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#1661
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This is from the Air Publication 129 Royal Air Force Flying Training Manual Part I - Landplanes; Revised June, 1940 (Reprint April 1941 incorporating A.L. No. 1), A.L. No. 2 from May 1941 is slipped in. Quote:
Last edited by 41Sqn_Banks; 05-16-2012 at 05:19 AM. |
#1662
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I doubt it would be just as likely. If you read the memorandum point one and two, "A recent increase in the number of engine failures, due to the failure of bearings, is an inication that some pilots are over-stepping the engine limitations laid down in the Pilot's handbook. 2. The use of the automatic boot cut out control enables the pilot to get an emergency boost of +12lbs per sq in. from the engine for 5 minutes when circumstances demand it. Some Pilots "pull the plug" with little excuse on every occasion." The wording of this memo suggest that the practice of exceeding the limits was quite widespread. Now if it was as you suggest a 50-50 chance of engine failure when the limits were exceeded then the culprits responsible for abusing their engines would be quickly identified and I expect grounded. The practice of exceeding the limits would only become common place if the pilots thought they could get away with it. Maybe thats why they put the wire seal on the boost control to make it obvious to the maintenance staff that it had been used. Then the pilot would have had to justify their use of boost after the mission. As long as they didn't overheat their engines and the correct fuel was used the boost control still limits the boost available to stop destructive pre-ignition and detonation as a cause of engine damage. (ie if you run the 12lb boost on 87 octane fuel you could get servere and possibly imediate damage from detonation, but not with 100 octane fuel.) So what was left was damage caused by accellerated wear on the engine that was "liable to manifest themselves on some subsequent occasion" http://www.spitfireperformance.com/dowding.pdf |
#1663
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Unles of course you can prove that they were not using the fuel which reminds me, to do that you need to prove which 16 squadrons or stations were using the fuel. Any update? I admit to not holding my breath |
#1664
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All frontline RAF aircraft were given a daily inspection whenever possible and this would be when any such issues were found and, if need be, notified in the aircraft's engine log. BTW Some might remember this thread? http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthread.php?t=20117 £74.50 for a copy of the Mk I Pilot's Notes from Kew? v $15.9 from http://www.flight-manuals.com/ap1565a-vol1.html Apart from these there don't seem to be many original Spitfire I Pilot's Notes available. Also note the Defiant used 100 octane and +12 lbs boost - the attachment is dated 24 5 (or 6?) 40 lower LH side Last edited by NZtyphoon; 05-16-2012 at 10:26 AM. |
#1665
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Unless, that is, you can find a memo or other such document stating, for example, that, until further notice, 87 Octane fuel will be used by the majority of the RAF's frontline fighters. Either that or find a list of units authorised to use 100 octane fuel, and/or an explanation of the logistical processes used by the RAF to ensure a limited supply of 100 octane directed at selected units or stations. |
#1666
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It shouldn't be that hard to identify those 16 squadrons should it Glider? ![]() |
#1667
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I concur that "Emergency 5 mins.max." on the Inspection and Test Certificates is related to "95°C" oil inlet temperature. Unfortunately I haven't seen a power curve for the Merlin III similar to the one you posted for another type. My understanding is that the power curve figures shown on the Inspection and Test Certificates were obtained through bench testing. In the case of N.3171 the engine Inspection and Test Certificate is dated 9-6-39 whilst N.3171's first flight occured on 10-11-39. The A.&.A.E.E. report on N.3171 notes: "The engine installed in the aeroplane develops slightly less power under test bed conditions than that in K.9793, the aeroplane fitted with the 2-pitch airscrew. This could have the effect of reducing the top level speed by about 2 m.p.h. "One can see that the power figures were not pulled from a chart given the differing powers obtained: K.9703 Inspection and Test Certificate |
#1668
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Overstress an engine and it might fail then and might fail later. The point being, it will fail and its life is significantly shortenend. That memo is telling the pilots of the RAF that reality. Overstress the motor and it will fail. There is a good reason why it was a requirement to log the use and have the motor inspected to ensure some reasonable life was left in it. |
#1669
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The 1937 RAF training manual amends the RAF old definitions for engine ratings. The only difference is the 1937 RAF Training Manual list's the system for take off purposes. Quote:
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#1670
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There you go, they are testing the engines on a bench at boost over-ride on 87 Octane. Everything in aviation related to the airworthiness is tightly controlled and must be specified. The Air Ministry documents the standards and conditions they expect their pilots to use down to the point of defining the standards they expect if a pilot violates the airworthiness standards in an life threatening emergency. The RAF instructs its pilots to balance and evaluate risk before taking the risk of moving outside of the airworthiness instructions. From 1937 on, they are able to use boost override. Without the specific mention of using +12, an anecdote that makes any reference to boost override, pulling the tit, boost cut out, or anything other term related to the system is irrelevant to the use of 100 Octane. |
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