units started using 100 Octane in February not March. Document Attached.

Irrelevant.

As before this section I do fundamentally disagree with. In December 1939 stocks of 100 Octane were 202,000 tons, by May 1940 stocks were 294,000 tons and by August 1940 stocks were at 404,000 tons (documents are attached). We know that in June – August the average consumption was 10,000 tons a month (document attached).
The question I suggest we need to ask is If you have what is in effect a two and a half year stockpile, is this a strain, let alone a great strain on the stockpile. In my opinion it isn’t a strain at all, it’s barely noticeable

What you think is irrelevant again. The RAF considered 800 000 tons of reserves necessary, they had about 220-294 000 by the spring of 1940, and supply was uncertain.

At 10 000 tons per month consumption the storage would be enough for 20 months, but this is with about 25% of the fighters and some bombers running 100 octane.

Complete conversion would have meant the reserves would not be enough for more than about 5-6 months, running out by October.

Morgan and Shacklady in Spitfire the History also notes the concerns about supply, and the U boot thread. In fact up to that time about 300 000 tons of oil shipments were sunk by uboots and mines.

The British War Cabinet didn’t discuss 100 Octane at all in May and as a result no decisions were made. I spent a day in the NA going through all the papers for the meetings, the meeting notes and the actions resulting, and Fuel of any kind was not discussed. I should add that in May 1940 the War Cabinet met almost daily and it was a huge amount of paper, literally hundreds of sheets making it impossible to copy and post. Clearly as this wasn't discussed there were no actons or decisions made along this line.

David, can we see the post-May 18 decisions by the Oil Committee in their completeness?

The first part is correct, the first shipment from the middle East did arrive in August, however the rest is misleading. Numerous other tankers arrived from others parts of the world between May and August and stocks continued to increase . On July 11th stocks of 100 Octane were 343,000 tons as specified in the Narrow Margin page 87 (document attached).

So in end of April there were 294 000 tons, and some three months later in July there were some 40 000 tons more? What was the total monthly consumption again - 40-50 000 tons?

So in three months the equivalent of one months of supply arrived. Do we need to make even more clear why the British were concerned about a complete conversion to 100 octane?

This is clearly wrong In August 1940 permission was given for all commands to use 100 Octane in Operational aircraft. (Document attached)

There's nothing wrong with it. Pips says the RAF emberked again to 100 octane conversion in late September 1940. Fuel consumption shows exactly that. Of course they made decision earlier, in August, but things seem to have take some time in the RAF. Just consider they made decision about supplying 18 squadrons with 100 octane in March 1939 - and when this was realized..? In May 1940...



Noteworthy that the consumption remains pretty much the same between May (when select Fighter Squadrons converted) and late September 1940.

Now if someone could produce this and its supporting inforation then we would be in a good position.

I agree. At which point again I ask: why are you holding back the papers you have dealing with period Pips research covers?

I should point out that all my comments are supported by original documentation.

I should point out that all you comments are supported by misrepresentation of original documentation.

The posting isn't supported by anything. If the people working on the code base there scenario's on Pips posting as above, they have only themselves to blame if the adverse comments arrive.

From whom, the lone partisans in the woods..? What pips says competely agrees with all the present documents. What you keep saying rapes the same papers - after all come on, you say that of Fighter Command was using 100 octane, and all the papers you wave around say select/concerned/certain Squadrons...?!